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Abstract 
This thesis contributes to the theorization of the concept of the university and strives to 
imagine its future by bringing together particular threads within feminist and 
deconstructive thought. Through deconstructive textual analysis of three theoretical 
debates – on the disciplinarity of women’s studies, on resistance against the so called 
‘neoliberalization’ of the university, and on narratives of feminist studies – this study 
seeks to establish the theoretical ground necessary for generating a university beyond its 
phallocentric and neoliberal predicament. This attempt is conveyed under a heading 
‘tremendous pedagogies’. Part I discusses how the possibility of women’s studies can 
be further re-thought. This discussion triggers a critique of the discourses through which 
the current university is most commonly accounted for. Part II examines how 
deconstructive scholars theorize resistance to the so called ‘neoliberalization’ of the 
university. Here, the exploration proceeds through the word and the concept of 
‘accountability’. Finally, drawing form these insights, Part III examines how narratives 
of feminist studies can help us articulate premises under which a university and its 
future beyond its current ‘neoliberal’ and ‘phallocentric’ predicament can be made 
possible.
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Preface 
 
As with every journey, the one followed in this thesis began long before reaching its 
official starting point. It was underway and in motion before October 2012, when I 
enrolled on the PhD program in Cultural Studies at The School of Fine Arts, History 
of Art & Cultural Studies at the University of Leeds.  
I began to ask questions which, retrospectively, I would call feminist, as a 
teenager, as I tried to divert from the paths which already seemed set for me. I 
pursued the answers to those questions through drawing and painting and by 
developing my own art practice. Throughout my secondary education, I attended 
additional weekend courses where I learnt the basics of the techniques and 
technologies in visual arts. As part of this education I was also introduced to the 
Western canon of art history and began to familiarize myself with the codes and 
grammar of art’s contemporary forms and concepts. This field seemed to be one 
where I could develop my intellectual leanings, so I planned to go to a university and 
study fine arts. My future steps were not clear, but, perhaps, I could become an art 
teacher in one of the schools in a city near my home town in the southern part of the 
Czech Republic.  
The first steps were soon taken. In 2003, after finishing secondary school, I 
began an undergraduate programme in art education in a city across the country 
from our town. Coming to the university felt incredibly exciting and liberating. It 
was an opportunity to explore and learn more about things I was beginning to be 
passionate about and an opportunity to be surrounded and supported by people who 
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would share similar interests and who could open new intellectual horizons for me. 
The possibilities for me felt infinite. An artist? An art teacher? A bohemian art shop 
owner in the romanticised south of Spain? Every door seemed open for me.  
That was, at least, what I imagined. The reality was, as a matter of course, 
quite different. Although I signed up for ‘Spanish Language for beginners’, I only 
rarely made it to the 8am classes. I stopped attending after a few months. But it was 
not only the lack of commitment and dedication on my part which narrowed my 
view and my visions for the future. Very early on I became aware that my 
educational environment was structured by various hierarchies and power relations 
which were only rarely reflected or even recognized as such. Those in the 
educational institution I was part of - to my surprise and against my expectation - did 
not share my passion and did not challenge or even wish to challenge institutional 
inequalities across the axes of age, class, gender and race. The lack of commitment 
to engage with how different people experience and inhabit this world was also 
reflected the content of my education. Thus, for instance, although feminist 
scholarship had proliferated across various disciplines, and gender and feminism 
related courses had been taught in the Czech Republic by that time, feminist 
critiques were rarely reflected in this artistic and academic community.1  
Mentions of men’s and women’s different position in society, whether in 
relation to art, scholarship, pedagogy or policy, almost always strictly followed 
discourses carried by the mainstream media and the Czech intellectual and political 
elites which dismissed or mocked both feminism and the women’s movement. Most 
                                                 
1 The Center for Gender Studies, as an independent academic site, has been established in Charles 
University in Prague in 1998, the undergraduate gender studies course in Masaryk University in Brno 
in 2004. The Master degree in Gender Studies in Charles University in Prague was established also in 
2004. ‘Speciál O OBORECH: Gender studia’, Vysokéškoly.cz < 
http://www.vysokeskoly.cz/clanek/special-o-oborech-gender-studia> [accessed 20 January 2017]. 
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commonly, feminism was portrayed as an artificial import from the ‘oversensitive’ 
West which was depicted as over-occupied with political correctness. Within this 
framework, feminism was represented as a powerful lobby which sought to impose 
new regulations and control and introduce agendas considered foreign to Czech 
tradition. Simultaneously, however, the emphasis feminism puts on solidarity and 
collective action, were not welcome for another reason. The insight that 
discrimination against women does not happen only on an individual level but 
structures legislation, media, education or intimate relations, and therefore also must 
be addressed on a collective and structural level, made feminism resemble another 
‘movement’ ending with ‘–ism’, the condemned ‘communism’. Represented as 
communism’s kin, feminism seemed to oppose the key aspirations of the time, the 
development towards democratic and capitalist society and its exorbitant valuation 
and enforcement of individualism and free choice which dominated this post-
Communist and newly capitalist country after the ‘Velvet Revolution’ in 1989.2 
Feminism was thus depicted as being both too progressive and conversely too 
regressive. 
My disturbing feeling of ‘being in discord’ with what not only the 
mainstream media and cultural and intellectual scene but also most of my mentors, 
peers, friends and family thought about how society should and could work led me 
to seek different visions elsewhere, to ‘follow’ feminism to what seemed to be, from 
the Czech vantage point, its ‘proper’ place – to the ‘West’. In particular, it was my 
frustration with the lack of any critical discussion in the classrooms and more 
                                                 
2 For an analysis of how feminism and women’s movements were perceived in the Czech Republic 
after 1989 see Elzieta Korolczuka and Steven Saxonberg, ‘Strategies of Contentious Action: A 
comparative analysis of the women's movements in Poland and the Czech Republic’, European 
Societies 17 (2015), 404-422.  
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broadly with gender politics and the unquestioned racism directed at the Romani 
minority, which led me to pursue further education in the United Kingdom.  
Feminists in the UK might see it as an unlikely destination for one seeking an 
alternative to institutional sexism and widespread racism. However, in comparison 
to higher education in the Czech Republic, in British academia, feminist scholarship, 
research on women, gender, race and sexuality, are institutionally recognized as 
legitimate fields of inquiry and have a much longer institutional history alongside 
the problems they challenge. Moving from the Czech Republic to the United 
Kingdom also opened for me an opportunity to be surrounded by a community of 
friends, scholars, artists and activists, whose political and intellectual perspectives 
were not so fundamentally contradictory to mine. That was something I hadn’t had a 
chance to experience until then. Yet, as aptly described by scholars who reflect on 
feminism’s past and present entanglement with the universities in the UK or 
elsewhere in the so called ‘West’, and as I will also explore at length throughout the 
thesis, the situation is not as unambiguous in the British university and society as it 
might have seemed from the vantage point of a student in an Eastern European 
country. As Clare Hemmings and other feminist scholars before her have pointed 
out, despite feminism’s successes – or, as some believe due to feminism’s successes 
– instead of proliferating, feminist political and intellectual projects seem to be 
rather tolerated in the British university and cunningly put aside.3 
The perspectives I bring to this thesis were thus developed also along this 
intersection offered by the coupling of my origins in a ‘post-communist country’ 
with my new location in an established capitalist democracy. In Czech society 
                                                 
3 Clare Hemmings, Why Stories Matter: The Political Grammar of Feminist Theory (Durham & 
London: Duke University Press, 2011).  
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‘feminism’ would be seen as new, unnecessary and unwelcome. In the UK where 
feminism has long been part of higher education, the mainstream culture, however, 
can present it as old, past-its-prime, and claim that we live in ‘post-patriarchal’ age. 
Feminism can be seen to have become redundant and is therefore also, unwelcome. 
This, however, is not the only axis through which I approach the problems discussed 
in this thesis. There are two more ‘distortions’ which I would like to call upon. 
One of them is linguistic. Apparently, this thesis is not written in my mother 
tongue, that is, in Czech. Nor were most of the texts which I discuss throughout the 
following pages. Similarly, although I studied these texts mostly in English, some 
were originally written in French, German or Ancient Greek. This ‘linguistic 
distortion’, although on the one hand is undoubtedly limiting, on the other hand has 
also proven to be particularly useful during my wrestling with the problems pursued 
in this thesis. More specifically, ‘the problem of translation’, which I come into 
contact with regularly, seems to me to be a productive way to grasp the issues 
pursued in the thesis – the theoretical, political and institutional aspects of my at 
once feminist and deconstructive reading of the university and the crossings between 
these unique contexts, modalities and interventions. This ‘methodology’ gains a 
particularly significant role and charge when we take into account the context of 
‘globalisation and virtualisation’, where terms and concepts seem to, as I argue in 
the thesis following work by Joan Scott and Anne Berger ‘travel without translation’ 
and thus tend towards homogenization and unification.4 Hence, I also understand 
‘translating’ as a practice which seeks to resist this trend and, instead, promotes 
plurality and heterogeneity not only in ‘intellectual’ or ‘scholarly’ senses but also as 
                                                 
4 Anne E. Berger, ‘Gender Springtime in Paris: A Twenty-First-Century Tale of Seasons’, differences 
27 (2016), 1-26 (p. 10); Joan Scott, ‘Gender: Still a Useful Category of Analysis?’, Diogenes 57.1. 
(2010), 7-14 (p. 13). 
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a political aim. For me, additionally, ‘translation’ also includes the question of 
‘transmitting’ and ‘transferring’ and thus pedagogy and education. The ‘linguistic’ 
aspect, as already apparent, in my understanding, goes far beyond what we 
traditionally grasp as something related to language understood as a means of 
communication by written or spoken words.  
Finally, another significant distortion which forms the way I approach my 
questions comes from my educational journey which, as already indicated, has been 
from the very start closely related to visual art. I began my studies in an art-teaching 
undergraduate programme in a university situated in one of the most economically 
deprived parts of the country. Later on, and after several unsuccessful attempts, I 
was finally accepted to a fine art school, an academic field highly competitive and 
still considered very prestigious in the Czech Republic.  
I was made acutely aware of the effects of the binary ‘gender divide’ which 
privileges those considered men over those perceived as women, in every aspect of 
my studying. It struck me immediately that I had become a part of what Adrianne 
Rich would call the ‘man-centred university’ which was ‘a breeding ground not of 
humanism, but of masculine privilege’.5  Only a brief look around lecture theatres 
and art studios confirmed that becoming an artist would not be an easy path: in the 
art-teaching program, although attended almost exclusively by women, most of the 
lecturers were men. In the fine art schools, which focused on the training of 
professional artists rather than art teachers, the ratio between the number of men and 
women students was more or less equal. The professors were, however, apart from a 
few exceptions, again only artists who were men.6  
                                                 
5 Adrianne Rich, ‘Toward a Woman-Centred University’, in On Lies, Secrets, and Silence: Selected 
Prose, 2nd edn. (New York & London: W. W. Norton & company, 1995) pp. 125-156 (p. 127). 
6 The disproportion between staff who were almost exclusively men and students who in majority 
were women, was, I believed, a problem specific to fine art education in the Czech Republic. This 
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Experiences of sexist behaviour were common in both art-teaching 
programmes and fine art schools. Women students were daily exposed to crude 
jokes, intimidation, patronising treatment, humiliation and abuse. It wasn’t 
uncommon that teachers or administrators abused their position of power especially 
in relation to students’ access to resources, assessment and evaluation. Of course, 
one might object that this could have happened in any field of study, in any 
university department in higher education. And, I suppose, women who studied in 
Czech universities would testify that it often did. Education which is in any way 
related to what we call ‘creative arts’ (such as visual arts, music or literature), 
however, proved to be a privileged site in this respect. These educational scenes 
seem to be further distorted by their ‘objects’ of study – by what we call ‘creative 
arts’.  
That there is something particular about the relation of literature, music or 
visual arts to education has been argued by many scholars. A scholar in French and 
comparative literature, Peggy Kamuf, who also works across the two ‘schools’ I 
situate myself within - deconstruction and feminist theory – makes a similar point. 
Kamuf argues that literature and the teaching of literature, much like my 
interpretation of visual art, has a particular relationship to the university. As Kamuf 
explains in her book The division/of literature or the university in deconstruction 
from 1997, the reason for this is because the question that literature poses to the 
university - ‘what do we teach as literature?’ – is ‘touching upon some essential 
foundation of the university institution’. In other words, literature ‘is a question 
                                                 
demographic feature, to my surprise, however turned out to characterize the fine art department of the 
University in the UK I am a part of now. 
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posed to the possible limits of this institution, that is, to the definition of what is and 
what is not to be comprehended within that institution’s determination of itself’.7   
Kamuf understands ‘literature’ as a division or divisionality. This potential 
is, as she argues, preserved or embodied in the institution of literature and its 
teaching. Teaching literature therefore represents ‘an open set, and, thereby, the 
opening beyond itself, beyond the self’.8 Because of this peculiar character, literature 
and its teaching(s) are, on the one hand, experienced as threatening to the identity of 
educational institutions. Yet, on the other hand, it is literature and the teaching of 
literature which, according to Kamuf, represents a chance of the university’s 
transformation. It makes the university, as she argues, ‘open to the transformations 
of a future’: 
 
with the question of literature’s institution, a space may be opened up for the 
remaking of institutionality in general, a space that is neither inside nor 
outside some pre-given (instituted) boundaries.9 
  
As I see it, this interpretation can also apply to fine art education. One of the ways in 
which this ‘divisional’ potential manifested itself in the institutions where I studied 
was their relentless refusal to conform to the university and its orthodoxies. Fine Art 
departments did not follow university doctrines. There was no systemic induction 
and pedagogical encounters did not follow conventions characteristic of the 
academic environment. The departments did not have fixed guidance for assessing 
students’ work, clearly defined programs of study, or criteria for students’ admission 
                                                 
7 Peggy Kamuf, ‘Introduction/Catachresis and Institution’, in The Division / Of Literature: or the 
University in Deconstruction (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1997), pp. 1-40 
(p. 3). 
8 Kamuf, ‘Introduction/Catachresis and Institution’, p. 7. 
9 Kamuf, ‘Introduction/Catachresis and Institution’, p. 4. 
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to study programs. My first impression of the overall mood in the schools would 
suggest that it was very relaxed. For instance, the encounters with teachers such as 
consultations, tutorials, seminars, or even examinations, took place in the pub. The 
art departments’ non-conformist approach also impacted the accessibility of this 
education. It opened the university to students who would otherwise struggle to gain 
a university degree. It provided access to education for people who, owing to various 
reasons ‘did not fit’, and would otherwise have no chance of being accepted to any 
other university program.  
Art schools thus did - in many respects - feel like an ‘open set, as an opening 
beyond itself and the self’ which was remaking the space of education and art 
beyond pre-given boundaries as Kamuf describes it. Practices and ideas could be 
developed which were impossible to pursue in any other department of higher 
education across the country. This was not only in art practice, but also regarding all 
methods and objects of teaching, and ‘institutionality’ across the curriculum. Art 
schools were places which in many ways acted as a counter-force against the 
university establishment, as a maverick which resisted orthodoxies, normativity, 
disciplining, as a free creative place where ‘civil disobedience’ or ‘dissidence’, 
creative and critical practice, could develop. It was a gap, an exception from the 
(educational) system, a deviation from the norm, which resisted being ‘quantified’ 
by university measures and which provided room for experimentation in art as well 
as life.  
However, as I described earlier, the experience of being an art student 
distorted the optimism of this picture. Although the questions art and its teaching 
posed to the university did ‘touch upon some essential foundation of the university 
institution’ in significant ways as described by Kamuf, it left certain questions 
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untouched and thus kept some parts of its ‘foundations’ firmly in place. There was 
another boundary which the division of art – despite its ubiquitous presence – did 
not see. Although art departments did question the possible limits of the university, 
this questioning seemed to harden another limit which the institution failed even to 
recognise as one. The possibility that through the question of art’s institution ‘a 
space may be opened up for the remaking of institutionality in general, a space that 
is neither inside nor outside some pre-given (instituted) boundaries’, was divided by 
another divide or a ‘cut’ – the gender dichotomy. 
To be clear, the art departments were not in accord with the ways in which 
gender binaries manifested themselves in the Czech mainstream culture and society 
of that time. It did not correlate with the gender roles and (hetero)normativity 
characterised by the majority of Czech society. Art students and art teachers were 
transgressing limits not only artistically but also in terms of traditional distribution 
of gender roles and sexuality. However, despite the exceptional gender-fluidity and 
the loosening of sexual norms – or, perhaps, because of it - sexism against women 
flourished extremely well in art schools. For women students, and particularly for 
those, myself included, who pointed at this ‘hidden limit’ of the seemingly otherwise 
‘limitless’ and transgressive art department, art’s institutionalization in the university 
felt like a dead end and not an ‘openness towards transformation of a future’.10  
Clearly, the creative arts, as Kamuf writes of literature, are not characterized 
only by their ‘openness’. It is not only the ‘“space” of the neither –nor, which is […] 
not marked out by spatial or conceptual boundaries’. Although literature or the fine 
art school may act ‘as a reserve in excess over its past or present institutions’, they 
                                                 
10 On the problem of how places which are in discord with and seek to challenge the status quo, not 
only artistically but, as Kamuf suggests, politically and institutionally, may in fact reproduce and 
harden that which they sought to oppose see Jo Freeman’s ‘The Tyranny of Structurelessness’. Jo 
Freeman, ‘The Tyranny of Structurelessness’, Berkeley Journal of Sociology 17 (1972-3), 151-164.  
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are, still, institutions.11 Just like the university, literature or fine art were founded in 
a particular cultural and historical context. They are, therefore, as Kamuf puts it, ‘the 
instituted name of a set of traditions, practices, conventions, and evaluations’.12  
The extreme form in which institutional sexism manifested itself in the 
Czech art schools was undoubtedly related to the way in which this specific quality, 
the so called ‘openness’, was translated in its institution. In other words, the reason 
institutional sexism thrived so well in this environment was related to the traditions, 
practices, conventions, and evaluations which dominated Czech art and art 
education.13  
As feminist scholars pointed out, although current Western art education 
proceeds in accordance with ‘post-’ or even ‘anti-’ modernism and thus has 
questioned some of the fundamental aspects of modernist and bourgeois concepts of 
art and artist, it is still dominated by this particular paradigm.14 As Griselda Pollock 
defines it, the modernist paradigm ‘celebrate[s] individualism by means of the idea 
of the self-motivating and self-creating artist who makes things which embody that 
peculiarly heightened and highly valued subjectivity’ and ‘whose works express 
both a personal sensibility and a universal condition’.15  The creative and 
independent individuality, furthermore, is not ‘gender neutral’ but a modernist 
                                                 
11 Kamuf, ‘Introduction/Catachresis and Institution’, p. 5. 
12 Kamuf, ‘Introduction/Catachresis and Institution’, p. 7. 
13 On an analysis of sexism in fine art school in Czech see Zuzana Štefková, ‘The East Side Story of 
(Gendered) Art: Framing Gender in Czech and Slovak Contemporary Art’, in Czech Feminisms: 
Perspectives on Gender in East Central Europe, eds. Iveta Jusová and Jiřina Šiklová (Bloomington & 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2016), pp. 247-269. 
14 See Pen Dalton. Pen Dalton, ‘Oedipal Dramas in Art Education’, The International Journal of Art 
& Design Education 18.3 (1999), 301-306.; The Gendering of Art Education: Modernism, identity 
and critical feminism (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2001); Griselda Pollock, ‘“Art, Art 
School, Culture: Individualism after the death of the artist” (1985)’, in Feminism-Art-Theory: An 
anthology 1968-2000, ed. Hilary Robinson (Malden & Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2001), pp. 131-
139;  Griselda Pollock, ‘Then and now: what difference does difference make?’, Arts & Education 7 
(2015). 
15 Griselda Pollock, ‘“Art, Art School, Culture: Individualism after the death of the artist” (1985)’, in 
Feminism-Art-Theory: An anthology 1968-2000, ed. Hilary Robinson (Malden & Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2001), pp. 131-139 (p. 133). 
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paradigm which ‘celebrate(s) the great and creative as an exclusively masculine 
attribute. Man is an artist tout court’.16 
Pollock’s analysis of the art schools in the United Kingdom which was first 
published in 1985 closely corresponds with the situation of art departments in the 
Czech Republic as I remember it. The imperatives of modernism were critically 
reflected by the more ‘progressive’ or ‘open-minded’ pedagogues and students (most 
commonly pedagogues and students who were women). Also, the names of critical 
thinkers such as Michel Foucault, Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida or even Judith 
Butler and Linda Nochlin were referenced in conversations and taught in seminars. 
However, the modernist paradigm of the artist as a supreme, independent, ‘gifted’ 
male individual, someone detached from its enabling conditions, a self-created 
‘Master’, hadn’t been challenged in any significant way and still ruled supremely 
over the education of future professional artists and art teachers. The ‘new’ critical 
and ‘postmodern’ approaches were, in fact, accommodated by this modernist 
discourse. The challenges they raised were interpreted as the contradiction between 
artistic generations which is an idea central to the modernist conceptualization of art 
progression as overcoming ‘ancestors’ by the young radical and rebellious 
generation of (male) artists.  
The modernist paradigm of art and artists seemed to be further strengthened 
in the context of the Czech Republic in two particular ways. Firstly, the definitions 
of the artist as an independent, individual radical force correlated with the values 
which dominated the political and cultural climate of that time. As I alluded to 
above, after the ‘Velvet Revolution’ in 1989, the key aspiration was that 
Czechoslovakia was to move from totalitarian communism to democratic and 
                                                 
16 Pollock, ‘“Art, Art School, Culture’, p. 131. 
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capitalist society. This shift was understood not only as a shift from totalitarianism 
to democracy, from socialism to capitalism, but also as a shift from ‘collectivism’ to 
‘individualism’. The understanding of the artist as a self-motivating and self-creating 
individual independent from his surrounding, who expresses his subjectivity through 
art, correlated well with the supreme individualism of a businessman or a consumer 
free to express himself or herself on the new capitalist market. Nor was the revolt 
against ‘norms’ and ‘normativity’ performed by artists directed against the actual 
(capitalist) establishment. Rather, most of the art scene which felt driven to 
politically-engaged themes or topics joined the new ruling classes in their attacks 
against the values associated with the previous regime. By proxy, these artists also 
attacked feminism which, as described above, was portrayed by the media and the 
political and intellectual representation as communism’s ‘ally’ or a ‘descendant’.  
The institutional sexism of art education was further strengthened by a 
second factor, the structural organization of art education. In the Czech Republic, 
fine art departments, or fine art academies, are divided into ‘ateliers’ (workshops or 
studios) where a small number of students study under the supervision of a principle 
master artist, a professional painter, sculptor or new media artist. Although ateliers 
are divided and officially named according to the various artistic media (e.g., 
‘Atelier of Painting’ or ‘Atelier of Video Art’), and the students receive training in 
the skills and techniques in that particular medium, it is the persona of the master, 
the artist-pedagogue, which epitomized the atelier’s raison d'être.17  
Surely, a formative encounter with a strong and mature creative individuality 
was something we all longed for during our studies. This encounter, however, was 
                                                 
17 To the question ‘In which atelier do you study?’ a student would not answer ‘the studio of painting’ 
but with the name of master of the studio.  
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set up in the context of a hierarchical paternalistic pyramidal structure, where 
everyone was subordinate to this single authority. An affiliation with an atelier 
therefore meant much more than just studying one artistic medium or another. After 
being selected by the pedagogue-artist in an interview, one became a disciple, a 
member of an enclosed and close-knit camp which embraced the views of its master. 
This resulted in antagonisms with other camps at the school, a rivalrous relationship 
with the other students in the atelier and competition with the master himself. This 
pedagogical scene thus animated - ‘in flesh’ - the model of artistic progression 
through contestation and overcoming of previous generations, the battle between 
‘the father’ and the ‘sons’.18 
According to feminist theorist Joan Copjec, discipleship is based on the 
‘Oedipal battle’ between masters and disciples where men occupy both sides of this 
transference. The model of discipleship does not react to sexual difference but rather 
is founded on its exclusion.19 This educational model thus, undoubtedly, might be a 
‘spur to creativity and intellectual development’. However, as Mignon Nixon adds in 
her study of art discipleship, it works only ‘for boys’.20 For women, ‘who would 
occupy the role of disciple, the position of the surrogate daughter is very far from 
that of the surrogate son, whose rebellion is the proof and fulfilment of the 
patriarchal bond’.21   
As already suggested, in the case of art education, the model of discipleship 
is further complicated by its ‘object’; art. In the modernist paradigm, art is 
                                                 
18 It seems little may have changed since I studied Fine Art Higher Education in the Czech Republic. 
See a video produced by a women collective which calls themselves ‘Čtvrtá vlna’ [The Fourth Wave] 
published in January 2017: Čtvrtá vlna, ‘Sexismus na českých uměleckých školách’ [‘Sexism in 
Czech Fine Art Schools’], https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IalaPTetZig [accessed 21 January 
2017]. 
19 Joan Copjec, ‘Transference: Letters and the Unknown Woman’, October 28 (1984), 60-90 (p. 76). 
20 Mignon Nixon, ‘Discipleship: Deference and Difference’, in Fantastic Reality: Louise Bourgeois 
and a Story of Modern Art (Cambridge & London: The MIT Press, 2005), pp. 13-53 (p. 26). 
21 Nixon, ‘Discipleship’, p. 25. 
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understood as the expression of masculine creative subjectivity. Modernist artists, 
however, also appropriate and identify themselves with features attached to idealized 
femininity. This is what Nixon shows with her study of the surrealist movement. 
Surrealists celebrated ‘hysteria’ as a ‘sign of forbidden desire’, as a ‘source of 
inspiration and a model of creative expression’. As she further points out, it is, 
however, 
 
one thing to identify, as an artist, with the hysteria of the other, as the male 
surrealists did: to turn hysterical might feel exciting or terrifying, liberating or 
rebellious. It is something else to lay claim, as a ‘woman artist’, to the hysteria 
that is culturally synonymous with being a woman.22  
 
In the art schools where I studied, discontent and protesting actual women were not 
perceived as artists with access to ‘sources of inspiration’ or ‘creativity’. Nor was 
the rebellion against paternal authority of art students who were women understood 
as a legitimate way of forming their artistic identity. These art students were, on the 
contrary, seen as immature, ungrateful, or, eventually, immoderately ambitious 
‘daughters’.  
In such an environment, becoming a woman artist was almost impossible as 
was creating relationships with other artists and art students. The idea that one would 
have something in common with someone else usually made the situation even 
worse for these students. It marked them as dependent and weak, and thus only 
confirmed the established assumption that they do not meet the requirements of a 
strong, self-determined creative individuality characteristic of ‘real’ – that is ‘man’ - 
artists.  
                                                 
22 Nixon, ‘Discipleship’, p. 32. 
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Similarly, attempts to create a space where the issues of what a ‘woman 
artist’ might be (or might become), and how her education might look, a space 
where these questions could be asked, thematised and discussed, was perceived as a 
threat to the foundations of the art school. Such art practices, were, however, not 
recognized as an opening beyond pre-given boundaries of art, art education and the 
society. They were simply not recognized as art practices. They were excluded from 
the realm of art and defined as art’s other, as ‘mere’ theory or politics or, even, they 
were sometimes declared to be an expression of militant and dangerous ideologies. 
My own art practice usually received such responses from my tutors and peers. My 
project ‘How to Become a Woman Artist?’ which aimed to problematize the 
institutions of art education and art, was particularly unwelcome. An attempt to 
problematize the question of how woman can become an artist raised very hostile 
reactions from administrators, some art-pedagogues and men studying in my art 
school.23 
To conclude, I want to highlight that my experience of studying to become a 
‘woman artist’ made me aware that what might seem transformative may actually 
entrench patterns and modes of thinking. Surely, self-proclaimed radicality, such as 
that of ‘modernist artists’, doesn’t suffice to exempt one from the most entrenched 
biases and assumptions. More fundamentally however, trying to create any work 
which would be artistically, intellectually and also politically transformative, is an 
                                                 
23  The art project ‘Feminist Action Research – How to Study to Become a Woman Artist?’ was my 
MA dissertation project at the Faculty of Fine Arts, Brno University of Technology in 2010. I wrote 
and interpreted the situation in two texts: ‘Feministický Akční Výzkum – Jak studovat na umělyni’ 
[‘Feminist Action Research – How to Study to Become a Woman Artist?’], in Vizuální Gramotnost, 
ed. by Katarína Přikrilová (Praha: Univerzita Karlova v Praze, 2010), pp. 61-75; and ‘Negativita ve 
studování na umělecké škole’ [‘Negativity in Studying in the Art School’], Sociální studia 3 (2012), 
51–64. 
   
 
17 
 
endeavour which cannot be guaranteed despite one’s good intentions, politics and 
ideals.  
When, from this vantage point, I look back to my project ‘How to become a 
woman artist?’, I see that what I hoped for in fine art was not very dissimilar from 
the potential to intervene which Kamuf sees in literature. I wanted to question the 
limitations and dominant definitions which constrain what the university, art, and 
teaching art are and could be. As a way of becoming an artist, I wanted to question 
the ‘possible limits of … institution, that is, the definition of what is and what is not 
to be comprehended within that institution’s determination of itself’. I wanted to 
make these institutions, as Kamuf would put it ‘open to the transformations of a 
future’, to open a space ‘for the remaking of institutionality in general, a space that is 
neither inside nor outside some pre-given (instituted) boundaries’.24  
In that time, however, I did not know about Peggy Kamuf and her work. 
Those who were accompanying me in my educational journey at that time, likewise 
did not interpret my art project as an attempt to open art and education beyond pre-
given boundaries.  
It became clearer that my questions therefore applied beyond their initial 
limits, they could not be solved locally, but spread outwards instituationality itself, 
to the university as a whole and down to its very foundations.  
Perspectives, however, do shift and change and there is a chance to intervene 
and distort the paths which have been prescribed to us. It is the belief in the 
possibility of influencing them which has led this project from its very beginning, 
slowly away from those initial paths and towards encounters which unfold, for me, 
the intricacies of the university and visions of its future. 
                                                 
24 Kamuf, ‘Introduction/Catachresis and Institution’, p. 4. 
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Introduction - Mapping Tremendous 
Pedagogies 
This thesis contributes to the theorization of the concept of the university and strives 
to imagine its future by bringing together particular threads within feminist and 
deconstructive thought. Through deconstructive textual analysis of three theoretical 
debates – on the disciplinarity of women’s studies, resistance against the so called 
‘neoliberalization’ of the university, and narratives of feminist studies – the study 
seeks to establish the theoretical ground necessary for generating a university 
beyond its phallocentric and neoliberal predicament. This attempt is conveyed under 
a heading ‘tremendous pedagogies’.1  
  The combination of these two words, which themselves proliferate with 
multiple meanings, can be interpreted in various ways.2 In this thesis, however, the 
                                                 
1 The idea of ‘tremendous pedagogies’ was inspired by Joan Scott’s phrase ‘fantasy echo’. Scott 
employs this phrase in order to intervene in feminist historiography. As she explains, ‘fantasy echo’ is 
not a ‘technical term’ but ‘could become one of those clever formulations that also does useful 
interpretative work’. Joan W. Scott, ‘Fantasy Echo: History and the Construction of Identity’, Critical 
Inquiry, 27.2 (2001), 284-304 (p. 284-5).  
2 The adjective ‘tremendous’ comes from the Latin word tremendus, a gerundive of tremĕre which 
means to shake, quake or tremble. The word ‘tremendous’, which appeared in English in the 
seventeenth century, thus first designated something that excites trembling, or awe, something 
dreadful, horrible, or astonishingly terrible. In the early nineteenth century, however, it gained 
meanings which we are more likely to associate with this word today. It is used hyperbolically or as 
an intensive. Thus, if we describe something as ‘tremendous’ it implies something which ‘excites 
wonder on account of its magnitude or violence’. The word ‘tremendous’ is used to describe 
something ‘outstanding, extraordinarily great or immense’, something which is excellent or 
remarkable, something exciting, wonderful, fantastic and exceptional; something that is beyond what 
is ordinary or usual. ‘Tremendous’, Oxford English Dictionary Online <http://0-
www.oed.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk/view/Entry/205497?redirectedFrom=tremendous#eid> [accessed 21 
January 2017]. The second word, ‘pedagogies’, is of multiple origins. It came to English through the 
old French word pédagogie, which means ‘instruction’ or ‘education’, and post-classical Latin, where 
the word paedagagia also designated ‘school’ or ‘college’. Unlike the word ‘trembling’, however, 
‘pedagogy’ is not originally Latin but comes from Greek (παιδαγωγία, paidagōgiā). Paidagōgiā is 
composed of two words. The one which forms its prefix, país, is a genitive of paidos meaning ‘child’. 
The word that forms the suffix of ‘pedagogy’, ‘agogy’, comes from agōgos, a reduplication of ago, a 
verb meaning to ‘lead’, ‘drive’, ‘bring’ or ‘carry’. The word ‘pedagogy’ thus literally means to ‘lead a 
child’. The suffix ‘-agogue’ indicates a person that leads or incites one to action and is also used in 
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phrase ‘tremendous pedagogies’ refers to the future of the university and its 
practices which do not yet exist but towards which this thesis aspires to contribute. 
Specifically, it is a development of Jacques Derrida’s theorization of a university of 
the world more just than the one we have inhabited, a ‘university-to-come’, which 
he envisions as a ‘university without condition’ and which he describes as ‘an 
ultimate place for critical resistance – and more than critical – to all the powers of 
dogmatic and unjust appropriation’.3   
 Taking ‘tremendous pedagogies’ as that which the work seeks to help make 
possible, the various readings presented in this thesis do not therefore deal directly 
with pedagogical practices, feminist or otherwise.4 Neither does the thesis explore 
the university directly via, for instance, historical analysis, through an examination 
of documents produced by universities’ management and policy-makers or 
ethnographic research.5 This work intervenes on a theoretical level, which is 
similarly necessary for any substantive contribution to the generation of the so called 
‘university-to-come’. 
                                                 
medicine where it indicates a substance that stimulates flow or secretion. Between the fifteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, and unlike today, the word ‘pedagogy’ was frequently used to name a place 
where instruction took place such as a school, college or university. Today, the word ‘pedagogy’ is 
used to designate instruction, discipline and training, or a system or a doctrine of introductory training 
and a means of guidance in both an educational and spiritual sense. Finally, the word ‘pedagogy’ is 
used to name ‘the art, occupation, or practice of teaching’, ‘the theory or principles of education’ or ‘a 
method of teaching based on such a theory’. ‘Pedagogy’, Oxford English Dictionary < http://0-
www.oed.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk/view/Entry/139520?redirectedFrom=pedagogy#eid> [accessed 21 
January 2017]. 
3 Derrida, ‘The Future of the Profession or the University without Condition (Thanks to the 
“Humanities,” What Could Take Place Tomorrow)’, in Jacques Derrida and the Humanities, ed. by 
Tom Cohen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 24-57 (p. 26). 
4 See bell hooks, Teaching to Transgress: Pedagogy as a Practice of Freedom (New York and Oxon: 
Routledge, 1994); bell hooks, Teaching Community: A Pedagogy of Hope (New York and London: 
Routledge, 2003); Paolo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 
1973). 
5 See Christopher Newfield, Unmaking the Public University: The Forty-year Assault on the Middle 
Class (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2008). For a feminist ethnography of 
academia see Maria do Mar Pereira, Power, Knowledge and Feminist Scholarship: an ethnography of 
academia (London and New York: Routledge, 2017). 
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 Likewise, the theoretical discussions of the three themes – the disciplinarity 
of women’s studies, resistance to the ‘neoliberalization’ of the university, and 
narratives of feminist studies – in the subsequent chapters, do not aim to provide an 
exhaustive overview of the vast and diverse engagements, which have developed 
within feminist and critical theory towards these themes. Rather, the study seeks to 
contribute to the current debates by performing deconstructive textual close reading 
of groups of significant writing on each topic.  
 The corpus of texts examined in the subsequent chapters have been selected 
on two grounds. First, the works examined in this thesis focus on a particular issue 
in relation to the university and feminist scholarship and, second, the texts employ 
textual and deconstructive analysis in order to examine this issue.6 Specifically, the 
thesis examines texts which engage with a question of the possibility and its 
correlate, impossibility, of constituting and maintaining an institutional space where 
free thinking and scholarship can develop. One of the arguments made in this thesis 
is that the question of the possibility/impossibility of such a space does not only 
characterize texts produced in one particular academic field or in one historical 
moment. Yet, the decision to structure the study around the texts which thematise 
this issue has been made in response to a particular political, intellectual and 
institutional context. It was triggered by a proposition made by some feminist 
scholars who argue that feminists working within particular theoretical paradigms 
                                                 
6 The texts I examine all employ textual or deconstructive analysis, with the exception of the two 
texts which serve as a ‘springboard’ for it, namely the work by Wendy Brown and Bill Readings. 
Wendy Brown, ‘The impossibility of women’s studies’, in Women’s Studies on the Edge, Joan W. 
Scott, ed. (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2008), pp. 17-38; Bill Readings, The 
University in Ruins (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1997). 
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and in a particular historical moment have been reluctant to profess their faith or 
commitment to envision and strive for ‘better’ futures.7  
 Anne Berger, one of the feminist theorists who engages with this issue, 
argues that particularly within ‘America’ since 1990s,8 the focus of feminist 
scholarship either moved to different problems or ‘became intro-retrospective […] 
as we can see from countless talks and publications that thematize “after-ness” in 
various ways: the datedness, the posthumous character, but also the enduring if 
problematic legacy of women’s studies, gender studies, and their queer 
posteriority’.9 As a consequence, ‘American’ feminist theory has detached itself 
from  a ‘utopian impetus’ which other feminist intellectual and political traditions 
(particularly those related to the context of the 1970s, and continued and developed 
by scholars such as Drucilla Cornell or Elizabeth Grosz and many others), have 
considered to be ‘a necessary heuristic condition for theoretical and political 
progress’.10  
An example of a feminist account to which Berger may be referring is the 
introduction to the collection of essays Women’s Studies on the Edge by American 
                                                 
7 For more on this argument within feminist theory see, for instance, Clare Hemmings, Why Stories 
Matter: The Political Grammar of Feminist Theory (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 
2011), p. 139.  For similar argumentation within cultural theory and particularly Marxism see Nick 
Srnicek and Williams, Alex, Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and the World without Work 
(London and New York: Verso Books, 2015); Erik Olin Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias (London 
and New York: Verso Books, 2010).  
8 For Berger, what ‘America’ (and ‘Americanization’) signifies, is one of the questions at stake. As 
she explains in The Queer Turn in Feminism, ‘”America” … which I am speaking is not always or 
not merely a territorial entity with precise boundaries. It is also a cultural zone whose contours do not 
simply coincide with the geopolitical entity ‘United States’, it is a phantasmatic territory […] and it is 
a question of ‘vantage point’ (Anne E. Berger, The Queer Turn, p. 9). In ‘Gender Springtime in 
Paris’, Berger poses the question whether ‘“Americanization”’ of the field [feminist scholarship, 
gender and women’s studies] amount[s] to a hegemonic and/or neocolonial pattern of extension’. 
(Anne E. Berger, ‘Gender Springtime in Paris: A Twenty-First-Century Tale of Seasons’, differences, 
special issue Transatlantic Gender Crossings, 27.2 (2016), 1-26, p. 8.    
9 Berger, The Queer Turn, p. 2. 
10 Berger, The Queer Turn, p. 129; Or, as Drucilla Cornell puts it, ‘without the aesthetic evocation of 
utopian possibility of feminine difference, we are left with the politics of revenge … feminism 
becomes another power-seeking ideology, a reversal that inevitably reinstates the old economy’. 
Drucilla Cornell, Beyond Accommodation: Ethical Feminism, Deconstruction and the Law (London 
and New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 185. 
   
 
22 
 
feminist theorist and historian Joan Scott. In this text, Scott both enacts and critiques 
this detachment when she argues that the 1980s felt like ‘amazingly productive and 
exciting years’ while, in the following decade and particularly on the eve of the new 
century, ‘the sense of open-ended, utopian possibilities was fast disappearing’.11 
Although, as Scott continues, gender stereotypes had been to a large extent 
undermined and women were granted access to professional careers and experiences 
once closed to them, this progress, which is largely a result of the women’s 
movement and feminist struggles, had nonetheless become detached from feminism. 
Scott therefore argues that within U.S. academia and in society at large, for more 
than twenty years we have been witnessing ‘the turn away from feminism’.12  
Among the factors that caused this shift Scott enumerates the worldwide 
success of neoliberalism, which, on the level of the university, is characterized by 
the restructuring of universities’ namely,  
 
the turn to corporate models of administration and governance; […] 
redefinitions of ideas as commodities and of students as fee-paying clients; the 
substitution of vocational ends for humanistic ones; and the emphasis on 
acquiring factual information rather than learning to think critically.13  
 
Scott stresses that the effects of this development have not only performed some 
‘cosmetic changes’ to the facades of the universities. The marketization of higher 
education did not only eradicate some particular views and approaches from the 
university curricula but is attempting to wipe out the key defining feature of the 
                                                 
11Joan W. Scott, ‘Introduction: Feminism’s Critical Edge’, in Women’s Studies on the Edge, ed. by 
Joan W. Scott (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2008), pp. 1-13 (p. 3.). 
12 Scott, ‘Introduction’, p. 4.  
13 Scott, ‘Introduction’, p. 4. 
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modern university – its association with critique. Specifically, in relation to feminist 
scholarship, these changes have had crucial consequences for disciplines such as 
women’s studies. As one of the critical forces exposing the seeming neutrality and 
objectivity of knowledge production, women’s studies, as Scott argues, are currently 
under attack. 
This thesis shows that it is not only accounts by particular feminist theorists 
and historians in the U.S., like that of Scott, which became ‘intro-retrospective’. 
That Scott situates the alleged ‘turn away from feminism’ in the context of the 
university under neoliberalism, which is characterized by its corporatization and the 
commodification of knowledge, is demonstrative of this.14 As I will argue, 
discourses where ‘after-ness’ is being thematized as ‘the datedness’ and as a struggle 
with a problematic legacy of institutional forms also proliferate through and, in some 
cases, govern, discourses which account for the university as a whole.  
The proposition that the possibility and the impossibility of an institutional 
space where we could develop free thinking and scholarship relates to the problem 
and the tension between ‘the part’ (or ‘the particular’) and ‘the whole’ (or ‘the 
general’) is significant for this thesis. First, it is a pattern which structures the study: 
The first section discusses the problem of im/possibility in relation to a particular 
                                                 
14 Scott is not the only scholar who has taken account of and critiqued these changes. That something 
has been happening to the ‘value’ of and in higher education, and as I will discuss particularly in the 
second part of my thesis, has been voiced by many scholars and not only in the U.S. Particularly what 
is called the ‘corporatization’ of knowledge and the ‘marketization’ of higher education, the so called 
‘neoliberal university’, has been at the centre of the critiques conveyed by activists as well as critical 
theorists of the last three decades in countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom but also 
the Netherlands and South Africa. In relation to protest and activism see ‘Support the New 
University’, <https://www.change.org/p/university-of-amsterdam-executive-board-support-the-new-
university> [accessed 14 February 2017]; Gray, Jonathan, ‘Dutch student protest ignite movement 
against management of universities’, The Guardian, 17 March 2015, < 
https://www.theguardian.com/higher-education-network/2015/mar/17/dutch-student-protests-ignite-
movement-against-management-of-universities> [accessed 14 February 2017]; Reuters in 
Johannesburg, ‘South Africa: students attack police as protests over tuition fees escalate’, The 
Guardian, 4 October 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/04/south-africa-students-
attack-police-protests-tuition-fees-escalate> [22 March 2017].  
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discipline, women’s studies; the second section examines it in relation to the whole, 
the university; whereas the third section, returning to the particular again, (narratives 
of feminist studies), examines how re-configurations of this question can be 
generated within feminist thinking. Second, in this thesis, the issue of ‘the part’ and 
‘the whole’ is identified and examined as one of the key conceptual problems 
intrinsic to the way in which the question of the institutionalization of a space for 
free thinking and scholarship proceeds in the examined texts. Finally, the thesis 
proposes that oscillating between ‘the particular’ and ‘the general’, or ‘the singular’ 
and ‘the plural’, is to be used as a method which will help to re-constitute a belief 
that different and better worlds are possible. This is a belief from which, as Berger 
and others have argued, certain discourses within feminist and cultural theory have 
detached themselves. In other words, the thesis demonstrates that by keeping this 
tension open and unresolved, we can re-introduce ‘utopian impetus’ into the 
narratives about feminism’s academic institutionalization and the university. By 
doing so, this thesis aims to be both critical and constructive. This programme is 
reflected in the choice of texts examined, and in the methodology of the thesis.  
Methodology 
In order to gesture towards ‘tremendous pedagogies’, the thesis deploys 
deconstructive textual analysis. This methodological approach is both developed 
through and demonstrated in the three topics discussed in the subsequent chapters. 
Although deconstructive and textual analysis have been implemented by 
many scholars within feminist and cultural theory – and it is particularly these 
scholars whose work I focus on – this methodological approach is most commonly 
associated with the French philosopher Jacques Derrida. Derrida addressed the 
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problem of ‘tremendousness’ and ‘trembling’15 in relation to the methodological 
proceedings of deconstruction on several occasions. For instance, a term soliciter, 
from the Latin solicitare, meaning to shake or make tremble, appears in one of his 
early texts, the first chapter of Writing and Difference entitled ‘Force and 
Signification’.16 Similarly, it is not uncommon among scholars to describe and 
speculate on Derrida’s work or deconstruction and its effects as causing ‘trembling’ 
or ‘tremors’,17 as something that incites ‘shaking’ or ‘solicits-into movement’,18 as 
something that makes one ‘shiver’ or even ‘stutter’ or ‘stammer’.19 Most recently, 
David Wills has taken this route as a way of speaking about Derrida and 
deconstruction in his talk entitled ‘the Solicitation of Deconstruction (If I never see 
the English…)’.20 Kas Saghafi takes a comparable approach in his explorations of 
the theme of ‘remains’ in Derrida’s work.21  
However, my approach to deconstructive textual analysis is distinct from that 
which, as it seems to me, is the prevailing one among scholars. It is not only that 
                                                 
15 There is also a particular root to the usage of the term ‘trembling’ in relation to feminist thinking. It 
refers to Hélèn Cixous’ famous declaration ‘Let the priest tremble, we’re going to show them our 
sexts!’. Hélèn Cixous, Keith Cohen, Paula Cohen, ‘The Laugh of the Medusa’, Signs 1.4 (1976), 875-
893 (p. 885).  
16 Jacques Derrida, ‘Force and Signification’, in Writing and Difference (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1978), pp. 1-35 (p. 5); For more see Alan Bass, ‘Translator’s Introduction’, in Writing and 
Difference (London and New York: Routledge, 1978), pp. ix-xxiii; Sarah Wood: Derrida’s Writing 
and Difference: A Reader’s Guide (New York and London: Continuum, 2009); or David Wills, ‘The 
Solicitation of Deconstruction (If I never see the English …)’, paper presented at the 5th Derrida 
Today Conference, Goldsmiths, June 10 2016. One of the last lectures Derrida delivered was also 
devoted to the problem of trembling and was entitled ‘Comment ne pas trembler’ [‘How to Avoid 
Trembling?’], Annali: Fondazione Europea del Disegno (Fondation Adami) 2 (2006), 91-104. 
Furthermore, as I will discuss in the last part of the thesis, mysterium tremendum, which appears in 
one of the Heretical Essays by the Czech philosopher Jan Patočka, triggers Derrida’s deliberations on 
the problem of responsibility. Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death, trans. David Wills (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1995). 
17 Laurence Simmons, ‘Comment ne pas trembler?: Derrida’s Earthquake,’ SubStance, 42.3 (2013), 
28-45. 
18 Dawne McCance, ‘Mourning the Voice’, in Medusa’s Ear: University Foundings from Kant to 
Chora L (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004), pp. 1-26. 
19 Peggy Kamuf, ‘Accounterability’, Textual Practice 21.2 (2007), 251-266 (p. 253). 
20 David Wills, ‘The Solicitation of Deconstruction (If I never see the English …)’, paper presented at 
the 5th Derrida Today Conference, Goldsmiths, June 10 2016. 
21Kas Saghafi, ‘The Master Trembles: Sacrifice, Hierarchy, and Ontology in Derrida’s Remain(s)’, 
Derrida Today 9.2. (2016), 124-139.  
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such reading shakes the foundations of Western thinking by, for instance, showing 
that meaning is not one but always multiple. In my view, it embodies what John 
Mowitt calls ‘antidisciplinary potential’.22  
With regard to feminist scholarship, I understand deconstructive textual 
reading as being more than a useful ‘tool’ for tracing the diverse ways in which 
phallocentrism produces and sustains itself through unstable but still powerful 
dichotomies such as feminine/masculine, private/public, nature/culture or 
sex/gender.23 Following the feminist thinkers Drucilla Cornell, Elizabeth Grosz and 
Berger, I read deconstruction and Derrida’s work as deeply interested and 
profoundly invested in a better future, as work which strives to reinvent the world as 
more just than the one we are living in.24 In other words, deconstructive textual 
reading is one of the traditions which considers the ‘utopian impetus’ to be a 
necessary heuristic condition for political and intellectual progress. 
Simultaneously, however, as the thesis seeks to demonstrate, deconstructive 
textual analysis does not embrace ‘the utopian’ as conceived in ‘general’ or 
‘abstract’ terms or as something unrepresentable. Rather, it is a method which allows 
us to conceive of ‘the utopian’ in relation to particular ‘others’, and in relation to 
current political struggles. As such, deconstructive textual analysis allows, as 
Mowitt argues, to think through ‘how it may become possible to articulate in a fairly 
direct way the struggle over interpretation with the struggle to change the world of 
disciplinary power’.25  
                                                 
22 John Mowitt, Text: The Genealogy of an Antidisciplinary Object (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 1992), p. 14. 
23 For such an interpretation of Derrida’s work see, for instance, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 
‘Displacement and the Discourse of Woman’, in Feminist Interpretations of Jacques Derrida 
(Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), pp. 43-72. 
24 Drucilla Cornell, The Philosophy of the Limit (London and New York: Routledge, 1992); Elizabeth 
Grosz, ‘Derrida and Feminism: A Remembrance’, differences, special issue Derrida’s Gift, 16.3 
(2005), 88-94. 
25 Mowitt, Text, p. 46. 
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In the thesis, this method is employed in order to provide interpretations of 
the concept of the university which would allow for its remaking beyond its 
phallocentric and neoliberal predicaments. Practically, the thesis focuses on close 
examination of a limited number of texts and the examination of the flows and the 
patters of the structural organization of their argumentation and terminological 
choices. The ‘close reading’ or the ‘textual analysis’ which is deconstructive has a 
particular character: it allows for 1) the identification and the tracing of structural 
elements within the analyzed text without reducing the multiplicity of its meanings; 
2) the crossing of boundaries between different linguistic, epistemological and 
disciplinary registers; and 3) the development of interpretations which open 
possibilities for transformation within the work. The articulation and demonstration 
of these particular characteristics of deconstructive textual analysis can be 
considered to be the productive and concrete outcome of the thesis’ theoretical 
engagement with the question of the university.  
Chapter outline 
In this thesis, deconstructive textual analysis is employed on a limited number of 
theoretical texts which engage with the three following themes: the disciplinarity of 
women’s studies, the question of how can we resist the ‘neoliberalization’ of the 
university, and narratives of feminist studies. As it also follows from the 
methodological approach described above, the subsequent chapters do not aim to 
provide an exhaustive overview of theoretical approaches which have developed 
around these themes, but to closely examine groups of significant writings on each 
topic.  
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 The choice of the corpus of texts examined in this thesis is related both to 
theoretical and methodological concerns. As argued previously, the underlying link 
between the chosen texts is their focus on the question of the possibility and the 
impossibility of an institutional space for free thinking and scholarship. The second 
link is that these particular texts engage with this question through textual or 
deconstructive textual analysis, with the exception of two texts which serve as the 
ground for these readings.   
 The thesis is divided into three sections, which each consists of two chapters, 
a preface, an introduction and a conclusion. The rest of this introduction further 
develops on how the three themes are discussed in the thesis and introduces the 
corpus of texts examined in each of the three sections.  
The disciplinarity of women’s studies  
Examination of the theoretical debate on the disciplinarity of women’s studies 
follows a premise that certain ‘American’ feminists began to account for the past 
and the present of feminism and its emergent disciplinarity in a way which Berger 
describes as ‘intro-retrospective’. More specifically, this argument states that many 
contributions to the study of the institutionalization of women’s studies reflect on the 
impossibility of its institutional enterprise, and do not allow for theorization of the 
premises under which institutionalization of the field can be generated.26   My work 
seeks to contribute a particular perspective to this debate – a perspective which 
highlights that projects such as establishing a department of women’s studies are 
                                                 
26 Berger, The Queer Turn, p. 2. 
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anything but simple.27 In other words, I follow feminist theorists who identify the 
techniques through which the discourses that dominate the debate about women’s 
studies’ own emergent disciplinarity are secured and through which their status of a 
common sense is reproduced.28 These scholars embrace the institutionalization of 
feminist scholarship within academia as an inherently ambiguous process with 
diverse or even conflicted political, theoretical and institutional effects, and 
conceptualize academic feminism and its disciplinary forms as having irreducibly 
paradoxical identities. 29 
 Using feminism’s ‘identity paradox’ as a springboard, these interventions do 
not aim to create a metanarrative of feminism’s institutionalization within the 
establishment of Western higher education. Rather, they trace assumptions, fantasies 
and knowledge practices through which women’s studies’ scholars produce 
narratives about the emergent disciplinarity of their field. This is done in order to 
identify points of intervention through which these discourses can be transformed.  
 In order to productively develop this debate, I closely examine texts by two 
scholars who have significantly contributed to it - Wendy Brown and Robin 
Wiegman. Brown’s famous essay ‘The Impossibility of Women’s Studies’, first 
published in 1997, can be considered an example par excellence of the ‘intro-
retrospective’ mode many reflections within the discipline took in relation to its 
                                                 
27 Apart from being a general invitation to take past and present relationships of feminist scholarship 
to the university seriously and complicate the question of institutionalization of feminism in 
academia, this proposition is also a particular reference. It echoes and tributes Ewa Ziarek’s insightful 
reading of the famous seminar regarding Jacques Derrida ‘Women in the Beehive’ which Ziarek 
presented in LGS Summer Academy as the Pleshette de Armitt memorial lecture. While extensively 
drawing from Derrida’s works, Ziarek nonetheless also questions Derrida for not paying enough 
attention to the particular and complex event of ‘instituting women’s studies’ with his suggestion that 
one has to ‘do more than simply institute a department of Women’s Studies’, an assumption which, as 
Ziarek showed, then haunts Derrida throughout the rest of the conversation. Ewa Ziarek, ‘Reframing 
the Law: Derrida, Women’s Studies, Intersectionality’. philoSOPHIA 7.1. (2017), 79-89. 
28 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 20.  
29 Scott, ‘Introduction’, p. 13. 
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institutional enterprise. In the thesis, the close reading of this essay serves as an 
introduction to the debate and a starting point for its critical and constructive re-
reading. Further discussion relies on and develops work by Wiegman. Wiegman has 
been continually reflecting on the problem of how scholars theorize the 
institutionalization of women’s studies in the U.S. since the late 1990s through 
various articles and book chapters.30 There are two main reasons why Wiegman’s 
work is central for my explorations. First, Wiegman examines the proceedings and 
effects of works produced by scholars who reflect on the emergent disciplinarity of 
women’s studies. By closely examining the flows and the patterns of the structural 
organization of the argumentation, Wiegman identifies the techniques through which 
the discourses (that according to her dominate the debate) are secured and 
reproduced. The second reason why I decided to focus particularly on Weigman’s 
work is related to the way in which she conveys her close examinations. Although 
Wiegman does not describe her methodological approach as ‘deconstructive textual 
analysis’, the proceedings and aims of her approach are very close to the method 
which this thesis both employs and develops. More specifically, similarly to 
deconstructive textual analysis, Wiegman does not take an ‘oppositional’ approach 
towards the texts she examines. Rather, working from ‘within’ these texts, she seeks 
to offer their transformative re-reading, to read the possibility into the impossibility 
                                                 
30 These articles include: Robyn Wiegman ‘Feminism, Institutionalism, and the Idiom of Failure’, 
differences, 11.3 (1999), 107-136; ‘Feminism’s Apocalyptic Futures’, New Literary History 31.4 
(2000), 805-825; ‘Academic Feminism Against Itself’, NWSA Journal, 14.2. (2002), 18-34; ‘On 
Being in Time with Feminism’, Modern Language Quarterly, 65.1 (2004), 161-176; ‘The Possibility 
of Women’s Studies’, in Women’s Studies for the Future: Foundations, Interrogations, Politics, ed. 
by Elizabeth Lapovsky Kennedy and Agatha Beins (New Brunswick and London: Rutgers University 
Press, 2005), pp. 40-60. Wiegman returned to Brown’s article also in her book Object Lessons 
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2012). She has also been an editor of volumes 
concerning the disciplinarity of women’s studies: Robyn Wiegman and Diane Elam, eds. Feminism 
Beside Itself (New York and London: Routledge, 1995); Robyn Wiegman, ed., Women’s Studies on 
Its Own (Durham and London: Duke University, 2002).   
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of women’s studies. By doing so, she seeks to allow for imagining feminism’s 
‘future to be other than what we think it was or what we assume we now are’.31  
 Two propositions emerge as an outcome of Wiegman’s work in relation to 
‘reading the possibility into the impossibility of women’s studies’. First, she calls for 
fostering a radical relationship to the future through re-cultivating feminist utopian 
thought and, second, she argues for a deeper consideration of knowledge practices 
within the university as a whole. The rest of the first section and the second section 
of this thesis develop the latter named concern.  
 The discussion of the university proceeds in a way similar to that concerning 
the disciplinarity of women’s studies. As a starting point, I introduce and closely 
examine a discourse on the university that Wiegman herself relies on, Bill Reading’s 
influential book The University in Ruins published in 1997.32 My examination of this 
work however demonstrates that the structural organization of Readings’ 
argumentation proceeds in a vein similar to Brown’s account of women’s studies 
and as such leads towards similar ends. I therefore propose we approach the 
university through paradigms which conceptualize the university differently, namely 
through deconstruction.  
 Throughout the thesis, when I focus on investigation of the university as a 
whole, I thus specifically examine and rely on works by scholars working within 
deconstruction, with the exception of Readings’ text, which provides the ground for 
the development of my deconstructive textual reading. In the first section of the 
                                                 
31 Wiegman, ‘On Being in Time’, p. 167. 
32 Bill Readings, The University in Ruins (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 
1997). For other works focusing on the problem of the university which follow different theoretical 
traditions than deconstruction see Henry, A. Giroux, Neoliberalism’s War on Higher Education 
(Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2014); Pedagogy And the Politics Of Hope: Theory, Culture, And 
Schooling: A Critical Reader (Colorado and Oxford: Westview Press 1997); Thomas Docherty, 
Universities at War (Los Angeles: Sage, 2015); For the University: Democracy and the Future of the 
Institution (London and New York: Bloomsbury 2011). 
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thesis, it is work by Derrida which is at the centre of the examination. Over a period 
of more than 30 years Derrida wrote on the problem of education and the university 
(particularly concerning philosophical research, the teaching of philosophy and its 
relation to the university) on several occasions and for various purposes.33 This 
strand of his oeuvre has also been explored by scholars working within 
deconstruction, as well as those working within the theory of education.34 
 Within feminist theory,35 the most influential of Derrida’s texts on the 
university has been the transcription of a seminar at Brown University’s Pembroke 
                                                 
33 On Derrida’s work on education see the introductions of Who’s Afraid of Philosophy?: Right to 
Philosophy 1 and Eyes of the University: Right to Philosophy 2 which translate his Du droit à la 
philsophie. These two volumes contain most of Derrida’s essays, interviews and reports on the 
university and education. Jacques Derrida, Who’s Afraid of Philosophy?: Right to Philosophy 1 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002); Eyes of the University: Right to Philosophy 2 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2004); Du droit à la philosophie (Paris, Galilée, 1990); An overview of 
Derrida’s work on the university and pedagogy is also provided in the introduction of Counter-
institutions: Jacques Derrida and the Question of the University by Simon Wortham (2006) or 
Derrida’s biography by Benoît Peeters published in English in 2013. Simon Wortham, ‘Introduction’, 
in Counter-institutions: Jacques Derrida and the question of the University (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2006), pp. 1-24; Benoît Peeters, Derrida: A Biography, trans. Andrew Brown 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).  
34 See Simon Morgan Wortham, Rethinking the University: Leverage and Deconstruction 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999); ‘Auditing Culture’, parallax, special issue 
Auditing Culture, 10.2 (2004), 3-18; Counter-institutions: Jacques Derrida and the Question of the 
University (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006); Gary Hall and Simon M. Wortham, eds., 
Cultural Machine, special issue The University Cultural Machine, 2 (2000) < 
https://www.culturemachine.net/index.php/cm/article/view/311/296> [accessed 8 February 2017];  
Peggy Kamuf, ‘The University in the World it is Attempting to Think’, Culture Machine, 6 (2004), 
<https://www.culturemachine.net/index.php/cm/article/view/3/2> [accessed 8 February 2017]; 
‘Preface: Toward the Event’, in Without Alibi, ed. and trans. by Peggy Kamuf (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2002), pp. xi-xv; Gert Biesta and Michael A. Peters, ‘Education, Accountability, 
and the Ethical Demand: Can the Democratic Potential of Accountability be Regained?’, Educational 
Theory 54.3 (2004), 233-250; Michael, A. Peters and Gert Biesta, Derrida, Deconstruction, and the 
Politics of Pedagogy (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2009); Gert, J. J. Biesta and Denise Egéa-
Kuehne, eds., Derrida & Education (London and New York : Routledge, 2001); Allen, Graham, ed., 
The Pupils of the University, special issue of parallax 40 (2006); Pericles, Peter, Trifonas, ‘Auditing 
Education: Deconstruction and the Archiving of Knowledge as Curriculum’, Auditing Culture, 
special issue parallax 10.2 (2004), 37-49; Peter, Pericles, Trifonas and Michael, A. Peters, eds., 
Derrida, Deconstruction, and Education: Ethics of Pedagogy and Research (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2004); Richard Rand, ed. Logomachia: The Conflict of the Faculties (Lincoln and London: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1992); Dawne McCance, ‘The Architecture of Institution’, in Medusa’s Ear: 
University Foundings from Kant to Chora L (Albany: Sate University of New York Press, 2004), pp. 
27-46.  
35 For an account on the meaning and the history of ‘feminist theory’ see Teresa de Lauretis, 
‘Displacing Hegemonic Discourses: Reflections on Feminist Theorising in the 1980’s’, Inscriptions 
3.4 (1988), 127–44; Anne E. Berger’s section ‘Crisis in Feminism, Feminism in Crisis’ in The Queer 
Turn (126-130). On ‘feminist theory’ in relation to ‘philosophy’ and ‘feminist philosophy’ see Stella 
Sandford’s ‘Contradiction in terms: Feminist Theory, Philosophy and Transdisciplinarity’, Theory, 
Culture & Society 32.5-6 (2015), 159-182. Another account is provided by Sarah Ahmed in her 
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Center for Teaching and Research on Women, which took place in 1984 and was 
chaired by Scott. The seminar was first published that year in subjects/objects under 
the title ‘Women in the Beehive: A Seminar with Jacques Derrida’ and addresses the 
question of the institutionalization of feminism in the university and the problem of 
its emergent disciplinarity.36 However, in my thesis, I do not examine this famous 
seminar. The focus of my study lies in other texts where, as it seems to me, Derrida 
problematizes the question of the university and its disciplines in a more rigorous 
and complex way than in ‘Women in the Beehive’.37 More specifically, I focus on 
essays where Derrida addresses the question which guides the whole thesis, the 
question of the possibility and the impossibility of an institutional space where free 
thinking and scholarship can develop.  
 These essays draw from Immanuel Kant, and particularly on one of the last 
works published during Kant’s lifetime, The Conflict of the Faculties.38 This minor 
work of Kant’s is, as Richard Rand argues, ‘a work unknown even to many 
                                                 
article ‘Whose Counting?’. Ahmed proposes to grasp the issue by thinking about ‘where’ rather than 
‘what’ counts as feminist theory as a way of avoiding both ‘relativism’ and ‘universalism’; Sarah 
Ahmed, ‘Whose Counting?’, Feminist Theory 1.1 (2000), 97-103. 
36 Jacques Derrida, James Adner, Kate Doyle, and Glenn Hendler, 'Women in the Beehive: A 
Seminar with Jacques Derrida', differences 16.3 (2005), 139-157. Among the feminist authors who 
reflected on this text are Penelope Deutscher, ‘Women, and so on …’, Symposium: Canadian Journal 
of Continental Philosophy, 11.1 (2007), 101-119; Ellen, T. Armour, Deconstruction, Feminist 
Theology, and the Problem of Difference (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Naomi 
Schor, Bad Object: Essays Popular and Unpopular (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 
1995); Diane Elam: Feminism and Deconstruction: Ms. En Abyme (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1993); Scott, Joan W., ‘Introduction: Feminism’s Critical Edge’, in Women’s Studies on 
the Edge, ed. by Joan Scott (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2008), pp. 1-13. For the 
most recent reflections on this seminar see already mentioned Ewa Ziarek, ‘Reframing the Law: 
Derrida, Women’s Studies, Intersectionality’; Tina Chanter, ‘Derrida and Beyond: Living Feminism 
Affirmatively’, philoSOPHIA 7.1. (2017), 6-17. 
37 Apart from McCance’s Medusa’s Ear: University Foundings from Kant to Chora L (2004) who 
offers a reading of the university with, or alongside, Derrida’s, and a chapter in Diane Elam’s book 
Feminism and Deconstruction: Ms. En Abyme (1993) see specifically Tuija Pulkkinen, ‘Identity and 
Intervention: Disciplinarity as Transdisciplinarity in Gender Studies’, Theory, Culture & Society, 
32.5-6 (2015), 183-205. 
38 Immanuel Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties, trans. Mary J. Gregor (New York: Abaris Books, 
1979) 
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specialists in Kant studies’,39 and has been considered to contain no important new 
ideas.40 Yet, it is particularly this text which occupies a prominent position in 
Derrida’s reflections on the university.41 In his deliberations on how we can theorize 
its foundations and future, Derrida again and again returns to this book and re-opens, 
re-thinks and re-articulates Kant’s effort to conceptualize and negotiate a space 
where free thinking and scholarship would have been possible.42 According to my 
interpretation, and following Rebecca Comay, Derrida’s persistent and rigorous 
concern with and investment in this later and minor work of Kant is not 
insignificant.43 It triggers not only a profound shift in the interpretations of Kant’s 
work by Kant scholars but also inaugurates a shift in how we understand the legacy 
of the Enlightenment in the context of the current globalized and virtualized world. 
At the same time, it puts the question of the university at the very heart of these 
deliberations.44 As Kamuf argues in her commentary on Derrida’s last essay on the 
                                                 
39 Richard Rand, ‘Preface’, in Logomachia: The Conflict of the Faculties, ed. by Richard Rand 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), pp. vii-xii (p. vii).  
40 See Howard Caygill, ‘Kant and the “age of criticism”’, in Kant Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers Ltd, 1995), pp. 7-34. 
41 Derrida’s attention to this text does not, however, imply that Kant’s The Conflict of the Faculties 
does not need further ‘deconstruction’ as for instance Peter Gilgen argues. Peter Gilgen, ‘Structures, 
But in Ruins Only: On Kant’s History of Reason and the University, CR: The New Centennial 
Review, 9.2 (2009), 165-193.  
42 Derrida examines Kant’s The Conflict of the Faculties in two essays which I closely examine in 
this thesis - ‘Vacant Chair: Censorship, Mastery, Magisteriality’ and ‘Mochlos, or The Conflict of the 
Faculties’. It is also central to his other works on the university, namely ‘The Principle of Reason: 
The University in the Eyes of its Pupils’ and is mentioned in ‘Theology of Translation’, ‘Titles (for 
the College International de Philosophie), ‘Privilege: Justificatory Title and Introductory Remarks’. 
These texts are collected in Jacques Derrida Du droit à la philosophie (Paris: Galilée, 1990) 
translated into English as Who’s Afraid of Philosophy?: Right to Philosophy 1 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2002) and Eyes of the University: Right to Philosophy 2 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2004). The Conflict of the Faculties is also central to Derrida’s last essay on the 
university, ‘The Future of the Profession or the University without Condition (Thanks to the 
“Humanities,” What Could Take Place Tomorrow)’, in Jacques Derrida and the Humanities, ed. by 
Tom Cohen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 24-57;  and appears in an interview 
‘Canons and Metonymies: An Interview Jacques Derrida’, in Logomachia: The Conflict of the 
Faculties, Richard Rand, ed. (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), pp. 195-218.  
43 Rebeca Comey ‘Leverage’, presented at 2015 LGS Summer Academy: Right to Philosophy 
(University College London, 24 June, 2015). 
44 For Derrida, the question of the university is intrinsically intertwined with that of democracy. On 
the question of Enlightenment-to-come see Jacques Derrida, ‘The “World” of the Enlightenment to 
Come (Exception, Calculation, Sovereignty)’, Research in Phenomenology, 33.1 (2003), 1569-1640; 
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university, ‘The Future of The Profession or The University without Condition …’, 
in his writings on the university, Derrida strives to ‘renew the belief that the 
university must have a future for there to be a future of the world’.45  
In this first section which looks at the university specifically in relation to the 
disciplinarity of women’s studies, I examine Derrida’s essay ‘Vacant Chair: 
Censorship, Mastery, Magisteriality’. Here, Derrida reflects on the university, 
drawing from Kant’s theorization of the position of philosophy within this 
educational institution. My reading of the essay demonstrates that the question of the 
possibility and the impossibility of an institutional space where free thinking and 
scholarship can develop is characteristic also of Kant’s theorizations. Developing 
this insight, I propose that we conceptualize the university as being structurally 
defined by this paradox. I argue that conceptualizing the university as a formation 
which is both ‘possible’ and ‘impossible’ may open up new theoretical ground, 
which is necessary to generate the university beyond its phallocentric and neoliberal 
predicament.  
As a gesture towards rethinking the question of the disciplinarity of feminist 
scholarship within the university, the final chapter of this section examines how 
sexual difference operates within the university conceptualized as structurally 
defined by this paradox. In order to do so, I close read the final passage of Derrida’s 
essays ‘Vacant Chair’ and draw from Sarah Kofman’s work on Kant’s ethics in 
relation to sexual difference. My examination shows that the conceptualization of 
the university as both possible and impossible relies on the exclusion of the sexually 
                                                 
The Other Heading: Reflections on Today’s Europe’ (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1992); Rogues: Two Essays on Reason (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). 
45 Peggy Kamuf, ‘The University in the World it is Attempting to Think’. Cultural Machine, 6 
(2004), <https://www.culturemachine.net/index.php/cm/article/view/3/2> [accessed 8 February 
2017]. 
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other through a complex set of reversals and the appropriation of both sides of the 
dichotomy, the ‘feminine’ and ‘the masculine’, as they are inscribed within the 
phallocentric logic.  
Resisting the ‘neoliberalization’ of the university 
The second theme discussed in this thesis is the question of how we can theorize 
resistance to the ‘neoliberalization’ of the university. The problem of the 
‘neoliberalization’ of the university is, however, not discussed directly but through 
following a particular theoretical debate on this problem. Specifically, the discussion 
proceeds through examination of how the definitions and uses of the word and the 
concept of ‘accountability’ figure in theoretical accounts which wrestle with the 
question of resistance to the so called ‘neoliberalization’ of the university.  
 Although as argued previously, my focus is work by scholars who address 
this problem from within deconstruction, the discussion opens with a re-reading of 
Readings’ book The University in Ruins. Specifically, I develop an argument which 
appears in this work, and which supplements but also contests Readings’ main 
proposition that the university is ‘non-referential’. This supplementary argument 
suggests that the university becomes ‘a bureaucratic corporation’ through 
implementation of a ‘generalized logic of accountability’ which reduces 
accountability to mere accounting and takes over every university activity.46  
 Although Derrida’s work is important also for this section of the thesis, at the 
centre of my attention are works by other scholars working within deconstruction 
who have been continuously focusing on the problem of the university, such as 
                                                 
46 Readings, The University, p. 3. 
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Peggy Kamuf and Samuel Weber.47 In their work on how the university can resist 
‘neoliberalization’, both Kamuf and Weber adopt an approach which is, I argue, a 
prevailing one among deconstructive theorists who address the problem of resisting 
the ‘neoliberalization’ of the university. These scholars examine and highlight the 
importance of developing procedures characteristic for the production and the study 
of ‘literature’ or ‘creative arts’ in general. 48 By examining particularly Kamuf’s 
work, I critically examine the pattern and the effects of this line of inquiry. My close 
examination demonstrates that if this line of inquiry does not position ‘the 
humanities’ and ‘science’ in other than oppositional terms, this approach does not 
allow for resistance to the ‘neoliberalization’ of the university which would not be 
‘reactionary’, that is, non-effective. Following this insight, I therefore argue that the 
theorization of the university and its resistance to ‘neoliberalization’ must proceed 
differently.  
                                                 
47 See Peggy Kamuf, The Division / of Literature or the University in Deconstruction (Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1997); ‘The University in the World it is Attempting to 
Think’, Culture Machine, 6 (2004), <https://www.culturemachine.net/index.php/cm/article/view/3/2> 
[accessed 8 February 2017]; ‘Accounterability’, Textual Practice, 21.2 (2007), 251-266; ‘Preface: 
Toward the Event’, in Without Alibi, ed. and trans. by Peggy Kamuf (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2002), pp. xi-xv; Peggy Kamuf and Dawne McCance: ‘Crossings: An Interview with Peggy 
Kamuf’, Mosaic 43.4 (2009), 227-243; Samuel Weber, ‘The Future Campus: Destiny in a virtual 
world’, Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management, 21.2 (1999), 151-164; Samuel Weber, 
‘The Future of the Humanities: Experimenting’, The University Cultural Machine 2 (2000) < 
https://www.culturemachine.net/index.php/cm/article/view/311/296> [accessed 8 February 2017]. 
48 In addition to Kamuf and Weber, similar line of inquiry can be found also in the work of Simon 
Morgan Wortham, Rethinking the University: Leverage and Deconstruction (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1999); ‘Auditing Culture’, parallax, special issue Auditing Culture, 10.2 (2004); 
Counter-institutions: Jacques Derrida and the Question of the University (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2006); Dawne McCance, ‘The Architecture of Institution’, in Medusa’s Ear: 
University Foundings from Kant to Chora L (Albany: Sate University of New York Press, 2004), pp. 
27-46.; Peggy Kamuf and Dawne McCance: ‘Crossings: An Interview with Peggy Kamuf’, Mosaic 
43.4 (2009), 227-243.), Nicholas Royle, (Timothy Clark and Nicholas, Royle, eds., The University in 
Ruins, special issue of The Oxford Literary Review, 17.1. (1995), 3-14; Nicholas Royle, ‘The 
Holocaust of the Bankers’, paper presented at the School of Fine Art, History of Art & Cultural 
Studies, University of Leeds, September 24 2015); Henry Miller ‘The University of Dissensus’, The 
Oxford Literary Review, 17.1. (1995), 121-144; Graham Allen ‘Transparency, incalculability, 
Mythologies today’, Nottingham French Studies, 47.2 (2008), 71-82. 
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 At this point, my examination relies on the work of scholars who, while also 
working within a similar theoretical and methodological paradigm, nonetheless take 
a different route in their work on the university from the majority of deconstructive 
scholars, namely the cultural theorist John Mowitt and a historian of critical 
accounting and management, Keith Hoskin.49  
 Mowitt’s work is significant specifically for this section and the thesis in 
general in two respects. First, his earlier work provides a methodological framework 
for grasping deconstructive textual reading as ‘antidisciplinary’. Importantly, as I 
show in this section, for Mowitt, the idea of ‘antidisciplinarity’ is not only meant to 
suggest that a transformative re-reading from ‘within’ a given text is possible and 
that it allows for political transformation, but situates this effort within Foucault’s 
notion of ‘disciplinarity’. Secondly, Mowitt’s recent work, which engages with 
theories of resistance to the ‘neoliberalization’ of the university, and which itself 
implements a methodology of deconstructive textual reading which is 
‘antidisciplinary’, provides a framework for my own examination of this question. 
More specifically, drawing from Mowitt’s work, I propose that in elaborating the 
problem of resistance to the ‘neoliberalization’ of the university we, first, utilize the 
word and the concept of accountability and, second, do not treat accountability as a 
disciplinary power-knowledge technique but approach it as a textual problem. In the 
section that follows I introduce and further develop Peggy Kamuf’s effort to found 
‘a counter-institution of resistance to the irresistible logic of accountability’ which 
she calls ‘accounterability’.50 Accounterability, as I suggest, should however not be 
                                                 
49 See, for instance, John Mowitt, Text: The Genealogy of an Antidisciplinary Object (Durham and 
London: Duke University Press, 1992); ‘On the One Hand, and the Other’, College Literature, 42.2. 
(2015), 311-336; Keith Hoskin, ‘The Awful Idea of Accountability: Inscribing People into the 
Measurement of Object’, in Accountability, Power, Ethos and the Technologies of Managing, ed. by 
R. Munor and J. Mourtisen (London: International Thomson Business Press, 1996), pp. 265-282. 
50 Kamuf, ‘Accounterability’, p. 251. 
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understood as opposing our ‘abilities’ to count or account but as a way of providing 
accountability with ‘resistance’ which will make accountability a useful term for our 
theoretical and political interventions. In the following section, I further explore the 
position of ‘counting’ and ‘accountability’ in Western philosophical discourse. 
Finally, drawing particularly from Derrida’s text, ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, and Hoskin’s 
historical study of European elite education at the end of the eighteenth century, I 
propose that, despite what Readings and other current critiques of the 
neoliberalization of the university propose, the story of ‘counting’, ‘accounting’ and 
‘accountability’ seems to be an ‘educational story’.51  
Narratives of feminist studies 
Drawing form the arguments developed in the section which examined the question 
of the possibility and the impossibility of an institutional space where free thinking 
and scholarship can develop in relation to the university as a whole, the third section 
returns to the problem of the particular. In this section, I examine two different 
feminist accounts. More specifically, I examine work by Clare Hemmings and Anne 
Berger, who explore narratives and discourses which dominate the current scene of 
feminist studies and try to provide their transformative re-reading from ‘within’.  
 There are two main reasons why I focus on the work of these two particular 
scholars. First, their work relies on close readings and textual analyses which seek to 
create effects which are ‘antidisciplinary’. Although it is particularly Berger who 
utilizes proceedings of deconstructive textual analysis in her exploration of gender 
                                                 
51 Keith Hoskin ‘The Awful Idea of Accountability: Inscribing People into the Measurement of 
Object’, in Accountability, Power, Ethos and the Technologies of Managing, ed. by R. Munor and J. 
Mourtisen (London: International Thomson Business Press, 1996), pp. 265-282 (p. 269). 
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and queer theories and their consequences for identity politics,52 similar patterns can 
be found also in Hemmings’ work. More specifically, Hemmings examines what she 
calls the ‘political grammar of Western feminist theory’. This consists of the 
examination of narrative forms of feminist discourses and the textual and 
grammatical mechanisms which underwrite them, such as the formation of binary 
pairs, exclusions, embedded temporality and a hierarchy of meaning and, 
particularly importantly for Hemmings’ project, techniques of citation and textual 
affect.53 Significant in this respect is also the thinking that guides Hemmings’ work: 
in order to produce narratives which would be ‘ethically accountable and potentially 
more politically transformative’,54 Hemmings suggests we tell feminist stories 
differently, rather than produce different stories.55  
 The second reason why I examine Hemmings’ and Berger’s work is their 
common concern regarding the problem of how we can conceptualize intersections 
and differentiate between discourses on feminism, gender and sexuality which have 
‘feminist’ and ‘non-feminist’ effects. Both Hemmings and Berger derive their 
explorations from a premise that ‘an absolute distinction between feminist and 
nonfeminist mobilizations of gender discourses can or should be sustained’.56 Yet, 
despite the professed impossibility of such a demarcation or, rather, because of it, 
they strive to conceptualize a possibility of making it.57 It is particularly this effort 
                                                 
52 In addition to utilizing deconstructive textual reading, Berger also refers to Derrida’s work, see 
namely chapter ‘The Ends of an Idiom, or Sexual Difference in Translation’ (Berger, The Queer 
Turn, p. 107-125.). 
53 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 17. 
54 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 2. 
55 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 16. 
56 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 139. 
57 For instance, Berger distinguishes between two kinds of ‘postfeminism’: ‘First, a (post)feminism 
whose “immanent critique” aims less to discredit feminism that to refine its instruments of analysis’, 
which is ‘still faithful to the political and philosophical project of feminism’ and, second, a 
postfeminism which, ‘even as it assumes its genealogical link with feminism, resolutely regards the 
latter as inadequate and outdated’. Berger, The Queer Turn, p. 10. 
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which interests me in this section and which I attempt to examine specifically in 
relation to the question of how can we resist the ‘neoliberalization’ of the university.  
 Following this line of inquiry, the first chapter of this section provides a 
close reading of the notion of ‘amenability’ which Hemmings utilizes in order to 
conceptualize the intersection between feminist and nonfeminist discourses in her 
book Why Stories Matter: The political grammar of feminist theory. I examine and 
develop this notion specifically in relation to ethics and the notion of 
‘accountability’. 
 As I interpret it, Hemmings proposes we proceed in a way which is 
intrinsically paradoxical: she suggests we take responsibility for the amenability of 
our narratives and we interrupt that amenability in order to make feminist 
storytelling more accountable which would, consequently, increase the chances of 
Western feminist theory bringing about political transformation. As I read it, these 
propositions bring a useful complication of the relationship between the narratives 
produced by Western feminist theory and the trends which, as identified and 
discussed in the previous section, dominate current universities. In order to support 
this line of inquiry, I propose to further radicalize the notion of accountability. 
Specifically, I propose we take, what I call ‘tremendous responsibilities’. I develop 
this conceptualization through a close examination of the opening passage of one of 
Derrida’s essay on the university, ‘Mochlos, or The Conflict of the Faculties’ and of 
his work which addresses the problem of responsibility, The Gift of Death. As I 
show, in these two works, Derrida stresses the singular and irreplaceable character of 
responsibility and proposes to conceptualize responsibility as having the structure of 
an aporia. I argue that understanding responsibilities as ‘tremendous’ is a 
conceptualization of ethics that is adequate to the character and aims of feminist 
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interventions, which feminist theorists such as Hemmings seek to implement. 
Additionally, a conceptualization of ethics in this way is in contestation with the 
accountability movement which currently dominates the context of Western 
universities.  
 Taking ‘tremendous responsibilities’, does not, however, tackle an issue 
which, as I understand it, is no less important for the project of telling feminist 
stories differently – the articulation of the uses of ‘political grammars’ which would 
be ‘idiolectic’ to the storytelling of feminist theory.58 The final chapter of this thesis 
focuses on the problem of ‘the particular’ or ‘the singular’ from this angle.  
The chapter begins with a close examination of Hemmings’ essay entitled ‘Is 
Gender Studies Singular? Stories of Queer/Feminist Difference and Displacement’ 
from 2016, where Hemmings contests that there could be a single feminist theory of 
gender and seeks to ‘orient us toward multiplicity and away from singularity’.59 
Drawing from my close examination of her argumentation, contrary to Hemmings, I 
argue that we need to stop perceiving singularity as being associated only with ‘the 
dangers of exclusion’ and rethink the relationship between singularity and plurality 
as other than oppositional.60 Following work by Berger, I argue that insisting on the 
singularity of feminist accounts is indispensable for feminist endeavours whose very 
raison d’être has been and continues to be ‘promotion of plurality’ and ‘the 
excavation of unrecognized or unwanted differences’.61 
I offer two theorizations which may help us to conceptualize the relationship 
between singularity and plurality in other than oppositional terms – theorizations 
which utilize notions of translation and theatricality. The remaining part of the thesis 
                                                 
58 Berger, ‘Gender Springtime in Paris’, p. 10. 
59 Hemmings, ‘Is Gender Studies Singular?’, p. 81. 
60 Hemmings, ‘Is Gender Studies Singular?’, p. 82. 
61 Berger, abstract to ‘Gender Springtime in Paris’. 
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develops these two propositions in relation to narratives of feminist studies and the 
university.  
The first proposition is that in order to help re-conceptualize the relation 
between singularity and plurality, we employ a notion of translation that is grounded 
in the recognition that the gap of difference between various lexicons and their 
grammars is, to a certain extent, unbridgeable. Drawing on the work of Berger, 
Derrida and Scott, I briefly outline the advantages this conceptualization implies for 
Hemmings’ project of telling feminist stories differently.  
However, it is the second notion, the notion of theatricality, which I discuss 
in more depth. While I particularly focus on the examination of Berger’s use of 
theatricality within the realm of gender and queer theory and politics, the chapter 
opens with a debate which shows how this notion can be utilized in order to theorize 
resistance to the so called ‘accountability regimes’ which define current universities. 
At this point in my examination I draw from the work of scholars who argue that 
‘accountability regimes’ are intimately bound up with ‘vision’ and ‘visibility’. More 
specifically, the so called ‘seeing through’ and ‘making what is invisible visible’ are 
understood as the conditions, as well as the outcomes of accountability’s accounting. 
However, also drawing from the methodological shift from disciplinary power to 
textual reading proposed previously, I argue that we should not grasp the 
relationship between the current university and its ‘visions’ as merely a 
‘disciplinary’ and ‘disciplining’ problem.62 Relying on work of Marilyn Strathern, 
John Francis McKernan and Samuel Weber, I suggest that instead of grasping the 
university as a ‘panoptical’ institution, we conceive of it as a scene where visibility 
                                                 
62 For more on the proposed shift from ‘disciplinarity’ to ‘textuality’ see chapter III, ‘From 
Disciplinary Power to Textuality’, where I rely on work of John Mowitt. 
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is not simply opposed to invisibility but the two are interwoven by a range of more 
complex differences and diverse distributions of the visible, and its correlate, the 
invisible.63  
Further discussion situates this problem of ‘vision’ and ‘visibility’ in relation 
to the attempt to rearticulate the singularity of feminist political and theoretical 
endeavours outlined previously. Following Berger, I identify an ‘idiomatic feature’ 
of the political grammars employed by Western feminist theory. As follows from her 
argumentation in The Queer Turn in Feminism: Identities, Sexualities, and the 
Theater of Gender, certain feminist and queer theories and their politics are defined 
by a desire to become visible, as if ‘liberation – or the struggle to achieve it – 
required catching the light; as if, to advance a cause one had to get spotlights to 
shine on it’.64  
The demand to be visible, which to a certain extent defines current feminist 
and queer politics, cannot, as Berger explains, be accounted for only as an 
implementation of the Western program of the Enlightenment. Nor it can be 
understood only to be a result of the ‘panoptical’ regimes which characterize 
contemporary societies. Berger suggests that there are two other sources to this 
demand. Both sources are tied to the political, intellectual and cultural specificity of 
‘America’: first, it is the problematization of race by the American civil rights 
movements and, second, it is the articulation of ‘gender’ as a category that depends 
on a certain test of the visible, further perpetuated by its ‘queer’ questioning.  
                                                 
63 For more on the shift in methodological approach I propose here see Derrida’s critique of 
Foucault’s treatment of the problem of in/visibility in Discipline and Punish (Jacques Derrida and 
Roudinesco, Elisabeth, ‘Choosing One’s Heritage’, in For What Tomorrow: A Dialogue (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 1-19 (p. 12). 
64 Berger, The Queer Turn, p.27. 
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As I demonstrate with my reading, this theorization does not only provide an 
opportunity for further examination of how the ‘grammars’ of feminist storytelling 
entangle with the trends dominating current universities. More specifically, Berger’s 
work is not to be interpreted simply as providing evidence that the feminist and 
queer discourses embracing this view are, if not intrinsically, at least significantly 
tied to the regimes of visibility upholding accountability cultures which impose 
themselves with particular intensity in the context of the current ‘neoliberal’ 
university. Instead, I argue that Berger’s work allows us to theorize how these trends 
might be resisted from within feminist theory. As I show in the conclusion of the last 
chapter, by taking a ‘theatrical’ approach, both as a methodology and an ‘object’ of 
her explorations, Berger opens up a possibility for theorizing feminist resistance 
which will help to generate a university beyond its phallocentric and neoliberal 
predicaments.  
The final section of the thesis concludes the study. After summarizing the 
concerns of the thesis, and highlighting some issues encountered in its journey, the 
conclusion signposts possible directions of future development.
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Part I – The disciplinarity of Women’s 
Studies (Current Vacancies) 
Chapter I – University Places  
The ‘No There There’ of Women’s Studies 
In ‘The Impossibility of Women’s Studies’ Wendy Brown wrestles with the question 
of how feminist academic work can and cannot take place institutionally within the 
context of the U.S. Higher Education system.1 Her inquiry into institutionalized 
domains of feminist academic study and its intellectual premises is led from 
‘within’, from a department of women’s studies at the University of California, 
Santa Cruz. Brown frames her essay by recalling an experience with curricula 
revision which her department undertook in the early 1990s. As she describes it, 
questions such as ‘what would constitute an intellectually rigorous as well as 
coherent program’ or ‘what a women’s studies curriculum should contain’ were 
questions Brown and her colleagues found themselves ‘completely stumped over’.2  
As Brown recalls it, this ‘practical exercise’ revealed an ‘important historical-
political problem’ of the contemporary women’s studies. She expresses this unease 
at the opening of her essay with this question: ‘Why, when we looked closely at this 
                                                 
1 ‘The impossibility of Women’s Studies’ was first published in the journal differences (1997). It has 
been republished in a collection of essay edited by Joan W. Scott Women’s Studies on the Edge 
(2008). It is this edition to which I reference in here. Brown has also included the essay in her book 
Edgework: Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics published in 2005. All references made to 
Brown’s article in this thesis are to the 2008 edition.  
2 Brown, ‘The Impossibility’, p. 19. 
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project for which we had fought so hard and which was now academically 
institutionalized, could we find no there there?’3 
Clearly, Brown does not believe that other academic disciplines are fixed and 
solid entities with firm foundations. As she argues, ‘the definitions of all disciplines 
wobble, their identities mutate, their rules and regulations appear contingent and 
contestable’.4 Women’s studies, or, more precisely, ‘any field organized by social 
identity rather than by genre or inquiry’, is, nonetheless, somehow more problematic 
in this respect. Women’s studies is ‘especially vulnerable to losing its raison d’être 
when the coherence or boundedness of its object of study is challenged’.5  
According to Brown, what lies behind the heightened vulnerability of 
women’s studies and other disciplines organized around social identity is their 
relationship to the world outside of the university and which is different from that of 
other, more traditional, academic disciplines. As Brown explains, women’s studies 
was founded in a direct continuation of the women’s movement. And, although she 
admits the profound importance of this ‘political moment in the academy’ in ‘which 
women’s movements challenged the ubiquitous misogyny, masculinism, and sexism 
in academic research, curricula, canons, and pedagogies’, she finds this heritage to 
be highly problematic for the contemporary women’s studies.6 Current women’s 
studies is, according to Brown - as an intellectual endeavour –significantly restricted 
by its political origins. The political limits its object of study to ‘social identity’ and 
its ‘categories’ such as ‘gender’ and ‘women’, and pre-determines its goals. The 
goals of women’s studies are not only ‘intellectual’ but also ‘political’ because 
                                                 
3 Brown, ‘The Impossibility’, p. 20. 
4 Brown, ‘The Impossibility’, p. 23. 
5 Brown, ‘The Impossibility’, p. 24. 
6 Brown, ‘The Impossibility’, p. 21. 
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women’s studies aims to contribute to gaining social justice for oppressed groups 
within the society.  
For Brown it is therefore and clearly the dependency on the political, the 
circumscription of women’s studies by women’s movement which is behind the 
current unease of academic feminism. It is because of the delimitation of the 
‘intellectual’ by what she perceives as its distinct and anterior ‘other’ – the political - 
that Brown and her colleagues could not find the so called ‘there there’ of their 
department.  
Brown explains this ‘trouble’ women’s studies experience in respect to one 
of the key objects this academic discipline focuses, gender. As she puts it:  
 
paradoxically, sustaining gender as a critical, self-reflexive category rather 
than a normative or nominal one, and sustaining women’s studies as an 
intellectually and institutionally radical site rather than a regulatory one – in 
short, refusing to allow gender studies and women’s studies to be disciplined 
– are concerns and refusals at odds with affirming women’s studies as a 
coherent field of study.7 
 
As Brown understands this paradox, in order to sustain women’s or gender studies as 
an intellectually and institutionally radical site, gender must be conceived as a 
critical and self-reflexive category. This demand is, however, in contradiction with 
the disciplinary demands, which, according to Brown, need gender to be conceived 
as normative and nominal. It is therefore the limitation which ‘disciplined’ gender 
(i.e. gender defined by identity politics) imposes on the intellectual work, that makes 
women’s or gender studies impossible as an academic discipline.  
                                                 
7 Brown, ‘The Impossibility’, p. 24. 
   
 
49 
 
Furthermore, as Brown argues, the effects of such a circumscription are fatal 
not only for women’s studies’ intellectual mission but, at the end, also undermine 
political goals of the women’s movement and feminism. The privileging of the 
political over the intellectual does not only make women’s studies ‘intellectually 
incoherent’ and ‘tacitly conservative’ as an academic discipline 8 but, eventually, by  
 
moving toward positivism … [it] repeats the very eclipse of sociohistorical 
powers it was intended to challenge: these powers become fixed as categories 
of analysis, rendered as adjectives and nouns, rather than historicized and 
theorized.9  
 
With her article Brown seeks to find a passage out of this intellectual, political and 
institutional impasse which, according to her, is caused by the merging of the two 
spheres (political and intellectual). The path she chooses to take is to address this 
problem through theory. As she recalls, this is an uncommon approach within the 
debates about institutionalization of feminism in academia and women’s studies 
specifically. According to Brown, women’s studies scholars who do recognize ‘the 
problems and incoherence of the field’ usually focus on formulating ‘arguments on 
behalf of sustaining and building women’s studies programs’ through ‘expressly 
political language’ and, simultaneously, focus on stressing that ‘women’s studies 
programs continue to have irrefutable political value’. Although Brown does share 
the assumption of this argument ‘to a degree’, she finds it ultimately  ineffective as it 
supports that which she identifies to be the core problem of women’s studies in the 
first place: the privileging of the political value over the ‘intellectual aporias’.10   
                                                 
8 Brown, ‘The Impossibility’, p. 21. 
9 Brown, ‘The Impossibility’, p. 31. 
10 Brown, ‘The Impossibility’, p. 33. 
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Instead of ‘political language’, Brown therefore chooses to lead her 
argumentation from the standpoint of ‘theory’. More specifically, she suggests we 
develop a non-positivist, theoretically rigorous and complex understanding of what 
she takes ‘to be one of the central problematics of feminist inquiry today and of the 
central conundrums facing women’s studies’, that is, ‘how to come to terms with the 
problem of the powers involved in the construction of subjects’.11  
As she stresses, the problem of a subject and its construction is, however, in 
itself, a kind of ‘conundrum’. The construction of subject is also ‘shaped by a 
paradox’: 
 
[o]n the one hand, various marked subjects are created through very different 
kinds of power- not just different powers. That is, subjects of gender, class, 
nationality, race, sexuality, and so forth, are created through different 
histories, different mechanisms and sites of power, different discursive 
formations, different regulatory schemes. On the other hand, we are not 
fabricated as subjects in discrete units by these various powers: they do not 
operate on and through us independently, or linearly, or cumulatively. Insofar 
as subject construction does not take place along discrete lines of nationality, 
race, sexuality, gender, caste, class, and so forth, these powers of subject 
formation are not separable in the subject itself.12  
 
Further in the essay Brown summarizes this point by claiming that a living subject is 
‘a production that is historically complex and contingent’ and therefore exceeds 
‘analytically distinct identity categories’.13 The subject is a kind of ‘fiction’ which 
always has ‘significant elements … that exceed the accounting offered by such 
                                                 
11 Brown, ‘The Impossibility’, p. 24. 
12 Brown, ‘The Impossibility’, p. 24. 
13 Brown, ‘The Impossibility’, p. 24.  
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lists’.14 The conclusion Brown makes from this theoretical argument for the issue of 
disciplinarity is that a discipline which forms its inquiry within the conceptual 
framing of analytically distinct identity categories (as women’s studies does 
according to Brown) ‘sacrifices the imaginative reach of theory’ and is therefore 
inadequate for inquiry of subjectivity.15  
In her article, Brown therefore seeks to suggest an alternative to this 
approach. Drawing on the work of Michel Foucault she outlines a method of 
academic inquiry which would be adequate to the paradox of a construction of a 
subject. As she puts it,  
 
[w]hat is needed is the practice of a historiography quite different from that 
expressed by notions of cause and effect, accumulation, origin, or various 
intersecting lines of development, a historiography that emphasizes instead 
contingent developments, formations that may be at odds with or convergent 
with each other, and trajectories of power that vary in weight for different 
kinds of subject.16 
 
This ‘different historiography’ will, as Brown explains, have significant 
consequences for feminist inquiry and its position in the academia. It will 
problematize analytically distinct identity categories such as ‘gender’ and ‘women’ 
and, simultaneously, interrupt the dependence of women’s studies on the political of 
social movements. As she puts it, it will ‘add up to neither a unified and coherent 
notion of gender nor a firm foundation for women’s studies’. Instead, this work, as 
Brown professes, may  
 
                                                 
14 Brown, ‘The Impossibility’, p. 31. 
15 Brown, ‘The Impossibility’, p. 31. 
16 Brown, ‘The Impossibility’, p. 32. 
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allow us to take those powerful founding and sustaining impulses of women’s 
studies – to challenge the seamless histories, theories, literatures, and sciences 
featuring and reproducing a Humanism starring only Man - and harness them 
for another generation or two of productive, insurrectionary work.17  
 
Following Brown’s argument, one might have expected that the next step  would be 
to suggest that the ‘different historiography’ inspired by Foucault should be 
implemented not only to the category ‘subject’ but also to the other categories she 
mentions in the essay, namely the categories of ‘gender’ and ‘women’. One might 
have expected that Brown would make use of  the ‘imaginative reach of theory’ and 
would venture to imagine ‘gender’ as ‘paradoxical’, as a notion which would not be 
‘unified and coherent’ but ‘historically complex and contingent’ and thus would 
‘exceed accounting’ and the logic ‘of cause and effect, accumulation, origin, or 
various intersecting lines of development’.18 
Finally, following the theoretical path she inaugurated, one might have 
expected that Brown would also want to re-conceptualize the institutional location 
where these categories were theorized and problematized, that is, women’s studies. 
That she would want to interrupt the linear and simplistic narrative of women’s 
studies being a direct continuation of the identity politics of social movements and 
would want to ponder the possibility of thinking specific institutional location of 
feminist academic work in a way which would not need the ‘firm foundations’. 
Briefly put, the next step to take one might have imagined would be to use the 
theoretical tools she has invoked to challenge and re-define what  ‘gender’, ‘the 
                                                 
17 Brown, ‘The Impossibility’, p. 32. 
18 Brown, ‘The Impossibility’, p. 32. 
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political’, ‘research’, ‘disciplinarity’, ‘feminism’ and ‘the university’ were and could 
be.  
Brown, however, takes a different path from those suggested above. She 
proposes we abandon the category of ‘gender’ and ‘women’, and the endeavour of 
imagining a possibility of a specific place within the university where this category 
could be problematized all together. For Brown, the intellectual work which would 
be able to conceive a subject and its construction in its paradoxicality cannot 
proceed through these particular categories. In her view, they are inadequate to ‘the 
problem of representing and addressing the construction, the positioning, and the 
injuries of complex subjects […]’.19 Consequently, nor can such a theoretical work 
take place within women’s studies. As Brown argues, women’s studies, because it 
has ‘gender’ or ‘women’ as its ‘primary’ or ‘structuring’ object ‘will never 
accurately describe or trace the lines of a living subject’.20  
Although Brown is hesitant to offer any alternatives in her essay, as it 
follows from the conclusion of her article, the solution to the ‘no there there’ of 
women’s studies, is not theorizing ‘gender’, ‘women’ or ‘feminism’ as ‘contingent 
formations’. Neither does she want to ‘fill’ the space of women’s studies with 
‘theory’, nor to imagine the possibility of women’s studies with the help of theory. 
She envisions the future of work which used to be women’s studies’ and feminist 
scholarship as follows: 
 
[h]owever much it is shaped by feminism, this work will no longer have 
gender at its core and is in that sense no longer women’s studies. To the extent 
that women’s studies programs can allow themselves to be transformed - in 
name, content, and scope – by these and allied projects, they will be renewed 
                                                 
19 Brown, ‘The Impossibility’, p. 30. 
20 Brown, ‘The Impossibility’, p. 31. 
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as sites of critical inquiry and political energy. To the extent that they refuse 
this task and adhere to a founding and exclusive preoccupation with women 
and feminism, they will further entrench themselves as conservative barriers 
to the critical theory and research called for by the very scholarship they 
incited and pedagogical practices they mobilized over the past two decades.21 
 
The impossibility of imagining gender and women as other than a ‘normative and 
nominalistic’ identity category which brings only exclusions of other categories 
leads Brown ‘beyond’ both ‘gender’ and ‘women’. It also leads her, as the quotation 
suggests, ‘beyond’ feminism as her understanding of feminism is firmly attached to 
the conceptualization of gender invoked above. For Brown, this theoretico-political 
move (away from gender, women and feminism) implies also an institutional 
clearing. Although, as Brown argues, she affirms the constitution and development 
of institutionalized women’s studies programs in the past, she suggests we avoid 
investing in further development of specific disciplinary sites and instead focus on 
mobility and dispersion of feminism across the university. As she argues, 
 
The story of women’s studies suggests that our current and future contests 
over meaning and knowledge, and freedom and equality, should probably 
avoid consolidating victories in the form of new degree-granting programs in 
the university.22 
 
Practically, the effects of this move would be that feminist courses should become 
part of and be taught in general curriculum of other ‘disciplinary and especially 
                                                 
21 Brown, ‘The Impossibility’, p. 32. 
22 Brown, ‘The Impossibility’, p. 36. 
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interdisciplinary programmatic sites’.23 She suggests we disperse women’s and 
gender studies’ content to other academic disciplines.  
Surely, Brown is aware of some of the limitations of her approach (as she 
argues, her essay ‘does not tell us what to do instead’).24 My unease at her account 
does not, however, rely on critiquing Brown for not delivering what she did not 
promise, i.e. concrete and practical solutions. In the conclusion, Brown argues that 
the task those working within women’s studies should address today is ‘thinking’. 
She argues that, in this current moment, when women’s studies is losing its raison 
d’être we should, instead of developing ‘new degree-granting programs’, ‘consider 
where we have been so that we might, in a Nietzschean vein, affirm our errors’ 
which is, as she explains, ‘a moment for thinking’.25  
It is thus not only ‘Foucauldian historiography’ but, as follows from her 
conclusion, ‘thinking’ as such which, for Brown, seems incompatible with women’s 
and gender studies and its primary objects of study such as ‘women’ or ‘gender’. It 
seems that for Brown, in order to ‘think’, one must first clear the space, one must 
make a room for it by wiping out ‘gender’, ‘women’ and ‘feminism’ as well as 
‘women’s and gender studies’ as if those categories, politics and locations were in 
the way of the possibility of ‘thinking’. It seems as if Brown wanted to start ‘from 
scratch’, from the very ‘beginning’, that is, without relying on any previous feminist 
work for assistance.  
As I interpret it, Brown’s article is exemplary of how some current feminist 
scholars wrestle with and try to make sense of (politically, intellectually and 
institutionally) the presence of academic feminism and of its history. More 
                                                 
23 Brown, ‘The Impossibility’, p. 35. 
24 Brown, ‘The Impossibility’, p. 36. 
25 Brown, ‘The Impossibility’, p. 36. 
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specifically, ‘The Impossibility of Women’s Studies’ can be read as a gesture by 
which one approaches this problem through attempting to separate oneself from 
feminism as a political, intellectual and institutional project. Brown thus belongs, as 
Anne E. Berger puts it, to the current of feminist scholars who ‘took a melancholic 
turn’ and in whose work ‘feminist theory [and, consequently, its disciplinary 
presence in the university] became the site and the target of endless mournful 
reflection on its impossibility of its own enterprise’.26 
For Brown, however, ‘vacating’ women’s studies in the name of ‘thinking’ is 
above all, a pragmatic choice.27 In her view, getting rid of women’s studies will help 
solve the key problem she finds with women’s studies – the lack of intellectual rigor. 
The inclusion of feminist courses in different disciplines will, as Brown argues, 
prepare students for ‘thinking’. It will help, according to Brown, ‘develop 
background knowledges as part of students’ work in philosophy, cultural studies, 
literature, anthropology, or critical theory so that they would actually be armed to 
engage and contest the arguments they encounter in feminist theory and in 
postcolonial, queer, and critical race theories as well’.28    
Thinking the Possibilities of ‘The Impossibility of Women’s Studies’  
‘The Impossibility of Women’s Studies’, since it was first published in the 
journal differences in 1997, has been re-published several times and received 
                                                 
26 Berger, The Queer Turn, p. 128. As I will develop further in the final chapter of this thesis, this 
critical feminist reflection which may result in a certain – if not ‘post-feminist’ but certainly ‘post’ or 
‘anti’ women’s and ‘gender studies’ position, is also related to the problem of avoiding the task of 
articulating what is specific (i.e. singular) about feminist thinking and politics. 
27 It is, precisely, a retrieve to a certain ‘pragmatism’ which, according to my interpretation, is one of 
the key obstacles for ‘imagining’ not only disciplinary possibility of ‘academic feminism’ but also, as 
I will show with my analysis of Readings’ The University in Ruins, the university as a whole.   
28 Brown, ‘The Impossibility’, p. 35. 
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many diverse reactions and commentaries from feminist scholars. However, I 
do not want to downplay Brown’s concerns by pronouncing them to be simply 
an expression of frustration resulting from a bad personal experience. Neither 
do I wish to dismiss her article and the issues it raises as being solely a problem 
of U.S. academia, where ‘identity politics wars’ have taken particular shape. 
Nor do I wish to argue that women’s and gender studies have, since Brown’s 
article was first published, overcome their troubles and consolidated their 
intellectual and institutional positions.29 My reading follows Robyn Wiegman 
who suggests we take Brown’s wrestling with the locations and modalities of 
academic feminism as a productive insight. 
‘The Impossibility of Women’s Studies’ is pivotal particularly for 
Wiegman’s work which discusses institutionalization of feminism in the 
university.30 In these various texts, Wiegman seeks to transform Brown’s 
pessimism and generate a possibility of conceptualizing an institutional 
location where ‘gender’, ‘women’ and ‘feminism’ can be problematized and 
theorized.   
To be clear, however, Wiegman does not dispute Brown’s doubts about 
women’s studies’ intellectual rigor. Nor does she disagree with her observation 
that the field increasingly focuses on social identity and its categories. 
Similarly to Brown, Wiegman identifies women’s studies’ heterogeneity, 
particularly the relationship between its political and academic registers, as its 
                                                 
29 At this point, my understanding differs from Tuija Pulkkinen’s account of how we can conceive 
disciplinarity of academic feminism. Tuija Pulkkinen, ‘Identity and Intervention: Disciplinarity as 
Transdisciplinarity in Gender Studies’, Theory, Culture & Society, 32.5-6, 183-205 (p. 195). 
30 These articles include already mentioned ‘Feminism, Institutionalism, and the Idiom of Failure’ 
from 1999, ‘Feminism’s Apocalyptic Futures’ from 2000, ‘Academic Feminism Against Itself’ from 
2002, ‘On Being on Time with Feminism’ from 2004 and ‘The Possibility of Women’s Studies’ from 
2005. Wiegman returns to Brown’s article also in her book from 2012 entitled Object Lessons.  
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key defining feature. Echoing Brown, Wiegman also critiques the privileging 
of the political over the academic that accompanies feminism’s 
institutionalization and the restrictions it imposes on the intellectual demands 
of the field. As she argues, 
 
any attempt to write movement subjectivity as the field’s origin and 
reproductive goal is not simply wrong headed but counterproductive precisely 
because it generates as a disciplinary imperative a certain understanding of 
the political (and with it the relation between theory and activism).31 
 
Yet, Wiegman’s reading of Brown’s article brings further insight into the current 
debates about feminism’s emergent disciplinarity. The problem Wiegman has with 
Brown’s article is that Brown does not question key premises on which the 
discourses she critiques rely, but instead only reverses their assessment. Giving 
priority to the ‘intellectual’ over the ‘political’ as Brown does it, only confirms the 
two premises Brown sought to critique – firstly, the seeming anteriority of ‘the 
political’ over the ‘academic’, and, secondly, the fantasy of a singular and original 
feminism uncontaminated by ‘intellectual work’ and ‘disciplining’.32  
As follows from Wiegman’s readings, conceptualizing the 
institutionalization of feminism on the two premises that Brown shares with the 
discourse she opposes, produces, on the one hand, contradictory assessments, and on 
the other, similar ends. Women’s studies is, at once, considered to be too theoretical 
and not theoretical enough, too political and not political enough. Thus, these 
evaluations are not only contradictory but also lead towards similar ends: academic 
                                                 
31 Robyn Wiegman, ‘Academic Feminism Against Itself’, NWSA Journal, 14.2. (2002), 18-34 (p. 20).  
32 Robyn Wiegman, ‘The Possibility of Women’s Studies’, in Women’s Studies for the Future: 
Foundations, Interrogations, Politics, ed. by Elizabeth Lapovsky Kennedy and Agatha Beins (New 
Brunswick and London: Rutgers University Press, 2005), pp. 40-60 (p. 52). 
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institutionalization of feminism is always understood as a failure,33 as something 
which is ‘bringing feminism to an end’.34  
Drawing on this insight, Wiegman calls discourses which follow this 
structural organization ‘narratives of failure’ and points out that the debate about 
feminism and its relationship to the university has not always proceeded under those 
terms. More specifically, the political (as a set of social movement ideals), and the 
institutional (as a project of academic transformation), were not always firmly 
opposed. Although, as Wiegman notes, ‘feminism, in particular, has struggled over 
the dynamic of knowing and doing, over the difference that each constitutes to the 
other, weighing one over the other, weighing one over the other […]’,35 it was only 
in the early 1990s when feminism begun to pose ‘the academic against feminism’ 
and narrate the ‘political failure [but also intellectual failure as we can see from 
Brown’s essay] in academic feminism’s institutional success’.36 
Accounting for feminism’s emergent disciplinarity through positioning 
‘politics’ or ‘feminism’ against ‘academia’ relates to the second assumption on 
which ‘failure’ narratives rely – a representation of feminism as a given and fully 
knowable entity. Brown, as well as those she critiques, seem to act as if she knews, 
what ‘feminism’ was. In her account, feminism seems to coincide with a political 
ideal of the women’s movement towards which, according to those she critiques, 
‘academic feminism’ has to return or, from which, according to Brown, it has to 
separate itself. As follows from Wiegman’s readings of accounts of feminism’s 
institutionalization in the university, however, what feminism is and was, and how it 
                                                 
33 Wiegman, ‘Academic Feminism’, p. 32. 
34 Wiegman, ‘Academic Feminism’, p. 23. 
35 Robyn Wiegman, ‘Feminism, Institutionalism, and the Idiom of Failure’, differences, 11.3 (1999), 
107-136, p. 109. 
36 Wiegman, ‘The Possibility’, p. 41. 
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has related and relates to the university is, precisely, irreducible to one singular 
narrative. Through Weigman’s readings, feminism and women’s studies respectively 
arise as inherently conflicted and paradoxical sites. Wiegman argues that   
 
[f]eminism itself provides no stable referent, no coherent point of origin, no 
comprehensive political project for the social justice needs of present change 
or for the intellectual horizons, methodological requirements, or pedagogical 
desires of the field, women’s studies, that is organized in political 
commitment to its name.37 
 
For Wiegman it is not, therefore, the privileging of the political per se which is the 
cause of the ‘growing uneasiness, often overt despair, among feminist scholars about 
the agenda, languages, and political consequences of feminism’s academic 
enterprise’.38 Nor does the current vulnerability of women’s studies to losing its 
raison d’être arise out of feminism. Instead, for Wiegman, what is behind ‘the 
problem of academic feminism’ is ‘having institutional power’;39 the problem 
academic feminism has is its own ‘struggle with the forms and consequences of 
academic feminism itself’.40  
Similarly to Brown, Wiegman wants to perform what she calls a ‘Foucaldian 
reversal’, i.e. to understand disciplines ‘as a consequence of acts of knowledge 
production’. She argues that this approach assumes ‘that efforts to define objects of 
study are always implicated in the construction of the knower as a subject’.41 Her 
grasp on this methodology, however, takes a different road from Brown. Weigman 
                                                 
37 Robyn, Wiegman, ‘On Being in Time with Feminism’, Modern Language Quarterly, 65.1 (2004), 
161-176, p. 175. 
38 Wiegman, ‘The Possibility’, p. 40. 
39 Wiegman, ‘Feminism, Institutionalism’, p. 112. 
40 Wiegman, ‘The Possibility’, p. 42. 
41 Wiegman, ‘Academic Feminim’, p. 30. 
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understands the two premises which uphold discourses of failure, i.e. the binary 
‘political/academic’ and the related positioning of feminism ‘as a stable and 
knowable entity’ are, in themselves, ‘acts of knowledge production’ which produce 
the discipline of women’s studies and its ‘failure’ accounts. In her work Wiegman 
therefore wants to ‘break ranks’ with such ‘stabilizing temporal formulations that 
have accompanied […] historicizing deployments of feminism’ characteristic of 
Brown’s and others’ narratives.42  
Starting from a premise that ‘feminism is not and never has been solely an 
entity, an action, or a movement in time’, Wiegman proposes to approach the issue 
of feminism’s institutionalization in academia by conceptualizing feminism as 
defined by ‘constitutive otherness’ and thus as being unable ‘to remain identical to 
itself’.43 By this she means less to point out that there are various kinds of feminism 
or that we each understand, practice and experience feminism differently, but rather 
to suggest that invoking feminism as otherness (or, ‘our most challenging other’ as 
she puts it elsewhere)  means that there is no ‘temporally singular, or coherently 
knowable – and knowing feminism’.44 Feminism is, as Weigman conceptualizes it, 
both more than what we use it to know and less than what we invest it to answer’.45 
Echoing historiographical work by Joan Scott, rather than seeking a knowable – let 
alone coherent – set of discourses, commitments and political agendas, Wiegman 
affirms and emphasizes discontinuities, discords and differences with and within 
feminism. This approach allows her to overturn the fatum of a failure inscribed in 
the work of Brown and those she critiques, and instead to think through the 
conditions of generating possibilities which are currently unimaginable within their 
                                                 
42 Wiegman, ‘On Being in Time’, p. 163. 
43 Wiegman, ‘On Being in Time’, p. 175. 
44 Wiegman, ‘On Being in Time’, p. 165. 
45 Wiegman, ‘On Being in Time’, p. 175. 
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discourses. It allows her, as she puts it, to inhabit ‘the spectre of failure that haunts 
contemporary academic feminism’.46 
In her text ‘Academic Feminism Against Itself’, Wiegman overturns the 
logic of failure narratives by examining the two concerns raised by Brown (the lack 
of intellectual rigor and the focus on social identity) as related to the university’s 
organization and economy on the whole. The lack of intellectual rigor Brown 
identified within women’s studies Weigman relates to the status and the political 
function of the humanities at the contemporary ‘transnational university’. As 
Wiegman points out, within feminist ‘failure narratives’, it is the humanities-based 
intellectual work (its problematization of subjectivity, language, representation and 
cultural production) which is usually accused of ‘de-politicizing’ feminism. 
Wiegman, in order to disclaim this view, argues that today’s humanities are ‘less the 
antithesis to feminism’s political aspirations than a site’ whose lack of incorporating 
‘national’ vision opens up ‘political possibilities’ for feminism and for the project of 
feminism’s institutionalization in the academy.47 As she explains, in the same vein to 
Bill Readings’ famous account of the current university and its history, ‘the statutes 
of culture, language, and literacy have changed radically as the Cold War university 
and its reliance on the specificity of national culture has given way’.48 The 
humanities, ‘[i]n the loss of its nationalist value as the productive homogenizing 
force for a certain kind of culturally literate citizen’ became an ‘unruly site’. The 
value of the humanities for feminism, Wiegman argues, rests, precisely, in its 
‘unruliness’, in its failure to be instrumentalized by the university and, by proxy, the 
(trans)national state.49  
                                                 
46 Wiegman, ‘The Possibility’, p. 41. 
47 Wiegman, ‘Academic Feminism’, p. 28. 
48 Wiegman, ‘Academic Feminism’, p. 27. 
49 Wiegman, ‘Academic Feminism’, p. 28. 
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Wiegman argues that if academic feminism wants to have a non-
instrumentalized relation to knowledge production, it has to insist on its 
interdisciplinarity and refuse the disciplinary-based distinction which is being 
currently reinforced, i.e. the distinction ‘between theory and practice that reiterates 
the social sciences as the domain of material and social concern and the humanities 
as its abstract and narcissistically-obsessed other’.50  
In her deliberations on the possibilities of women’s studies Wiegman agrees 
also with Brown’s second objection that women’s studies puts increasing 
methodological and epistemological emphasis on the social identity and its 
categories as its proper objects of study. She develops Brown’s argument further and 
shows how this emphasis helps sustain the paradigm where the authentic ‘real 
world’ of experience coincides with the ideal of the political and of feminism, which 
are narrated against the academic and the intellectual. In this context the latter 
(intellectual) is, furthermore, understood as ‘patriarchal’. Wiegman argues, 
 
To be in contact with “her”, no less than to be (autobiographically) “her,” has 
served to generate an equivalency between experience, consciousness, and 
critical practice that is often presented as the real world antithesis to theory’s 
abstracted engagements. “She” is the place, indeed the placeholder, of the 
real, and it is her self descriptions that have been made to facilitate women’s 
studies’ own anxious relation to institutionalization by repeating, so as to 
instantiate as a seemingly inaugural fact, the field’s proclaimed distinction: 
that women’s experience - no matter how mediated, socially constructed, 
complexly self-narrated, or internally differentiated – is the necessary 
thematic and methodological counter to patriarchal discipline.51 
 
                                                 
50 Wiegman, ‘Academic Feminism’, p. 27. 
51 Wiegman, ‘Academic Feminism’, p. 29. 
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While showing and critiquing the ways in which emphasis on ‘her’ and ‘her 
experience’ shape the field and support the dominant narratives about feminism’s 
emergent disciplinarity, Wiegman, nonetheless, also recognizes that emphasizing 
‘identity’, ‘consciousness’, ‘experience’ and the ‘real world’ are by no means trends 
which dominate only women’s studies. According to Weigman, the focus on identity 
is not a trend which has appeared at the university with the advent of women’s 
studies. Instead, it is a sign of an ‘allegiance to the foundational categories of the 
political that underlie not only the twentieth century women’s movement in 
America, but forms of subjectivity in enlightened modernity’.52 Wiegman therefore 
concludes that ‘knowledge production as we know it today is also an identitarian 
project’. At the university, ‘one does not simply study literature, politics, or social 
organization’, but one is a ‘biologist, philosopher, political scientist, even a critical 
theorist’.53 As she further points out,  
 
that these intellectual identities have come to rest in enlightened modernity on 
their dis-establishment from the corporeal does not make them less 
identitarian: rather it reveals how profoundly shaped by structures of identity 
is the domain of academic knowledge production on the whole.54 
 
Following Janet Newman, Wiegman then traces the current reinforcement of 
‘identitarian’ political and ethical discourses and examines their role in the 
production of ‘transnational managed subject’. As she points out, it is not only 
women’s studies but all the humanities and qualitative social sciences are being 
currently reorganized in a way which reinvests ‘in human consciousness, called 
                                                 
52 Wiegman, ‘Academic Feminism’, p. 30. 
53 Weigman, ‘The Possibility’, p. 56. 
54 Weigman, ‘The Possibility’, p. 53. 
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critical thinking, as the domain of social responsibility and ethics’ so as to forge ‘a 
new kind of managed subject for an increasingly mobile and transnational 
knowledge economy’.55 
Peggy Kamuf in her article entitled ‘Accounterability’ calls this trend the 
‘accountability movement’. The problem here, as the title of Kamuf’s essay also 
suggests, is that it is not only scholarly discourses which try to intervene and 
challenge the unjust ‘disciplinary order’ and who call for ‘situated knowledges, 
ethics, and social implementation’, but also, and more increasingly, this rhetoric is 
mobilized by discourses which want to support and further strengthen the current 
status quo.56 Weigman also suggests that the instrumenalization of identity we 
witness in the current university does not only change this particular institution, but 
also plays significant role within the economics and politics on the global scale. As 
she explains, within the context of the U.S., it upholds  
 
democratic progress narrative of the nation-state whereby the production and 
social recognition of injured identities becomes the means … to extend its 
imperial mission into a seemingly ethical globalizing human rights agenda 
(and with it ‘various forms of economic “development” that reiterate the U.S. 
nation-state as a transnational political formation).57 
 
From this perspective, the trends which, according to Wiegman, currently dominate 
women’s studies, the humanities and social sciences respectively therefore stand less 
outside or against the unequal global power relations than they function as an 
increasingly managed and managing site which sustains and reproduce them.  
                                                 
55 Wigeman, ‘Academic Feminism’, p. 22. 
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Recognizing that the two concerns Brown raised in relation to women’s 
studies are not a consequence of discipline’s relation to women’s movement and 
feminism but are, instead, part and parcel of the wider organization of knowledge 
production in the university, allows Wiegman to critically assess Brown’s 
suggestion voiced in the conclusion of ‘The Impossibility of Women’s Studies’. As 
described earlier, Brown, in order to find a way out of the problems she diagnoses 
with women’s studies, suggests we ‘vacate’ the institutional sites where feminism, 
gender and women are primary objects of study, and disperse its content and course 
work to other disciplines within the university. Following Wiegman’s analysis, 
however, it becomes apparent that such a move will not rescue feminist scholarship 
from its troubles related to complex and problematic entanglements of subject 
formation and knowledge production. It will not resolve problems with raison d’être 
neither of those particular disciplinary sites, nor of disciplinarity in general. It will 
not make feminist scholarship less ‘identitarian’. Rather, as Wiegman argues, this 
move will, in the end, only obscure ‘the extent to which traditional disciplines 
themselves are identity formations’.58 
Finally, leaving women’s studies will not help feminists to produce more 
intellectually rigorous work and produce instead the work Brown calls for: the study 
‘of the powers involved in the construction of subjects’. As Weigman notes, Brown 
is, ‘paradoxically, too optimistic’ in her assessment of the current situation in higher 
education. 
The contemporary university, according to Wiegman, ‘offers quite literally “no there 
there” for such a kind of inquiry’.59  
                                                 
58 Wiegman, ‘The Possibility’, p. 50. 
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When, following Brown, we wanted to call for a moment of ‘thinking’, ‘for 
considering where we have been so that we might, in a Nietzschean vein, affirm our 
errors’, we would have to, Wiegman argues, take into account ‘this [that is, not only 
women’s studies but the university’s] institutional failure’. Such considerations will, 
according to Wiegman, function as a preamble not for ‘dismiss[ing] women’s 
studies as an academic endeavour, but in order to extend the critique of identitarian 
belonging to the disciplinary formations that currently structure women’s studies’ 
own knowledge production’.60  
Following Wiegman’s arguments, but also taking the work of the two 
scholars who at the time of addressing the issue of the disciplinarity of women’s 
studies were both affiliated with women’s studies (Brown and Wiegman) as 
examples, it seems that women’s studies, through its analytic work, rather than 
stopping, enables critical examination of the problematics of knowledge production 
and identity. From this perspective, women’s studies, rather than an obstacle which 
makes ‘developing a complex model of power’ impossible – seems to facilitate such 
a possibility.  
This is, precisely, the direction in which Wiegman's argumentation proceeds 
in order to envision the possibility of women’s studies. As she argues, ‘women’s 
studies’ does not have to, and should not, be taken ‘literally’ – that is, as if its 
content has to ‘be compatible, if not coterminous, with modes of inquiry, objects of 
study, and field domain names’. As Wiegman argues, we must ‘refuse the 
assumption that intellectual domains and their objects of study are referentially the 
same’.61 Such an assumption would only repeat mistakes Brown warns against in her 
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article. Assuming that a name of a discipline is fully referential of its object of study 
and that this object can accurately describe or trace the lines of a living subject is to 
‘sacrifice the imaginative reach of theory’ and ‘inevitably’ move  
 
toward positivism, and in this way repeats the very eclipse of sociohistorical 
powers it was intended to challenge: there powers become fixed as categories 
of analysis, rendered as adjectives and nouns, rather than historicized and 
theorized.62 
 
Wiegman, therefore, provides a different conceptualization of women’s studies. 
Drawing on her analysis, she seeks to imagine that what is unimaginable within the 
framework of failure narratives – the possibility of women’s studies. In her 
envisioning of its ‘contingent positivity’, she conceives it as a discipline which 
provides ‘complex elaborations on identity and thus also re-configure[s] the 
organizational principles of knowledge production and practices’. This elaboration, 
as her argument in ‘Academic Feminisms Against Itself’ suggests, and as she further 
develops in a footnote to that essay,63 involves several reconsiderations. 
Firstly, this possibility relies on conceptualizing feminism not as a given and 
fully knowable entity but on understanding feminism as defined by ‘constitutive 
otherness’, as being unable ‘to remain identical to itself’. This, according to 
Weigman, will interrupt academic feminism’s dependence on a certain 
conceptualization of the political and its consequent demand it makes on feminist 
thought. 
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Secondly, re-conceiving feminism as defined by constitutive otherness 
entails a non-instrumental relation to feminist thought. Leaving the affiliation among 
feminism’s various modalities open will enable us to re-imagine what the ongoing 
project of feminism’s academic institutionalization might politically yield. By 
envisioning feminism as ‘non-identical to itself’, Wiegman therefore also argues for 
re-cultivation of feminist ‘utopian thought’. As she articulates it, it will generate 
possibilities for feminism’s ‘future to be other than what we think it was or what we 
assume we now are’64 and therefore, it will keep, as Wiegman invoking thought by 
Elizabeth Grosz argues, ‘the radical openness of the future’.65  
Thirdly, the possibility of women’s studies relies not only on developing a 
critique of knowledge practices within women’s studies but also on forging a deeper 
consideration of the knowledge practices within the university. Specifically, the 
critique of ‘identitariasm’ as, for instance, developed by Wendy Brown in relation to 
knowledge practices in women’s studies, must be extended to a broader critique of 
university knowledge practices. As Wiegman argues, this work entails not only ‘the 
problem of making social identity into disciplines’ but also ‘a rethinking of the 
disciplines as identity formations’.66 It involves understanding and critique of the 
identitarian as belonging to the disciplinary formations that structure not only 
women’s studies internal practices of knowledge production, but the broader shape 
and scope of the university’s organization of bodies and knowledges as well.   
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Women’s Studies at The University in Ruins 
In line with Wiegman I propose we approach feminism as non-identical to itself, 
cultivate radical relationships to the future through utopian thought and forge a 
deeper consideration of knowledge practices within the university. However, I also 
argue that we need to recognize that ‘university knowledge practices’ are not a 
‘given’ but that the way we understand what the university is and was also relies on 
particular narratives. We need to pay attention to and distinguish between various 
narratives concerning the current university and its history.  
More specifically, it is not only feminists who believe that their movements 
and disciplines have lost their rasion d’être and who, as a consequence, narrate their 
own history as a failure. Instead, this trope which has circulated around the discourse 
on feminism since the 1990s, resonates with and can be understood as a part of a 
more general trend. As Clare Hemmings shows, ‘[b]roader social and cultural theory 
reproduces the same story in relation to its own “lost politics”’.67 To Hemmings’ 
insight my work adds another point: the tropes of loss and failure also proliferate 
through and govern discourses which account for the presence and the past of the 
university. Particularly, accounts which dominate the discussion about the university 
since the 1990s seem to narrate the current university as if this institution has also 
reached its end.  
Brown’s ‘The Impossibility of Women’s Studies’ perhaps most noticeably 
resembles one of the most influential texts on the university from the 1990s, Bill 
Readings’ The University in Ruins.  In my interpretation, it is, however, less the 
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appeal and provocativeness of these titles, than it is the structural organization of 
their argument which connects the two texts. 
In his book Readings conceptualizes the modern university as being 
‘organized in view of a single regulatory idea’,68 an idea ‘that functions as its 
referent, as the end and meaning of its activities’.69 This ‘referential’ idea, although 
it has never been exclusively and solely a university’s property, functions as a 
foundation of the modern university and defines its character: the university has an 
autonomous structure but only in order to serve a clear function outside itself, as ‘a 
model for rational political community at large’.70  
As Readings represents the development of this educational institution, it 
begins as a Kantian university of reason which is later replaced by the unifying idea 
of culture. Culture then leads to the even ‘looser’ referent of literature which is then 
not replaced by a new referent but, instead, is released of its referentiality. The 
current university, according to Readings, has lost its very ‘definition’, it has lost its 
content, its raison d'être. It is not characterized by a ‘new referent’ but is empty of 
any idea and becomes a non-referential university of excellence. As such, the current 
university of excellence is a self-contained, self-referential ‘technology’. As 
Readings explains, this is a result of various pressures and changes both within the 
society and the university, namely of the collapse of the nation-state and the 
dismantling of the traditional disciplines and their axioms. The genealogy which 
leads toward the contemporary non-referentiality, is, however, not gradual and 
coherent, but the university, in its ‘final’ –that is, our – stage breaks connection with 
its previous stages. The present university ‘turns’ against its past. As Readings’ title 
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suggests and as he argues, today, we find ourselves ‘at the twilight’ of the modern 
university, in its ‘posthistory’.71  
The aim of Readings’ book, however, is not only to account for the past and 
present of the university but also to think through the possibilities of how we might, 
in the future, ‘dwell in the ruins of the University’.72 In his elaborations of this 
question, he does not recommend we resuscitate any of the previous ideas (reason, 
culture or literature), neither does he recommend we re-conceptualize them. Nor 
does Readings seek to fill the empty university space with a ‘new idea’. Such a 
move would, he argues, only be a nostalgic gesture which would, like the ‘old’ 
ideas, bear exclusionary effects in its desire to encompass and demarcate the 
university’s content. Readings suggests that instead we need to employ an 
‘institutional pragmatics’ which relies - on the contrary - on behaving ‘without 
alibis, without “elsewheres,” [without] a truth whose name might be invoked to save 
us from responsibility for our actions’.73 In his view, if ‘students and teachers are 
ready to abandon nostalgia and try to move in ways that keep questions open’ we 
can turn the ‘dereferentialization of the posthistorical university to good advantage’. 
‘Dereferentialization’ will allow ‘considerable room for manoeuvre’. As he specifies 
further in his text, this would consist in developing new ‘Thought’, a ‘thinking 
without identity and unity’, which, in return, will, refigure ‘the University not as 
grounded upon and reinforced by common cultural identity but as ‘a locus of 
dissensus’.74 
Readings conceptualizes this place where ‘thought takes place beside 
thought, where thinking is a shared process without identity or unity’, the so called 
                                                 
71 Readings, The University, p. 7. 
72 Readings, The University, p. 172-178. 
73 Readings, The University, p. 168. 
74 Readings, The University, p. 192. 
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‘community of dissensus’, through contrasting it to the community of consensus. As 
he argues, traditionally, ‘the community’ has been conceptualized as being ‘founded 
upon the autonomous decision of individuals to communicate with each other as 
subjects of a state’.75 In this sense, ‘the modern community is inherently 
universalizing, since it is based upon the assumption of a shared human capacity for 
their essential humanity’ and the possibility of transparent communication.76 The 
possibility of the autonomous subject is conditioned by one’s subjection to the state 
by which a subject’s singularity and difference are reduced. In the process of 
‘becoming a citizen’, she is therefore torn away from her personal and singular 
experience, sexual difference and specificity, ethnicity, history, context as well as 
from her connections to others, from her dependencies and obligations towards the 
society. 
Against this traditional view, Readings introduces another conceptualization, 
a community which will be ‘heteronomous rather than autonomous’. This means that 
the community of dissensus will not be ‘grounded in sharing commonalities (such as 
ethnicity or language)’ but, as already argued, in sharing ‘without identity or unity’. 
This implies, as Readings further develops, that, in the community of dissensus, 
there are ‘no consensual answers’. The community of dissensus does not ‘pretend to 
have the power to name and determine itself’. It is a ‘sharing which does not 
establish an autonomous collective subject who is authorized to say “we” and to 
terrorize those who do not, or cannot, speak in that “we”’.77  
In order to further elucidate that such a community might have looked like, 
Readings, at the end of his book, turns to Kant. The community of dissensus, he 
                                                 
75 Readings, The University, p. 181. 
76 Readings, The University, p. 182. 
77 Readings, The University, p. 187. 
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argues, ‘would have to be understood on the model of dependency rather than 
emancipation’. This is because,  
 
we are, bluntly speaking, addicted to others, and no amount of twelve-
stepping will allow us to overcome that dependency, to make it the object of a 
fully autonomous subjective consciousness. […]. [W]e cannot emancipate 
ourselves from our dependency on others. We remain in this sense immature, 
dependent - despite all of Kant’s impatience.78 
 
As Readings envisions it, a community grounded in the concept of dependency 
rather than in the Kantian model of emancipation, will turn the university’s ‘ruins’ to 
our advantage because it will fail to provide a model of community for the state. It 
will ‘no longer serve as the answer to the question of the social function of the 
University’. According to this vision, the university will become ‘one place among 
others where the question of being-together is posed rather than an ideal community’ 
[my emphasis].79  
Clearly, Brown’s ‘The Impossibility of Women’s Studies’ and Reading’s The 
University in Ruins are, in many respects, very different kinds of works.80 Yet, 
despite all those differences, one finds striking similarities between the two texts. As 
                                                 
78 Readings, The University, p. 190. 
79 Readings, The University, p. 127. 
80 Readings and Brown, for instance, belong to two different disciplines where they, furthermore, 
occupy markedly different positions. Comparing the two shows how texts and their authors are 
treated differently within feminist scholarship and in a field of ‘critical theory’. The University in 
Ruins has an established and recognized position within its discipline. In fact, as it seems to me, the 
text has been, right from the start, ‘elevated’ to the ‘canonical’ level. Brown’s text, on the other hand, 
does not seem to receive such support. Although her text does not take rank with the provocativeness 
of Readings’ book, and although it is well known and widely cited within feminist scholarship, it has 
not reached similar status. Brown’s work seems to be invoked rather as an example of an ‘extreme’ 
position which is to be readily dismissed or, alternatively, it is approached in the way Wiegman - or I 
attempt to treat her text in this chapter - as a trigger for developing further critical thought. This 
difference, as it seems to me, is also one of the factors which influences the specificity of the field of 
feminist research and why, ‘academic feminism’ is less likely to become, to use Derrida’s 
formulation, ‘just another cell in the academic beehive’ (Derrida, ‘Women in the Beehive’, p.142).  
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I interpret it, Readings’ account of the university’s past and present entanglement 
with the society and his envisioning of its future, follows structural organization of 
narratives which Wiegman calls ‘narratives of failure’. 
Similarly to Brown’s account of feminism and women’s studies, Readings 
reduces the complexities and paradoxes of the university’s history into a single, 
linear narrative which is grounded in the conceptualization of the university as 
having one unifying idea and function. The inability to imagine the university as an 
inherently paradoxical institution and relationality as other than a clear unambiguous 
connection (i.e. the university has only one single function within the society) leads 
Readings to the opposite but symmetrically extreme position. It leads him to propose 
that the current university is ‘non-referential’. This narrows not only his analysis but 
also the resulting propositions. More specifically, the community of dissensus based 
on ‘thinking without identity and unity’ replicates and establishes with further 
strength what it originally wanted to oppose – the university as self-identical, 
autonomous space without any relations to its outside.  
In fact, as Samuel Weber also points out, ‘the thinking without identity and 
unity’ Readings envisions as a foundation of the community of dissensus resembles 
the very ‘modern’ premise of the ‘self-doubting thought, through which a subject 
finds the assurance of oneself’, the Cartesian dubito, ergo cogito, ergo sum (‘I doubt, 
therefore I think, therefore I am’) on which the conception of the modern subject 
relies. As Weber argues in relation to Readings’ ‘non-referential’ university, ‘non-
referentiality’ is   
 
[p]erhaps the distinctively modern form of reference, even since Descartes 
invoked the notion of doubt in order to determine the absolutely certain 
ground upon which the modern subject could take its stand. Excellence, like 
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the Cartesian cogito, distinguished itself from all others, above all from the 
objects of its representations. It divests itself of all ‘content’ in order thereby 
to demarcate its own self-identity, henceforth to be determined as nothing but 
the process of representing as such, which is to say, as the process of 
‘doubting’ as opposed to the determination of that which is doubted.81 
 
From this perspective, Readings’ ‘non-referential’ university rather than a radical 
break with the traditional modern university and its theorizations, seems to be its 
fulfilment. Weber continues, 
 
[i]t is as if Readings, in his effort to discern what is distinctive in the 
contemporary form of the university, himself falls prey to the traditional 
temptation of construing the university as an institution that is utterly self-
contained, identifying simply such self-containment with a ‘bureaucratic 
system’ of management that administers ‘excellence’ in terms of its own self-
interest. It is as if the dream of the university to rid itself finally off all 
external tutelage seems to reach fruition, albeit in a nightmare, when Readings 
asserts that: ‘the University is no longer primarily an ideological arm of the 
nation-state but an autonomous bureaucratic corporation. 82 
 
As Weber argues, the University of Excellence repeats and re-inscribes the modern 
concepts of knowledge and identity formation and thus fulfils the ‘modern’ dream of 
self-identical and autonomous university. Weber suggests, however, that at the same 
time this turns the dream into a ‘nightmare’. This is, as I interpret it, because in the 
process of separating itself from the society, emptying itself of any idea and 
function, the university itself disappears. Readings’ formulation that ‘the University 
                                                 
81 Samuel Weber, ‘The Future Campus: Destiny in a virtual world’, Journal of Higher Education 
Policy and Management, 21.2 (1999), 151-164, p. 160. The essay has been republished as ‘The 
Future of the University: The Cutting Edge’ in 2000 and included in an extended edition of Weber’s 
book Institution and Interpretation in 2001 originally published in 1987.  
82 Weber, ‘The Future Campus’, p. 158.  
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becomes one place among others …’ which describes the ‘future’ community of 
dissensus, would support such an interpretation. For if the university loses its 
singularity, its specificity which distinguishes it from other research or educational 
institutions or places where the question of community is posed, if it becomes one 
place among others, then there is no need to call this place the university anymore - 
there is no need for the university.  
This movement ‘forward’ or ‘ahead’, that is, ‘beyond the modern university’, 
can thus also be interpreted as a movement ‘backwards’; as a regression. Contrary to 
what Readings suggests, the university which ‘no longer gives the answer to the 
question of the social function of the University’, the community of dissensus, will 
not fail to provide a model of a community for the state. According to my 
interpretation, in his deliberations, Readings fails to recognize that to refuse to give 
an answer is, nonetheless, still an answer. The community of dissensus, in its 
rejection of any answers and functions – still offers ‘a model’ for a society. The 
society based on this model is a society without the modern university. It is a society 
of the age before the modern university, that is, before the ‘modern – Kantian – age’. 
 This is also an interpretation which Reading’s description of the community 
of dissensus grounded on dependency rather than emancipation at the end of his 
book implies. By opposing the community of dissensus as based in dependency to 
emancipation, Readings implies a society in its ‘pre-modern stage’ – a ‘feudal’ 
society of dependence and tutelage, of a complete subjugation of subjects to their 
rulers. By arguing for ‘immaturity’ and ‘dependency’ (or even ‘addiction’ as he puts 
it) Readings, erases not only the institution of the university but also the frontier 
through which Kant sought to limit the state’s power and censorship and create a 
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room for intellectual freedom, for free thinking, which would, ultimately, lead, 
towards political freedom.  
That such Kantian demarcations are problematic and paradoxical has been 
clear from the ‘beginning’ of the modern university.83 Erasing those frontiers, as 
Readings’ suggests, however, will not resolve this paradox in a way which would 
allow us to create a possibility of conceiving institutions such as the university, 
neither to re-imagine the project of emancipation and freedom. Nor will it, at the 
end, allow what Readings seeks to create – a room for ‘free thinking’. According to 
my interpretation, the ‘failure’ of Readings’ narrative is, therefore, not only the 
impossibility of imagining the university other than in ‘ruins’. Readings’ also fails to 
deliver what he promised – a concept of community where free thinking would be 
possible.  
Weigman’s examination of the structures of feminist narratives of 
feminism’s institutionalization in the university thus opens a new perspective for the 
examination of how the university and knowledge production is conceptualized. 
More specifically, it enables us to identify elements in Reading’s argumentation in 
The University in Ruins which are similar to those Wiegman critiqued in Brown’s 
work. Yet, that Readings’ university discourse is just another ‘narrative of failure’ is 
a point which Wiegman does not recognize in her work. Although she understands 
                                                 
83 This is a problem which Derrida demonstrates throughout his various readings of the ‘foundations’ 
of the modern university, particularly of Kant’s late book The Conflict of the Faculties published in 
1798. To this insight I would add that the paradox of this limit which seeks to create a room for 
intellectual freedom has appeared even before that. Already in his famous essay ‘What is 
Enlightenment?’, which precedes Kant’s later book on the university by more than ten years, Kant, 
after arguing why it is in the interest of the state to allow its citizens to thin and speak freely (i.e. 
practice ‘public use of reason’), says, after the famous proclamation ‘Argue as much as you like and 
about whatever you like, but obey!’ that ‘[t]his reveals to us a strange and unexpected pattern in 
human affairs (such as we shall always find if we consider them in the widest sense, in which nearly 
everything is paradoxical)’. Immanuel Kant, ‘An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?’ in 
Kant: Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 
54-61 (p. 59). 
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that the two premises which uphold feminist narratives of failure are themselves 
‘acts of knowledge production’ which produce the discipline of women’s studies and 
its current theoretical accounts, when she reflects on knowledge production at the 
university as a whole, she relies on accounts of the university which produce effects 
similar to those she identified in Brown’s work.  
This is not only apparent from references to Readings in her texts84 but also 
from the way she narrates the ‘story’ of knowledge production in the university. 
Particularly the way Wiegman describes the current position of the humanities is 
reminiscent of this approach. As already outlined, in Wiegman’s account, the 
humanities traditionally functioned as a means of unification of a nation state. And 
yet, currently, because of the collapse of the nation state, the humanities has lost its 
function. The humanities, in Wiegmans’ view, is a site which fails to offer an 
incorporating ‘national vision’. The humanities, ‘[i]n the loss of its nationalist value 
as the productive homogenizing force for a certain kind of culturally literate citizen’ 
became an ‘unruly site’. For Wiegman, the value of the humanities for feminism 
rests, precisely, in its ‘unruliness’, in its failure to be instrumentalized by the 
university and, by proxy, the (trans)national state.85  
As it follows from my reading of Brown and Readings, however, and as 
Wiegman herself admits in her work, there is never an ‘empty space’, an ‘unruly’ 
site. A pure and empty space is just another ‘modern’ fantasy. Even non-reference is, 
after all, as Weber argues, still a kind of reference. Furthermore, this ‘referentiality’ 
is not ‘an unruly site’ but is always organized and demarcated in a particular way. 
Indeed, as I will specifically address in the second part of the thesis, the idea that the 
                                                 
84 Wiegman refers to Reading’s work in already mentioned book co-edited with Diane Elam, 
Feminism Beside Itself from 1995 or in ‘The Possibility of Women’s Studies’ (2005). 
85 Wiegman, ‘Academic Feminism’, p. 27. 
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humanities’ key value is that it resists ‘instrumentalization’ is as useless as it is 
widespread. As I will show throughout my analyses, the discourses which argue 
‘against’ ‘instrumentalization’ in such a manner are in fact one of the key obstacles 
for the theoretization of the university as other than ‘in ruins’.  
For now, however, I will conclude this chapter by arguing that the problem I 
see with Wiegman’s way of imagining the possibility of women’s studies is that her 
overall argument is based on the premise that it is not women’s studies but that the 
university as a whole ‘is an institutional failure’. This is not only because her 
conceptualization of the university and the humanities draws on or is similar to that 
of Readings, but also from her arguments that the lack of ‘intellectual rigour’ is not 
only a problem of women’s studies, or from her argument that the whole of 
‘knowledge production as we know it today is also an identitarian project’. 
Following Wiegman’s attempt to read a possibility into the ‘Impossibility of 
Women’s Studies’, I argue that we indeed need to move beyond conceptualizing 
‘feminism’ as identical to itself. In addition, I argue that we also need to move 
beyond theorizations which conceptualize the university (and its humanities) as once 
having an ‘identity’ which now is in a ‘crisis’. I argue that, instead of theorizations 
which reduce the university’s development to a single narrative firmly grounded in a 
conceptualization of the university as a given and knowable entity, we need to work 
through accounts which, to borrow Wiegman’s vocabulary, conceptualize the 
university as being defined by ‘constitutive otherness’. By doing so we may not only 
counter the currently increasing focus on social identity and its categories within 
women’s studies, as critiqued both by Brown and Wiegman, but we may also begin 
to conceptualize the disciplinary character of academic feminism in terms other than 
those of identity.  
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Chapter II - Out of Place  
In this chapter, I will again re-open the possibility of the impossibility of women’s 
studies. I will, however, not open it by arguing that women’s and gender studies 
have, since Brown’s article was first published in the 1990s, overcome their troubles 
and consolidated their intellectual and institutional positions, that they have found 
their ‘proper’ raison d’étre and stabilized their disciplines. Nor will I attempt to go 
in a direction similar to Wiegman’s interpretation in which she proposes that we 
make women’s studies possible by overcoming Brown’s pessimistic approach 
through showing that the problems which women’s studies encounters relate to 
university knowledge production as a whole. In other words, by arguing that the 
whole university is a ‘failure’.  
Both Brown and Wiegman understand ‘impossibility’ as the other or 
negative side of possibility. It is understood to be ‘the not-yet possible’, and thus as 
something which is to be rendered possible, that is, acquired and assimilated within 
the field and reach of already existing options and possibilities. Against this 
traditional understanding, my reading suggests that we do not conceive 
‘impossibility’ simply as a negative of possibility, as something which has to be 
‘overcome’ and rendered possible. I suggest that in order to conceive women’s or 
gender studies as a formation which is open to its unknown future, as Wiegman 
argues, we also have to reconsider the relationship between the possible and the 
impossible. In short, the proposition is that imagining the possibility of women’s 
studies consists in being and doing the impossible.  
How can this be possible? How can we fulfil such a tremendous task? 
In order to outline how we may proceed, I will introduce a discourse which 
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addresses the question of the possibility of the impossible in relation to the 
foundations of the modern university. More specifically, I will discuss an essay 
by Jacques Derrida entitled ‘Vacant Chair: Censorship, Mastery, 
Magisteriality’ where Derrida explores the foundations of the modern 
university through reflections on how Immanuel Kant wrestled with this new 
situation both in his theoretical discourse and his own position within this new 
institutional setting through the question of censorship.  
In the first section of this chapter, I will show with my interpretation of 
this essay that whether academic disciplines are, in their impossibility, 
possible, how the two can be negotiated and how impossibility can or cannot 
be translated to its institutional possibility, was always at stake. I argue that the 
thinking through one’s discipline, the self-reflection of one’s position within 
institutional knowledge production and its possibilities and impossibilities, is 
limited neither to academic feminism nor to the historical moment of its 
emergence. I argue, instead, that such reflections have been central to 
discourses on the modern university since its very beginning. It is, in fact, this 
reflection of oneself as being both a ‘thinker’ and a professor or a teacher at the 
public institution which makes the university ‘modern’. I thus argue that the 
modern university is, structurally, an unsuitable formation, always 
inappropriate to the circumstances and locations of its time. In short, the 
modern university as such, is ‘out of place’.  
This, however is not bad news for the current debates on how feminism 
can or cannot take place in the university. The second section of this chapter 
will examine how sexual difference operates in Derrida’s re-reading of Kant’s 
discourse on the university and censorship. Through a close examination of its 
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final passage, I will show that it is not, as Derrida suggests, only ‘metaphysics’ 
on which the university relies but also ‘phallocentrism’. In other words, Kant 
founds his discourse on the university through the exclusion of the sexually 
other. As my interpretation shows, this exclusion is done through a set of 
reversals of (sexual) powers and roles within the phallocentric economy. 
Vacant Chair: The impossible foundations of the department of philosophy  
‘Vacant Chair: Censorship, Mastery and Magisteriality’ is a part of a lecture series 
titled ‘Transfer Ex Cathedra: language and institutions of philosophy’ which Derrida 
delivered at the University of Toronto in 1985. ‘Vacant Chair’ is the third of the four 
lectures and opens with pointing at a certain ‘transfer ex cathedra’, a particular 
transformation of the position of philosophy and philosophers at the end of the 
eighteenth century and the foundation of the modern university. 
Derrida explains this shift in relation to the theme of the previous 
lecture where he discusses national and natural languages in relation to 
Descartes’ philosophical discourse and language. Descartes, as Derrida 
explains, is an example of a philosopher who, although he struggled with all 
sorts of institutional authorities and posed a series of pedagogical questions, 
‘never did so as a teaching philosopher, as a professor and civil servant in a 
State university’. He did not have to ‘deal with a teaching of philosophy 
organized by the State and entrusted to teachers who are also servants of the 
State’.1 This situation, as Derrida further develops, however, changed 
                                                 
1 Jacques Derrida, ‘Vacant Chair: Censorship, Mastery, Magisteriality’, in Eyes of the University: 
Right to Philosophy 2, eds. Werner Hamacher and David E. Wellbery (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2004), pp. 43-63 (p. 43). 
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everywhere in Europe at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the 
nineteenth centuries. It influenced both the procedures and the content of 
philosophy, as well as philosophy’s (and those practising it, i.e. ‘philosophers’) 
position in the society. In fact, this transformation created a new space - a State 
university where philosophy is located as a discipline, and a new figure - a 
teaching philosopher, that is, a philosopher who simultaneously is a civil 
servant.  
As already suggested, the construction of this new place, the modern 
university, is approached through reflections on Kant’s university discourse 
through the question of censorship. The path Derrida takes through his 
elaborations is, however, rather unusual for a philosopher. In contrast to what 
one might have expected, Derrida does not go straight to ‘philosophy’, to 
‘philosophy’ understood as a universal set of ideas independent of its cultural, 
intellectual and political context. In order to pose the question of censorship, of 
‘censorship, as it might be posed between Reason and the university’, Derrida 
does not drive straight into philosophical works where Kant discusses 
censorship or censorship in relation to the university and philosophy but first 
recalls the political and intellectual climate in Prussia during Kant’s age.2  
‘Kant’s age’, as the Prussian philosopher famously argued in his essay 
‘The Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?’ published in the 
monthly magazine Berlinische Monatsschrift in 1784, is ‘an age of 
enlightenment’.3 Two years after the publication of this article, however, the 
king whom Kant in this essay calls ‘a ruler who is himself enlightened and has 
                                                 
2 Derrida, ‘Vacant Chair’, p. 44. 
3 Immanuel Kant, ‘The Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?’, p. 58. 
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no fear of phantoms’, Frederick the Great, was replaced by his nephew, 
Frederick William II.4 This transfer from an old to a new king significantly 
changed the political and intellectual climate in Prussia. Specifically, it resulted 
in reinforcement of censorship. Although, as the translator of Kant’s work, 
Mary J. Gregor argues, the mechanisms of censorship did exist under Frederick 
the Great, they were, ‘applied very mildly in scholarly affairs’.5 Within the two 
years after Frederick’s the Great death, however, everything changed in this 
respect. Frederick William II was not, unlike his predecessor, in favour of 
enlightenment but ‘rigorously orthodox and mystically inclined’.6 During his 
rule, the power of the church rose significantly which resulted in the 
reinforcement of censorship from the State authorities. In 1788, the law against 
the freedom of the press was declared and after the French Revolution, in 1792, 
a censorship commission was established in Berlin. 
These changes also affected Kant and his work. In 1792, the censorship 
commission prohibited the publication of his Religion within the Limits of 
Reason Alone. Kant protested against this decision and managed to publish the 
book in 1793. The Preface to the first edition of Religion, where Kant discusses 
the question of censorship, arose out of the circumstances surrounding its 
publication. It was also this publication which, as Derrida also recalls, earned 
Kant Frederick William’s II famous reprimand which Kant, together with his 
response, published in the Preface to The Conflict of the Faculties from 1798. 
In 1795 the commission also issued an order to the academic senate in 
Konigsberg, forbidding any professor to lecture on Kant’s philosophy of 
                                                 
4 Immanuel Kant, ‘The Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?’, p. 59. 
5 Mary J. Gregor, ‘Translator’s Introduction’, in The Conflict of the Faculties/ Der Streit der 
Fakultäten (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1979), pp. vii-xxiv (p. ix).  
6 Gregor, p. ix.  
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religion.7 Neither did the book on the university, The Conflict of the Faculties, 
escape repressive measures. The book could be published only after Friedrich 
William II’s death in 1797. 8 
Recalling these socio-political and institutional shifts, transformations 
and conflicts, and situating Kant’s philosophical texts on the university within 
them, is crucial for Derrida’s reading of the modern university. It outlines the 
way in which he conceptualizes the modern university. In ‘Vacant Chair’ and 
other texts on the university, Derrida reads Kant’s university discourse as a 
response to this complex set of structural changes within the political, cultural 
and intellectual context from within philosophy. He reads it as an event which 
both constitutes the concept and the institutions of the modern university and 
changes philosophical thought itself. In other words, for Derrida, ‘context’ 
(geo-political, intellectual, cultural, linguistic but also, as I will show with my 
analysis of the conclusion of ‘Vacant Chair’ in the following section, ‘sexual’) 
is not extraneous to philosophy.9 For Derrida the university has never been –as 
for instance Bill Readings conceives it - an institution ‘organized in view of a 
                                                 
7 Gregor, p. xi.  
8 For more on the shifts in the political, intellectual and cultural context of Prussia in relation to 
Kant’s work, see ‘Translator’s Introduction’ to The Conflict of the Faculties (1979) by Mary J. 
Gregor, or ‘Introduction: Kant and the language of philosophy’ in A Kant Dictionary (1995) by 
Howard Caygill (Howard Caygill, ‘Kant and the “age of criticism”’, in Kant Dictionary (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1995), pp. 7-34. Both Gregor and Caygill read Kant’s The Conflict of the 
Faculties as an elaboration of his earlier discussion of Friedrich the Great’s dictum ‘argue but obey’. 
However, Kant himself does not use the same terminology in his latter text. In his writings on the 
university, Derrida also does not refer to Kant’s ‘What is Enlightenment?’.  
9  In ‘Vacant Chair’, Derrida reads the Kantian university as a response to censorship. In his essay 
‘Mochlos; or, The Conflict of the Faculties’ (1980) the institutionalization of the modern university is 
grasped as a ‘responsible response’, as an attempt to develop ‘a university responsibility’ (Jacques 
Derrida, ‘Mochlos; or, The Conflict of the Faculties’, in Logomachia: The Conflict of the Faculties, 
ed. by Richard Rand (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), pp. 3-34 (p. 3). In his last text on 
this theme, ‘The Future of the Profession or the University without Condition (thanks to the 
‘Humanities that would take place tomorrow)’ delivered in 1991, Derrida conceives his essay as a 
‘profession of faith in the modern university’ (Jacques Derrida, ‘The Future of the Profession or 
University without Condition (Thanks to the “Humanities,” What Could Take Place Tomorrow)’, in 
Jacques Derrida and the Humanities, ed. by Tom Cohen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), pp. 24-57 (p. 24.). 
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single regulatory idea’10 which ‘functions as its referent, as the end and 
meaning of its activities’.11  Derrida does not conceive of the modern 
university as if it ever had a clear and unambiguous relation to the State and the 
society. In his various accounts, the modern university has never been only ‘a 
model for rational political community at large’,12 a means of unification of the 
nation-state as for instance Readings proposes. Instead, Derrida reads the 
modern university, its foundations and relation to the State and the society as 
inherently ambiguous and conflicted.  
In ‘Vacant Chair’ specifically, the modern university is presented as an 
attempt to resist the State’s censorship. Kant’s university discourse is read as 
an attempt to create a space which would be withdrawn from the state’s power 
and its censorship, as an attempt to create a room for free thinking and freedom 
of expression.  
The motif of censorship threads throughout the whole essay. In his 
considerations of how censorship relates to the university, Derrida draws on 
Kant’s definition which appears in the censored work for which Kant received 
the king’s reprimand, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. In the 
‘Preface’ of this book, Kant defines censorship as ‘a critique that has power’. 
Censorship is a ‘critique that has force at its disposal’ and which ‘prohibits, 
reduces to silence, or limits the manifestation of thought, the written or spoken 
word’. For Kant, as Derrida further explains, the ‘power’ or the ‘force’ which 
prohibits is always ‘a political force linked to the power of the State’. It is a 
legal force, Gewalt.13 
                                                 
10 Readings, The University, p. 14. 
11 Readings, The University, p. 54. 
12 Readings, The University, p. 180. 
13 Derrida, ‘Vacant Chair’, p. 48. 
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Drawing on this specification, Derrida therefore argues that censorship 
is defined by two features: it is always tied to reason and it always takes place 
within the public domain. He then discusses the link between reason, publicity 
and censorship in three ways. Firstly, he invokes the etymology of the word 
‘censorship’. He points to the semantic ‘chain’ which ‘links ratio to 
accounting, calculation, censorship’. He emphasises that the Latin word 
‘censere means to evaluate [réputer], to count, to compute’. He recalls that the 
‘“census” is the [public] enumeration of citizens and the evaluation of their 
wealth by the censors (the census takers)’.14 
Secondly, he argues that censorship ‘never presents itself as a brutal 
and mute repression’. Although censorship uses force and uses it against a 
particular discourse, it, nonetheless, always does so ‘in the name of another 
discourse’. Censorship always presupposes the existence of a discourse and of 
a framework of rights, laws, and a tribunal. Censorship, as Derrida argues, is a 
‘judgment with power’. It presupposes institutions, experts, authorities and it 
proceeds ‘through public acts’. It ‘only exists where there is a public domain, 
with state-like centralization’.15  
The third link between censorship, reason and publicity which Derrida 
discusses in his essay is the one created by Kant in his discourse on the 
university. As Derrida describes it,  
 
within or beyond that which can link the possibility of reason to that of 
censorship (technical calculation and enforced examination, by force, of that 
                                                 
14 Derrida, ‘Vacant Chair’, p. 49-50. The question of the overdetermined notion of ‘accounting’ and 
problematization of how it is employed in the discourses reflecting on the current university under the 
unprecedented pressure of ‘marketization’ is explored in the second part of this thesis entitled 
‘Accounting for the University’.  
15 Derrida, ‘Vacant Chair’, p. 49-50. 
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which must and must not be uttered), Kant wants to give the reason for 
censorship in a discourse on the university. He wants to speak the truth about 
censorship from the stance of reason. In doing and saying this, he would like 
to protect reason itself from censorship.16 
 
According to Derrida, all Kantian politics can be interpreted as an enterprise 
‘whose aim is to take note and delimit: to take note of a censoring power – and 
of a legitimacy of State reason as a censoring reason, the power of censorship - 
but also to delimit this power’.17 Yet he also notes that this delimitation of 
State’s power and censorship is a distinctive one. Although Kant ‘takes note 
and delimits’, he, in contrast to what one might have concluded from the 
definition of censorship outlined above, does not envision himself as a censor. 
The way in which Kant delimits the State’s power and censorship does not, as 
Derrida interprets it, happen by opposing the State’s power using a ‘counter-
power’, but rather by using a sort of ‘non-power’. In other words, Kant founds 
the university on an idea of reason which is heteronomous to power.  
Within the Kantian university schema, this ‘non-power’, that is, 
‘reason’, inhabits the Faculty of Philosophy. In his argumentation, Kant always 
insists that this University Faculty does not have any executive power, that 
philosophers and their Faculty are not able to give orders. They do not have the 
power to censor, the legal force, Gewalt. This Faculty is therefore not only 
withdrawn from censorship but also incapable itself of censorship. It is a space 
of pure reason without any power or force. Yet, as Derrida also points out, 
                                                 
16 Derrida, ‘Vacant Chair’, p. 52. 
17 Derrida, ‘Vacant Chair’, p. 49. 
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there is ‘no doubt [that] Kant wants this faculty to have, under certain 
conditions, the right to censor’.18  
How is this possible? How can Kant claim power for the Faculty of 
Philosophy, while, at the same time, arguing that it has no power?  
The answer Kant gives is ‘reason’, an a priori rationality which grounds 
the empirical reality. It gives reason to and reasons for censorship. More 
specifically, according to this schema, the State’s censorship is not simply an 
exercise of a brutal force but it is a use of force with reason. The king - as Kant 
already argued in his famous essay ‘What is Enlightenment?’ which precedes 
the change of the political and intellectual climate in Prussia - is himself 
‘enlightened’.19 In other words, the State and its government is itself inspired 
by reason. Thus, although the university is in conflict with the state and its 
interests (and this conflict, as follows from the title of Kant’s book, The 
Conflict of the Faculties, proliferates the university, but also, as Derrida shows, 
the Faculty of Philosophy and even ‘splits’ the figure of the philosopher-
teacher), the two – the State and the university - are, at the same time, at 
‘peace’. Because both – the State and the University - are grounded in reason, 
they are, at the end of the day, in ‘harmony’.20  
This peculiar limitation implies two key and intertwined consequences 
for the modern university and society: 
On the one hand, reason legitimizes and justifies the State’s censorship. 
Kant, in fact, rationalizes an empirical fact (the existence of the State and its 
censorship). He argues that censorship is not only a ‘factual situation’ but is 
                                                 
18 Derrida, ‘Vacant Chair’, p. 49. Kant even uses the word ‘censorship’ in the conflict of the faculties’  
19 Kant, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, p. 59. 
20 Derrida, ‘Vacant Chair’, p. 57. 
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given ‘a priori’. Censorship is thus ‘found in reason’.21 As Derrida argues 
drawing on his reading of the ‘Preface’ to Religion, the essential argument 
Kant offers for this is the ‘finitude and the fallibility of man’. Derrida, quoting 
from Religion, explains that ‘since the sublimity of moral law “shrinks” in the 
hands of man, respect must be imposed from the outside, by “coercive laws”’, 
that is, by censorship.22  
Yet, on the other hand, a priori rationality also allows Kant to argue for 
freedom of thought and expression, to demand a withdrawal of the Faculty of 
Philosophy from the State’s power and censorship. Furthermore, it also allows 
him to reverse the ‘forces’ in play. It allows him to claim for the Faculty of 
Philosophy the ‘upper hand’.  
The explanation Kant provides in order to claim this reversal is that 
although the State censors, and it has the right to do so, it, nonetheless, cannot 
explain nor give reasons for its actions, and thus nor for its censorship. The 
State therefore needs someone who would be able to rationalize censorship, to 
tell ‘the truth’ about censorship. In other words, the State government needs 
‘experts’ who, in order to do so, would, however, be independent from the 
State, experts who would not be subjected to the State’s authority and would be 
exempt from its censorship. These experts, to whom ‘the truth of censorship is 
accessible’, are, as Kant envisions it, the philosophers and their Faculty, the 
Faculty of Philosophy.23  
I believe that it is because of this particular move – i.e. claiming that 
reason is ‘everywhere’ (it rules over the commonwealth and ‘beyond’, i.e. is 
                                                 
21 Derrida, ‘Vacant Chair’, p. 44. 
22 Derrida, ‘Vacant Chair’, p. 45. 
23 Derrida, ‘Vacant Chair’, p. 52-53. 
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universal) and yet, simultaneously, has a singular, unique place (the Faculty of 
Philosophy) in this particular way - that Derrida repeatedly returns to Kant’s 
university discourse to re-examine and further deconstruct it.24 It is Kant’s 
delimiting and at the same time crossing beyond this limit, and the effects 
(theoretical, but also political and institutional) this particular move implies, 
such as the reversal of powers between the ‘powerful’ State and the Faculty of 
Philosophy which has no power, is weak and vulnerable, why Kant’s discourse 
on the university occupies such a privileged position within Derrida’s 
deliberations on the university.25    
In ‘Vacant Chair’, Derrida’s ‘guiding thread’, in the accounting for this 
paradox in Kant’s university discourse, is the motif of censorship. The 
university, as a public institution of the State, was, as he stresses, ‘in Kant’s 
time and remains to a certain extent today a very sensitive place for tracing this 
limit between censoring and censored reason’. Today, although we find 
ourselves in a different situation from Kant, the theme of censorship in relation 
to the university is, as Derrida reminds us, by no means, anachronistic. 
Although ‘academics are no longer prohibited from publishing a paper, either 
spoken or written’, by a government which would base its decision on the 
opinion of a censorship commission, ‘it would be naïve to conclude that 
censorship disappeared’. Although censorship ‘does not necessarily originate 
                                                 
24 Although, as I show, Kant uses a certain ‘paradox’ in his argument, this does not mean his 
university discourse is a deconstructive discourse and therefore does not need deconstruction as Peter 
Gilgen argues in his reading of it. Peter Gilgen, ‘Structures, But in Ruins Only: On Kant’s History of 
Reason and the University’, CR: The New Centennial Review, 9.2 (2009), 165-193. 
25 As Rebecca Comey argued in her paper entitled ‘Leverage’, Derrida’s reading of The Conflict of 
the Faculties’, Kant’s work on the problem of the university significantly diverts from his previous 
work on the question of enlightenment. Comey argues that within Kant’s oeuvre, The Conflict of the 
Faculties is something like the ‘fourth Critique’ which, rather than serving as a ‘bridge’ (such as the 
third Critique), leads towards paradox and irreconcilability, i.e. aporia. Rebeca Comey, ‘Leverage’, 
presented at 2015 LGS Summer Academy: Right to Philosophy (University College London, 24 June, 
2015). 
   
 
93 
 
from a central and specialized organism, from a person (the king or his 
minister), from a commission officially established for this purpose’, it is still 
present today in the university. What has changed, since Kant’s time, ‘is the 
form the use of this force takes, the place and machinery of its application, of 
its distribution, the complexity, the diversification, and the overdetermination 
of its pathways’. Today, censorship proceeds ‘[t]hrough a highly differentiated, 
indeed contradictory, network’. Even today, Derrida emphasises further, ‘there 
are things that cannot be uttered within the university- or outside of the 
university’: ‘There are certain ways of saying certain things that are neither 
legitimate nor authorized’. There are ‘objects’ which one cannot study or 
analyse in the university or elsewhere.26  
Additionally, as Derrida argues, the way censorship works is not, 
necessarily, by reducing a discourse to an ‘absolute silence’ - ‘not to 
“legitimize” something, according to this or that criterion, not to give it the 
means to manifest itself, is already to censor’: 
 
A book of which two thousand copies are published, an untranslated book, 
remains, today almost a confidential and private document. […] Censorship 
exists as soon as certain forces (linked to powers of evaluation and to 
symbolic structures) simply limit the extent of a field of study, the resonance 
or the propagation of a discourse. […] The moment a discourse, even if it is 
not forbidden, cannot find the conditions for an exposition or for an unlimited 
public, discussion, one can speak of an effect of censorship, no matter how 
excessive this may seem.27 
 
                                                 
26 Derrida, ‘Vacant Chair’, p. 46. 
27 Derrida, ‘Vacant Chair’, p. 47. 
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As the quotation suggests, for Derrida, unlike for Kant, there is no way out of 
censorship. As he argues in several places in ‘Vacant Chair’, ‘the censoring 
delimitation remains unavoidable in a finite and necessarily agonistic field’.28 
‘There is never any pure censorship or pure lifting of censorship’.29 The 
university is, therefore, ‘always censured and censoring’.30  
As I interpret it, however, his reading does not only show how the 
university is always censored and censoring but also further complicates the 
concept of censorship itself. More specifically, while the main theme of the 
essay seems to be ‘censorship stricto sensu’, Derrida – according to my 
interpretation importantly - also suggests that it is not only the question of 
censorship we are dealing with when we encounter the university. Specifically, 
he argues that we cannot ‘limit the question of repressive or prohibitive force 
to that of censorship’. For instance, there is no private censorship - ‘one does 
not speak of censorship in the case of repressive acts or of suppression directed 
toward a private discourse (even less in the case of thoughts without 
discourse)’. Censorship is also ineffective in restricting instances of 
‘contraband, translation, substitution, or disguise’.31 At this point Derrida refers 
to Freud’s use of the figure of censorship as a way of describing the process of 
repression. This figure, Derrida argues, is ‘felicitous’ ‘only insofar as it appeals 
to a principle of order, the rationality of a central organization with its 
discourses, its guardians/experts, and above all its representatives’.32 But there 
are, as he further argues - and not only within one’s psyche - other ‘procedures, 
                                                 
28 Derrida, ‘Vacant Chair’, p. 47. 
29 Derrida, ‘Vacant Chair’, p. 47. 
30 Derrida, ‘Vacant Chair’, p. 46. 
31 Derrida, ‘Vacant Chair’, p. 50. 
32 Derrida, ‘Vacant Chair’, p. 51. 
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techniques, strategies, and ruses’ which ‘prohibit’. There are other ways of 
prohibiting and marginalizing, other mechanisms of prohibition which are not 
‘subjected to a process of State reason, or without declaring itself publicly’.33  
These mechanisms of prohibition, as Derrida further points out, 
‘already existed and were already very complex in Kant’s time’. Kant, 
however, does not discuss them in his work. These mechanisms of prohibition, 
furthermore, exist also ‘[i]n industrial societies with supposedly liberal and 
democratic regimes, even if State censorship is very reduced’. Today, there are 
 
mechanisms of prohibitions, suppression, repression, without censorship 
(stricto sensu): an increasing multiplicity, refinement, and over-determination 
of marginalization or disqualification, delegitimation of certain discourses, 
certain practices, and certain “poems.”34 
 
Kant, as I already argued, does not, in his discourse, pay attention to other 
means of prohibition than censorship even though, as Derrida says, they were 
present and were already very complex in his time. Neither does Kant consider 
‘lapses’ or ‘disturbances’ within ‘a system’ to be, potentially, means of 
resistance against censorship. For Kant, on the contrary, such instances are 
always undesirable and therefore must be limited. Kant’s university layout 
presupposes the establishment of a border, of a pure and decidable limit which 
withdraws the university from the State’s power and censorship. Yet, as 
Derrida’s deconstructive reading of Kant’s university discourse shows, it is – 
precisely - the transgression of the limits that Kant himself sets up which 
                                                 
33 Derrida, ‘Vacant Chair’, p. 51. 
34 Derrida, ‘Vacant Chair’, p. 51. 
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enables his university discourse. When Kant claims power for the Faculty of 
Philosophy which has no power, he himself makes use of a certain ‘lapse’, of 
‘contraband’ or a ‘disguise’.  
This peculiar demarcation, as Derrida reads it, implies several 
consequences for the topology of the university and its position within the 
society: 
1. As already argued, Kant legitimizes and justifies the State’s 
censorship of free thinking and the freedom of expression anywhere but the 
university. This move thus can be understood as being in contradiction with 
‘the enlightenment proper’, with Kant’s previous attempts of establishing 
freedom of thinking ‘for all’.35 Kant’s university discourse which sets up the 
line between the state’s censorship and the university thus has been criticized 
by some of Kant’s followers and contemporaries. Johann Erich Biester, the 
editor of the already mentioned pro-enlightenment Berlinische Monatschrift 
considered it to be a ‘betrayal’ of enlightenment. In a letter to Kant from 1794, 
Biester interprets Kant’s argumentation as a sign of Kant’s withdrawal from 
the struggle for enlightenment, leaving it to others to ‘continue to work on the 
great philosophical and theological enlightenment that […] Kant [had] so 
happily begun’.36 Yet, as I attempt to show, following Derrida and the 
interpretation of Rebeca Comey,37 and in contrast to most of the scholarship on 
Kant’s work, Kant’s deliberations on the university are not a retreat from the 
                                                 
35 A careful reading of this proposition in Kant’s ‘What is Enlightnement?’ would however show, that 
the paradox as well as the strategy of ‘disguising’ Derrida finds in Kant’s university discourse has 
already been foundational for the claim for ‘public use of reason’. Kant, ‘What is Enlightenment?’.  
36 Immanuel Kant, ‘From J. E. Biester, December 17. 1794’, in Philosophical Correspondence, 1759-
1799 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1967), p. 220.  
37 Comey, ‘Leverage’.  
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ideals of Enlightenment. Rather, they signal a path towards another kind of 
enlightenment.38 
2. Although Kant legitimizes the State’s reason as a censoring reason, 
as having the right to censor in certain conditions and within certain limits, he 
also wants, at the same time, to withdraw pure reason, the Faculty of 
Philosophy and the University respectively, from all censoring power. The 
limit between the State’s censoring reason and reason without power does not, 
however, circumvent the university but passes right through it. In Kant’s 
university layout, the university consists of two classes of faculties. The Higher 
Faculties (Theology, Law and Medicine) and the Lower Faculty (Philosophy). 
The Higher Faculties are linked to the state which they also represent, and they 
are subjected to its authority. In the Lower Faculty, on the contrary, the State 
cannot exercise its censorship as long as philosophy does not intervene in the 
State’s affairs, that is, as long as it limits itself to speaking within the university 
and not outside of it.39 
3. The border line which secures the division of the rights and the 
authorities of the Kantian university schema not only prefigures and configures 
the singular place of the department of philosophy but also a definition of the 
philosopher as the ‘teacher of pure reason’.40 The faculty of philosophy is a 
place where a ‘teacher of pure reason’ is located. However, as I argued in the 
introduction of this section, in this ‘new situation’, i.e. in the modern 
university, the philosopher is not simply an individual subject. He is also ‘a 
                                                 
38 E.g., Howard Caygill. Howard, Caygill, ‘Kant and the ‘age of criticism’, in A Kant Dictionary 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1995), pp. 7-34.  
39 Indeed, one of the key ‘methodological’ paths Derrida takes in order to deconstruct Kant’s 
university discourse in his other works is through the distinction between constative and performative 
speech acts. The discussion in the chapter V elaborates on this. 
40 Derrida, ‘Vacant Chair’, p. 53. 
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teaching subject in an institution, a competent subject and civil servant’ who 
spreads a doctrine. He is, as Derrida puts it, a ‘“Dozent,” someone who teaches 
disciples and whose qualifications are recognized by the State. He has a status, 
which is no longer the status that dominated in philosophy before Kant’. This 
‘Kantian moment’ is therefore a moment of ‘becoming-institution, more 
exactly, a becoming-state-institution of reason, a becoming-faculty of 
reason’.41 However, the ‘transfer ex cathedra’, a transfer toward a position of 
authority and power, the institutionalization of philosophy within the university 
is not, as Derrida shows with his various readings of it, as straightforward and 
unequivocal as it might seem.  
4. The teacher of philosophy seems to be occupied only with reason, 
with a priori rationality, and not with other issues – issues which are discussed 
within the Higher Faculties, let alone outside of the University. Such issues 
seem, according to Kant’s delimitations, not to be within the official 
competence of the teaching philosopher. This is, however, only an appearance. 
As Derrida stresses, ‘it seems to be this way’. It is ‘truth’ only ‘in certain 
respects’.42 For as I already argued, from another point of view, the 
philosopher and the Faculty of Philosophy claim to observe the entire field of 
the other university faculties and thus, by proxy, also the affairs of the State. 
The teacher of pure reason, although he is located in a particular department 
and has no power, in his vision and his critical inspection is, nevertheless, able 
to comprehend the entire field of knowledge. 
                                                 
41 Derrida, ‘Vacant Chair’, p. 55. 
42 Derrida, ‘Vacant Chair’, p. 54. 
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Drawing on the paradoxical character of this topology, Derrida 
concludes that the teacher of pure reason therefore must have two places: a 
circumscribed place and a non-place that is also a panoptical ubiquity. This 
bears consequences for the university and its topology. More specifically, the 
result of the Kantian university topology is a ‘double bind’ which implies that 
the teaching philosopher has a particular relationship to power.  The 
institutional consequences 
 
result from this double bind that knots itself around the sublime body of the 
teacher of philosophizing, of his evident and unavoidable absence. For in his 
very withdrawal, he remains unavoidable. He haunts the scene more than he 
dominates it; he dominates it, indeed, as would a phantom. One could say that 
he fascinates and seduces, if these connotations were not too closely tied to 
sensibility and imagination: for reason should break the charm.43 
 
Derrida pushes this paradox in Kant’s university discourse forward with his 
interrogation at the end of the essay: How can it be possible that a ‘phantom’ 
rules the university? How can the university, teaching, and the Faculty of 
Philosophy, Derrida asks,  
 
constitute institutional places […] for a teacher of pure reason who in fact 
does not exist and is nowhere to be found (aber da er selbs do nirgend)? How 
can one think this corporate body without a body proper? […] Nowhere, 
everywhere: how to order this topology? How to translate it into an 
institution?44 
 
                                                 
43 Derrida, ‘Vacant Chair’, p. 62. 
44 Derrida, ‘Vacant Chair’, p. 63. 
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That Kant’s university layout is caught in a double bind is not, as Derrida points 
out, his own observation. It is an objection which has already been raised by Kant’s 
contemporaries and his followers, such as Friedrich Schelling. As Derrida recalls, 
according to Schelling, ‘Kant is wrong to wish there were something like a 
specialized institutional place, a department for philosophy. Since philosophy is 
everywhere, one must not reserve a place for it. Above all, one must not assign it a 
place’.45  
Derrida, in his explanation of how ‘one can [or, I would even argue that one 
has to] assign it a place’, in showing how the topology of ‘nowhere’ and 
‘everywhere’ still translates into an institution, takes a different direction to 
Schelling. In the last paragraphs of his essay he argues that if this impossible 
topology can take place, if this topology of ‘nowhere’ and ‘everywhere’ can be 
ordered into an institution, it is due to ‘rational metaphysics’ that is also the censor in 
the Faculty of the Philosophy. With this proposition Derrida deconstructs the border 
which Kant suggested (or, rather seemed to suggest), to draw and maintain between 
censorship and domains which are withdrawn from it. For Derrida, unlike for Kant, 
the question therefore is not that of ‘censorship’ and ‘non-censorship’ but, as he 
concludes in ‘Vacant Chair’,  
 
the debate […] remains that of the best censorship. For a teacher, or for a 
finite being, there is never any lifting of censorship, only a strategic 
calculation: censorship against censorship. Is this strategy an art?46  
 
                                                 
45 Derrida, ‘Vacant Chair’, p. 63. 
46 Derrida, ‘Vacant Chair’, p. 63.  
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Does the conclusion of ‘Vacant Chair’ that there is ‘never lifting of censorship’ 
imply that we should not seek to found and further develop institutional places such 
as universities or specific departments where ‘free and critical thinking’ can be 
pursued? Does Derrida’s insight, that neither ‘thinking’ of a philosopher like Kant is 
- if not conditioned by - at least inseparable from his socio-political context, parallel 
Brown’s critique of women’s studies? In particular, does it parallel her argument that 
it is its exorbitant relationship with its political origin which makes women’s studies 
impossible as an academic discipline? Or, as the final sentence quoted above would 
suggest, is Derrida trying to propose that ‘founding’ educational institutions, like that 
of the university, rather than being a business of philosophy is an artistic project?  
As I interpret it, for Derrida, the recognition that censorship is unavoidable 
does not imply we cannot strive for freedom of thinking and expression. Neither does 
it imply that we should not try to demarcate locations where these freedoms can be 
pursued and that the faculty of Philosophy or any other department and the ‘rational’ 
university are impossible. Derrida does not turn against the Kantian idea of 
emancipation and autonomy, against an idea of ‘rational community’ as Readings 
does with his ‘community of dissensus’. Yet, as his conclusion implies, nor does he 
pursue a fantasy of a place fully free of external strings.  
As Derrida explicitly professes in other works where he addresses the 
question of the university or reflects on the problem of enlightenment, he believes in 
the possibility of the future of the modern-Kantian-university and affirms concerns 
for independence and autonomy yet, simultaneously he puts these concepts and 
institutions into question.47 As it seems to me, it is this belief which, however, does 
                                                 
47 This appears, as already argued in the Introduction, in texts such as ‘Mochlos’, in ‘The future of the 
profession or the university without condition’, ‘The Principle of Reason: The University in the Eyes 
of its Pupils, in his essay ‘Privilege’ as well as in the essay ‘The ‘world’ of the enlightenment to 
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not exclude but rather feeds on radical interrogation, which differentiates Derrida’s 
university discourse not only from that of Schelling’s but also from that of Readings 
and Brown who both, at least with the works discussed in here, seem to walk in 
Shelling’s footsteps.  
‘Vacant Chair’, a reading of the foundations of the modern university as 
wrestling with the possibility of philosophy as an academic discipline, with how 
philosophy can take place institutionally, thus offers an insight into how we can 
conceptualize the disciplinarity of academic feminism, how we can conceptualize 
women’s studies as both a possible and an impossible disciplinary formation. As my 
interpretation shows, whether academic disciplines are, in their impossibility, 
possible, how the two can be negotiated and how impossibility can or cannot be 
translated to its institutional possibility, was always at stake. Indeed, such reflections 
are structural to the modern university. Following Derrida’s reading of Kant’s 
university discourse, we can argue that, in this sense, the modern university is 
structurally, an unsuitable formation, always inappropriate to the circumstances and 
locations of its time. In short, the modern university is ‘out of place’.  
Affinities, discrepancies and folds of tremendous formations 
The idea of being ‘out of place’ is thus not unique to women’s studies. What, 
however, is unique to women’s studies is the place from which it is out.  
Clearly, that which we call ‘women’s studies’, ‘gender studies’, 
‘feminist studies’, ‘academic feminism’ or even ‘feminist theory’ is not 
                                                 
come’, in ‘The Other Heading: Reflections on Today’s Europe’. Derrida discusses this through Kant 
also in the interview ‘Canons and Metonymies’ with Richard Rand.  
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‘philosophy’.48 ‘Feminist theory’, as Stella Standford says in her consideration 
of the relationship of this endeavour to philosophy, is ‘indeed at odds with, and 
pose[s] a threat to, the traditional insularity of the discipline of philosophy’.49 
To the extent that philosophy understands itself as a self-sufficient and all-
explanatory discipline able to provide univocal explanations, as long as 
philosophy considers itself to be ‘the queen’ of disciplines and of all 
knowledge (which is a limitation which, as Standford argues, philosophy is 
‘perversely proud of’), feminist theory and its disciplinary locations such as 
gender or women’s studies, are in conflict with philosophy and make its 
foundations tremble.50   
The reason for this is not only because academic work conveyed in 
women’s studies is ‘all over the place’ (that is, ‘inter-’ or ‘trans-’ disciplinary) 
but also because of the ways in which women’s studies is ‘out of place’ and 
which are implied by the particularity of the enabling limits of its emergence. 
Feminist theory and women’s studies did not, as Standford argues and as the 
work of Brown and Wiegman also testifies, constitute themselves primarily in 
relation to any specific discipline, or the disciplines in general. They are not 
like, for instance, philosophy or the humanities which constitute themselves 
particularly through a relation to what we call ‘natural sciences’. In philosophy 
and the humanities, this encounter has most commonly taken the form of 
denunciation and consequential exclusion of natural sciences. As such, and as I 
                                                 
48 That concepts and categories are non-identical entities does not, however, as for instance Brown 
seems to believe, make them unusable. For me, the point of showing that ‘feminism’, ‘gender’ or 
‘women’ or ‘gender studies’ are problematic and paradoxical, is not an encouragement to abandon 
those categories. Although their meaning is unstable and always reaches beyond them, it is, according 
to my opinion, still meaningful and necessary to speak about and differentiate between ‘gender’, 
‘women’, ‘feminism’, ‘feminist theory’ or ‘philosophy’ and ‘deconstruction’.   
49 Stella Standford, ‘Contradiction of Terms: Feminist Theory, Philosophy and Transdisciplinarity’, 
Theory, Culture & Society 32.5-6 (2015), 159-182, p. 159. 
50 Standford, ‘Contradiction of Terms’, p. 175. 
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will discuss in the second part of the thesis, it continues to be one of the key 
obstacles of imagining the university as other than in ‘ruins’.  
The enabling condition of the emergence of feminist scholarship are 
different from the one described above. As Stanford puts it, the decisive 
relation for this discipline has been, above all, the relationship to ‘practice, that 
is, politics’.51 Or, as Wiegman argues, academic feminism has constituted itself 
particularly through struggling ‘over the dynamic of knowing and doing, over 
the difference that each constitutes to the other, weighing one over the other, at 
times defending real world politics as a culmination of both’.52  
It is thus the tie to the women’s movement, to the broad and collective 
response to what some call ‘the inequality between men and women’ and 
others ‘patriarchy’ or ‘phallocentrism’ which makes feminist scholarship 
particularly ‘out of place’. As such, ‘women’s studies’ is ‘out of place’ not 
only in the sense that it is not restricted only to the university. It is not only 
because ‘feminism’ has various and incommensurable modalities (i.e. political, 
intellectual, etc.) but also because it does not properly belong to the current 
circumstances, to this patriarchal society. Thus, it does not only point at or 
critique the inadequacies of this current ‘place’ but also seeks to transform it so 
as to make possible futures which would be more just than our past and 
present.53 It therefore does not belong in at least two ways: First, it is ‘out of 
place’ in the sense that it is not particularly welcomed (and that is why, as 
Pollock argues, feminism is experienced as ‘traumatic’ by both men and 
women, why it is a ‘bad memory’). Second, it is not fully in this current world 
                                                 
51 Standford, p. 174.  
52 Robyn Wiegman, ‘Feminism, Institutionalism, and the Idiom of Failure’, differences, 11.3 (1999), 
107-136, p. 109. 
53 See for instance Cornell, Beyond Accommodation, p. 185. 
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as it seeks to step or leap into this ‘other’, ‘unknown’ and ‘uncertain’ place 
called ‘future’ (Pollock calls this modality of feminism the ‘virtual future’).54   
No ignorance of disciplinary frontiers and contextual differences on my 
part then. The political, intellectual and cultural specificities of historical 
contexts and resulting specificities of the two are related but significantly 
different. The disciplinary projects, philosophy and women’s studies, are 
clearly incommensurable in this sense.  
Yet, apparently, philosophy is not the only academic formation with 
which feminist inquiry is incommensurable. It is neither synonymous with 
other ‘tremendous’ formations which emerged in the academia or in its vicinity 
within the same time and which are akin to it. In other words, what we call 
‘feminist theory’ is not ‘critical theory’ or another tradition of thinking which I 
mobilize specifically in my thesis, ‘deconstruction’.55  
That ‘feminist theory’, ‘critical theory’ or ‘deconstruction’ share strong 
affinities can be confirmed by a brief look into university curricula. Courses 
titled ‘critical theory’ contain texts which were written by feminist scholars, 
address problems which are central to feminist inquiry or discuss texts and 
concepts which were not primarily taking feminist critique into account from 
‘feminist perspective’. Neither is it uncommon that feminist authors and 
themes feminist scholarship focuses on appear on syllabi on ‘deconstruction’ or 
seminars discussing Derrida’s work.  
‘Critical theory’, ‘deconstruction’ and ‘feminist theory’ also often ask 
similar questions and their inquiries proceed along similar paths. Sometimes, 
                                                 
54 Griselda Pollock, ‘Is Feminism a Trauma, a Bad Memory, or a Virtual Future?’, differences, special 
issue Transatlantic Gender Crossings, 27.2 (2016), 27-61. 
55 On the further discussion on the relationship between ‘critical thought’, ‘theory’ and ‘feminist 
theory’ see Berger, The Queer Turn, 126-127. 
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they even create similar intellectual and political effects. This is hardly 
surprising, after all, as they have emerged out of mutual conversations and 
provocations. Despite these affinities, they are, however, still formations which 
are in important ways different from each other. Thus, although deconstruction 
has a particularly strong relationship to political transformation and seeks to 
imagine more just futures, and although it has been, undoubtedly, in its 
emergence and since then influenced by ‘revolutions’ triggered by social and 
political movements,56 its relationship to them is different from that of feminist 
theory. ‘Deconstruction’ emerged as a ‘tremendous project’ from within 
philosophy and one of its key enabling limits was, as Derrida explains in 
‘Punctuations: the Time of a Thesis’ which he first presented at his oral 
defence for the doctorat d’état in 1980, an encounter with literature.57 The 
kinds of trembling deconstruction triggers thus have a different character to 
that of feminist theory. 
Yet, as I interpret it, that deconstruction and feminist theory, in all their 
affinity, are unique and have different abilities and focuses, is not a weakness 
but the strength of their alliance. For my part, it is the places where the two 
fold into each other which cause the most interesting and profound trembling. 
Identifying and exploring instances of their folding particularly in relation to 
                                                 
56 This is, at least, according to my understanding and also according to other scholars such as 
Drucilla Cornell or Elizabeth Grosz. See Cornell’s two seminal works The Philosophy of the Limit 
(1992) and Beyond Accommodation (1991). Grosz explains how deconstruction, or Derrida’s work 
relates to feminism in ‘Ontology and Equivocation’ (1995) or ‘Derrida and Feminism’ (2005). 
57 Jacques, Derrida, ‘Punctuations: The Time of the Thesis’, in Eyes of the University: Right to 
Philosophy 2. (Stanford: Standford University Press, 2004), pp. 113-128. The first title of the doctoral 
thesis which Derrida registered in 1957 under the supervision of Jean Hyppolite was The Ideality of 
the Literary Object. Derrida says in ‘Punctuations’: ‘I have to remind you, somewhat bluntly and 
simply, that my most constant interest, coming even before my philosophical interest, I would say, if 
this is possible, was directed toward literature, toward that writing that is called literary’ (116).  
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the questions of academic disciplines and the university is, indeed, one of the 
aims of this thesis.  
In the essay ‘Vacant Chair’, one of these ‘folds’ manifests itself in the 
conclusion where Derrida, after recalling Schelling’s criticism that Kant’s 
university is paradoxical and one therefore cannot ‘assign a place to 
philosophy’, explains how the topology of ‘nowhere’ and ‘everywhere’ 
translates into an institution. The way Derrida narrates the institutionalization 
of philosophy seems striking to me: It is metaphysics that translates this 
impossible topology into an institution. She, according to Derrida’s choice of 
pronouns, is also a censor in the faculty of Philosophy and, as Derrida 
suggests, perhaps exercises censorship against the censorship of the State. In 
this ‘story of origin’, ‘metaphysics’ is, indeed, presented as ‘she’ and the whole 
scene is narrated as a ‘love story’, as a ‘lovers’ story’ or a ‘love affair’ between 
the philosopher (master) and his ‘mistress’, metaphysics.   
In the following section, I will closely examine this final passage. 
Drawing on my reading, I will propose that it is not only ‘censorship against 
censorship’ we are dealing with when we consider the foundations of the 
modern university. Nor that it is only metaphysics that translates the impossible 
university topology into an institution. According to my interpretation, the 
‘other forces’ and ‘means of prohibition’ which Derrida mentions earlier in his 
text, and on which the university relies, are not only ‘metaphysical’, but also 
‘phallocentric’. In other words, the university is founded by the exclusion of 
the sexually other which the teaching philosopher masters by playing a ‘double 
game’, by using ‘sexual powers’ which are both ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’. 
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The invocation of the ‘love affair’ between the master and the mistress 
is thus an instance which allows us to critically examine the complexity of the 
way phallocentrism operates within Kant’s paradoxical university discourse. It 
thus also allows us to situate, within the university, a possibility of ‘certain 
discourses, certain practices, and certain “poems”’ Derrida mentions in his 
essay and which are subject to various mechanisms of prohibition, suppression, 
repression, without censorship (stricto sensu)’. As I interpret it, this passage 
thus also signals the possibility of particular ‘poems’ which the university 
hides from itself - ‘poems’, which suggest The Sex which is not One, tell the 
Tales of Sexual Difference, and ask: ‘What Does a Woman Want?’58 
The Mistress, Misstery and the Missery of Kant’s University  
In order to examine the final passage of ‘Vacant Chair’, let me quote it in its entirety. 
After recalling Schelling’s criticism that Kant’s university is paradoxical and one 
therefore cannot ‘assign a place to philosophy’, Derrida writes: 
 
Nowhere, everywhere: how to order this topology? How to translate it into an 
institution? […] 
There is the teacher [maître] – and he is absent. But he has a mistress – 
metaphysics. Kant presents metaphysics as a cherished lover (Geliebte) to 
whom one always returns after quarrelling. This teacher’s mistress [maîtresse 
du maître] is also a censor: in the department or in the (lower) Faculty of 
philosophy. She is, therefore a censor without public force. Perhaps this 
                                                 
58 Readers familiar with feminist thinking undoubtedly recognize that these are also references to the 
seminal works within the field. Particularly, they belong to feminist tradition which seeks to imagine 
sexual difference as ‘other’ sexual difference, that is, beyond phallocentric logic. Luce Irigaray, This 
Sex Which is not One (New York: Cornell University Press, 1985); Hélène Cixous, ‘Tales of Sexual 
Difference’, in The Portable Cixous, ed. by Marta Segarra (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2010), pp. 48-60; and Shoshana Felman, What Does a Woman Want?: Reading and sexual difference 
(Maryland: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).  
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censor exercises her censorship against the censorship of the State. Censorship 
against censorship, censorship of reason, serving and not opposing reason.  
But, by defining this rational metaphysics as Censoramt, one acknowledges a 
censoring structure of reason. 
The debate thus remains that of the best censorship. For a teacher, or for a 
finite being, there is never any lifting of censorship, only a strategic 
calculation: censorship against censorship. Is this strategy an art?59 
 
As discussed in the previous section, in ‘Vacant Chair’, Derrida describes the 
emergence of the modern university and the institutionalization of philosophy as an 
academic discipline as processes intimately tied to censorship. Drawing on Kant’s 
definition, Derrida conceives of censorship as a power inspired by reason which 
relies on the existence of public domain and its institutions. The final passage quoted 
above however further complicates this proposed schema. 
Firstly, as we read in the passage, metaphysics is a censor located in the 
lower faculty, in the faculty of philosophy. Metaphysics thus, as Derrida argues, does 
not have, unlike the State’s censorship, public force. This specification would 
suggest that metaphysics is a power which operates through the other ‘forces’ and 
‘mechanisms’ Derrida mentioned earlier in the essay. In other words, it would 
suggest that metaphysics belongs to ‘prohibitions’ which do not declare themselves 
publicly and thus operate on the level of ‘the private discourse’, or ‘thoughts without 
a discourse’, that is, on a level which, as he also points out, eludes censorship stricto 
sensu. Metaphysics thus seems to belong to this more clandestine and concealed 
mechanisms of prohibition, to the ‘illegal traffic’ which proceeds through strategies 
                                                 
59 Derrida, ‘Vacant Chair’, p. 63. 
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such as ‘disguise, substitution, contraband and translation’ which Derrida 
enumerated earlier in the essay and which can also oppose the State’s censorship.   
Secondly, in order to describe how the university can take place, Derrida does 
not speak about metaphysics only as a censoring and prohibiting power but also as a 
productive power. In other words, it is a power which institutes, a power which puts 
institutions in their place. Metaphysics is thus a censor who ‘orders’ the topology of 
‘nowhere and everywhere’ into an institution. The way Derrida describes how this at 
once restrictive and productive force works seems to me to be peculiar. Derrida says 
that Kant’s topology of ‘nowhere’ and ‘everywhere’ is a paradox which ‘orders’ into 
an institution through translation: as we read in the quotation, he asks ‘How to 
translate it [the topology of ‘nowhere’ and ‘everywhere’] in to an institution?’60 
Metaphysics thus, as the final passage of ‘Vacant Chair’ suggests, not only censors 
but also translates. 
Does this terminological choice imply that ‘translation’ is a ‘metaphysical 
operation’? Or, does it imply that translation is a kind of censorship? Does Derrida 
want to suggest that ‘translation’ is a process of ‘expurgation’, that translation ‘cuts’ 
words as a censor cuts portions of a book, film, or letter?  
Clearly, the term ‘translation’ is used in a broad sense in this passage. This 
terminological choice is however, according to my interpretation, not without 
significance.61  In the ‘Roundtable on Translation’ which accompanies another of 
                                                 
60 Derrida, ‘Vacant Chair’, p. 63. 
61 Consulting the other three texts which belong to the lecture series ‘Transfer Ex Cathedra: 
Language and Institutions of Philosophy’ would support this assumption (it is published in Eyes of 
the University: Right to Philosophy 2 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004, pp1-81). The two 
essays which precede ‘Vacant Chair’ are entitled ‘If There is Cause to Translate I: Philosophy in its 
National Language (Toward a “licterature en francois”)’ and ‘If There is Cause to Translate II: 
Descartes’ Romances, or the Economy of Words’. In these two lectures Derrida explores the 
implications of Descartes writing the Discourse on Method in French rather than in Latin and of 
French becoming a State language. The last lecture of the series, ‘Theology of Translation’, examines 
consequences of Schelling’s ‘institutional translation’ of Kant’s ‘conflictual’ university schema into a 
layout secured by the idea of the ‘unity of the originary world’ (75). 
   
 
111 
 
Derrida’s texts on education,62 Derrida argues that we can understand translation not 
only, as Jakobson’s classification of translation proposes, in ‘intralingual’ sense (as 
paraphrasing) or as ‘interlingual translation’ (a translation from one language to 
another) but also as an ‘inter-semiotic’ operation, that is, as a re-encoding of verbal 
signs into non-verbal sign systems.63 Additionally, he points out that ‘translation is 
not one’, also in a sense of there being various conceptualizations of translation. The 
traditional understanding, as Derrida explains, such as Jakobson’s classification, is 
grounded in the belief in self-identity and purity of language systems and the 
resulting possibility of transparent translatability.64 This conception of translation 
‘presumes the existence of one language and of one translation in the literal sense, 
that is, as the passage from one language into another’. It is grounded on the idea that 
translation is a ‘transfer of a meaning or a truth from one language to another without 
any essential harm being done’. It wants to ‘fix’ the seeming univocality of meaning, 
or, at least, ‘master’ its plurivocality.65  
Such an understanding of translation, as Derrida further explains, does not 
characterize only Jakobson’s classification but sustains the project of philosophy. 
This implies significant consequences for philosophy: When the translation fails to 
transfer meaning transparently, philosophy also finds itself defeated. This is what 
Derrida sought to show in his famous text ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ through the word 
‘pharmakon’ whose ‘body’, as he puts it in the roundtable discussion, ‘is in itself a 
constant challenge to philosophy’:  
 
                                                 
62 Jacques Derrida, ‘Roundtable on Translation’, in The Ear of the Other: Otobiography, 
Transference, Translation, ed. by Christie McDonald (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1985), pp.93-161. 
63 Derrida, ‘Roundtable’, p. 95-105. 
64 Derrida, ‘Roundtable’, p. 100. 
65 Derrida, ‘Roundtable’, p. 119. 
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Philosophical discourse cannot master a word meaning two things at the same 
time and which therefore cannot be translated without an essential loss. 
Whether one translates pharmakon as ‘poison’ or ‘remedy’, whether one 
comes down on the side of sickness or health, life or death, the undecidability 
is going to be lost. So pharmakon is one of the limits, one of the verbal forms 
– but one could cite many others and many other forms - marking the limit of 
philosophy as translation.66  
 
Derrida, in contrast to traditional philosophers, does not seek to ‘fix’ meaning or 
master plurivocality. For him, as he argues, translation is an ‘agreement’ which 
implies ‘the difference of languages rather than transparent translatability’. 
Transparent translation is therefore always a failure, and thus is always impossible. 
This, however, does not imply that one should not translate. Although translation is, 
in this sense impossible, we cannot do anything else but translate. For Derrida, 
translation thus operates in the form of a ‘promise’: It ‘never succeeds in the pure 
and absolute sense of the term’ but ‘succeeds in promising success, in promising 
reconciliation’.67 ‘Good translation’, Derrida argues, ‘is one that enacts that 
performative called a promise with the result that through the translation one sees the 
coming shape of a possible reconciliation among languages’.68 
Derrida’s understanding of translation not as a ‘transparent transfer’ but as a 
multiplying generative force, would explain why he chooses this word to describe the 
process of university’s institutionalization.69 More specifically, conceiving of 
institutionalization as translation opens the possibility of instituting the university 
                                                 
66 Derrida, ‘Roundtable’, p. 120. 
67 Derrida, ‘Roundtable’, p. 123. 
68 Derrida, ‘Roundtable’, p. 123. 
69 Derrida explains in ‘Letter to Japanese Friend’, ‘the question of deconstruction is also through and 
through the question of translation, and of the language of concepts, of the conceptual corpus of so-
called “western” metaphysics’. Jacques Derrida ‘Letter to Japanese Friend (Prof. Izutsu)’, in Derrida 
and Différence, ed. Robert Wood and Rober Bernasconi (Evaston: Northwestern University Press, 
1988), pp. 1-5 (p.1). 
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otherwise, of a possibility of translation which would be founded on other 
‘agreements’ than those which are currently in place. Furthermore, his understanding 
of translation as a promise, as a necessary even though impossible task, would also 
explain why, in contrast to other inheritors of Kant’s discourse on the university (like 
Schelling, Readings or Brown in the case of women’s studies), he insists on the 
possibility of ‘translating’ Kant’s ‘impossible’ topology into an institution, that is, 
the necessity of founding institutions and academic disciplines.  
Finally, as already indicated, in this closing passage, metaphysics is not 
described only as a censor and a translator but also as ‘a cherished lover’. However, 
describing metaphysics as a lover is not Derrida’s own idea. It is a repetition and a 
translation of Kant’s comment made in Critique of Pure Reason where the latter says 
that ‘we shall always return to metaphysics as to an estranged beloved [entzweiten 
Geliebten], since reason, because essential ends are at issue here, must work without 
respite […].70 As regards Derrida’s invocation of the theme of love, apart from this 
instance, he makes only one brief allusion to it earlier in the essay. In this earlier 
reference, just as in the conclusion, this reference appears in close vicinity to the 
invocation of creativity and artistic skill. (To recall, in the conclusion, after narrating 
how the department of philosophy takes place as, what is seems to be a ‘love story’, 
and arguing that ‘there is never any lifting of censorship, only a strategic calculation: 
censorship against censorship’ Derrida closes his essay with a question: ‘Is this 
strategy an art?’).  
The earlier reference to love (or sexuality) and creativity appears in a place 
where Derrida speculates on the character of the philosophers’ power. As discussed 
                                                 
70 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 700 
(A 850/B 878). 
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previously, according to Derrida, the philosopher (who has two places, a 
circumscribed place and a non-place that is also a panoptical ubiquity), dominates the 
university ‘as would a phantom’: ‘he haunts the scene more than he dominates it; he 
dominates it, indeed, as would a phantom’. And, as already suggested in the previous 
section, Derrida adds a further specification to this description. He argues that one 
could say that the philosopher ‘fascinates and seduces, if these connotations were not 
too closely tied to sensibility and imagination: for reason should break the charm’.71  
Apart from the description of the philosophers’ haunting power as a power of 
seduction and fascination, which, as Derrida implies would problematize Kant’s idea 
of reason and the university, the theme of love has no precedent in this text.72 A 
depiction of censoring metaphysics as a ‘cherished lover’ to whom ‘one’ (the 
philosopher, perhaps Kant), ‘always returns after quarrelling’ in the conclusion 
therefore comes as a surprise. It thus makes one wonder: Why account for the 
foundations of the modern university and depict the transformation of philosophy 
into an academic discipline as what is seems to be a ‘love story’? Why describe the 
institutionalization of philosophy within the modern university as a lovers’ story, as a 
love affair between the philosopher and his mistress?  
In an essay entitled ‘Derrida and Gender: The Other Sexual Difference’ from 
2002 Peggy Kamuf argues that using sexualized language is a deliberate gesture on 
Derrida’s part. For Derrida, according to Kamuf, ‘sexualisation of the general 
language of philosophical or analytic discourse is a strategic move’ which is ‘against 
or at least in tension with the kind of neutralization of sexual difference that has 
                                                 
71 Derrida, ‘Vacant Chair’, p. 63. 
72 ‘Love’, is, however, mentioned in ‘If There is a Cause to Translate II: Descartes’ Romances, or the 
Economy of Words’ (37, 39), a lecture which precedes ‘Vacant Chair’. 
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traditionally characterized it’.73 Another scholar who also works within feminist 
theory and deconstruction, Anne Berger, develops this insight further. Berger, 
drawing on her analysis of the famous interview ‘Choreographies’ and other texts 
where Derrida thematises the problem of sexual difference, argues, that Derrida’s 
‘attention to the ways in which “sexual difference” figures or not and occupies or not 
a certain place or space in philosophical endeavours that he reads and values […] 
does not amount to a simple endorsement of such a notion’. Instead, Berger argues,  
 
his interest in “sexual difference” is precisely what leads him to forcefully 
question, hence deconstruct, the binary logic that underwrites traditional 
notions of sexual difference and of sexuality in general (to begin with, the 
oppositional divide between heterosexuality and homosexuality). All aspects 
of what he calls “sexduality” come under his critical scrutiny. He doesn’t 
leave sexual difference at rest: he doesn’t leave it in place.74  
 
For my part, I do not find enough indications to make a decision about Derrida’s 
intentions with the sexualized language used in this particular essay. It is undecidable 
whether, as Kamuf argues, the sexualisation of language is a deliberate gesture in this 
particular case, or, whether, as the quotation from Berger’s work would suggest, 
Derrida’s reference to Kant’s presentation of metaphysics as a ‘cherished lover 
(Geliebte) to whom one always returns after quarrelling’ is not a simple endorsement 
of the notion of ‘sexual difference’ but a manifestation of his deconstructive 
approach which ‘doesn’t leave sexual difference at rest’, which ‘doesn’t leave it in 
place’.  
                                                 
73 Peggy Kamuf, ‘Derrida and Gender: The Other Sexual Difference’, in Jacques Derrida and the 
Humanities: A Critical Reader, ed. Tom Cohen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Presws, 2001), 
pp. 82-107 (p. 88). 
74 Anne E. Berger, ‘Sexing Differances’, differences, 16.3 (2005), 52-67, p. 56. 
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Rather than deliberating on Derrida’s intentions, I want to focus on and 
examine the effects of this particular way of narrating the foundations of the modern 
university. The question which interests me is ‘What does narrating the 
institutionalization of the modern university as what seems to be a love affair 
between a philosopher and his lover, metaphysics, imply for how we can understand 
Kant’s conceptualization of the modern university and how it can help us further 
develop and complicate insights which Derrida makes in his reading of this 
university discourse?’  
Misstranslations in the sexual economy of the modern university 
That the gender of metaphysics is feminine is clear from the beginning. However, it 
is not the expression ‘lover’ which reveals it. If Derrida wrote in English and used 
only the word lover, we would not know the gender of the philosopher’s lover, the 
gender of metaphysics. Neither could we discern whether the philosopher’s love of 
metaphysics is a ‘homosexual’ or a ‘heterosexual’ one. This all would have remained 
unclear. Derrida, however, as we know, does not write in English, but in French. In 
French, as in German, which are both gendered languages, metaphysics’ grammatical 
gender is discernible immediately.  
In English, the gender of philosopher’s lover is revealed due to another 
locution Derrida uses in this passage; the word ‘mistress’. In this passage, ‘mistress’ 
functions as a synonym (that is, as an ‘interlinguistic translation’) of the word 
‘lover’. Yet, the meaning of the word ‘mistress’ is not exactly the same as that of 
‘lover’. In English, ‘lover’ is ‘cut’ from its gender ambiguity. Or, perhaps, the other 
way round: by translating the word lover as mistress, additional parts are attached to 
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it, such as gender and other meanings Derrida plays on in order to describe this 
academic scene.  
The plurivocality of this word, its ambiguous meanings which work in 
English and French, however, cannot be translated in the language in which Derrida 
reads this essay, that is, German, without an essential loss. In German, there is a clear 
difference between the various meanings of this word. ‘Mistress’ as a lover, as for 
instance a woman who has a continuing sexual relationship with a man who is 
married to someone else, is called Geliebte. A woman in a position of authority, a 
woman who has a control over something or someone, a woman who directs or 
reigns, is in German called Meisterin or Herrin. Even the meaning which refers to a 
woman who has mastered a skill or branch of learning, a female teacher, a 
schoolteacher, or a scholar, is not called ‘mistress’ in German but Lehrerin or 
Gelehterin.75 In French and in English, the languages into which Derrida translates 
Kant’s Geliebte, on the other hand, the ambiguity remains.  
The word ‘mistress’, as Amy Louise Erickson shows in her study, has 
proliferated with these multiple and parallel meanings from the very beginning.76 
‘Mistress’ comes to English from French and the sexual connotation and the 
inference of power date back to at least the later Middle Ages, to the fourteenth or 
fifteenth-century sources. Throughout its history, the various meanings referring to 
sexuality and power have changed and intertwined. In some contexts, the two 
overlap significantly, as it is in the case of European courts in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries where mistresses often wielded great power and influence. 
Furthermore, their relationships with kings were ‘an open secret’.  
                                                 
75 ‘Mistress’, Collins English-German Dictionary, 
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english-german/mistress [Accessed 28 March 2017]. 
76 Amy Louise Erickson, ‘Mistress and Marriage: or, a Short History of the Mrs’, History Workshop 
Journal, 78.1 (2014), 39-57. 
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Neither has been the sexual meaning of the word ‘mistress’ univocal. As 
Erickson referring to Johnson’s dictionary from 1755-6 shows, the word ‘mistress’ 
has been used in a romantic sense, as referring to a man’s beloved or sweetheart. 
However, it also denoted a ‘wife’ of an important member of a community, a 
‘concubine’ and a ‘whore’. Additionally, the word has also come to denote a 
particular kind of ‘lover’, a ‘kept woman’. ‘Kept woman’, just like a wife of a 
wealthy men is maintained and financially supported, although, and in contrast to a 
wife, without legal binding. Simultaneously, while a mistress is ‘kept’ so as to be 
available for man’s sexual pleasure, she is not a ‘whore’ or a ‘prostitute’. A 
relationship with a mistress implies more than an exchange of sex for money. It 
involves emotional and social bonds, a romantic and possibly ‘faithful’ love.77 
The brief excursion into the convoluted history of this word and the concept 
could perhaps help us understand why philosopher’s lover, metaphysics, is ‘kept’ in 
the Lower Faculty (like one keeps a secret or hides a precious treasure) and why, 
although she has a force at her disposal, it is not a public one. Furthermore, following 
Derrida’s comments made in the ‘Roundtable on Translation’ on philosophy’s 
inability to master words which mean more than one thing at one time, we could also 
argue that ‘mistress’ might perhaps represent yet another limit of philosophy as 
translation. Just like pharmakon, ‘mistress’ could be seen as a word meaning more 
things at one time, as a word and a concept which cannot be translated without an 
essential loss. Whether one translates ‘mistress’ as ‘lover’, ‘teacher’, ‘scholar’ or 
‘woman who reigns’, as we have seen on the case of German, whether one comes 
down on the side of love/sex, education or power, the undecidability is going to be 
                                                 
77 In modern times, the meaning of the term ‘mistress’ shifts again. In today’s English, the ‘monetary’ 
aspect of its meaning has disappeared and ‘mistress’ is used to describe a woman in an illicit 
relationship with a married man, a man’s lover who is not his wife (Erickson, 55). 
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lost. To paraphrase Derrida then, ‘mistress’s ‘body’ – like that of pharmakon – thus 
might be ‘in itself a constant challenge to philosophy’. 
Yet, there is an additional sense in which ‘mistress’ could be considered 
‘untranslatable’. The word does not translate transparently not only – to use 
Jakobson’s classification again – in an ‘intralingual sense’ (as a synonym of a word 
‘lover’), or, in an ‘interlingual sense’ (from English to German). It does not translate 
transparently in – what we could call – an ‘intrasexual sense’. In other words, 
although the term ‘mistress’ is, linguistically, a feminine version of the word 
‘master’, mistress is not a translation of ‘master’ into feminine. In fact, there is no 
feminine equivalent term for the word and the concept of ‘master’.  
This particular ‘untranslatability’ would perhaps explain why the word 
‘mistress’ appears in the conclusion of ‘Vacant Chair’. As already suggested, 
Derrida, in contrast to traditional philosophers, does not want to ‘fix’ meaning or 
master plurivocality. The effect of deconstruction, as Berger also rightly describes in 
her essay, is not that of a dismissal of the deconstructed term but that of 
multiplication’.78  
The invocation of ‘mistress’ at the end of ‘Vacant Chair’ can be, indeed, 
understood as an example of this process. In other words, her appearance is a 
consequence of a process of multiplication which if not intrinsic to deconstruction is 
at least made visible by it. The multiplying logic of this endeavour always implies 
that there is an ‘other’. As deconstruction famously teaches us, there is always ‘an 
outside’ which intrudes ‘the inside’. In the conclusion of ‘Vacant Chair’, one of the 
ways in which the effects of this teaching ‘materialize’ is in the figure of a mistress. 
                                                 
78 Berger, ‘Sexing Differances’, p. 56. 
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We can even argue that, in this sense, ‘mistress’ has been present in the essay 
from its very beginning. She has been there from its very introduction where Derrida 
links the discourse on the university to Kant and describes the political, cultural and 
intellectual context in which his reflections on the university took place. The figure 
of a ‘master’ who is, furthermore a ‘split subject’, a teaching-philosopher, already 
problematizes the unity and universality of philosophical discourse. In the moment 
when philosophical discourse is not understood as a self-contained and self-sufficient 
entity but has its ‘master’, it also calls for the problematization of his position and his 
‘mastery’. The philosopher, as Derrida seeks to show with ‘Vacant Chair’, is not ‘the 
master of his house’, that is, of his claim that philosophy and philosophers are 
‘powerless’ and therefore cannot censor. He deconstructs Kant’s claim that 
philosophers have no censoring power. He shows that the philosopher is not 
powerless but has a power and that there is censorship in the faculty of philosophy. 
Reason and its ‘department’, the Faculty of Philosophy, despite Kant’s 
proclamations, do censor.  
As I argued earlier, unlike in traditional philosophy, for Derrida there is no 
desire to fix meaning or to master plurivocality. He understands translation as an 
‘agreement’ which implies ‘the difference of languages rather than transparent 
translatability’. Translation, as Derrida argues in the ‘Roundtable Discussion’, thus 
operates in the mode of a ‘promise’. It ‘never succeeds in the pure and absolute sense 
of the term’ but ‘succeeds in promising success, in promising reconciliation’. To 
quote from Derrida again, ‘good translation is one that enacts that performative 
called a promise with the result that through translation one sees the coming shape of 
a possible reconciliation among languages’.79 
                                                 
79 Derrida, ‘Roundtable’, p. 123. 
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The questions which arise from this discussion are the following: ‘What is 
this “agreement” upon which this particular translation (that of the “master” into 
“mistress” and the impossible topology of the university into an institution) relies? 
What kind of “promise” is it? What kind of success and reconciliation does this 
translation promise? And among which and whose languages?’  
My proposition is that the agreement on which the institution of the 
university relies, and which manifests itself in the invocation of a ‘mistress’ in the 
conclusion of Derrida’s essay, is the exclusion of the sexually other, an exclusion 
which Kant masters by ‘playing double’, by playing both ‘the master’ and ‘the 
mistress’.  But first, we need to develop on what I call the ‘intrasexual 
untranslatability’ in relation to the word and the concept of ‘mistress’.  
Although the word ‘mistress’ is ambiguous, its various meanings do not 
occupy equal positions. Although we can hear the reference to ‘a woman teacher’ or 
‘a woman who governs’ in the word ‘mistress’, in today’s English or French, the 
sexual connotation is clearly privileged. The socio-cultural and political effects 
which the word and the concept of ‘mistress’ at once produces and bears witness to, 
has been examined in a book by Rozsika Parker and Griselda Pollock Old 
Mistresses: Women, Art and Ideology. Old Mistresses explores and critiques how Art 
History ‘structurally and actively excluded women from being considered able to 
participate in the realm of art, and from being considered an artist’.80 As Parker and 
Pollock explain, in English or in French, ‘there is no equivalent term of respect such 
as “Old Master” to designate the artist-women who also made Renaissance, Baroque 
and subsequent art in the West’.81 ‘Mistresses’, however, as the book sought to point 
                                                 
80 Rozsika Parker and Griselda Pollock, ‘A Lonely Preface (2013)’, in Old Mistresses: Women, Art 
and Ideology, 2nd edn (London and New York: I.B. Tarius, 2013), pp. xvii-xxviii, (p. xviii).  
81 Parker and Pollock, Old Mistresses, p. xix.   
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out, do not occupy positions similar to those of ‘masters’ only in art. What the 
analysis shows is that ‘the problem of a sexual hierarchy in art is already being in 
language’. The phrase and the book ‘Old Mistresses’82 thus seeks to expose ‘the 
ideological, that is to say interested, partial and exclusionary, underpinnings of 
language in general’.83  
It is thus not only, as Derrida seems to suggest, metaphysics which translates 
the impossible topology of philosophy into an academic institution. It is not the 
philosopher’s mistress who has this at once censoring and productive power as one 
of the old meanings of the verb form of ‘mistress’ would suggest (‘to mistress it’, 
according to the OED, is to ‘play the part of mistress, to have the upper hand’).84 It is 
not her power which translates the ‘impossible idea of the university’ into an 
institution, but the power which produces this particular structural organization, a 
system of ‘master-mistress’. In other words, the system which, to quote Old 
Mistresses again, ‘structurally and actively excludes women,’ the sexual hierarchy 
which is not limited only to art history, philosophy or the university, but is also the 
‘underpinnings of language in general’. 
But how does this sexual economy exclude women? And does this exclusion 
operate in a same way everywhere in the society, or does the privileging of the 
masculine over the feminine take different forms, for example, in art history and art, 
and still a different one in the philosophical discourse on the university? And, after 
                                                 
82 As Parker and Pollock note, the phrase ‘Old Mistresses’ was first used by Elizabeth Broun and Ann 
Gabhart for an exhibition of women artists of the past in 1972 (xix). For a problem of ‘mistress’ or 
‘playing a mistress’ in philosophy see Grosz’ discussion of Irigaray’s mimicry (Grosz Elizabeth 
‘Lacan and feminism’, in Jacques Lacan: A feminist introduction (London and New York: Routledge, 
1990), pp. 147-187. 
83 Parker and Pollock, Old Mistresses, p. xix. 
84 ‘Mistress, v.’, Oxford English Dictionary < http://0-
www.oed.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk/view/Entry/120148?rskey=TIq3MB&result=2#eid> [accessed 9 
February 2017]. 
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all, is not the invocation of a ‘mistress’ rather a sign of women’s inclusion? Does it 
not create a possibility if not ‘having the upper hand’, at least a possibility of ‘having 
an equal hand’?  
In order to address these questions, it is necessary to add yet another 
interpretation of a ‘mistress’.  In this - that is, phallocentric - sexual economy, 
‘mistress’ is not defined only in relation to her male lover. Or, more precisely, her 
relation to him is defined by how she is positioned in relation with other women. She 
is a part of and has her proper place in a system where ‘mistresses’ are taken up and 
kept alongside other women, particularly those to whom the masters are married, 
their wives. If, then, she had any powers, they would have been used not so much or 
only in order to overpower her married lover as to claim an upper hand over the 
woman against whom she had been put into a competition. To put this into structural 
terms, in this economy, ‘mistresses’ are taken up and kept in order to introduce and 
formalize an ‘outside’ of the (marital) system. They thus help create and make 
functional an allegedly diverse and antagonistic field where women are presented as 
those in charge, as having powers over men. These powers are, however, only a 
projection. They are projected on women as a result of the master’s insecurities and 
anxieties over his power, his identity, and his mastery. According to this 
interpretation, ‘having a mistress’ is a strategy of camouflage: it at once hides the 
master’s fear of the sexually other, of the ‘the feminine’, and, by way of this 
disguise, it protects him from ‘her’. 
The word and the concept of ‘mistress’, which means more than one thing at 
one time, whose meaning is not univocal but multiple, does not, according to this 
interpretation, represent a challenge to philosophy. It is not that philosophical 
discourse - and the philosophers - cannot master ‘her’; rather the opposite. The 
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mistress and her ‘plurivocality’, her ‘untranslatable’ and thus ‘unmastarable’ 
character, as well as the power she allegedly has, are a part if not a condition of the 
functioning of this sexual economy. She is a means and a symptom of the 
phallocentric system: the mistresses’ ‘mastery’, that is - if we were to provide an 
‘intrasexual translation’ – her ‘misstery’, is not as much of a misstery, or even 
mystery, as it is a mis-s-ery.  
Clearly, feminist scholars do not have to engage with deconstruction or 
critical theory in order to find out that the university is phallocentric. A recognition 
that the university is ‘man-centred’ that it is, as Adrianne Rich puts it ‘a breeding 
ground not of humanism, but of masculine privilege’ is, together with the desire to 
change it, that what triggers feminist political and intellectual endeavours.85  What 
the discussion in ‘Vacant Chair’ seems essential for is the exploration of how the 
university is phallocentric and how we can explore it in a way which rather than only 
confirming this fact would also open a possibility of theorizing the possibility of its 
transformation. More specifically, the questions my interpretation of Derrida’s essay 
helps us address are questions concerning the complexities of how the binary logic, 
the privileging of the masculine over the feminine, and the resulting exclusion of the 
sexually other, operates in the theoretical discourse of this particular institution. It 
helps us examine the intricacies of how phallocentrism operates within a discourse 
which wants to create a place where freedom of thinking and expression - and thus 
also, consequently, of feminist scholarship and its disciplinary formations such as 
women’s studies - would have been possible.  
As described in the previous section, in ‘Vacant Chair’ specifically, the 
modern university is presented as an attempt to resist the State’s censorship. 
                                                 
85 Rich, ‘Toward a Woman-Centred University’, p. 127. 
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Derrida reads it as an attempt to create a space which would be withdrawn 
from the State’s power and its censorship, as an attempt to create room for free 
thinking and freedom of expression. As he recalls, the way in which Kant 
justifies the existence of the university, the Faculty of Philosophy, and claims 
the reversal of the powers between the State and his faculty, and how Kant 
claims an upper hand for philosophy, is through arguing that rationality is 
given ‘a priori’. It is this argument which backs his claim for the reversal of 
powers between the ‘powerful’ State and the Faculty of Philosophy which has 
no power, which is weak and vulnerable.  
However, as we read in ‘Vacant Chair’, the teacher of pure reason, despite 
Kant’s declarations, is not powerless. Although, his power is not the same as that of 
the State, the philosopher still has power. His power does not only stem from his 
assigned position, ex cathedra. His chair, as Derrida suggests, ‘is empty’. In a sense, 
the philosopher does not even need to have a ‘chair’, he does not need socially 
accepted status and authority, in order to execute his power. He does not need legal 
and public power in order to dominate (her) and claim the upper hand for philosophy. 
His power is ‘produced’ elsewhere.  
Derrida describes the philosopher’s power as ‘haunting’. As Derrida puts it, 
the teaching philosopher haunts the scene more than he dominates it; he dominates it, 
indeed, as would a phantom’. And, as already quoted, he adds a further specification 
to this description: one could therefore say, Derrida claims, that the philosopher 
‘fascinates and seduces, if these connotations were not too closely tied to sensibility 
and imagination: for reason should break the charm’.86 
                                                 
86 Derrida, ‘Vacant Chair’, p. 63. 
   
 
126 
 
The philosopher’s power, as it seems, therefore does not need a priori reason 
as it needs other powers; such as the power of imagination. One could, indeed, 
conclude, and Derrida’s reference to art in the very end of the essay would support 
such interpretation, that instituting a university is not so much a philosophical project 
as it is an artistic one. When founding a university, rather than reason, one needs 
imagination; or both. Philosophers thus, and despite Kant’s argumentation which 
Derrida also includes in ‘Vacant Chair’, also might be an artist or, at least, have some 
‘artistic skills’.87  
Undoubtedly, such a proposition would complicate the relationship between 
the modern university defined as a ‘philosophical’ or ‘scientific’ institution on the 
one hand, and artistic practice on the other. Yet, according to my interpretation, the 
quarrel between a ‘philosopher’ and a ‘poet’ is not what is at stake. The question is 
not whether the institutionalization of the university proceeds ‘scientifically’ or 
‘artistically’, whether one employs reason or imagination. What follows from my 
analysis is that when conceiving the foundations of the university, one does not 
need only reasoning and perhaps artistic skills, but also – or most importantly - 
powers which are ‘sexual’. More specifically, it seems to me that in his discourse 
on the foundations of the university, Kant makes use of a logic similar to that I 
identified as that which produces the invocation of ‘mistress’ in the end of 
Derrida’s essay in a particular way.  
This ‘master’, as I showed, dominates the mistress by way of projecting 
power onto her. He secures his position of mastery by creating and formalizing 
an ‘outside’ to a closed (marital) system, and thus creates an allusion of a 
diverse and antagonistic field where women are presented as dominating men.  
                                                 
87 See Derrida, ‘Vacant Chair’, p. 56-57, 62-63, 69.  
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Yet, simultaneously, this academic master is not only ‘a master’. He also 
plays the part of the ‘mistress’. The way Kant claims the upper hand for the Faculty 
of Philosophy is by mimicking a mistress’s power. By way of fascinating and 
seducing, by using charm and disguise, Kant claims for the Faculty of Philosophy a 
position which is similar to that of a ‘mistress’ within a phallocentric sexual 
economy: a formalized outside space (the Faculty of Philosophy as a place without 
censorship) to the system of the State’s censorship. We could, indeed, say that Kant 
‘mistresses’ the State. The withdrawal of the university from the State’s censorship 
takes the form of playing at ‘emasculation’, by hiding one’s masculinity, one’s 
masculine identity and power.   
As already argued, what translates the impossible topology of the university 
into an institution is therefore not only ‘metaphysics’ but also ‘phallocentrism’. The 
way the ‘agreement’ (between the king and the philosopher, between the state and 
the university) is made possible does not, however, proceed simply through the 
exclusion of the feminine. Rather, this agreement needs the feminine as its enabling 
‘other’. It excludes it by ‘incorporating’ it through a complex set of reversals and 
appropriations. The way Kant founds the university and sustains this sexual economy 
is by playing both ‘sides’ of this economy, ‘the master’ and ‘the mistress’, the 
‘masculine’ and the ‘feminine’.   
Other Vacancies 
My interpretation of how ‘sexual economy’ functions within Kant’s university 
discourse supports and further develops Sarah Kofman’s deconstructive reading of 
ethical discourse proposed by Kant presented in her essay ‘The Economy of Respect: 
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Kant and respect for Women’.88 Interestingly, Kofman delivered this article first as a 
talk in Derrida’s seminar on respect in the works of Kant which took place in École 
Normale Supérieure during the academic year 1980-81, that is, a few years before 
Derrida gave his lecture series ‘Transfer Ex Cathedra’ (of which ‘Vacant Chair’ is a 
part). 
In the essay, Kofman deconstructs Kantian ethical discourse by showing that, 
firstly, men’s respect of women is not just an application of the moral imperative, 
one of the cases where a free being respects another free being, but is foundational to 
Kant’s ethics and, secondly, that ‘the holding women in respect – at a certain 
respectful distance – [...] serves as a cover for an operation of a completely different 
order, an operation of mastery’.89 In other words, Kofman shows that Kant’s ethics is 
not ‘universal’ or ‘natural’ but is founded on a bias which privileges the masculine 
over the feminine and which men’s respect for women both conceals and keeps 
functional.  
As Kofman argues, in Doctrine of Virtue, Kant presents the relation between 
the sexes as ‘one of moral relations wherein each respects the other as representative 
of the sublimity of the moral law’. Yet, recalling Kant’s Anthropology, Kofman 
shows that in Kant’s view, the relation between the sexes is ‘rather one of warlike 
relations in which each struggles for domination’.90 As she describes it,  
 
in this war it is the so-called weaker sex which has the upper hand – just 
because of its weakness; men are thereby disarmed, constrained to respect as 
well as to a whole series of compensations: the right of women to respect 
                                                 
88 Sarah, Kofman, ‘The Economy of Respect: Kant and Respect for Women’, in Feminist 
Interpretations of Immanuel Kant, ed. by Robin May Schott (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1997), pp. 355-372. 
89 Kofman, p. 357.  
90 Kofman, p. 357. 
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seems from the beginning to be a right acquired by their weakness, a measure 
of protection granted to the weak by the strong. 
As always there arises a downright reversal: the weakness of women and all 
the traits which characterizes them are so many levers for controlling men and 
using them at their will. If women cannot dominate by force, they dominate 
by indirect means, by the obliqueness of ruse, the art women have to use men 
for their own ends. Thanks to their charms, to the love they inspire, women 
enchain their victims and master them through their particular abilities.91 
 
As Kofman further argues, ‘the respect for women’ sets up the ‘sexual economy’ of a 
certain ‘respite’: ‘the woman refuses, the man demands’. She ‘must appear cold, not 
respond too easily to the demand, under pain of her own dishonour’. It is, as she 
argues, ‘her reserve, her modesty’ which makes ‘humanity possible’, that which 
prevents men from the fall into ‘animality’.92 Yet, the respect for women is not, as 
the quotation above also indicates, simply an expression of men’s benevolence and 
moral virtues. What seems to be a generous and virtuous ‘gesture’ of respect and 
protection on the part of the strong (men) for the benefit of the weak (women), in fact 
conceals the ‘real’ nature of the ‘war of sexes’. Rather than benevolence and the will 
to compensate for unequal ‘powers’, it is the fear of women which leads men to 
respect them. As Kofman argues with her deconstructive and psychoanalytic reading 
of this sexual economy,   
 
To respect is to hold them in awe at a distance, in order not to be tempted to 
lift their veil or master them, an act culpable because of the prohibition of 
incest, but above all dangerous and doubly dangerous. The lifting of the veil 
would risk confounding man, crushing him, paralyzing him, and depriving 
woman, the mother of all her phallic dignity, emasculating her. To put 
                                                 
91 Kofman, p. 355-6. 
92 Kofman, p. 358-9. To connect it to the issues discussed previously, according to this interpretation, 
her modesty would thus also be a kind of ‘censorship’. 
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women/mothers on high, to respect them, is to avoid seeing that they have no 
penis, “that they have nothing to hide.” The economy realized by respect is 
that of the agony of castration, communicated with a gesture of fetishism.93 
 
According to Kofman’s interpretation then, men’s respect for women, as well as all 
Kantian ethics, are bound to the anguish of castration. In effect, Kofman concludes, 
‘respect for women’ is reversed ‘misogyny’. It requires  
 
the rejection in oneself and beyond oneself of femininity, from fear of being in 
one way or another contaminated by it and perishing from it. Respect for 
women is always the glorious, moral obverse of the “misogyny” of men.94   
  
As follows from Kofman’s work, ‘respect for women’ is therefore yet another device 
for dominating women. It is an ‘umbrella’ which both conceals the operation of 
mastery of men over women and by ‘pushing’ women onto the pedestal of worship 
and thus keeping them at a ‘safe’ distance. The universal moral respect and whole of 
Kant’s ethics can be ‘established only by excluding women in the same move by 
which they seem to be included’.95 It is claimed that Kant’s ‘ethical theory veils 
again and again his horror of recognizing that the feminine infiltrates the masculine; 
that inclination, sexuality, and desire pervade reason; and that the hidden force 
driving moral law is feminine, sexual, and powerful’.96 
 My interpretation of the final passage of Derrida’s ‘Vacant Chair’ supports 
and further develops these conclusions. As I have shown, a similar logic of reversals 
                                                 
93 Kofman, p. 369-70. 
94 Kofman, p. 369. 
95 Natalie Alexander, ‘Rending Kant’s Umbrella: Kofman’s Diagnosis of Ethical Law’, in Enigmas: 
Essays on Sarah Kofman, eds. Penelope Deutscher and Kelly Oliver (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1999), pp. 143-158 (p. 157). 
96 Alexander, ‘Rending Kant’s Umbrella’, p. 156. 
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which Kofman identifies in Kant’s ethics is at work also in his university discourse. 
It is not ‘reason’ or ‘metaphysics’ which are foundational to the university. It is not 
the ‘mistress’ who has the power at her disposal. Rather, ‘the mistress’ and the power 
she allegedly has are part and parcel of the sexual economy which excludes women. 
Seemingly including women and showing them as those who dominate over the men 
hides the fear of women and keeps them in ‘respite’.  
Yet, additionally, in the case of the university founding, Kant himself makes 
claim to similar ‘respect’. He positions himself and the Faculty of Philosophy as 
those who, in relation to the State, are weak and vulnerable and do not make any 
claims to power. As such the faculty of the philosophy and philosophers should be, 
according to Kant, granted protection and the rule of non-violation. The State is 
obliged not to exercise its power over philosophers and their faculty. Yet, as Derrida 
shows, this is only a deception as Kant wants to gain the upper hand for the Faculty 
of Philosophy. The strategies Kant uses in order to perform this reversal remind of 
those which, according to Kofman, Kant attributes to women.  
Kofman argues that ‘respect for women is always the glorious, moral obverse 
of the “misogyny” of men’. It is ‘the rejection in oneself and beyond oneself of 
femininity, from fear of being in one way or another contaminated by it and 
perishing from it’.97 The question is then what does the repetition of this logic in 
Kant’s discourse on the university imply. Could this repetition signal - rather than 
‘rejection’- an acceptance ‘in oneself and beyond oneself of femininity’? Or, does it 
at least signal openness to accept it? Does it create an opening for freeing us from a 
fear of being ‘in one way or another contaminated by it [femininity] and perishing 
from it’? Or, is Kant’s utilization of strategies associated with women within the 
                                                 
97 Kofman, p. 369.  
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phallocentric sexual economy simply just another ‘observe of the “misogyny” of 
men’? Or, is his theorization of the university even a misogyny multiplied?  
What my reading of Derrida’s deconstruction of Kant’s university discourse 
shows is that the theorizations as well as politics of the ‘sexual forces’ need to be 
taken into account if we wish to theorize the university and its disciplines, and 
imagine their futures beyond its phallocentric predicament.  
This proposition, as I take it, leads to a particular ‘school’ within feminist 
theorising. This ‘school’ suggests we explore concepts and paradigms which have 
been, as it seems from my vantage point, rather on the periphery of the focus of 
feminist theory. More specifically, I am drawn to theorizations such as that of 
Elizabeth Grosz who, in her text entitled ‘The Force of Sexual Difference’, argues 
that 
  
it is time to move beyond the very language of identity and gender, to look at 
other issues left untouched, questions unasked, assumptions unelaborated, that 
feminist and queer politics need to address in order to revitalize themselves 
and to propel themselves into new conceptions of desire, power, pleasure, and 
into the development of new practices.98  
 
For Grosz, such a shift in ‘language’ will allow feminists ponder questions which are 
currently ‘underdeveloped and unasked’ and which have been ‘deemed the most 
offensive and disputed within the last decades’ such as that of ‘messy biology, 
matter, materiality’ and particularly ‘sexual difference, that untidy and ambiguous 
invocation of the pre-structuring of being by irreducible difference’.99 Grosz, who, 
                                                 
98 Elizabeth Grosz, ‘The Force of Sexual Difference’, in Time Travels: Feminism, Nature, Power 
(London and New York: Duke University Press, 2005), pp. 171-184 (p. 171). 
99 Grosz, ‘The Force’, p. 171. 
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as she says, follows the work of Irigaray and Deleuze, conceptualizes sexual 
difference as that which 
 
both preconditions and destabilizes gender and bodies, that which 
problematizes all identity, that which discourse and representation cannot 
contain and politics cannot direct: sexual difference as force; and force itself 
as divided, differentiated, sexualized.100 
 
For Grosz, this theorizing will also transform how we conceive the political. As she 
develops on such a potential, sexual difference, which is conceived of as not  
 
tied to opposition, difference not determined by identity, difference not 
subsumed by comparison, difference as an ontological force – can disturb and 
displace the politics of identity on which most feminist, queer, and minority 
politics are currently based, and can provide new research questions and new 
political experiments by which these political programs may revitalize 
themselves.101 
 
Indeed, my interpretation of the operation of sexual difference in Derrida’s reading 
of Kant’s university discourse can be seen as an examination of ‘sexual difference’ 
as Grosz envisions it. In other words, it is an exploration of sexual difference as an 
‘untidy and ambiguous invocation of the pre-structuring of being by irreducible 
difference’, as a ‘force’ which is itself divided, differentiated and sexualized and 
which both ‘preconditions and destabilizes gender and bodies’, ‘problematizes all 
identity’ and is that ‘which discourse and representation cannot contain and politics 
cannot direct’.102  
                                                 
100 Grosz, ‘The Force’, xxx, p. 172.  
101 Grosz, ‘The Force’, xxx. p. 172. 
102 Grosz, ‘The Force’, p. 171-2. 
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Yet, if there is a lesson to be learned from my discussion of these ‘Current 
Vacancies’ in Part II of my thesis, it is that we also need to think about how are we 
to propose such shifts in our theoretical and political focus. Following the journey 
and the places encountered along it, it seems necessary to deliberate carefully on 
how the ‘force of sexual difference’ is going to be claimed, on how this distortion is 
going to be accounted for. 
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Part II – Resisting to the ‘neoliberalization’ 
of the University (Accounting for the 
University) 
Chapter III - University Values 
Bill Readings’ Accounts 
In Bill Readings’ The University in Ruins published in 1997 appears a 
supplementary thread which develops but also leads away from his main proposition 
that the current university of ‘Excellence’ is a ruined institution. This supplementary 
thread leads from his examination of the publication by UNESCO of Alfonso 
Borrero Cabal’s The University as an Institution Today (1993) which Readings first 
outlines in his introductory chapter. Drawing on this text, Readings proposes that the 
university becomes a ‘bureaucratic corporation’ through implementing a 
‘generalized logic of “accountability”’.1 This phrase, ‘generalized logic of 
accountability’, is meant to capture two aspects – firstly, ‘accountability’ becoming 
a synonym for ‘accounting’, and, secondly, ‘accountable accounting’ becoming a 
logic which structures not only university book-keeping but proliferates and takes 
over every university activity such as teaching and research. As I interpret it, 
following thus in the steps of Simon Morgan Wortham, Dominik LaCapra and 
Samuel Weber, the shift in analytical approach allows Readings to grasp the 
university without following the structural organization characteristic of his key 
                                                 
1 Readings, The University, p. 3. 
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argument and thus opens a possibility to theorize the university as other than ‘in 
ruins’.2  
Applying this approach, Readings grasps the university as a paradoxical 
formation which produces ambiguous effects for those inhabiting it. This is best 
demonstrated when he considers the ‘Excellence’ mode in relation to types of 
knowledge and groups hitherto excluded from higher education. As we read in the 
chapter ‘The Posthistorical University’, although in his final analysis, the equating 
of accountability with accounting ‘only serves to prop up the logic of consumerism 
that rules the University of Excellence’, Readings nonetheless does not narrow-
mindedly denounce the new ‘logic of evaluation’ but recognizes its ambivalence. 3 
On the one hand, the ‘generalized logic of accounting’, because it ‘pretends 
indifference to the gendering or other forms of marking of the bodies that it 
evaluates’, perpetuates and further strengthens already existing hierarchies and 
privileges.4 On the other hand, however, it is the generalized logic of accountability 
that ‘has permitted the speed with which feminism and African-American studies 
have risen to powerful positions in the disciplinary order’.5 Drawing on the insight 
                                                 
2 LaCapra argues: ‘Somehow incidentally, “accountability” takes him [Readings] beyond the measure 
of excellence and as such might be incompatible with Readings’ historical narrative which although 
supposedly allows for “divergent and noncontemporaneous discourse” (Readings p.14), retains a 
certain telos somewhat at odds with the dissensually non-linear thought he advocates’. Dominick 
LaCapra, ‘The University in Ruins?’, Critical Inquiry 25.14 (1998), 32-55, (p. 55). Also Weber, who 
is otherwise critical of Reading’s analysis, sees this moment as close to marking ‘the possibility of 
thinking the future [of the university] as “promise”’. Samuel Weber, ‘The Future Campus: Destiny in 
a virtual world’, Jounral of Higher Education Policy and Management, 21 (1999), 151-164 (p. 161). 
Wortham’s, Lacapra’s and Weber’s interpretations are in odds with Nicholas Royle’s. The University 
in Ruins was the subject of heated debate between LaCapra and Royle in the journal Critical Inquiry 
during 1998 and 1999. Royle replied to LaCapra’s ‘The University in Ruins?’ with ‘Yes, Yes, the 
University in Ruins’ (Nicholas Royle, ‘Yes, Yes, the University in Ruins’, Critical Inquiry 26.1 
(1999), 147-153) to which LaCapra replied with ‘Yes, Yes, Yes, Yes … Well, Maybe’ (Dominick 
LaCapra, ‘Yes, Yes, Yes, Yes… Well, Maybe: Response to Nicholas Royle’, Critical Inquiry 26.1 
(1999), 154-158. For a different development and interpretation of Readings’ work see special issue 
The University in Ruins published in Oxford Literary Review in 1995 edited by Timothy Clark and 
Nicholas Royle (Timothy Clark and Nicholas Royle, eds., The University in Ruins, special issue of 
The Oxford Literary Review, 17.1 (1995), 1-160). 
3 Readings, The University, p. 134. 
4 Readings, The University, p. 144. 
5 Readings, The University, p. 146. 
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that the effects of the ‘general logic of accountability’ can be both positive and 
negative, Readings argues that he does not simply want to denounce accountable 
evaluative modes or evaluation in general. Instead, he claims that it is the question of 
value and evaluation which are at stake in the current university.  
Such a proposition significantly complicates the two main arguments of The 
University in Ruins. Firstly, it challenges the idea that the university has lost its 
content and is thus ‘non-referential’. In other words, taking up the question of value 
and evaluation seems to suggest, against Readings’ repeated proclamations, that the 
referent of ‘Excellence’ is – after all – not ‘empty’. It reveals that ‘Excellence’ is not 
a neutral, unmotivated ‘lump’ of technology and measurement but is determined by 
forces which represent particular cultural, political and economic interests. 
Excellence, although it presents itself as empty of any idea is still ideological. 
Specifically, it is determined by market forces and its aim is to contribute to the 
marketization and the corporatization of the university. The supposed ‘emptiness’ or 
non- character of the university is then rather a strategy which is used to mask its 
ideological content and thus help promote its interests.  
Secondly, conceiving the university through the notion of accountability also 
allows a more complex theorization of the historical development of the university. 
Rather than relying on ‘oppositional thinking’ (referent/non-referent), Readings 
conceptualizes the genealogy of the university as a displacement of the question of 
value; as a shift from focusing on the ‘content’ or ‘nature’ of value, to focussing on 
its function. As Readings argues, the question ‘what’ (i.e. what is the value) ceases 
to matter in the University of Excellence. Measures themselves become the targets. 
All university content, teaching, research, and the university’s relationship to the 
society at large, are reduced to an undifferentiated ‘mass’ easily subjected to the 
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logic of costs and benefits. This reduction then also bears significant political and 
ethical consequences for the university. What was once called the ‘social 
responsibility of the University, its accountability to society’, Readings argues, is 
now ‘solely a matter of services rendered for a fee’.6 
Finally, the shift in analytical approach also influences Readings’ view on 
how the resistance against the mode of Excellence should be conveyed. Drawing on 
the argument that it is the ‘general logic of accountability’ through which the 
Excellence mode operates, Readings proposes that a strategy to help resist it must 
intervene within the domain of evaluation. Also at this point, rather than relying on 
oppositional thinking, as with his argument on (non)referentiality, Readings 
proceeds through a strategy of a ‘double move’: 
 
It is imperative that the University responds to the demand for accountability, 
while at the same time refusing to conduct the debate over the nature of its 
responsibility solely in terms of the language of accounting (whose currency 
is excellence).7  
 
In other words, academics should intervene in the language of evaluation which 
reduces accountability to mere accounting by taking responsibility which would not 
let itself be reduced to accounting. This, as Readings further specifies, will consist in 
resisting ‘accounting solutions’ by making decisions and ‘critical judgments’. These 
decisions and judgments will, however, not be treated as ‘methods’ of finding what 
‘constitutes true value’. Readings does not wish to set up new criteria for 
‘measuring’ value but seeks to find ways ‘to keep the question of evaluation open’, 
                                                 
6 Readings, The University, p. 32. 
7 Readings, The University, p. 8. 
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of holding the question of ‘value’ and its ‘measurement’ as ‘a matter for dispute’.8 In 
this way, Readings argues, ‘evaluation can become a social question rather than a 
device of measurement’: ‘Holding open the question of value is a way of holding 
open a capacity to imagine the social otherwise’.9 
In order to further define how the holding of the question of value opens as a 
capacity to imagine the social otherwise may proceed, Readings turns to Lyotard’s 
notion of ‘differend’10 and, interestingly, to a tradition which Readings otherwise 
repudiates in the book, to deconstruction.11 Specifically, Readings suggests we turn 
to Paul de Man’s understanding of ‘the reading of literature as a necessary and 
impossible task’ and implement it onto the way we approach the question of 
evaluation in the university.12 Raising the question of value as something that is 
‘finally both unanswerable and essential’ implies, as he further develops, a 
production of ‘a judgment of value that seeks to grapple with and take responsibility 
for itself as a discursive act’. In other words, approaching university accountability 
in this way will involve radical interrogation of the process and the scene of judging 
itself. Questions which, as Readings suggests, must be continuously posed and 
worried over, such as ‘to whom and to what the University remains accountable’ 
will act as vehicles for the practice of this new university accountability.13  
As I interpret it, Readings’ elaborations on ‘responsible responding’ as a 
means of resisting the general logic of accountability which rules the current 
university open a possibility of thinking the university and its futures as other than in 
                                                 
8 Readings, The University, p. 130. 
9 Readings, The University, p. 120. 
10 For the discussion of Lytorard’s ‘differend’ in relation to disciplinarity of feminist research see 
Tuija Pulkkinen, ‘Feelings of Injustice: The Institutionalization of Gender Studies and Pluralization 
of Feminism’, differences, special issue Transatlantic Gender Crossings, 27.2 (2016), 103-124. 
11 Readings, The University, p. 124. 
12 Readings, The University, p. 132. 
13 Readings, The University, p. 134. 
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‘ruins’. At this point, Readings’ thinking is close to works of Peggy Kamuf and 
Jacques Derrida who conceive the university specifically in relation to accountability 
and responsibility.14 But before I proceed in this direction, I wish to draw attention 
to another aspect of Readings’ discussion. It will help further specify what in 
Readings’ account of accountability still seems to defeat the mission of taking a 
university responsibility as it is outlined above. Furthermore, importantly, it will 
explain the motivations for the intervention in the current debates about the 
university which I propose in this part of my thesis.  
Deconstructing the Critique of the Neoliberal University 
According to Readings, it is particularly the question of the value of teaching which 
will allow us to pursue resistance against the Excellence mode which defines the 
current university. In the chapter entitled ‘The Scene of Teaching’, Readings argues 
that pedagogy ‘has a specific chronotope that is radically alien to the notion of 
accountable time upon which the excellence of capitalist-bureaucratic management 
and bookkeeping depend’.15 Pedagogy, as he argues, is ‘markedly at odds with the 
logic of accounting that runs the University of Excellence’.16  
What makes pedagogy so resistant to excellence according to Readings arises 
from its inherent ‘irreconcilability’. This is because, as he explains, the question of 
the value of teaching is always ‘posed from a subjective standpoint that is taken to 
be central’ (e.g., from the standpoint of the teacher, the student or the administrator). 
                                                 
14 Kamuf addresses this problem particularly in her article ‘Accounterablity’ published in 2007 which 
I will closely examine in the chapter ‘Reading Accountability as a Text’. Derrida conceives a 
‘university responsibility’ particularly in his essay ‘Mochlos; or, The Conflict of the Faculties’. I will 
examine this essay and particularly its opening in the chapter entitled ‘Taking Tremendous 
Responsibilities’.   
15 Readings, The University, p. 151. 
16 Readings, The University, p. 154. 
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Pedagogy thus resists the reduction to an umbrella-like evaluation which 
administrators impose on university activities. With teaching, the current attempt of 
administrators to position themselves as ‘meta-evaluators’ fails. They cannot 
synthesize the different, and sometimes conflicting, interests of the three groups 
(professors, students and administrators) into one general formula.17  
Drawing on this assumption Readings therefore suggests we pursue the 
quality harboured in pedagogy in our attempts to resist the ‘general logic of 
accounting’. With this proposition, however, he does not want to re-centre pedagogy 
at the University of Excellence, to put ‘old’ teaching ‘back to the center of 
things’.18As Readings explains, he does not want to promote an old view which 
embraces teaching as a path from dependency to autonomy, as a means of 
emancipation which, for him, always entails the constitution of a sovereign 
autonomous subject. In contrast to this traditional approach, Readings wants to 
embrace pedagogy as ‘the question of justice’,19 which, for him, entails 
understanding education as a ‘relation, a network of obligation’.20 This also involves 
an obligation ‘to listen, without knowing why, before we know what it is that we are 
to listen to’. In this way, we will be enable to centre the university and its pedagogy 
on the ‘attention to the other’.21  
Although I am sympathetic to the direction in which Readings is aiming, i.e. 
centring the university and its pedagogy on the ‘attention to the other’, I find it 
problematic. As I argued in chapter one, without the possibility of separation (i.e. 
emancipation) from one’s ‘networks’ and ‘obligations’ as they are already defined 
                                                 
17 Readings, The University, p. 151. 
18 Readings, The University, p. 152. 
19 Readings, The University, p. 154. 
20 Readings, The University, p. 158. 
21 Readings, The University, p. 162. 
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and configured by our past and present, one cannot - simply - imagine the ‘radically’ 
other and constitute a relationship to it/her/him.  At this point, Readings again falls 
with his argumentation back into the line of opposing ‘relationality’ to ‘non-
relationality’.  
Most importantly, it is this inability to conceive the demand for autonomy 
and independence and the relation and obligation to the other in terms other than 
oppositional. This, as I showed in the previous discussion, closes the possibility of 
imagining political transformation. There is, however, a further aspect of Readings’ 
approach to the question of accountability and pedagogy which still demands 
examination.  
Why do I consider Readings’ critique of equating accountability with 
accounting inadequate? It is not that he situates the attempt to resist the Excellence 
mode in the domain of pedagogy that I find problematic. As I show in the arguments 
developed in this part of my thesis, there are, indeed, theoretical, political and 
historical reasons why we should specifically worry over the domain of university 
pedagogical practices in relation to accountability. Instead, what I find problematic 
is that Readings grounds his argument on the assumption that pedagogy is 
incompatible with ‘accountable logic’. This assumption, as I interpret it, is part and 
parcel of a particular grammar which not only structures Reading’s university 
discourse but is indicative of the current debate on the university and its futures. 
In Readings’ discourse, this ‘grammar’ manifests itself in a way we can 
summarize as follows: Firstly, despite the initial attempt to envision ‘the general 
logic of accountability’ as a conflictual process with ambivalent effects, there is no 
doubt about the value and the status of ‘accounting’ in his discourse. For Readings, 
‘accounting’ is clearly a bad procedure and accountability which accentuates 
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accounting brings only negative and harmful effects for the university. Secondly, as 
Readings’ deliberation on pedagogy reveals, the ‘general logic of accountability’ is, 
in his view, immediately positioned as being alien to the university body proper. It is 
as if the ‘accountable logic’ was implemented on university activities – to its 
teaching and research - from the outside, from domains which are not related to 
academic work. More specifically, in Readings’ view, ‘accounting’ belongs to the 
world of business which – through the implementation of the general logic of 
accountability – infects and colonizes the university. Drawing on this assumption, 
Readings then argues that although it infiltrates and begins to dominate all university 
activities, the group which belongs to the bearers of this new logic and the 
representatives of the interests of businesses can be easily identified. It is a group 
which, as he shows with his reading of Cabal’s text, gained unprecedented 
significance within the current university - administrators. Finally, on his timeline of 
the university’s historical development, Readings situates the moment of the 
‘contamination’ of the university by practices which equate accountability with 
accounting to the present, to what he calls the ‘posthistorical’ era. In other words, for 
Readings, ‘equating accounting with accountability’ is a new and unprecedented 
phenomenon. It is as if it was only ‘now’, when the displacement of the question of 
value occurs, when the question ‘what is the value?’ shifts to the interest solely in 
how the value is measured. 
Clearly, contemporary critics of the so-called ‘neoliberalization of higher 
education’ do not use Readings’ terminology. Today, we do not use terms such as 
‘the University of Excellence’ or ‘non-referentiality’. In the current discourse, which 
seeks to critique the processes of ‘neoliberalization’ or ‘corporatization’ of higher 
education, the university usually passes under the name ‘the neoliberal university’. 
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The structure of the discourses in which this phrase usually figures, is, however, not 
dissimilar to that identified in Reading’s treatment of the ‘general logic of 
accountability’.  
The phrase ‘the neoliberal university’ mostly functions as a shorthand meant 
to describe all the horrors resulting from so-called ‘neoliberalization’. It is meant to 
signify the ‘marketization’ of higher education, its privatization, the imposition of 
austerity and a resulting precariousness. It is also meant to capture the expansion of 
‘managerialism’ and quantitative performance control. The phrase also describes the 
privileging of applied research over ‘basic’ theoretical research, natural sciences 
over the humanities, and the general trend of instrumentalizing knowledge across all 
disciplines which would make them more easily available for application in 
industries and policies.  
When we say ‘the neoliberal university’, we also mean to express the 
changes within the so called ‘pedagogic scene’. It indicates the shift when teaching 
turns into a mere service offered to customers for a fee, with the aim to increase their 
employability and value on the job market, rather than to make a mark in students’ 
critical and creative approach to the world they live in.  
In relation to feminism, as discussed in Part one, feminism’s 
institutionalization in academia is sometimes considered to be a symptom of 
‘neoliberalization’. According to narratives which, as Robyn Wiegman and others 
have shown, dominate the debate since the 1990s, institutional recognition and 
support for feminism is perceived as corrupting a once revolutionary women’s 
movement. Since the early 1990s feminism began to pose ‘the academic against 
feminism’ and narrate the ‘political failure in academic feminism’s institutional 
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success’.22 In this paradigm, which opposes the political against the academic, the 
academic institutionalization of feminism is always understood as a failure,23 as 
something which is ‘bringing feminism to an end’.24  
The same is true for the concepts employed by feminist scholarship. 
Although, as Scott argues, ‘neither feminism nor gender are homogeneous even at 
their points of origin (if we can even identify such points)’ and ‘the forms they take 
and the meanings given to them are adapted to local circumstances’,  
 
[b]oth ‘gender’ and ‘feminism’ are usually taken to have Anglo-American 
origins; indeed, for some critics they are an example of the one-way trajectory 
of globalization, in the transmission of goods or ideas. Thus feminism has 
been reviled as one of those commodities “made in the USA” that corrupts the 
culture of traditional societies and gender (of similar provenance) has been 
taken to constitute a thread to the natural or “God-given” distinctions between 
the sexes.25  
 
Similarly, when the demands for ‘equality’, ‘inclusion’, ‘transparency’ or, precisely, 
‘accountability’, are recognized and endorsed on the level of a university policy, 
these are also, by the critics of the neoliberal university, revealed and criticized as 
concepts which are being (mis)used to promote rather than question the unequal 
distribution of power within academic and other global markets. 
The phrase ‘the neoliberal university’ refers to all of that and, as Wendy 
Brown points out in Undoing Demos, the adjective ‘neoliberal’ refers even to much 
                                                 
22 Wiegman, ‘The Possibility’, p. 41. 
23 Wiegman, ‘Academic Feminim’, p. 32. 
24 Wiegman, ‘Academic Feminim’, p. 23. 
25 Joan Wallach Scott, ‘Feminist Reverberations’, in The Fantasy of Feminist History (Durham and 
London: Duke University Press, 2011), pp. 68-90, p. 80. 
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more.26 However, as it also seems from reading Brown’s book, although this 
adjective seems to say so much, it can end up saying very little. Put rather bluntly, 
the adjective ‘neoliberal’ has become an ‘empty signifier’. It does not help with 
critical examination and evaluation of the situation we find ourselves in today.27  
In relation to the question of the university specifically, the problem is that 
the phrase ‘the neoliberal university’ seems to cover all complexities and 
contradictions as it in one stroke grooms and neatly aligns everything one would 
wish to critique to one side of the phrase – the adjective ‘neoliberal’, while the noun 
(university) is kept more or less untouched.28 It seems to me that when we speak 
about ‘the neoliberal university’, we usually avoid the critique of the university – a 
critique in a manner of self-critique, an interrogation of what the ‘university’ and 
‘we’ are and do. In other words, the critique led from this standpoint targets the 
university only in order to identify what we think are the university’s - and our - 
‘others’ against whom we need to defend ourselves.  
But, was it not – precisely - ‘the other’ in whose name we wanted to critique 
the so called neoliberal university in the first place? Was it not for ‘the attention to 
the other’ that Readings wanted to re-define pedagogy as the question of justice and 
                                                 
26 Wendy Brown, Undoing Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (Cambridge, MS and London, 
England: The MIT Press, 2015).  As we can read in Undoing Demos, neoliberalism, as governing 
reason or rationality, is a logic which ‘economizes’ everything. Thus, among many other things, 
‘neoliberalism’ is responsible – apart from profoundly damaging democracy - also for climate 
change, crippling of welfare state, or online dating. 
27 What makes the adjective ‘neoliberal’ useless does not, however, derive from the language in 
which this word is formed and conveyed. As Berger, following Scott explains in relation to the terms 
used by critical analyses, their ‘usefulness’ rather depend ‘on specific or “idiolectic” uses and 
contextual redeployments and displacements’. As she argues, when the term is treated as an ‘open 
question about how those meanings are established, what they signify, and in what contexts, then it 
remains a useful – because critical – category of analysis’. Anne E. Berger, ‘Gender Springtime in 
Paris: A Twenty-First-Century Tale of Seasons’, differences, special issue Transatlantic Gender 
Crossings, 27.2 (2016), 1-26, (p. 10). 
28 See, for instance, the discussion on the relation between REF and casualization: McRae, Andrew, 
‘The paradoxes of neo-liberalism in UK higher education, A Head of Department’s Blog < 
https://headofdepartmentblog.wordpress.com/2016/04/26/the-paradoxes-of-neo-liberalism-in-uk-
higher-education/> [accessed 9 February 2017]. 
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professed that, in order to resist the university’s Excellence mode, ‘we have to listen, 
without knowing why, before we know what it is that we are to listen to’?  
It seems to me that the grammar which defines the critique of the neoliberal 
university betrays such a mission. It only re-affirms the already agreed verdict that it 
is the ‘neoliberal’ - whatever the adjective is meant to refer to (‘instrumentalization’, 
‘accountability’, ‘inclusion’ ‘academic feminism’)- which we don’t want to hear. 
What we end up critiquing is not the university per se but what seem to be 
encroachments from the outside – ‘neoliberal’ - world. The perpetrators are 
identified and kept at a sufficiently safe distance; nothing moves, nothing shifts, 
nothing trembles.  
To be clear, it is not that I want to argue that notions such as ‘counting’, 
‘accounting’, ‘accountability’, ‘transparency’, ‘equality’, ‘emancipation’, or, indeed, 
‘academic feminism’ and ‘a university’, are unequivocal and unproblematic 
formulations. Rather the opposite – they are complex and intricate and that is why I 
believe it is worth bothering with them although they may be considered – by the 
critics of the neoliberal university – to be old and compromised.29 Neither do I wish 
to deny the devastating impacts of the so called neoliberalization of the university. 
These effects are, in one way or another, unfortunately, familiar to most of those 
inhabiting Western universities, and particularly in countries such as the UK.  
That we need to resist marketization of the university is thus not what is put 
into dispute here. What I do suggest is at stake, is, how can we convey this 
resistance? The question is by what rhetorical, theoretical, political, and institutional 
                                                 
29 Is it not, rather, abandoning concepts such as ‘feminism’, ‘accountability’ or ‘transparency’ what 
the so called ‘neoliberalism’ wants us to do?  
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means and from which positions and with a view to ‘what’, can we enact this 
resistance. 
To attempt to account for such differences is crucial particularly because the 
effects of the so called ‘neoliberalization’ do not affect all non-applicable 
knowledges (that is most of the work produced in the humanities), academic 
disciplines and groups inhabiting universities in a same way. Ironically, the current 
austerity measures affect most severely those for whom a more traditional - let’s say 
‘pre-neoliberal’ - university is not, or not a better, option – people of colour, 
disabled students, sexual minorities, women, working class people and people from 
other historically deprived backgrounds. Adrienne Rich’s remark written more than 
forty years ago in her famous essay ‘Toward a Woman-Centered University’ seems 
to describe the structuring of the current university strikingly well:  
 
The University is above all a hierarchy. At the top is a small cluster of highly 
paid and prestigious persons, chiefly men, whose careers entail the services of 
a very large base of ill-paid or unpaid persons, chiefly women: wives, research 
assistants, secretaries, teaching assistants, cleaning women, waitresses in the 
faculty club, lower-echelon administrators, and women students who are used 
in various ways to gratify the ego.30  
 
 Similarly, a conviction common among critics of the neoliberal university that the 
current ‘austerity measures’ affect all knowledge practices which are not 
immediately applicable in industry or policy making, or which in the same way do 
not produce immediate profit, is simply misguided. Austerity measures do not affect 
all ‘humanist’ knowledge in the same way and intensity but they restrain particularly 
                                                 
30 Rich, ‘Toward a Woman-Centered University’, p. 136. 
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academic work which strives to be transformative: work which is political and which 
strikes the androcentric concept of knowledge production and its transmission, the 
concept of the university and its institutions. In other words, it affects academic 
practices which, as Tuija Pulkkinen puts it, do not only produce new knowledge but 
which also seek to intervene in how knowledge is produced and transmitted.31 
Clearly, deciding which work, and under which circumstances, provides 
rather than closes opportunities for such an intervention is a tremendous task. But 
since the critique of the neoliberal university secures itself by directing its attention 
out of itself, and thus obscures university’s androcentric historical and structural 
character, it cannot be considered an effective (self)critique in the name of the 
openness to the other. If we want to take the call to approach the university and its 
pedagogy as centred on ‘the attention to the other’ seriously, if ‘the other’ is not to 
become just another ‘empty signifier’, if we really want to ‘listen, without knowing 
why, before we know what it is we are to listen to’ as Readings encourages us, we 
need to listen even – or perhaps particularly - to that which we might not want to 
hear. It is on these grounds that I call for tremendous pedagogies. It is in this sense 
that I argue that we have to make ourselves and the university tremble.  
From Disciplinary Power to Textuality 
Discontent with the paradigm which addresses the university from the standpoint of 
the ‘critique of the neoliberal university’ is not new. In particular, I wish to 
accentuate argumentation and critique articulated by John Mowitt, as follows.  
                                                 
31 Pulkkinen, ‘Identity and Intervention’, p. 200. 
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Considered in relation to Mowitt’s work, what I have been calling ‘the 
critique of the neoliberal university’ can be understood as belonging to the species of 
approaches Mowitt calls, in his book Text: The Genealogy of an Antidisciplinary 
Object, ‘affirmative critique of disciplinary reason’.32 As Mowitt explains, with this 
expression he means to describe a procedure through which one questions the limits 
of one’s project but only in order to ‘protect and further consolidate a disciplinary 
project by attempting to pass the gesture of self-scrutiny off as an encounter with 
what outdistances the project as such’. In short, ‘affirmative critique’ is ‘a critique 
which interrogates foundations in order to fortify them against critical scrutiny from 
the outside’.33  
This approach, as Mowitt shows in his more recent works, also extends over 
the current debate on the humanities and its status in the Western university.34 As an 
example he names particularly the critique of instrumental reason and argues that 
those following in the steps of Adorno, Horkheimer and particularly Habermas, in 
order to formulate what is called the ‘neoliberalization of knowledge’ or the 
‘corporatization of the university’, implement ‘the [affirmative] critique of 
instrumental reason’. Although, as Mowitt continues, such an approach might extend 
and complicate the debate, its problem is that it does so in ‘a polemical, and 
therefore instrumental, term’.35  As he elaborates on this in the paper ‘Left Leaning: 
Toward a Sinister Humanities’:  
                                                 
32 John Mowitt, Text: The Genealogy of an Antidisciplinary Object (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 1992), p. 42. 
33 Mowitt, Text, p. 43. 
34 These include articles and presentations, namely ‘The Humanities and the University in Ruin’, 
presented at Faculty of Arts, University of Western Cape, 31 May 2011, ‘What is Academic Freedom; 
or, Why Do They Hate Us?’, ADFL Bulletin, 42.2 (2013), 26-30; ‘On the One Hand, and the Other’, 
College Literature, 42.2 (2015), 311-336; ‘Mediating the Humanities’, presented at The University of 
Leeds, 26 February, 2014; ‘Left Leaning: Towards a Sinister Humanities’; presented at FAHACS 
Research Seminar, University of Leeds, 12 November, 2014. 
35 John Mowitt, ‘On the One Hand’, p. 311. 
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The current effort to salvage the humanities by stressing its relation to the 
anodyne pursuits of personal fulfilment, self-expression and multicultural 
awareness, while principled in their avoidance of risk, are … reactive and 
misguided. As expressions of the decades long search for an effective way to 
share its message with the public, such formulations are hopeless. Not only do 
they betray what is actually exciting to humanists about their work, but they 
avoid addressing neoliberalism where it lives: in risk.36 
 
It is in the contrast to these approaches, which to a large extent define the debate 
over the humanities, that Mowitt articulates his own project. According to him,  
 
[i]f the field of the humanities is to survive the pandemic of financialization 
and resultant austerity, it will be because it has engaged financialization on its 
own terms, and articulated there precisely what its stewards do not wish to 
hear.37  
 
This is also why, although stressing that we need to contest ‘the metrics used to 
evaluate the work of the humanities’, Mowitt nevertheless argues for ‘hanging on 
the concept of value’ in our examination of this work. However, Mowitt does not 
suggest we accept the concept imposed by the current formations of disciplinary 
power, and further perpetuated by those who critique it from the standpoint of the 
critique of instrumental reason. Key to this engagement is the re-elaboration of the 
concepts of ‘value’, ‘the humanities’ and what is called ‘human’.  
In his two works ‘On the One hand, and the Other’ and ‘Left leaning: 
Toward a Sinister Humanities’, these themes are developed quite literally. Mowitt 
                                                 
36 Mowitt, ‘Left Leaning’. p. 1. 
37 Mowitt, ‘Left Leaning’. p. 2. 
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examines the questions of the humanities through an examination of the importance 
of ‘hands’ in the texts of Engels, Heidegger and Derrida, and employs language 
which evokes ‘handling’ and ‘instrumentality’. The ‘instrumental’ connotation is 
also an important feature of one of his key concepts, the notion of ‘re: working’.38 
‘Re: working’ is a ‘methodological approach’ Mowitt suggests is to be taken in our 
examinations of the work of the humanities. This term, which is Mowitt’s translation 
of Bertold Brecht’s concept of Umfunktionierung,39 suggests that rather than 
opposing instruments (or instrumental reason), it presupposes a certain kind of 
instrumentality: ‘by virtue of the fact that in the Anglophone world what does or 
does not “work” implies a certain instrumentality’, Mowitt argues, ‘re: working the 
work of the humanities’ rather than opposing instrumental reason, requires its 
displacement ‘and those of its qualities that give its critical diagnosis of the 
humanities what power it has’.40  
The non-affirmative critique by way of ‘re: working’, and thus also 
engaging with ‘risks’ which the critiques of instrumental reason avoid, 
implies significant consequences for the field of the humanities. More 
specifically, this approach leads Mowitt to argue that we need to re-consider 
how the humanities constitutes itself and how it relates to other disciplines 
such as biology, anthropology or climatology. As he argues, we at least have 
to  
 
                                                 
38 The term ‘re: working’ first appears in Mowitt’s Radio: Essays in Bad Reception (Berkley and 
London: University of California Press, 2011). 
39 Typically, Brecht’s ‘Umfunktionierung’ is translated as ‘re-purposing’. This translation, however, 
does not evoke another meaning Brecht wished to convey. As Mowitt explains, Brecht ‘is just as 
often re-purposing purpose as he is, say, theatre’ (Mowitt, ‘On the one hand’, 313).  
40 Mowitt, ‘On the One Hand’, p. 313. 
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entertain the possibility that the humanities itself is exhausted, and that in the 
wake of its re: working something crucial to both it and the qualitative social 
sciences emerges to play a role in the current debate about the crisis of the 
university in the West.41  
 
His analysis thus leads him to argue that ‘the humanities as such seems less 
crucial’ as it is ‘not unique in its probing of the limits of the human’. In 
‘Left Leaning: Toward a Sinister Humanities’, Mowitt proposes what he 
calls ‘a sinister humanities’. What constitutes ‘the offensive profile, the 
monstrosity, of a sinister humanities’ is that it 
 
risks offence by “finishing” immanent self-critical tendencies within the field 
of humanistic inquiry – tendencies typically associated with the theoretical 
innovations of the last half century- and “finishing” them so as to amplify the 
implications they have had on the very conception of the human that has long 
oriented the field of the humanities.42 
 
Despite the impression which his language might invoke (using words such as 
‘exhausted’, ‘finishing’, ‘offensive’, ‘monstrosity’, etc.), Mowitt does not profess 
an end of humanistic inquiry. The ‘re: working of the work of the humanities’ is not 
another ruined narrative but an attempt to develop a non-defensive humanistic 
scholarship in institutional, theoretical and political terms.  
More specifically, it leads Mowitt to argue for the field’s disciplinary 
expansion. As he proposes, because the question of ‘human’ is adrift and the 
humanities has become in this sense ‘“ambient” (surrounding, yet everywhere and 
nowhere) one might be justified in situating the emergence of sound studies’, a 
                                                 
41 Mowitt, ‘On the One Hand’, p. 313. 
42 Mowitt, ‘Left Leaning’. p. 2. 
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discipline situated ‘within and between the humanities and social sciences’, as that 
which ‘gestures towards what is emerging as a provocation for thought in the 
university of austerity’.43 Neither does Mowitt’s proposition of ‘a sinister 
humanities’, a phrase which although invoking the theme of his analysis on ‘left-
handedness’ is undoubtedly also meant as a provocation, imply a break with the 
tradition of humanistic inquiry. Rather, a sinister humanities implies a continuation 
of a particular tradition of work developed within the humanities, a tradition usually 
labelled as ‘poststructuralist’. He argues for pursuing specifically one of its features 
which the theoretical endeavours gathered under this name employ, that is, an 
‘immanent self-critique’. Finally, developing the humanist work in this way, or, as 
Mowitt calls it, ‘finishing’ it, is a way of enabling us to conceive work in the 
humanities which will not affirm and thus strengthen trends we seek to contest, such 
as the ‘neoliberalization of knowledge’ and ‘corporatization of the university’. It is 
meant to give us a hand in resisting those very trends, to enable academics to 
participate in the current political struggles.  
Clearly, my thesis is different from Mowitt’s. There are, however, significant 
affinities between the two projects; affinities which, I would argue, exceed the mere 
provocative invocation of a ‘threat’ or a ‘risk’ by using terms like ‘sinister’ or 
‘tremendous’.  
The affinity starts with the appeal to the ‘poststructuralist’ theoretical 
tradition. Particularly however, it is the desire to offer what Mowitt calls a ‘non-
affirmative critique of disciplinary power’, a desire to theorize how we can, as 
academics, through our work, participate in the current political struggles.  
                                                 
43 Mowitt, ‘Left Leaning’. p. 2.  
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Mowitt elaborates this problematic in the already mentioned book Text: The 
Genealogy of an Antidisciplinary Object. Here he discusses the possibility of ‘non-
affirmative critique’ in relation to ‘disciplinarity’ and situates it specifically within 
Foucault’s understanding of ‘disciplinary power’.44 Mowitt argues that Foucault’s 
examination of disciplinary power shows how the reliance of disciplines (like 
sociology or psychology) on the reduction of human agency to a repository of 
potentially objective power presupposes a continuity ‘between the internal 
organization of knowledge production at the level of academic disciplines and the 
institutional structure of society’.45 According to Mowitt, taking this continuity into 
account is crucial for how we think and inhabit academic disciplines and their 
transformations. Particularly, it shows that if we want to resist disciplinary power, ‘it 
is not enough to attack parochialism of the disciplines, nor is it enough to affirm 
interdisciplinarity’. What Foucault’s insight allows us to understand is that 
‘rearranging disciplinary boundaries means little if this rearrangement is not 
understood to have consequences for the structure of disciplinary power within 
society at large’.  
Drawing on Foucault, Mowitt therefore insists that ‘interdisciplinary projects 
(like sociology of literature or women’s studies) […] continue to confront the task of 
theorizing and practically addressing the profound consequences of a social 
divestment of disciplinary power’. He calls this effort ‘antidisciplinary’46 and argues 
that this particular ‘quality’ is a ‘tactical consequence of the irreducible ambivalence 
                                                 
44 In Text Mowitt introduces a particular interpretation of Foucault’s work. As he argues, although 
‘Foucault cannot be read as a straightforward partisan of the text … this does not prevent his work 
from being read so as to provide a notion of discipline that illuminates what is at stake in the text’s 
antidisciplinary status’ (31).   
45 Mowitt, Text, p. 35. 
46 Tuija Pulkkinen discusses a similar issue specifically in relation to gender and women’s studies. 
She calls the ‘antidisciplinary potential’ ‘intervention’ (Pulkkinen, ‘Identity and Intervention’).   
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figured in the concept of textuality’.47 In other words, Mowitt suggests that in order 
to convey a non-affirmative critique of disciplinary power, our work must be not 
only interdisciplinary but also antidisciplinary. Methodologically speaking, this 
entails engaging disciplinary power through the notion of text.  
One advantage of using textuality for such an endeavour is that, unlike 
Foucault’s notion of ‘discourse’, it does not treat differences as ‘differences of 
degree’ which ends up continuing ‘to undergird the notion of society as a 
homogeneous, communicative system’. Textuality, because it is ‘fraught with 
ambivalence and antagonism’ opposes such homogenizing tendencies. This quality 
of irresolvable ambivalence, as already indicated, enables the text to strike 
disciplinary power in two directions. First, the text ‘is simultaneously shared by 
several disciplines’ and ‘thus exposes them to the borders they share’. Its 
ambivalence thus implies that ‘text’ is ‘interdisciplinary’. Its ambivalence, and this 
is what is at stake, is, however, not limited only to phenomena which already present 
themselves through the disciplines. ‘The text’, as Mowitt argues, ‘was not produced 
by any of the disciplines that came to share it as an object’. Instead, it was produced 
by a ‘confluence’ which, Mowitt argues using Freud’s term, ‘“overdetermined” it’. 
This puts the text into a particular spacio-temporal position in relation to disciplines: 
‘The text is within disciplinarity, but in a manner that captures the constitutional 
instability of disciplinary power – an instability rooted in the alterity that pressures 
discipline to develop and expand’.48 In other words, the text is within disciplinarity, 
but in a manner that captures the constitutional instability and thus also exceeds it.  
                                                 
47 Mowitt, Text, p. 36. 
48 Mowitt, Text, p. 44. 
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Because of this ambiguous yet particular position, the text not only exposes 
what distinguishes one discipline from another but also the limits which constitute 
them as disciplines. In other words, the text allows us to articulate and engage with 
disciplines’ ‘enabling others’, that is, with that which disciplines separated 
themselves from in their constitution and which they, as formations already 
configured by that very separation, themselves cannot comprehend. 
The way in which the text allows us to engage with the ‘enabling others’ 
does not, however, equate to ‘comprehension’, for the following two reasons. 
Firstly, ‘texts’, ‘discourses’ or ‘disciplines’ are not ‘objects’ to be ‘comprehended’, 
i.e. grasped and understood by a subject conceived as an entity separated from the 
objects it examines. As Foucault has taught us, disciplinary power is not a 
prohibitive force, but rather a productive one in the sense that modern ‘docile 
bodies’ and their ‘souls’ are not ‘oppressed’ or ‘mystified’ by it, but instead 
constituted. Foucault’s insight into how power operates is, thus, crucial for thinking 
the possibility of resisting disciplinary power. However, this paradigm does not, as 
Mowitt argues, allow us to articulate the possibility of a human agency which would 
go beyond ‘disciplinary power’.49 If, instead, as Mowitt proposes, drawing on 
scholars such as Roland Barthes, Julia Kristeva or Jacques Derrida, we interpret the 
‘subject’ (i.e. the ‘soul’ or the ‘psyche’), not as being merely a product of 
‘disciplinary power’ but as a ‘text’, we can not only challenge the assumption that 
what is interpreted (object) is separate from that which interprets it (subject), but we 
can also grasp interpretation as potentially intervening and thus unsettling 
‘disciplinary power’. In other words, ‘textuality’ does not only imply that we read 
                                                 
49 According to Mowitt, Foucault’s repressive hypothesis was not meant to reject the possibility of 
non-affirmative critique of disciplinary power but only to reject rather a naïve notion that one can 
resist power from a position which would be outside of it (Text, p. 44). 
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artefacts as ambivalent texts but that also our reading is textual, that the 
interpretation itself is an ambivalent operation. And this is meant not in a sense of 
‘anything goes’, as an embrace of relativism, but in an antidisciplinary sense. In 
other words, ‘textual reading’ opens a possibility of articulating human agency in 
other than a naïve – let’s say ‘pre-Foucauldian’ - way.  
How does antidisciplinarity operate within what Mowitt calls ‘textual 
reading’? As follows from his work, textual reading is antidisciplinary not so much 
because it is simply ambivalent, but because its ambivalence invites ‘reflections on 
its enabling conditions’:  
 
When we approach a particular cultural artefact from the standpoint of text 
[…] we are trying to comprehend how what eludes us in our interpretation has 
to do with the limits imposed upon our construction by the field in which it is 
executed.50 
 
The aim, however, and this is the second reason why textual interpretation is not 
exactly about comprehension, is not to encompass that which eludes us, or that 
which is ‘not yet integrated’ within the existing realm of (disciplinary) knowledge. 
Such a procedure would only extend the disciplinary framework and reaffirm its 
power. ‘Textuality’, therefore, must operate through an economy other than that of 
‘appropriation’, ‘assimilation’ or ‘comprehension’. As Mowitt explains, it 
‘encounters what contests disciplinary power, but in a manner that refuses to speak 
for our immediate social context is not yet prepared to integrate while nevertheless 
refusing to be silent about it’.51 In other words, it is through the complex strategy of 
                                                 
50 Mowitt, Text, p. 45-6. 
51 Mowitt, Text, p. 111. 
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‘un-veiling’ (not remaining silent but refusing to speak for ‘it’), that textual reading 
allows articulation – within one’s academic work and in a particular cultural practice 
or artefact – of the potential of something other, of the not yet known, of the 
‘utopic’, without reducing it to the disciplinary. 
For me, the key contribution of Mowitt’s work is in how he treats this ‘not 
yet known’. As already suggested, Mowitt does not insist on textual ambivalence 
because he wants to simply argue that meaning is always ambivalent, that it is ‘not 
one’ but always multiple. He does not simply promote ‘ambivalence’ or 
‘multiplicity’ of meaning in contrast to ‘clear’ and ‘unequivocal’ meaning. Let us 
not forget that, within the landscape of academic disciplines, binary oppositions such 
as ambiguity/unequivocality, obscurity/clarity, subjective/objective, or – one I will 
specifically concern myself with in the following chapter – narrating/counting, are 
commonly used to describe the difference between the humanities and natural 
sciences or, within the humanities, the study of literature (or art in general) from 
philosophy. 
Mowitt is not interested in this ‘not yet known’ made graspable through 
textuality in order to understand how literary or artistic ‘texts’ are produced. It is not 
in order to explain invention of artistic or literary production that Mowitt discusses 
textuality. Neither does he invoke textual ambivalence in order to promote more 
‘poetic’ readings of philosophy, natural sciences or disciplinarity. His motivations 
for taking up the notion of ‘text’, and Mowitt is explicit about them, are political. He 
engages with the text in order to develop the implications textuality has for the 
possibility of articulating political transformation. Text, according to Mowitt, ‘can 
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be made to respond to the political demands imposed upon us by the framework of 
disciplinary power’.52 
Calling for the ‘antidisciplinarity’ of textuality is therefore meant not only in 
the sense that the text has to ‘resist’ disciplines or disciplinarity in general. Invoking 
text’s ‘antidisciplinarity’ is meant also, or perhaps foremost, as a suggestion that the 
‘text’ must resist disciplinary formations where it feels ‘at home’ the most, that is, 
within the study of literary texts. Thus, although Mowitt does not seek to separate 
‘text’ from literature, he wants to, as he puts it, ‘attenuate the “literalization”’ of the 
textual model.53 Only when we do this can we develop its ‘antidisciplinary’ potential 
and thus develop academic work which opens possibilities for political 
transformation:  
 
By insisting upon this antidisciplianry dimension of textuality, one can, in 
effect, institutionalize – that is, render accessible – the conditions for a 
nonaffirmative critique of the institution. The political character of cultural 
interpretation is not then reduced to a dispute over ‘readings’, nor is it 
relegated to extracurricular activities like voting, demonstrating, or striking. 
Through the concept of the text it may become possible to articulate in a fairly 
direct way the struggle over interpretation with the struggle to change the 
world of disciplinary power.54 
 
To put it differently, conceiving textuality as antidisciplinary is thus a way of 
theorizing how we can inhabit the university and its disciplines in a way which 
opens them to ‘others’. It leaves space for the not yet known, for the other, to come 
not in some ‘general’, ‘abstract’ or unrepresentable way, but in a relationship to 
                                                 
52 Mowitt, Text, p. 45. 
53 Mowitt, Text, p. 47. 
54 Mowitt, Text, p. 46. 
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current political struggles. It is a way of articulating and negotiating, within one’s 
academic work, a possibility of intervening within the current context of disciplinary 
powers.  
Mowitt summarizes the ethico-political stakes implied by textuality in the 
conclusion of his book as following:  
 
[textual reading] seeks to assume responsibility for the way it inevitably 
extends the reach of disciplinary power - Western knowledge really does alter 
what it knows – while also embracing the possibility that what resists such 
power, both from within and without, will, if given the room to speak, tell us 
something “we” are in no position to hear. About this, of course, we can know 
very little. Nevertheless, we must still do everything in our power to listen.55 
 
Disciplines and texts of accounting  
My proposition is that the notion of antidisciplinarity of textual reading provides 
instruments through which we can begin to articulate how the university and 
pedagogy as centred on ‘the attention to the other’, as proposed by Readings, can be 
conceived. Following my interpretation of Readings’s and Mowitt’s work, I propose 
the following for our accounting for the university: Firstly, I propose we turn from 
discourses which I call ‘the critique of the neoliberal university’ and instead utilize 
the word and the concept of accountability. Secondly, I propose that we do not treat 
‘accountability’ as disciplinary or instrumental reason but approach accountability as 
a textual problem. The expectation is that such an approach will not produce what 
Mowitt calls ‘affirmative critique’ but, grasping the accounting of accountability as a 
                                                 
55 Mowitt, Text, p. 222. 
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movement which cannot be enclosed in any taxonomy, we will be able to drive a 
wedge into the disciplinary character not only of the university, but society at large.  
 When confronted with such a tremendous proposition, one may, however ask 
the following questions: Why should our non-affirmative critique of the university 
proceed through the notion of accountability? Why should one pick this particular 
word and concept in order to examine and resist the so called neoliberalization of 
higher education and, specifically, in relation to feminism? What is there to justify 
this choice? Is it not, after all, as Mowitt also stresses, possible to read anything as a 
‘text’? Is it not the case that - as Derrida famously argued - ‘there is nothing outside 
of the text’?  
Undoubtedly, the so called ‘textual reading’ can be implemented on any 
artefact or practice. Anything can be approached as ‘text’. But this is not what is at 
stake. As Mowitt interprets the famous phrase by Derrida, it is not only because 
everything (‘objects’ and ‘subjects’) has a textual structure why there is nothing 
outside of the text, but because it is a way of ‘naming what a certain model of 
reading produces when it approaches texts’: 
 
nothing is outside the text, because everything about which people might 
quarrel concerning its ‘meaning’ can be approached from the standpoint of the 
text, that is, from a standpoint that insists that one’s point of departure 
intervenes within, and thus unsettles, the meaning he or she assumes such a 
starting point will enable him or her to discover.56  
 
                                                 
56 Mowitt, Text, p. 95.  
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It seems to me that it is the notion of accountability which, within the current socio-
political context, and specifically in relation to the university, provides a particularly 
advantageous springboard for intervention and unsettling.  
The observation that within the last three decades and, particularly in the 
context of higher education, something has been happening to the word and the 
concept of ‘accountability’, is not limited only to a few remarks in Readings’ The 
University in Ruins as analysed above. Other scholars have called attention to and 
critiqued the conflation of the lexicons of politics, ethics and economics.57 One of 
them, Gert Biesta, even argues, that the shifts in the (mis)uses of accountability has 
in fact been a major area of inquiry in educational policy during the past decades.58  
Most of the authors agree that it is through the word and the concept of 
accountability that universities are subjected to the logic of the market and 
managerialism.59 Similarly to Readings, who argues that the university is dominated 
or ‘infected’ by a ‘general logic of accountability’, these scholars argue that the 
Western university is dominated by ‘accountability regimes’, ‘culture of 
accountability’ and ‘responsibilization’.60 This trend is further recognized as posing 
                                                 
57 These include, among many others: Kamuf, ‘Accounterability’, Afshin Mehrpouya and Marie 
Laure Djelic, ‘Transparency: From Enlightenment to Neoliberalism or When a Norm of Liberation 
Becomes a Tool of Governing’, HEC Paris Research Paper No. ACC-2014- 1059, SSSRN < 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2499402> [accessed 14 February 2017]; Mike 
Gismondim, Mike Sosteric and Gina Rathovic, ‘The University, Accountability, and Market 
Discipline in the Late 1990s, Electronic Journal of Sociology (1998), 
http://www.sociology.org/content/vol003.003/sosteric_d.html [accessed 9 February]; or Gert Biesta, 
‘Education, Accountability, and the Ethical Demand: Can the Democratic Potential of Accountability 
be Regained?’, Educational Theory 54.3 (2004), 233-250. Most recently then Wendy Brown, 
Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (New York: Zone Books, 2015). 
58 Biesta, ‘Education, Accountability’, p. 236. 
59 Bruce G. Charlton, ‘Audit, Accountability, Quality and All That: The Growth of Managerial 
Technologies in UK Universities’, in Education! Education! Education! Managerial Ethics and the 
Law of Unintended Consequences, eds. Stephen Prickett and Patricia Erskine-Hill (Exeter: Imprint 
Academic, 2002), pp. 13-32. 
60 Among scholars who discuss this trend, terminology invoking ‘poison’ or ‘infection’ seems to be 
common rhetorical device. Apart from already mentioned texts, see for instance Timothy Bahti; ‘The 
Injured University’, in Logomachia: The Conflict of the Faculties, Richard Rand, ed. (Lincoln and 
London: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), pp. 57-76. 
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a threat to political and ethical relationships, as an ‘antidemocratic strategy’ which is 
in contest with ‘democratic accountability’ and the values associated with it, such as 
‘equality’, ‘social justice’ and ‘empowerment’.61 
The word and the concept of ‘accountability’ – as the previous sentence 
suggests –appears, however, also on the other side of the equation. It is argued by 
theorists that under the current techno-managerial accountability regimes, 
developing and practicing ‘democratic accountability’, ‘responsibility’, ‘belief’ or 
‘trust’ is made impossible. 62 The call for ‘democratic accountability’ also still 
figures as one of the key demands of those protesting against the financialization of 
higher education.63  
The two ‘accountabilities’ (the ‘good’, democratic accountability, and the 
‘bad’, technological-managerial ) are thus understood as being in a direct opposition 
and, simultaneously, intimately intertwined. Scholars therefore argue that 
‘accountability’ is ‘deeply problematic’64 and a notion defined by ‘overdetermined 
crossings’,65 and that ‘accountability relations’ are not ‘static but dynamic’ processes 
which are in ‘contestation and change’.66 
                                                 
61 Kamuf, ‘Accounterability’; 2007, Marilyn Strathern, ‘The Tyranny of Transparency’, British 
Educational Research Journal, 26.3 (2000), 309-321; Biesta, ‘Education, Accountability’; Brown, 
Undoing Demos; Stewart Smyth, ‘Contesting Public Accountability: A Dialogical Exploration of 
Accountability and Social Housing’, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 23.3 (2012), 230-243. 
62 Scholars call for a renewal of ‘democratic accountability’ (Biesta, Smyth), ‘trust’ (Strathern), 
‘belief’ (Kamuf) or ‘responsibility’ (John McKertan, ‘Accountability as aporia, testimony, and gift, 
Critical Perspectives on Accounting, special issue Accounterability, 23.3 (2012), 258-278).  
63 The petition ‘Support the New University’ in support of students who on 13 February 2014 
occupied one of the University of Amsterdam’s buildings in protest to the financialization of 
academic life and which has been responded to by the university board of directors by initiating a 
lawsuit against the occupying students seeking a fine of €100,000 per student per day reads: ‘[w]e 
sympathize with their [students’] demand for greater transparency and accountability for university 
management, and for the democratization of decision-making process’ (‘Support the New 
University’, https://www.change.org/p/university-of-amsterdam-executive-board-support-the-new-
university [accessed 14 February 2017]; Gray, Johnatan, ‘Dutch student protest ignite movement 
against management of universities’, The Guardian, 17 March 2015 
https://www.theguardian.com/higher-education-network/2015/mar/17/dutch-student-protests-ignite-
movement-against-management-of-universities [accessed 14 February 2017]. 
64 Biesta, p. 241. 
65 Kamuf, ‘Accounterablity’, p. 251. 
66 Charleton, 17. 
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James Charleton, one of the scholars working on this issue, argues that 
‘accountability’ is a ‘slippery rhetorical term’ and is thus amenable to uses in 
‘rhetorically manipulative fashion’. According to Charleton, it is the ‘shifting back 
and forth’ between various meanings of accountability that makes it so 
problematic.67 Biesta also argues that it is because accountability operates on a basis 
of a ‘quick switch’ between its various meanings that it is difficult to introduce ‘an 
adequate analysis’. As he continues, accountability’s unstable and unreliable 
character also makes it difficult to critique. ‘Because we assume that accountability 
has to do with responsibility’, Biesta argues, it is difficult ‘to argue against 
accountability, since this may look like an argument for irresponsible action’.68 And, 
even more importantly, accountability’s ‘slippery character’ makes it difficult to 
imagine the ‘ways to resist and intervene in the current culture of accountability’. It 
seems, as scholars working on this issue conclude, that ‘accountability is not directly 
resistible’.69 
The increasing significance of ‘accounting’ and ‘accountability’ both as an 
‘object’ of critical scholarship and as an analytical tool through which we can 
examine the current changes in the society is testified also by the rise of critical 
accounting studies.70 From the very beginning of the formation of this discipline in 
the early 1990s, the most influential has been Foucault’s work. 71  The work of this 
                                                 
67 Charleton, p. 18.  
68 Biesta, p. 235. 
69 Biesta, p. 249; Keith Hoskin, ‘The Awful Idea of Accountability: Inscribing People into the 
Measurement of Object’, in Accountability, Power, Ethos and the Technologies of Managing, ed. by 
R. Munor and J. Mourtisen (London: International Thomson Business Press, 1996), pp. 265-282’, p. 
279; Kamuf, ‘Accounterability’, p. 253.  
70 The critical accounting studies is a discipline which emerged as an attempt to counter the global 
expansion of an ‘American invention’ of business schools in the 1980s. Essential to its emergence 
was a foundation of a platform for the discussions in critical accounting, the journal Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting established in 1990. 
71 For an overview of Foucault’s influence on the field see Peter Armstrong, ‘The Influence of Michel 
Foucault on the accounting research’, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 5 (1994), 25-55. 
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thinker allowed scholars to approach accounting not as a neutral and objective 
procedure (which is a view which dominates mainstream accounting) but as a 
particular – modern, that is ‘disciplinary’ - mode of answerability.   
One of the scholars who has introduced this paradigm into accounting studies 
is a historian and theorist Keith Hoskin. As Hoskin argues, although the Oxford 
English Dictonary gives examples of the adjective ‘accountable’ since the sixteenth 
century, the noun-form ‘accountability’ dates only to 1784 with a rather interesting 
entry which reads ‘an awful idea of accountability’.72 For Hoskin, the recent date of 
the formation of its noun-form is not accidental but marks the new knowledge-power 
relations. Hoskin proposes we grasp it as a ‘disciplinary breakthrough, with 
accounting playing a central and crucial role in its genesis’.73  
According to Hoskin, in contrast to pre-modern modes of answerability, 
accountability is not limited only to the evaluation of past performance or present 
circumstance, but reaches also into the future: accountability not only describes but 
also prescribes. Furthermore, this ‘panoptical’ order-making activity is not 
understood only as operating on the level of institutions, but also as involving a 
                                                 
72 Hoskin, ‘The Awful Idea’, p. 267.  
73 Keith Hoskin and Richard Macve,‘Accounting as Discipline: The Overlooked Supplement’, in 
Knowledges: Historical and Critical Studies in Disciplinarity, Messer-Davidow, Elle, Shumway, 
David, R., and Sylvan David, eds. (Charlottesville and London: University Press of Virginia, 1993), 
pp 25-53 (p. 28). In addition to this text and the already mentioned ‘The Awful Idea of 
Accountability’, I draw from Keith Hoskin,‘Education and the Genesis of Disciplinarity: The 
Unexpected Reversal’, in Knowledges: Historical and Critical Studies in Disciplinarity, Messer-
Davidow, Elle, Shumway, David, R., and Sylvan David, eds. (Charlottesville and London: University 
Press of Virginia, 1993), pp. 271-304. Hoskin is a leading historian and theorist on accounting and 
one of the scholars who introduced Foucauldian analysis into the field. Importantly, however, as I 
will discuss later in detail, Hoskin also goes beyond this particular paradigm. More specifically, he 
seeks to understand accountability in relation to ‘writing’ and ‘supplementarity’. This thread of 
Hoskin’s scholarship has, however, not been recognized by scholars in his field (see, for instance 
Armstrong’s summary; Armstrong, ‘The Influence of Michel Foucault’). Neither is Derrida’s work 
popular in the fields of critical accounting and critical management studies. This is explained in 
Pioneers of Critical Accounting (2002) as following: ‘Largely due to its complexity and its 
controversial reception by some quarters of the academic community there have been very few 
studies in accounting drawing on Derrida’s work’. Michael, J. R. Graffikin, ‘A Brief Historical 
Appreciation of Accounting Theory? But Who Cares?’, in Pioneers of Critical Accounting: A 
Celebration of the Life of Tony Lowe, ed. by Jim Hasalam, and Prem Sikka (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2016), pp. 143-162 (p. 131).  
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transformation of the self and the relation to the self. For Hoskin, ‘accountability’ is 
the first means of ‘human accounting’ which, as he refers to Foucault, seeks to 
‘judge individuals “in their truth”’.74 
Under this regime, an individual not only wants to fulfil their duty, but being 
exposed to a constant examination and evaluation which creates the need to compete 
with others, the individual wants also to be ‘number one’. This, however, 
simultaneously implies the ‘fear of being nothing but a zero’.75 The threat of failure 
is constant and not only for those who do fail the measures but also, or particularly, 
for those who are successful. This is because, as Hoskin argues, ‘not only new 
targets but new kinds of targets may at any moment get constructed out of the debris 
of past success and failure’: ‘Hence the emergence of the modern double-bind power 
of accountability’, where you are damned if you do perform and if you don’t.76 
Following Foucault, Hoskin and other scholars also argue that accountability 
has a particular relation to visibility: accountability is ‘panoptical’. Although as a 
modern disciplining power accountability operates ‘invisibly’, in order to examine 
and evaluate, it does not only account for things that have already been made visible. 
As Hoskin puts it, ‘the constant mutual implication of standard, actual and forecast 
measures of performance means that what is currently invisible may subsequently 
become visible’.77 Accountability is thus an order-making activity of modern powers 
where institutional practices in factories, workhouses, prisons, schools, hospitals, 
asylums or barracks, whatever their manifest functions, secure and perpetuate social 
order through superstitious surveillance.78  
                                                 
74 Hoskin, ‘The Awful Idea’, p. 271. 
75 Hoskin and Macve, p. 32.  
76 Hoskin and Macve, p. 32. 
77 Hoskin, ‘The Awful Idea’, p. 274.  
78 It is therefore no coincidence that accountability is closely related to, or sometimes even passes 
under, another term particular to current managerial lexicon - transparency. As there is no 
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As follows from this brief summary, grasping accountability as a disciplinary 
power already complicates what Readings calls ‘the general logic of accountability’. 
It allows us to understand accountability not merely as a result of technical or 
economic advancement but as constitutive of the modern Western world. It also 
shows the ‘accounting of accountability’ not as an oppressive procedure imposed on 
lecturers and students by management and administrators, but as a mode which 
constitutes modern subjectivity as such. 
Hoskin’s exploration, however, does not stop at this point. He pushes his 
examination further, asking questions such as ‘Which particular disciplinary 
formation or cultural practice does accountability come from? How could this 
evaluative mode, which from the very beginning has been recognized to be an 
“awful idea”, become so pervasive? What makes this ‘awful idea’ so irresistible?’ 
and last but not least, ‘How can we resist this irresistible mode?’  
In order to engage with these questions, Hoskin employs what I call, 
following Mowitt, an antidisciplinary reading.79 But before I proceed in this 
direction I will introduce and discuss work by Peggy Kamuf as it is particularly her 
work which I find useful for grasping accountability as an antidisciplinary object. 
                                                 
accountability without accounting, similarly, there is no accounting without transparency. I will 
discuss the problem of ‘visibility’ in relation to feminist theory and politics in part III ‘From 
Accounts to Visions’, particularly the chapter VI. 
79 As already argued, this part of Hoskin’s scholarship hasn’t been understood within his field. 
Armstrong, in his otherwise in-depth, rigorous and critical review and analysis of genealogy of 
Foucault’s influence on the critical accounting studies reads the ‘paradigmatic shift in Hoskin’s work 
as a retrieve to ‘traditional history’ which relies on ‘biographical links’ (xxx). Armstrong, p. 46.  
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Chapter IV – Accounting for a University Accountability  
Reading Accountability as a Text: Toward antidisciplinarity 
In her 2007 article ‘Accounterability’, Peggy Kamuf argues that today’s U.S. 
universities are defined by an ‘accountability movement’ which aims to eliminate 
risk so as to secure investments by parents, governments or business. For this 
purpose, the accountability movement attempts to ‘replace thinking by counting, to 
displace the responsibility of decision and judgment from the “subjective” place of 
thought to the balance sheet of summary numbers’.1  
Kamuf thus confirms analyses by Readings and other critics of the 
‘corporatization’ and the ‘marketization’ of the university. Importantly, however, 
she does not only enumerate the more or less obvious symptoms of the current 
culture of audit and accountability regimes, but her reading also provides a number 
of important theoretico-political manoeuvres which allow teasing out 
accountability’s antidisciplinary potential. 2  
One of those moves is Kamuf’s semantic analysis of ‘accountability’. She 
shows how this word is defined by an inherent tension between various and 
sometimes even conflicting meanings. More specifically, accountability is 
overdetermined by crossing ‘between calculation and narration, between count, 
account, and recount’. This semantic multiplicity, as Kamuf argues, derives from the 
word’s etymology. Accountability comes from the Latin computāre which is also the 
                                                 
1 Kamuf, ‘Accounterability’, p. 252. 
2 Kamuf’s article has been influential also beyond the field of deconstruction or the critique of the 
university. In 2012, the journal Critical Perspectives on Accounting published a special issue which 
was devoted to Kamuf’s work. McKernan, John and McPhail, Ken, eds., Accounterability, special 
issue of Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 23.3 (2012), 177-278. 
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origin of ‘the French homonyms, both the verbs compter [count] and conter [tell] 
and the nouns compte [account] and conte [tale]’.3 In French, it is the orthographic 
difference which prevents the two semantic threads - calculation and narration - 
from becoming entangled. However, nor in English, where there is no such a 
difference, the two meanings do get in the way of each other. In English, ‘counting’ 
and ‘narrating’ are kept apart due to the conventional habits of usage or other 
elements of context such as syntax.  
The two meanings, narrativity and computing, are, furthermore, not merely 
two different meanings of this word. As Kamuf argues, accountability is not only 
plurivocal but the meanings of computing and narrating are ‘commonly thought to 
stand in a rough opposition to each other’. Narrative accounting is perceived as 
‘occupying a pole in the vicinity of an act of witnessing or testimony, called, very 
loosely, subjective’. On the other hand, computational accounting, ‘lies at or close to 
the pole of what counts as objective fact, evidence, or even proof’.4 The word and 
the concept of accountability is thus defined by a binary opposition of 
computing/narrativity which constitutes a point of a chain of binary oppositions such 
as objectivity/subjectivity, evidence/witnessing, proof/testimony, etc. The two sides 
of the opposition, furthermore, do not occupy symmetrical positions towards one 
another but the sense which pulls accountability towards the ‘objective’ and ‘factual’ 
pole is evidently privileged. Kamuf lists a number of phrases which bear witness to 
this bias and which she immediately deconstructs: 
  
‘Numbers do not lie’, ‘Read the numbers, the numbers tell the story’, which is 
to say, the story of no story to tell; numbers, we believe, do not narrate, 
                                                 
3 Kamuf, ‘Accounterablity’, p. 251. 
4 Kamuf, ‘Accounterablity’, p. 251-252. 
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interpret, invent, or make up the figures – unless they do sometimes, which is 
why one is well-advised to run the numbers again, check and double-check 
them. Verification is always possible, at least in theory. Another more patently 
ironic dictum advises: ‘Put your faith in numbers’, in other words, in that 
which presumably make no claim on faith or belief, except, of course, the 
belief that numbers, counting, or quantification triumphs over belief.5 
 
Certainly, the belief that ‘numbers do not lie’, that is, assuming that there exists a 
direct reflection of ‘the truth’ in numerical representations, as if numbers were not a 
representation, as if they had nothing to do with - and thus could do without - 
language, discourse or narrative, and thus also concepts Kamuf employs in her 
reading, such as testimony or belief, is not a new phenomenon. Neither is the 
hardening of the connections to numbers within the semantico-pragmatic range of 
accountability a recent shift. The tendency to pull the meaning of accountability 
towards accounting and ‘letting its other more narrative, more “subjective” 
connections be subsumed and reduced to arithmetic figuration’, has, as Kamuf 
points out, perhaps always defined accountability. This tendency, furthermore, is not 
constrained only to the semantic field ascribed to this particular word. 
Accountability has come to take over the semantic field traditionally ascribed to 
responsibility. In this way, ‘decision and judgment taken from the “subjective” place 
of thought’ are being replaced by arithmetic solutions.6 
Although, as Kamuf argues, the overlay or overlap between accountability 
and responsibility has always taken place, in one particular ‘public interest domain’, 
it appears to have sorted itself out clearly in favour of accountability. As follows 
from Kamuf’s article, within higher education over the last twenty years and 
                                                 
5 Kamuf, ‘Accounterablity’, p. 252. 
6 Kamuf, ‘Accounterablity’, p. 252. 
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particularly in the U.S., ‘the notion of accountability has acquired a certain number 
of specific, defining traits that seem destined to determine its future use’.7 According 
to Kamuf, what we witness today in the university is therefore not only a gradual 
encroachment of the university’s frontiers by public and private capital (which has 
always been the case) but a radical re-definition of the very institution and the 
concept of what we have known as ‘the modern university’. The effects of this 
transformation are, furthermore, not limited only to educational institutions, but re-
define terms which are essential to the modern discourse of liberalism, such as the 
notion of the accountable subject. In other words, the semantic field of the word and 
the concept of ‘accountability’, as it is currently being employed to the purview of 
higher education, has come to constitute a ‘battlefield’ where the questions regarding 
not only the university and its futures but also those of democracy, are being fought 
over.  
These ‘academic battles’ are clearly not taking place in isolation. Kamuf 
goes on to show how these questions relate to wider socio-political changes in U.S. 
society. More specifically, she shows how the seemingly ‘objective’ and ‘non-faith 
based’ measure of the value added by one’s university education, as offered by 
accountabilists, relates to another recent shift within the U.S. society which, at first 
sight, seems to contradict the aims and the character of accountability movement.  
As Kamuf explains, the expression ‘faith-based’ has come to have a 
particular resonance within post-millenial American political discourse. It refers to a 
program put forward by G.W. Bush’s administration called the ‘Faith-Based 
Initiative’. The aim of this initiative is, as Kamuf argues, to reduce ‘the size – but 
not the spending – of government by shifting the responsibility for delivering a host 
                                                 
7 Kamuf, ‘Accounterablity’, p. 253. 
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of services from governmental agencies to faith-based organizations’. The initiative, 
as Kamuf argues, is clearly an attack on the concept - never very secure in the U.S. - 
of the separation between the state and religion.8  
Kamuf provides a careful reading which shows how the two seemingly 
opposite tendencies - disputing belief by the accountability movement and 
promoting belief through the ‘faith-based initiative’ - coincide.  ‘The accountability 
movement does not only accommodate and even favour the aims of the so-called 
faith-based initiative’ but the two ideas, as Kamuf states, ‘trace their impulse to the 
same source’.9 Accountabilism, although described by its proponents as a non-faith 
based initiative able to objectively measure value, promotes the ideology and values 
of a particular group, namely the conservative and right wing politics which aspire to 
re-organize the U.S. society in a mode reminiscent of ‘feudal’ rather than ‘modern’ 
organization.   
 Yet, Kamuf’s engagement with the accountability movement does not stop 
there. She does not only provide a semantic analysis of the word accountability and 
an illustration of how the two seemingly opposing movements coincide. As the 
‘counter’ smuggled into the middle of the word accountability in the title of her 
essay promises, the point is to intervene. As Kamuf argues, she wants to  
 
find an opening in calculating, accountable logic, to locate a space for other 
articulations between our accounts and our abilities, the space precisely of a 
free space or free play that can be taken into account only in the figure of the 
unknown, the factor of uncertainty a factor of X, or, as it happens, of a certain 
– er – that, falling at the point of exact bisection of accounterability, sounds a 
pause, a brief hiatus, a little time to think, to stop calculating and listen at 
another rhythm for something else, for an incalculability and unforseeability 
                                                 
8 Kamuf, ‘Accounterablity’, p. 257-8.  
9 Kamuf, ‘Accounterablity’, p. 258. 
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that cause the accountability programme to stammer or stutter: account, er, 
ability.10 
 
‘Accounterability’ is not, as Kamuf further explains, about ‘the space of a word or of 
word play’. Rather, her claim is to articulate ‘premises of a counter-practice to the 
numeric evaluation that assumes a prevailing place in public discourse’ and thus 
found ‘a counter-institution of resistance to the irresistible logic of accountability’.11  
How can one resist what is irresistible? How can one ‘counter’ something 
which already contains a ‘counter’, i.e. is defined by contradictory meanings (such 
as computing and narrativity, objectivity and subjectivity, etc.)? How can one 
oppose a trend which promotes values opposite to those it pretends to represent, that 
is, re-religionization of the secular society though a promotion of allegedly 
‘objective’, ‘non-faith’ based measures of value?  
As Kamuf also suggests, a resistance to the accountability movement cannot 
proceed in the form of oppositional strategy. It cannot follow the traditional logic of 
(oppositional) politics but must seek to re-define the political itself. It has to open 
the space of political imaginary beyond the limits which currently define it. Her 
proposition can, therefore, sound counterintuitive. Drawing on the insight that the 
accountability movement comes from and promotes values of the faith-based 
initiative, Kamuf thus argues, that ‘accountabilism deserves to be countered in the 
name of the oldest principles of the post-enlightenment, non-faith-based 
university’.12 In other words, Kamuf suggests we resist the accountability movement 
by affirming the principles of the modern university, by developing and cultivating 
                                                 
10 Kamuf, ‘Accounterablity’, p. 251. 
11 Kamuf, ‘Accounterablity’, p. 253. 
12 Kamuf, ‘Accounterablity’, p. 259. 
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premises laid down since the Enlightenment and understood ‘as the historical 
counter-force to “faith-based” social and political institutions’.13  
Kamuf’s call for enlightenment is, however, not a call for some good old, 
‘pre-accountabilist’ university, but an attempt to imagine the university’s futures. 
This follows from her tremendous proposition:  
 
if Enlightenment, as the historical counter-force to ‘faith-based’ social and 
political institutions, is in retrenchment, under siege, or simply at a standstill 
throughout the world, doesn’t this signal that the encounter is still to come?14 
 
In other words, rather than calling for the resuscitation of some allegedly ‘better 
past’, Kamuf calls for imagining a ‘better future’, for imagining an ‘enlightened 
university-to-come’. However, this new encounter, which will provide a counter to 
‘faith-based’ social and political institutions, will not denounce that what came to 
figure as reason’s repressed other within a certain legacy of enlightenment, i.e. 
‘belief’. Instead of denouncing belief, this encounter will seek leverage for the post-
enlightenment, non-faith-based university from a position which stresses the 
‘necessity of belief’. As Kamuf puts it, such an attempt will be grounded on ‘an 
opening to belief, that is the thinking of belief as the ground, the groundless ground 
of experience of every kind in the world with others’.15  
Such a ‘thinking of belief’ is, however, not similar to that which is behind the 
belief promoted by Bush’s ‘Faith-based Initiative’. Neither does Kamuf argue for 
founding a new religious organization. This belief, as she explains, ‘pivots around 
what situates the experience of belief beyond any institution of ‘faith-based 
                                                 
13 Kamuf, ‘Accounterablity’, p. 260. 
14 Kamuf, ‘Accounterablity’, p. 260. 
15 Kamuf, ‘Accounterablity’, p. 260. 
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organization’ yet, is pervasive to our everyday experience. It is as she explains, ‘the 
general space that Derrida sees defined by the performativo-pragmatic imperative 
“you must believe me” harboured in the problematic of testimony’.16 It is this kind 
of work and thinking which, in Kamuf’s view, will help us facilitate  
 
A new Enlightenment, a second (or third or fourth or nth) Enlightenment 
[which] would seek to think this groundless ground of belief as the 
conditioning limit on every possible encounter with another, every act of 
testimony given or received.17 
 
In other words, a new enlightenment-to-come. Through an analysis of the current 
university as driven by the accountability movement and Derrida’s conception of the 
notion of belief, Kamuf offers a way of resisting the accountability movement. She 
articulates a vision of a university which, in its affirmation of the legacy of 
enlightenment, transforms and fulfils this very legacy, and she expresses this 
potential through the neologism ‘accounterablity’. As I interpret it, Kamuf’s 
‘accounterability’ seeks to enact what Mowitt describes as an ‘antidisciplinary 
potential of textual reading’.  
Yet, this proposition requires further accounting. The question which it 
seems necessary to ask is to what extent is the envisioning of antidisciplinarity (or of 
deconstruction) as an obstacle to one’s abilities, as something which disables rather 
than enables the possibility of giving an account, an effective way of resisting not 
only the so-called accountability movement but also its affirmative critiques.18  Put 
                                                 
16
 Kamuf, ‘Accounterablity’, p. 260. 
17 Kamuf, ‘Accounterablity’, p. 260. 
18
 The word ‘ability’ comes from Latin habilis, which means ‘handy’. ‘Ability’, Oxford English 
Dictionary Online, <http://0-
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simply, is not Kamuf’s call for ‘an opening in calculation’ just another discourse 
directed against instrumentalization? Does not Kamuf, although providing an 
elaborate reading of the inherent tensions between various and conflicting meanings 
of accountability, at the end, simply denounce ‘counting’ and ‘calculation’, the 
‘objective’ pole of accountability in the name of this ‘more “subjective”, ‘more 
narrative-like’ pole, and thus repeat the bias Mowitt identified to be the major 
theoretical obstacle in our accounts of the university? How are we to understand her 
‘counter’?  
Re-counting accounterablity   
The interpretation that Kamuf’s deliberations on accountability might follow 
patterns Mowitt identifies and critiques in his work seems to be confirmed by 
arguments and propositions Kamuf develops in her other works where she addresses 
the problem of the university.  
In her book The Division of Literature Or the University in Deconstruction 
from 1997, Kamuf presents an argument that literature and its teaching puts the 
university into deconstruction. This is due to literature’s peculiar character: not only 
is literature a ‘division’ in the sense of being a particular ‘academic field’ with its 
own department but also in the sense of, unlike historical or scientific disciplines, 
not having any identity which would be possible to fully comprehend and delimit. 
‘Literature’, as she puts it, is a ‘divisionality’. According to Kamuf, the question 
‘What do we teach as “literature”? […] seems to go to the very border along which 
                                                 
www.oed.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk/view/Entry/313?rskey=PTw9JP&result=1#eid> [accessed 14 
February, 2017]. 
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an institution, here the university, sets itself off from some outside’.19 This potential, 
as she further argues, is then preserved in the institution of literature and its teaching.  
For Kamuf, it is ‘literature’ which embodies the potential of ‘deconstructive 
reserve’. In other words, it is particularly the literary text which embodies the 
characteristics Derrida ascribes to texts or writing:  
 
Literary text holds sense in reserve, does not exhaust the possibility for 
meaning in an indicative or transitive relation to a referent. Such texts, we can 
say, are reserved, that is, they hold back from a full and present disclosure of 
sense, not because they conceal a secret that can eventually be uncovered 
(although this structure of reserve cannot easily be distinguished from the 
structure of secrecy in the ordinary sense) but because the reserve shelters that 
which cannot be simply presented in the present and that which was never 
presentable in the past. It is the reserve of a time radically other than the 
present or the past present, the radical other we call, hopefully or in trembling, 
the future.20 
 
The teaching of literature, which preserves this ‘reserve’ therefore represents ‘an 
open set, and, thereby, the opening beyond itself, beyond the self’.21 Literature and 
its teaching(s) thus find themselves in a paradoxical position, when, on the one hand, 
they are experienced as threatening to the identity of educational institutions and, on 
the other, it is literature and the teaching of literature which, according to Kamuf, 
represents a chance of the university’s transformation. It is therefore literature, she 
argues, that makes the university ‘open to the transformations of a future’: 
 
                                                 
19 Kamuf, ‘Introduction/Catachresis and Institution’ p. 5. 
20 Kamuf, ‘Introduction/Catachresis and Institution’ p. 5-6. 
21 Kamuf, ‘Introduction/Catachresis and Institution’ p. 7.  
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with the question of literature’s institution, a space may be opened up for the 
remaking of institutionality in general, a space that is neither inside nor 
outside some pre-given (instituted) boundaries. This “space” of neither-nor, 
which is precisely not marked out by spatial or conceptual boundaries, 
constitutes something like a reserve of possible transformation for the 
stabilized, but never thoroughly stable institutions that draw on it. It is the 
reserve, therefore of these institutions’ historicality, by which is meant both 
that they have been bequeathed to us by a specific history and are not 
naturally occurring phenomena, and that whatever stabilized forms they may 
assume in the present remain open to the transformations of a future.22 
 
Kamuf further develops this in an interview with Dawne McCance entitled 
‘Crossings’ from 2009. Here she supports her claim by opposing literary study to 
science. ‘Literature’, Kamuf argues 
 
has always had a very uneasy relation to the fundamental mission of the 
modern scientific university: the search for knowledge, […] the preservation 
of and search for new knowledge. Literature is not unrelated to new 
knowledge, but its modes of discovery and invention are unlike, or work 
differently from, what apparently goes on in the sciences, through scientific 
method. Literature cannot be a method. I think every writer, every poet, 
everyone who experiences the urge, need, or desire to write, knows that; there 
is no method. 
So, what the uneasy incorporation of the study of literature in universities 
shows up is this other dispensation, this other relation to newness, to 
invention, to innovation, to the unknown, to an uncertainty that is not simply 
an extension of the known, not simply the known deploying itself according to 
its known and tested methods to conquer the unknown, to appropriate and use 
it.23  
 
                                                 
22 
Kamuf, ‘Introduction/Catachresis and Institution’p. 4. 
23 Peggy Kamuf and Dawne McCance: ‘Crossings: An Interview with Peggy Kamuf’, Mosaic 43.4 
(2009), 227-243, p. 229. 
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As Kamuf continues, this other relation literature has ‘to newness, to invention … to 
the unknown’ manifests as a ‘real impossibility’ to say within literary study ‘this is 
what you will learn, this is what you will discover, this is what you will know by the 
end of your studies, and this is what you will be certified to do’.24 Kamuf then 
presents this ‘uncertainty’ around the purpose of such a study as an ‘unease’ which 
is both its strength and a weakness.25 Currently, under the conditions where 
universities are increasingly subjected to ‘pre-professional paradigms’, it puts 
literary study ‘in a very vulnerable position’. Yet, as Kamuf stresses, this has always 
been the case: ‘literary studies, or the place set aside for reading and writing about, 
engaging with, the artefacts that are literary texts, … this place of literature has 
always been vulnerable’. Furthermore, ‘literature does not depend on the university’ 
but ‘lives’ also outside educational institutions. In order to stress this particular 
quality of ‘excessiveness’ or ‘independence’ with regards to education, Kamuf 
opposes the study ‘literature’ to the study of ‘accounting’:  
 
It [literature] is not like the study of accounting, let's say, which teaches 
specific techniques, rules, and practices, which purveys a pre-professional 
training, something in which one has to be schooled. No, we know that 
literature, as an experience, a fact, and a possibility in our world does not 
depend on a school, on schooling, and thus on the university. And maybe we 
know as well that it is not going to be there much longer.26 
 
                                                 
24 Kamuf and McCance, ‘Crossings’, p. 229.  
25 Interestingly, in the case of other disciplines, an ‘impossibility’ to provide ‘definition’ earns inverse 
evaluation from Kamuf. For more on this, see Kamuf’s critique of cultural studies. Peggy Kamuf, 
‘The University in the World it is Attempting to Think’, Cultural Machine, 6 (2004) 
<<https://www.culturemachine.net/index.php/cm/article/view/3/2> [accessed 8 February 2017]    
26 Peggy Kamuf and McCance, ‘Crossings’, p. 229. 
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I do agree with Kamuf that ‘literature’ is not ‘accounting’ and that the methods 
employed in the humanities and literary study are not identical with those in 
scientific disciplines. Yet, the relationship between them (literature and accounting 
as well as between the humanities and science) seems to be – and as her essay 
‘Accounterability’ also helps us to understand - much more complex than as she 
seems to be suggesting in the passages quoted above.27  
Kamuf’s wrestling with theoretization of the disciplinarity of literature and 
its teaching can be read as following a similar path as other disciplinary self-
reflections. These reflections seem to, particularly since the 1990s, proliferate also in 
other disciplines such as women’s studies, the humanities or the university as a 
whole. As I interpret it, what seems also to be at stake for Kamuf is an attempt to 
conceptualize her discipline as a singular and unique formation which is both 
‘possible’ and ‘impossible’, has both its place in the university but is, simultaneously 
‘out of place’, that is, as a ‘tremendous discipline’.   
The problem I see with Kamuf’s theorizations of the deconstructive and 
disciplinary potential of literature and its teachings, is, however, that her argument 
utilizes strategies which eventually prove to be counterproductive not only for our 
understanding of the current landscape of academic disciplines, but particularly for 
the fields in whose name such argumentation is implemented.  
                                                 
27 Comments which Kamuf makes in the introduction to Without Alibi which gathers Derrida’s 
essays, among others also his ‘University without Condition’, seems to derive from similar 
assumptions. Here Kamuf argues that Derrida’s call for professors being allowed to produce oeuvres 
‘does not appear particularly new, at least not in the U.S., where long before anyone pronounced the 
name “deconstruction,” poets and writers were working at universities, that is they were professors of 
“creative writing,” as it came to be called. And there have long been university departments of music, 
studio art, architecture, drama, and more recently, cinema, television, media production, and now 
even departments of performance art’. Peggy, Kamuf, ‘Introduction: Event of Resistance’, in Without 
Alibi, ed. and trans. by Peggy Kamuf (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), pp. 1-27 (p. 18). 
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Kamuf, however, is not the only scholar working within literature and 
deconstruction who follows this particular path. Similar conceptualizations also 
characterize Weber’s work or that of Graham Allen.28 I will briefly outline the 
argumentation of Weber. 
In his essay ‘The Future of the University: The Cutting Edge’, Weber 
suggests that rather than treating the university as a solid and self-contained body 
with a clear and definite function, we should conceive of the university as an 
inherently ambiguous place defined by an ‘irresolvable’ tension between its closing 
and opening.  
As Weber describes it, this tension manifests itself on various levels. Firstly, 
this tension manifests on the level of the diversity of universities with distinct 
cultural, geographical and national contexts and the ‘universality’ of knowledge 
those diverse institutions teach and research. Secondly, it also manifests itself as a 
tension between the university as ‘relatively self-contained and autonomous’ 
institution which, at the same time, is defined as transitional and thus ‘determined by 
factors from outside’. Finally, this tension can be found also within the university’s 
‘fundamental task’, ‘the acquisition of knowledge’ which involves ‘two divergent 
and yet interdependent tendencies’ - ‘an openness to the unknown, in order to move 
beyond a given state of knowledge’ and a ‘closure’, the ‘reduction or assimilation of 
knowledge to what is familiar’ which makes the knowledge recognizable, i.e. 
‘distinguishes it from error or illusion’.29  
                                                 
28 See Samuel Weber, ‘The Future of the University: The Cutting Edge’, in Institution and 
Interpretation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 220-235; Samuel Weber, ‘The Future 
of the Humanities: Experimenting’, The University Cultural Machine 2 (2000) < 
https://www.culturemachine.net/index.php/cm/article/view/311/296> [accessed 8 February 2017]; 
Graham Allen, ‘Transparency, incalculability, Mythologies today’, Nottingham French Studies, 47.2 
(2008), 71-82; Graham Allen, ‘Transparent Universities, Foreign Bodies’, Oxford Literary Review, 
28 (2008), 5-17; Graham Allen, ‘Transparency and Teaching’, Theory, Culture and Society, 23.2-3 
(2006), 568-570. 
29 Weber, ‘The Future Campus’, p. 153. 
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This tension, as Weber further argues, which has been inherent to the 
university ever since, has nonetheless reached an unprecedented intensity in recent 
decades. This is due to worldwide trends such as the ‘globalization’ of the economy, 
which ‘designates the progressive intrusion of the economic rationality of profit-
driven systems into areas that had hitherto not been entirely subordinated to such 
constraints’, and the ‘“virtualization” of reality’ which is bound to development of 
electronic media and has ‘delocalizing effects’.30 
Weber’s argument is that in order to ‘enable the university to have a future’, 
we should not seek to oppose those ‘delocalizing effects’ but that the university 
itself should take part in them and, by doing so, modify them. Weber proposes that 
such an intervention could be achieved through ‘experimentation’. The kind of 
experimentation Weber has in mind is not, however, scientific. For Weber, scientific 
experimentation lets itself be immediately subordinated to the ‘teleology of a 
concept of knowledge bent on assimilating the other to the same, the strange to the 
familiar’ which makes it, according to Weber, an ally of the neoliberal trends we 
seek to resist. In other words, because, as Weber argues, the aim of scientific 
experimentation is ‘to make the future calculable, controllable, falsifiable’, scientific 
experimentation ‘seems to be largely consonant’ with the ‘realization of capital as 
profit’.31 
In contrast to scientific experimentation Weber thus suggests we envision 
experimenting differently. He argues for experimenting which would not ‘follow the 
scientific assimilation of the unknowable to the known’ and thus would ‘not stand in 
the Cartesian tradition of searching to establish absolute certitude through universal 
                                                 
30 Weber, ‘The Future Campus’, p. 155. 
31 Weber, ‘The Future Campus, p. 161  
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doubt’.32 In order to theorize on this ‘new’ kind of ‘experimenting’, Weber turns to 
Kierkegaard’s text ‘Repetition’. As Weber argues, in this text, experimentation is 
defined as both ‘theatrical and virtual’ through a Danish word posse which Weber 
translates into English as farce.33 Weber then suggests that the question ‘that has 
begun to emerge’ in the current writings on the university, the question of whether 
‘infinite attention to the other’ can be imagined as the core of an alternative 
university, should be approached through this notion of Kierkegaard’s, the notion of 
posse.  
It is in this notion that Weber sees the possibility (posse in Latin means 
possibility) of how academics can intervene in the tension within the university’s 
closing and opening further accelerated by ‘globalization’ and ‘virtualization’. As he 
summarizes the project of the ‘future’ humanities,   
 
a task for the humanities would be to rethink not just the human but 
everything connected with it not, as hitherto, strictly from the perspective of 
the universal, the concept, but from that of the exception: which is to say, 
from the perspective of what refuses to fit in, what resists assimilation, but 
what, in so doing, reveals the enabling limits of all system, synthesis, and self-
containment.34 
 
As the above quotation testifies, Weber’s envisioning of the ‘future humanities’ 
follows paths which are quite similar to Mowitt’s proposal for a ‘sinister humanities’ 
discussed in third chapter. What, however, makes Weber’s and, as already argued, 
Kamuf’s accounts of literary studies, the humanities and the university, problematic, 
is the bias against and an exclusion of a particular field -  disciplines such as 
                                                 
32 Weber, ‘The Future Campus, p. 161  
33 Weber, ‘The Future Campus, p. 162.  
34 Weber, ‘The Future Campus, p. 162. 
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‘accounting’ or, more generally, ‘science’. To be clear, I do not want to deny 
disciplines which focus on literature's potential to, as Kamuf articulates it, put 
institutions or institutionality ‘in deconstruction’. It is not my aim to diminish the 
‘tremendous’ potential of this particular discipline or claim that ‘literature’ is 
identical to ‘accounting’. Rather, what I argue is that the way we theorize what 
literary study and deconstruction are and do with the university must proceed in a 
different way it does under the guidance of passages from Kamuf’s and Weber’s 
work quoted above. 
The argument I propose instead is that, in the development of a non-
affirmative critique of the accountability movement, it is crucial not to read Kamuf’s 
accounterability as opposing our ‘abilities’ to account, particularly our abilities to 
‘count’ and ‘calculate’. As I read it, rather than denouncing counting or accounting, 
accounterability resists effects produced by their usage. More specifically, Kamuf’s 
(ac)countering helps accountability resist its ‘travelling’ without ‘translation’, or in 
other words, its implementation as a ‘general logic’ which crosses boundaries of 
different contexts and reduces difference to sameness. The ‘errrr’ smuggled into the 
middle of ‘accountability’, as Anne Berger would put it, provides accountability 
with ‘the resistance of translation’ and thus makes it a useful term for our theoretical 
and political interventions.35  Interpreting Kamuf’s accounterability in this way 
nonetheless obliges us to further examine the value of ‘counting’ and ‘calculation’ in 
relation to the work of the humanities and the university.  
                                                 
35 Berger, ‘Gender Springtime in Paris’, p. 8. 
   
 
186 
 
Numbers and Other Instruments: ‘Counting as a bad procedure’ and its 
supplementary discomfort in the humanities 
In her article ‘Accounterability’, Kamuf’s deconstruction of the common belief that 
there exists a direct reflection of ‘the truth’ in numerical representation, as if 
numbers were not a representation, as if they had nothing to do with – and thus 
could do without – language, discourse or narrative, is crucial. She shows that 
‘numbers’, ‘calculation’, ‘computing’ or ‘objectivity’ are not ‘objective’ in the sense 
of being a-historical and neutral givens or truths. In relation to Kamuf’s thesis, this 
gesture allows her to recognize and critique the institutional and political character 
of what she calls the accountability movement, and to show how it functions in the 
wider socio-political context of U.S. society. More specifically, it allows her to 
uncover how this seemingly neutral, non-faith-based procedure which now 
dominates higher education in fact supports and sustains aims of conservative 
political representation, not only in its economic but also its ideological struggles.  
What her analysis does not imply, however, is that ‘numbers’ or ‘counting’ 
are somehow essentially ‘bad’ or ‘wrong’. Rather, with her deconstruction, Kamuf 
opens ‘numbers’, ‘counting’ and ‘accounting’ to reading, to reading them as ‘signs’, 
to reading them as a ‘text’. This implies that the value of ‘numbers’ or of ‘counting’, 
just like the value of any other textual element, is not inherent to them, but depends 
on the context and on the ways in which they are used, i.e. how they are written and 
how they read.  
Thus, on the one hand, Kamuf is correct to point out that the two meanings 
of ‘accountability’, namely ‘computing’ and ‘narrating’ are ‘commonly thought to 
stand in a rough opposition to each other’. She is also right to argue that ‘the so 
called “objective” or “factual” pole is often privileged over the “subjective” one. She 
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further points out that ‘counting, or quantification triumphs over belief’, or in other 
words, that the tendency towards ‘letting accountability’s other more narrative, more 
“subjective” connections be subsumed and reduced to arithmetic figuration’ is a bias 
which to a certain extent defines our society.36 There is no doubt that the ‘objective’, 
‘numeric’ representation is considered - and particularly by cultures (like ours), 
which stress effectiveness - to be ‘truth’ as phrases such as ‘numbers do not lie’, 
suggest.  
On the other hand, however, the scene which involves ‘numbers’ and 
‘counting’ is not always configured in this way. There is a particular socio-political 
and institutional site where ‘numbers’ and ‘counting’ obtain a different value - the 
scene of the humanist critique.  
In the humanities, the common bias of privileging numbers which 
characterizes the ‘general’ common sense seems to be further traversed by another 
bias. Put rather bluntly, here it is not a commonplace to agree that ‘numbers do not 
lie’, rather the opposite: the language of ‘numbers’ and ‘counting’ is avoided. It is 
decided beforehand that ‘numbers’, ‘counting’ or ‘science’ are the ‘others’ against 
which we have to defend ourselves and ‘our’ humanistic endeavours.  
This is also what Mowitt shows with his work as outlined previously. To 
recall his argument, it is the bias against ‘instruments’ and what is perceived as 
encroachments from other, more ‘scientific’ disciplines like biology, anthropology 
or palaeontology, which dominates and is the major theoretical obstacle in the 
current debate over the humanities and their position within the university.  
What I want to stress at this point, however, is that the belief that ‘numbers 
do lie’ does not seem to be a phenomenon which has appeared within the humanist 
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work only recently. Nor does it seem to be a ‘modern invention’ as Hoskin would 
put it following Foucault’s work on disciplinary power. Rather, ‘counting’, as it 
seems, has been considered to be ‘a bad procedure’ from the very beginning of 
Western theoretical endeavour. More specifically, denouncing numbers and counting 
and excluding them from theoretical work proper seems to be one of the 
foundational gestures of metaphysical philosophy.  
This is, at least, what follows from Derrida’s discussion of ‘numbers’, 
‘mathematics’ and ‘counting’ in his work Dissemination.37 It is perhaps in 
‘Outwork’, and in the text which follows this ‘preface’, ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, that 
Derrida most rigorously traces how Western philosophical tradition condemns 
‘counting’ as a mere formalism without ‘content’ and thus expels it from its project. 
In these two texts, rather than denouncing numbers, Derrida identifies the procedure 
of excluding counting to be one of the foundational exclusions which enabled the 
project of Western (metaphysical) theory as such.38  
As I share and endorse Kamuf’s countering of the accountability movement, 
I argue that in our elaboration on how ‘accounterability’ can be developed, it is 
                                                 
37 Jacques Derrida, Dissemination (London: The Althone Presss, 1981).  
38 As Celine Surprenant argues with her reading of Given Time: 1. Counterfeit Money [Donner le 
temps], where Derrida elaborates on gift as ‘what interrupts economy’ (Derrida, 1992, 7; 18), as 
pointing towards an ‘unheard-of kind of accounting’, ‘[i]f we isolate these statements from the rest of 
the book and from other ones which are found in Derrida’s oeuvre, it looks as though Derrida shares 
the trans-historical and consensual suspicion towards calculation’. The rejection of rational 
calculation is, however, as she rightly points out, only one side of the story. Celine Surprenant, 
‘“Counting is a bad procedure”: Calculation and Economy in Jacques Derrida’s Donner le temps’, 
Derrida Today, 4.1 (2011), 21-43, p. 24. A similar reading of Derrida’s grasp on ‘calculability’ and 
‘incalculability’ in relation to the question of justice is provided by Scott Cutler Shershow, ‘“A 
Triangle Open on its Fourth Side”: On the Strategy, Protocol, and “Justice” of Deconstruction’, 
Derrida Today, 4.1 (2011), 59-85, p. 61. It is, however, not only ‘later Derrida’ after what is called 
‘ethical turn’, that he develops premises articulated in his earlier work in this direction as Surprenant 
and Shershow suggest. The necessity to calculate (with the incalculable), of a strategic calculation, is 
pivotal also to his writings on the university. This is apparent from the already discussed essay 
‘Vacant Chair’ where, in the conclusion Derrida says: ‘… there is never any lifting of censorship, 
only a strategic calculation: censorship against censorship, Is this strategy an art?’ (63). The essay 
which I interpret in  Part III, ‘Mochlos; or The Conflict of The Faculties’ also thematises the problem 
of instrumentality (mochlos is a Greek word for lever) in relation to deconstruction and the university.  
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crucial we explore the notions of ‘counting’ and ‘accounting’ from this angle. Not 
that I suggest we accept the notion of counting imposed on us by the general 
common sense and the accountabilists, and as it seems to me, to a certain extent 
further perpetuated also by Kamuf. Rather, I suggest, following Dissemination, that 
we treat counting and counting with numbers differently, that we count otherwise.  
Working with numbers differently  
Dissemination, and particularly its ‘preface’, ‘Outwork’, and the first chapter, 
‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, are among the most read texts ever written by Derrida. In these 
two texts, Derrida lays down premises of deconstruction and discusses notions 
fundamental to his project such as ‘dissemination’, ‘writing’ or ‘supplement’. The 
way in which Derrida does this is also particular to his writing and to deconstruction. 
Through writing a ‘preface’, he deconstructs the way in which ‘prefaces’ and other 
‘others’, other ‘supplements’ (such as ‘writing’ to ‘speech’, ‘form’ to ‘content’, 
‘feminine’ to ‘masculine’, etc.) have been marked as secondary and thus considered 
as less important or even harmful by the phallocentric tradition of metaphysical 
philosophy. 
What does not receive much attention by the readers of Dissemination, and 
what is nonetheless important in relation to issues discussed here, is that Derrida - 
apart from the terms enumerated above (such as ‘writing’ or ‘supplement’) – 
addresses also ‘mathematics’ and ‘counting’. In ‘Outwork’ this is exemplified by 
discussion of Hegel. Derrida compares Hegel’s approach to ‘mathematism’ to the 
latter’s treatment of prefaces. For Hegel, Derrida argues, both mathematics and 
prefaces are ‘external to the concept and to the thing itself’. As he argues, ‘as a 
machine devoid of meaning or life, as an anatomical structure, the preface always 
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has some affinity with the procedure of mathematics’.39 ‘Formalism, mathematism 
and scientism’ are errors of a philosopher, just like the other extreme – ‘empiricism, 
intuitionism, prophetism’. They impose ‘upon the presentation of truth a set of 
epigraphs that are either intolerable to truth or that truth should produce on its 
own’.40  
What follows from Derrida’s reading is that, for Hegel, ‘mathematics’ is not 
on the side of ‘truth’ and philosophy. On the contrary, ‘counting’ is considered to be 
a mere ‘taxonomical inscription’. For Hegel, mathematics is a ‘science of death’ and 
a ‘dead science’.41 By opposing it to mathematics, Hegel thereby defines his 
philosophical project. Unlike mathematics, the speculative dialectic is a science 
which favours the living and thus cannot be reduced to the former. Its ‘triplicity’, 
Hegel argues,  
 
remains beyond the grasp of any arithmetic or of any numerology […] The 
numerical form of expression is too thin and inadequate to present true 
concrete unity. The Spirit is certainly a trinity, but it cannot be added up or 
counted. Counting is a bad procedure.42 
 
As this quotation testifies, instituting one’s theoretical project by opposing it to 
‘counting’ is therefore not a new procedure in ‘the humanities’. It is not only the 
aforementioned critics of instrumental reason or the critiques of the neoliberal 
university who employ this particular strategy. Neither is it, however, only Hegel 
who, in the history of Western theoretical endeavours, denounce numbers. Derrida 
identifies a similar treatment of ‘numbers’ and ‘counting’ also in Plato, which is 
                                                 
39 Derrida, ‘Outwork’, p. 13. 
40 Derrida, ‘Outwork’, p. 16.  
41 Derrida, ‘Outwork’, p. 23-4. 
42 Hegel in Derrida, ‘Outwork’, p. 24. 
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why, when he articulates how dissemination operates, he describes it as a kind of 
‘pharmacy’ which works with numbers differently. It counts in a way different not 
only from ‘mathematics’ but also, importantly, from that of Hegel and other 
metaphysical philosophers. As he argues, dissemination 
 
can no longer be dissociated from a restaging of arithmos and of ‘counting’ as 
a ‘bad procedure’. Nor from a rereading of the rythmos of Democritus, which 
stands as a kind of writing that philosophy has never been able to reckon with, 
since it is rather out of the prior existence and restless exteriority of that 
writing that philosophy is able to arise and account for itself: it forms a written 
preface, in a sense, and one which discourse as such can no longer envelop in 
its circulation, in that circle where the speculative impossibility and the 
speculative necessity of the prolegomenon meet.43 
 
For Derrida then, ‘counting’ is not merely ‘a bad procedure’. It is rather the 
denunciation of ‘counting’ as a foundational gesture of metaphysical philosophy 
that deconstruction is after. This can be deduced also from his famous discussion of 
writing in ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’.  
Theuth, the god of writing whom Plato famously recalls in the Phaedrus, 
did not invent only writing, draughts and dice, but also ‘numbers and calculation, 
geometry and astronomy’.44 Theuth, Derrida argues, occupies a similar place to his 
counterpart in Egyptian mythology, Thoth, who is a ‘secretary of the god Ra’,45 ‘the 
scribe and bookkeeper of Osiris’. ‘As “Master of the books,” Thoth becomes, by 
dint of consigning them, registering them, keeping account of them, and guarding 
their stock, the “master of divine words”’. In the underworld,  
                                                 
43 Derrida, ‘Outwork’, p. 27.  
44 Derrida, ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, p. 75. 
45 Derrida, ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, p. 91. 
   
 
192 
 
 
Thoth records the weight of the heart-souls of the dead, he first counts out the 
days of life, enumerates history. His arithmetic thus covers the events of 
divine biography. He is “the one who measures the length of the lives of gods 
and men.”46  
 
The Egyptian god Thoth also has a ‘female counterpart’. As Derrida argues in 
‘Plato’s Pharmacy’,  
 
her name, Seshat, doubtless means she-who-writes. “Mistress of libraries,” she 
records the exploits of the kings. [She is the] first goddess versed in the art of 
engraving, she marks the names of the kings on a tree in the temple of 
Heliopolis, while Thoth keeps account of the years on a notched pole.47 
 
The god and the goddess, the master and the mistress of writing are thus, first of all, 
bookkeepers and accountants. They administer, count and enumerate, they keep the 
records ‘in order’. Indeed, the god of writing, Theuth, as Derrida recalls, is in the 
Phaedrus presented as a ‘technocrat without power of decision, an engineer, a 
clever, ingenious servant’.48 Yet, despite the first appearance one might obtain from 
Theuth, things are not that much ‘in order’ with him but his every act is marked by 
‘unstable ambivalence’:  
 
this god of calculation, arithmetic and rational science also presides over the 
occult sciences, astrology and alchemy. He is the god of magic formulas that 
calm the sea, of secret accounts, of hidden texts […].49  
                                                 
46 Derrida, ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, p. 95. 
47 Derrida, ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, p. 95. 
48 Derrida, ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, p. 86. 
49 Derrida, ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, p. 93. 
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Today, we would perhaps say that Theuth is a truly ‘interdisciplinary’ or 
‘transdisciplinary’ scholar as he covers disciplines from ‘science’, such as 
calculation and arithmetic, to ‘magic’ and ‘secret accounts’. He is ‘a renaissance 
man’, who, as Derrida argues, is also in charge of ‘the passage between life and 
death’; his privileged domain being medicine.50  
Theuth’s ‘prescriptions’, as Derrida further points out, are meant to be 
beneficial. That is also why pharmakon, which means both ‘remedy’ and ‘poison’, 
two things at one time, is mostly translated by the word ‘remedy’. Surely, such a 
translation is not inaccurate. Nor is Theuth’s representation of his pharmakon (i.e. 
writing) to the king as a beneficial drug which ‘repairs and produces, accumulates 
and remedies, increases knowledge and reduces forgetfulness’ a misrepresentation. 
As Derrida’s reading of pharmakon shows, however, although these translations are 
not wrong, they nonetheless erase the other pole reserved in the word pharmakon 
and thus cancel its ambiguity. Theuth’s presentation and  
 
all translations into languages that are the heirs and depositaries of Western 
metaphysics thus produce on the pharmakon an effect of analysis that 
violently destroys it, reduces it to one of its simple elements by interpreting it, 
paradoxically enough, in the light of the ulterior developments it itself has 
made possible.51  
 
Translations which privilege one meaning over another, as Derrida further argues, 
are nonetheless not protected from their counterparts; the effectiveness of the 
                                                 
50 Derrida, ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, p. 94. 
51 Derrida, ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, p. 99. 
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pharmakon can be easily reversed. ‘Pharmakon’, as Derrida argues, can worsen the 
ill instead of remedy it’.52  
‘Counting’, as a part of Theuth’s pharmaceutical repertoire, cannot escape 
this ambivalence and its effects. Although numerical representation is often 
considered to be faithful to that for which it accounts, it can never be simply 
beneficial. As an operation which comes ‘after’, as a device designed for use after 
the event, as a representation of the thing and not the thing itself, ‘counting’ is 
always at a distance from the present. Because of this ‘distance’, its value and its 
effects can be never guaranteed. This distance, as Derrida puts it in ‘Plato’s 
Pharmacy’, ‘opens meaning up to all forms of adulteration which immediacy would 
have prevented’.53  
Discussing ‘accounting’ in relation to Derrida’s reading of pharmakon 
therefore explains why, as Kamuf shows with her reading, ‘counting’ is able to 
produce appearances which enable it to pass for truth. It can, however, 
simultaneously, be considered by philosophers such as Plato, Hegel, or the current 
critiques of the neoliberal university, to be ‘a bad procedure’. In other words, this is 
why, the ‘accounting of accountability’ can function as a device which promotes the 
aims of the current ‘technocratic-managerialism’ within higher education and thus 
significantly constrain political and ethical dimensions of democracy, and yet, 
simultaneously, functions as democracy’s condition and key instrument.  
Counting and accounting of accountability can be - alternately or 
simultaneously – considered maleficent or beneficent. ‘Numbers’, ‘counting’ and 
‘accounting’, because they belong to the weave of ‘writing’ or ‘texts’, will always be 
                                                 
52 Derrida, ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, p. 97. 
53 Barbara Johnson, ‘Translator’s Introduction’, in Dissemination (London: The Althone Press, 1981), 
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both, an addition and a substitute, both superfluous and necessary, dangerous and 
redemptive. We will thus never be able to master or get over ‘the supplementary 
discomfort inherent in the indecidability between the two’.54 
But what does revealing the ‘pharmakon-like’ character of ‘counting’ add to 
the analysis and the attempt to intervene within an accountability regime which 
dominates current higher education? Does not pointing out that the value and the 
effects of ‘numbers’ and ‘counting’ are invincibly ambivalent blunt our critique of 
the accountability movement? Does not pharmakon, and the ‘supplementary logic’ it 
reveals, compromise the efforts to resist the so called ‘accountability movement’? 
Does it not open a path to endless ‘countering’ of any evaluation or judgment and 
thus lead inevitably to relativism, or preclude the possibility of making any decisions 
and carrying actions which would be effective for countering the disciplinary powers 
which define our current society and its university?  
As follows from the supplementary logic revealed by Derrida’s reading of 
the Phaedrus, ‘countering’ and ‘counting’ are, indeed, processes without a closure. 
It seems to me that it is those who think that they can arrest this movement, that they 
can stop the counting and calculations, who are the most likely to fail in their 
critiques and interventions. What Derrida’s reading of pharmakon implies is that the 
strategies which offer the biggest chances of making any difference are the ones 
which – rather than arresting this movement – seek to manipulate and thus distort it.  
In the conclusion of this section I will develop on three particular ways in 
which Derrida’s work on pharmakon can help us with such distortions. Namely, I 
will discuss its implications for questions related to: (1) politics, (2) ethics, and (3) 
understanding the relationship between accountability and pedagogy. 
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1. As follows from my discussion of counting in relation to pharmakon, the 
reason why the accountability movement produces negative effects is not only 
because counting is privileged over narrativity as Kamuf seems to propose. As I 
interpreted above, it is not the ‘numbers’ themselves which are ‘harmful’, neither is 
it ‘counting’ which, as Hegel puts it, is inherently a ‘bad procedure’. Rather, what 
makes ‘numbers’ and ‘counting’ ‘harmful’ is the ‘pharmakon-like’ effects further 
enhanced by the ways in which numbers are used. I therefore propose that Kamuf’s 
propositions in ‘Accounterability’ are not to be read simply as suggesting that we 
should employ ‘subjective points of view’ instead of ‘objective measures’. As I see 
it, demanding a replacement of ‘numbers’ with ‘words’ in evaluation feedback forms 
supported with an argument that our academic work or that of our students is 
irreducible to metrics is not enough. I would even argue that only resisting the 
‘accountability movement’ by countering quantification, by privileging ‘narrating’ 
over ‘counting’, is , in the end, counterproductive.  
In other words, the discussion of accountability in relation to pharmakon 
implies that resistance against the so called accountability movement cannot proceed 
without counting. We need not only to show that ‘numbers’ belong to language (as 
Kamuf shows in her text) but also use them as such: We need to use our ability to 
‘counter’, that is, to take our ‘ac – count-er – ability’ also by using numbers; we 
have to count, we have to count with numbers, and count with them differently.  
At this point I am therefore in agreement with, and wish to further develop 
insights already articulated by Mowitt in his envisioning of a ‘sinister humanities’ 
and his call for engaging with financialization on its own terms so as to ‘articulate 
there precisely what its stewards do not wish to hear’. This endeavour does not only 
involve engaging with the questions of ‘neoliberalism’ or ‘financialization’ but it 
   
 
197 
 
also implies ‘“finishing” immanent self-critical tendencies within the field of 
humanistic inquiry’,55 that is, re-thinking the disciplinary character of the 
humanities, how it constitutes itself and how it relates to other disciplines 
traditionally considered as its ‘others’.  
2. Pharmakon’s ambivalence, its double and interchangeable character, 
whose value and effect can never be guaranteed and protected from its counterparts 
has significant consequences for the problem of ‘teaching’ as a problem of legacy 
and the possibility of one’s fidelity to it. One of the key questions Derrida’s 
discussion of the Phaedrus raises is, therefore: How can we - if “good” repetition 
(faithfulness) always brings with itself “bad” repetition (unfaithfulness) - 
conceptualize a possibility of an ethical relationship?  
This is precisely one of the key issues which scholars working on the 
question of accountability regimes dominating the current universities particularly in 
the U.S. and the UK wrestle with. As discussed above, it is most commonly the 
language of ethics (namely words such as ‘trust’, ‘responsibility’, ‘democratic 
accountability’ or ‘belief’) which is invoked by the critics of accountabilism to name 
that which has been destroyed by the techno-managerial regimes of accountability 
and which, therefore, need to be re-cultivated. With the exception of Biesta, Kamuf 
and Readings, however, most of the scholars do not seem to pay enough attention to 
the ‘remedies’ they propose. In their analyses, those notions invoking ethics which 
are suggested as strategies and practices capable of resisting or escaping the 
‘disciplining’ accountability regime are left unexamined and unproblematized as 
particular socio-cultural constructs with related histories and memories.56 I will 
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develop this problematic in detail in chapter V. More specifically, I will propose a 
conceptualization of ethical relationships which would enable us to take 
responsibility and ‘grapple with otherness’, which will enable us to inhibit the 
current feminist ‘politics but will also speak to the political desire for social change 
and futurity that we imbue with this name’.57  
3. At this point, however, I wish to develop another issue. The discussion of 
accountability in relation to pharmakon also challenges one of the key assumptions 
made by Bill Readings and the critics of the neoliberal university, namely the 
assumption that the ‘accounting of accountability’ and ‘audit culture’ has been 
added to the university and its activities, that is teaching and research, ‘ex post’, and 
that accountability’s accounting is irreconcilable with ‘pedagogy’.  
Generally speaking, Derrida’s discussion of pharmakon implies that there is 
never simply an uncontaminated origin. In other words, the starting point is not 
some originary ideal presence but the ‘lack of presence’. In the passages I 
interpreted in the opening of this section, Derrida shows how counting has been 
treated by metaphysical philosophy. What he shows is that it is not the ‘adding’ of 
the ‘mathematical method’ onto originally ‘non-mathematical’ philosophy which is 
the ‘error’ of a philosopher, as Hegel reproaches his colleagues. Rather, the 
exclusion of numbers and counting is what has enabled the institution of the 
philosophical project as such. ‘Quantification’, rather than being imposed on 
theoretical endeavours and their institutions ‘ex post’, has been always already at 
work in its supposedly ‘non-infected’ interiority. ‘Mathematics’ or ‘counting’ is 
philosophy’s ‘enabling other’, something philosophy separated itself from in its very 
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constitution. From this perspective, it therefore seems that ‘accounting’ and 
‘counting’ have been, like writing, ‘at the heart of the heart’ of the university and its 
pedagogy. 
 
Accountability: An educational story 
‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ could be indeed read as a treatise of and on pedagogy.58 As we 
read in Phaedrus, the leaves of writing lead Socrates, ‘the lover of learning’, out of 
the city, which, for Socrates, is the space of learning and teaching.59 As Socrates 
argues, ‘landscapes and trees have nothing to teach me, only people in the city can 
do that’. Phaedrus, however, as Socrates continues, managed to ‘found a potion to 
charm me into leaving’: like ‘a hungry animal […] driven by dangling a carrot or a 
bit of greenstuff in front of it’, Phaedrus leads Socrates ‘out of the city simply by 
waving in front of him leaves of a book containing a speech’.60  
Although Socrates claims that landscapes, trees and their leaves, unlike 
people in the city, can teach him nothing, it is the ‘leaves’ (the leaves of a book, like 
the records engraved by Seshat, the goddess of writing, into the bark of the trees) 
which lead him out to the city. It is as if Socrates was led despite or against himself 
and to places and sources where one would not expect to learn anything.  
As Derrida describes the scene, the ‘leaves of the book’, i.e. the pharmakon, 
intervenes in what has been prescribed to us. They take us from our ‘proper place’, 
                                                 
58 As outlined in the introduction, the suffix ‘-agogy’, which comes from Greek agōgos is a 
reduplication of ago meaning to ‘lead’, ‘drive’, ‘bring’ or ‘carry’. ‘Pedagogue’ then is literally a 
person who ‘leads the child’. Additionally, the suffix ‘agogoue’ is also used in medical lexicon, 
where it indicates the substance that stimulates the flow of secretion. 
59 The French word for ‘leaves’, feuilles, is used in the original.  
60 Plato, in Derrida, ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, p. 71.  
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off our ‘customary track’.61 This complex and paradoxical ability to ‘lead’, as he 
further argues, is thus also a kind of ‘misleading’ and is a quality which is particular 
to ‘pharmakons’, to texts: 
 
Only the words that are deferred, reserved, enveloped, rolled up, words that 
force one to wait for them in the form and under the cover of a solid object, 
letting themselves be desired for the space of a walk, only hidden letters can 
make […] Socrates moving. If a speech could be purely present, unveiled, 
naked, offered up in person in its truth, without the detours of a signifier 
foreign to it … it would not seduce anyone. It would not draw Socrates, as if 
under the effects of a pharmakon, out of his way …: writing, the pharmakon, 
the going or leading astray.62 
 
The way writing or texts lead, the way teaching works, is then, by leading astray, by 
misleading. According to this description, Derrida’s pedagogy, or any pedagogy, is 
not a ‘leading’ which takes one through a secure and straightforward path but a 
journey full of simulacra and deception. It is a tremendous path which makes us both 
wonder and tremble.63  
Furthermore, as we can read further in the passage quoted above, the way 
such teaching (mis)leads has a particular form the Pharmakon’s ambivalence, as 
Derrida suggests, implies ‘charm’. It has ‘spellbinding virtue’, a ‘power of 
                                                 
61 Derrida, ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, p. 70. 
62 Derrida, ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, p. 71. 
63 If we followed the reading of ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ as pedagogical text and developed it further 
particularly in relation to deconstruction, it would lead us to re-consider and re-interpret Foucault’s 
comment which appears in the appendix to the republication of Madness and Civilization entitled 
‘My body, this paper, this fire’ where Foucault infamously argues that ‘the system of reading […] of 
which Derrida is today the most decisive representative’ is nothing more than a ‘little pedagogy’. My 
body, this paper, this fire’, Oxford Literary Review, 4.1 (2012), 9-28 (p. 11).   
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fascination’, it ‘attracts’. The way writing and texts lead us astray from our general, 
natural or habitual paths and laws is, as Derrida argues, through seduction.64  
If we look at the etymology of ‘seduction’, it explains why this word appears 
in a close vicinity of the questions of education. The word ‘to seduce’ comes from 
the Medieval Latin word sēdūcere which is composed of a prefix sē  meaning 
‘apart’, ‘astray’ or ‘without’ and the word dūcō meaning to ‘lead’. ‘To seduce’ thus 
literally means to ‘lead astray’. Yet, as the prefix ‘se-’ suggests, seduction not only 
misleads. It does not only ‘take astray’, but also ‘takes apart’. The philosopher, in 
this case Socrates, is not only led out of the city into the countryside, from his proper 
place and off his customary track, but this ‘trip’ also ‘takes him apart’. Socrates is 
‘taken by desire’. It is desire which gets him moving. And, as Derrida argues, to 
make themselves desirable is something only ‘words’ which are ‘deferred’ and 
‘enveloped’ can do.  
What are the implications for our understanding of accountability if we read 
it as a textual problem and particularly in relation to the conceptualization of 
textuality proposed by Derrida’s ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’? Firstly, it helps us answer one 
of the key questions scholars examining and critiquing accountability movements 
ask, namely ‘How did “accountability”, despite it being from the very beginning an 
“awful idea” become so compelling and irresistible? How could the culture of 
accountability have become so prominent and pervasive? And why do we actively 
invest in it even though we are aware of its psychological dangers?’  
                                                 
64 In Latin, the word for ‘to lead’ is, dūcere. It is, furthermore, of the same family as docere meaning 
‘to teach’ or ‘instruct’. Dūcere is also the origin of the words such as ‘doctrine’, ‘doctor’ or, indeed, 
‘education’. ‘Educate, v.’, Oxford English Dictionary Online < http://0-
www.oed.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk/view/Entry/59580#eid5743294> [Accessed 28 March 2017]. 
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Addressing these questions in relation to Derrida’s deconstruction of the 
Phaedrus would imply that the modes of socio-psychological control exercised by 
‘accountability regimes’ are not only ‘disciplinary’ but that they also operate in the 
realm of desire. In other words, it is not only that we are ‘self-disciplined’ by 
accountability regimes, it is not only subjugation (constitution and disciplining) by 
power-knowledge as, for instance, Hoskin described the process. It is not only 
‘disciplining’ power which operates through institutional apparatuses and 
techniques, but also powers which are seductive. We could therefore argue that the 
reason why ‘accountability regimes’ are so irresistible and why people invest in 
them even when they are aware of their negative effects, is because of the 
mechanisms of seduction in place.65  
Secondly, according to Derrida, what makes us desire ‘texts’, the reason 
why they can seduce, is that they are ‘concealed’, ‘veiled’ and ‘hidden’, or in other 
words, not fully present. This suggestion implies a re-consideration of how 
accountability regimes relate to visibility. More specifically, according to this 
proposition, ‘accountability’ would not operate as a ‘panoptical’ power of all–
seeing surveillance. ‘Accountability’ would not operate as a modern power-
knowledge, ‘invisibly’ while, simultaneously, seeking to make ‘everything visible’ 
in order to enable ‘counting’ (as argued by scholars following Foucault).66 Reading 
‘accountability’ through ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ would imply another distribution of the 
visible and the invisible. Rather than being invisible ‘power’ which seeks to make 
                                                 
65 The argument that it is not only ‘panopticism’ which keeps the social order and control but also 
seduction, has been elaborated by other scholars, for instance Zygmunt Bauman, ‘On postmodern 
uses of sex’, Theory, Culture & Society, 15.3 (1998), 19-33. See also Bauman’s conversation with 
David Lyon: Zygmunt Bauman and David Lyon, Liquid Surveillance (Cambridge & Malden: Polity, 
2013).   
66 This proposition is not, however, particular only to scholars following from Foucault. Graham 
Allen, who follows from Derrida’s work makes similar proposition. See Graham Allen, 
‘Transparency, incalculability, Mythologies today’, Nottingham French Studies, 47.2 (2008), 71-82. 
   
 
203 
 
everything visible, this paradigm suggests a more complex play of differences, a 
more ‘virtual’ or ‘theatrical’ modality where the spatio-temporal properties as well 
as the particular ‘material’, the manner in which the given ‘text’ is woven, must be 
taken into account.67  
To summarize then, reading Derrida’s ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ adds further 
complications to the examination of how accountability regimes operate in higher 
education: it shows that the ‘accounting of accountability’ is not extrinsic to 
pedagogy, that ‘accountability’ not only ‘disciplines’ but ‘seduces’ and that its 
relationship to visibility presupposes a more complex interweaving of visibility and 
its correlate, invisibility.  
It is, however, not only in this general sense that I propose to situate 
accounting in the ‘heart of the heart’ of education. The story of accountability, as it 
seems, is an educational story.68  
This at least is what follows from Hoskin’s work on the modern history of 
accountability and accounting. Unlike most of the scholars researching this field, 
Hoskin does not believe that the concept of ‘accountability’ first appeared in its 
modern, ‘disciplinary’ form in the world of business. Although, undoubtedly, it is 
in the context of management accounting in private business in the U.S. during the 
mid-nineteenth century that accounting in its modern disciplinary forms first 
                                                 
67 Derrida’s critique of Foucault’s Discipline and Punish follows similar direction. Jacques Derrida 
and Elisabeth Roudinesco, ‘Choosing One’s Heritage’, in For What Tomorrow: A Dialogue 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 1-19 (p. 12). The problem of ‘visibility’ and its 
theorizations particularly in relation to the university and feminist theory and politics is developed in 
the last chapter ‘Re-inventing Feminist Resistance for a University-to-come’. 
68 In his paper ‘Education and Genesis of Disciplinarity’, Hoskin examines the problem from the 
perspective of disciplines and proposes a ‘reversal’ to Foucault’s genealogy of disciplinarity. 
Specifically, Hoskin argues that ‘the whole field of disciplinarity’, in the double Foucauldian sense, 
‘has an educational genesis’. Thus, only by understanding ‘education and its power can one 
understand the genesis of disciplinarity and the subsequent apparently inexorable growth of 
disciplinarity’s power’. Hoskin thus reverses the Foucauldian premise that ‘examination’ as a 
‘modern form of ‘power-knowledge’ originates in psychiatry and then moves into the field of 
pedagogy. Hoskin, ‘Education and the Genesis of Disciplinarity’, p. 272. 
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flourished, according to Hoskin, the world of business is not the disciplinary site 
where accountability originates.  
Hoskin disapproves particularly of explanations which argue that the rise of 
accounting in modernity is a response to some ‘ex-post imputed “need”’, such as the 
need for more efficient organization of labour raised by technological progress, the 
demands of the Industrial Revolution, for example.69 He argues that the ‘emergence 
of the modern business enterprise cannot simply be read as the triumph of economic 
or technical innovation’, as a ‘secondary response to external economic, 
organizational and governmental change’. Instead, he suggests that its ‘genesis’ 
should be read as a disciplinary breakthrough with ‘accounting’ and elite higher 
education in Europe playing central and crucial roles in it.70  
Hoskin supports this argument by recalling findings of archival research he 
and his colleague Macve did on early modern U.S. businesses, namely the 
Springfield Armory and Western Railroad. As the two historians argue, they found a 
particular ‘educational connection’, a link which connects ‘accountability regimes’ 
to the institutional ‘disciplinary’ domain of higher education. More specifically, that 
research showed that the shift toward new regimes of answerability was not 
engineered by businessmen. These were, as Hoskin puts it, ‘too busy defending 
short-term profits and keeping costs low’. It was not the entrepreneurs who began to 
implement new measures but the ‘salaried employees with little or no financial 
interest in the companies they served’, that is, the companies’ accountants and book-
keepers.  
                                                 
69 Hoskin’s work challenges one of the key and dominant narratives about the origin of businesses 
and the management structures of modern corporations, the seminal work by Alfred D. Chandler The 
Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business published in 1977. 
70 Hoskin, ‘Accounting as Discipline’, p. 28. 
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Unlike the businesses in Europe, the U.S. businesses found themselves in a 
fortunate position during that period. They ‘were given the direct and extensive 
financial and institutional support by the State in implementing their disciplinary 
innovations’. Such a support was absent anywhere else in the world at that time.71 
Hoskin however argues that the financial support which allowed the growth of 
administrative and managerial apparatus was not the only factor which influenced 
this development. According to him, another significant factor refers to education: 
the men in charge of ‘book-keeping’, before starting their jobs, all went through ‘the 
same specialized training’. They were ex-cadets of the U.S. Military Academy at 
West Point.72 Following this link, Hoskin’s further research showed that this 
institution, in 1817 and just shortly before these men joined it, underwent radical 
organizational changes. West Point, following the example of the educational 
institutions in Europe, began to employ a new scientific curriculum and disciplinary 
pedagogy and was thus transformed into a modern disciplinary educational 
institution. 
Drawing on this insight, Hoskin argues that the breakthrough of modern 
managerialism which now ‘dominates the global oligopolistic economy’ one of the 
forms of which are the ‘accountability regimes’,73 is related to the ‘pedagogic 
revolution’ which took place in the elite educational institutions in Europe around 
1800.74 This ‘revolution’, as he argues, happened ‘fairly abruptly, and without any 
apparent direct cross-fertilization’ across ‘different European countries’. In 
Germany, Great Britain and France, students were put under a new pedagogic 
regime based on the constant deployment of three practices which include: 
                                                 
71 Hoskin, ‘Education and the Genegis of Disciplinarity’, p. 276-277. 
72 Hoskin and Macve, p. 31.  
73 Hoskin, ‘The Awful Idea’, 277. 
74 Hoskin, ‘The Awful Idea’, 266. 
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‘examination, as the formal testing of human activity, quantification, the putting of 
numbers on the activity tested, and writing, in the sense of producing an archive of 
activities, tests, results, and judgments’.75  
Undoubtedly, and as Hoskin also notes, examination, writing and numerical 
grading were present in education long before the eighteenth century and appeared 
in various forms in different societies all over the world. Hoskin’s argument is that 
what distinguishes these ‘pre-modern’ practices from their ‘modern’ form is that 
these practices were not brought together and applied in a systemic manner, and 
neither were they accompanied by the re-definition the rational self.76 In other 
words, the shift towards the new regime of answerability and the ‘invention’ of 
‘human accounting’ arose from a ‘conjunction of certain already existing practices 
which had never been systematically conjoined before’ in combination with the 
‘redefinition of the rational self’ as a ‘self-examining’ subject in the context of elite 
education.77  
At the practical level, the shift was ‘simple and humble’.78 Before the 1800, 
university exams remained predominantly oral and students ‘were evaluated on a 
qualitative not a quantitative basis’. This is what Hoskin illustrates with one of his 
‘case studies’, the examinations at Cambridge and then at Oxford Universities 
between 1760 and 1810. Before 1792, the more ‘fluid’ structure of semi-oral 
examination, when individual examiners set questions and answers were evaluated 
in qualitative terms, was in place. As a consequence ‘of the induced failure of the 
                                                 
75 Hoskin, ‘An Awful Idea’, p. 269. 
76 Hoskin and Macve, p. 31. 
77 Hoskin, ‘Education and the Genesis of Disciplinarity’, p. 273. 
78 Hoskin, ‘Education and Genesis of Disciplinarity’, p. 272. 
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measure to be a good measure’, one examiner, in 1792, proposed that all questions 
‘shall henceforward be marked numerically’.79  
 Yet, as Hoskin shows, these simple changes in the procedures of 
examination had profound consequences transforming not only the organizational 
structure of education but also the ways in which students learned. It did not 
transform only how learning was organized but it also had a ‘psycho-pedagogic’ 
effect. Under this new regime, the students began, as Hoskin calls it, ‘learning to 
learn’. They began to ‘learn under constant examination and for grades, knowing 
that they were to be examined and graded on what and how they wrote’.80 As 
discussed previously, this regime ‘imposed a new “disciplinary” power over learners 
by imposing a constant surveillance and a calculating judgment over each examined 
performance, and then more generally over the individual self’.81 It set up the new 
world where learners ‘become self-disciplining, self-actualizing, failure-fearing, 
prize-chasing seekers after truth: the contradictory yet recognizable people who are 
our selves’.82  
Hoskin stresses that particularly the power of the numerical ‘mark’ or ‘grade’ 
played an important role. As he points out,  
 
the mark is quite different from earlier numerical approaches to evaluation 
such as the ordinal system of ranking (much used by the Jesuits). Ranking 
compares you with others, it promotes emulation where you wish to outdo 
your peers. But marks promote, instead of emulation, competition. People 
compete, not just with each other, but for a currency that denotes self-worth. 
Marks put an objective value on performance: they quantify both the 
                                                 
79 Hoskin, ‘The awful Idea’, p. 273. 
80 Hoskin, ‘Education and the Genesis of Disciplinarity’, p. 273. 
81 Hoskin, ‘Education and the Genesis of Disicplinarity’, p. 273. 
82 Hoskin, ‘Education and the Genesis of Disicplinarity’, p. 274. 
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perfection of the “10 out of 10,” and the absolute failure of the total zero. 
They also make it possible to put numerical value on the self […].83 
 
Hoskin illustrates the ‘awfulness’ of this new situation, the impact of accountability 
as a regime which does not only imply ‘the glory of success but [also, or most 
importantly] the fear of failure’ with several examples. He cites a number of 
instances of prominent and high-achieving Oxford students confessing their fear of 
exam failure (one even including attempted suicide from the 1830s). In these cases, 
according to Hoskin, ‘the behaviour cannot be explained instrumentally, by a need to 
succeed in external social or economic terms, for this was still an elite world of 
young men predestined to succeed in those terms’. The pressures, as he continues,  
 
were intra-familial and psychological: the numbers were a measure-target that 
could no longer be ignored. Identity, honour and self-esteem were at stake, 
and there is no ultimate touchstone of success that is impregnable. We enter a 
world where even external success can be seen as failure internally.84 
 
This dynamic, which is ‘now treated as virtually endemic’, is something which was, 
according to Hoskin, absent before the ‘pedagogic revolution’. And it was only after 
the idea of ‘learning to learn’ for the purpose of constant marked examination of 
                                                 
83 Hoskin, ‘Education and the Genesis of Disciplinarity’, p. 273. Yet, as Hoskin stresses, the effects of 
accountability are various. That members of elites began to put themselves under ‘self-disciplinary’ 
pressures is not the only effect of ‘the power of the arithmetical mark’ and the ‘awful idea of 
accountability’. Hoskin warns against romanticization of the ‘pre-modern’ society and its educational 
institutions. The ‘learning to learn under written, graded examination’ and the competition not just 
with each other but for a ‘currency’ which puts ‘an objective value on performance’ had also effect 
on the society and radical changes within it. For instance, the possibility of ‘objective measurement of 
academic performance’ helped women, as Hoskin puts it, ‘to prove that they have “brains”’. It helped 
to show that women have ‘legitimate intellectual power’ and begin to challenge the ‘ancient historical 
presupposition’ that ‘females were only exceptionally educable’. Hoskin, ‘Education and the Genesis 
of Disciplinarity', p. 298. 
84 Hoskin, ‘The Awful Idea of Accountablity’, p. 274. 
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written work was internalized by the elites in the seclusion of higher education, that 
‘accountability’ spread to other sites of modern social life.  
According to Hoskin, the place of its ‘origin’ also explains why this new idea, the 
‘awful idea of accountability’, could suddenly emerge as a self-evident ‘necessity’ 
and why it so smoothly came to proliferate in other aspects of social life. For 
Hoskin, the explanation for why the change was almost unnoticed is because this 
new regime of accountability was translated and implemented by those in privileged 
positions, by the intellectual (and political) elites. In this way, ‘these pedagogic 
practices had become taken for granted as fundamentals of our everyday reality’ and 
began ‘to restructure a whole range of social settings into the disciplinary image’.85 
In various contexts, these practices were taken up in different specific ways. In the 
U.S., the ‘human accounting’ invented in the elite higher education was transformed 
into an effective new economic form, managerialism, and its associated 
accountability in the workplace of business enterprises. This is precisely what, as 
Hoskin concludes, made the success of the U.S. business in the first half of the 
nineteenth century:  
 
the significant difference in the US context, something that marks it off from 
all prior approaches to handling workforces and work, is the continued 
absence elsewhere of an effective technology of human accounting. It is this 
that marks, in the economic world, the transition from responsibility to 
accountability.86  
 
Hoskin’s proposition that the modern regime of answerability, accountability, 
originates in the elite educational institutions of Europe at the end of the eighteenth 
                                                 
85 Hoskin, ‘The Awful Idea’, p. 269. 
86 Hoskin, ‘Education and the Genesis of Disciplinarity’, p. 275. 
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century brings significant implications for our understanding of the problem of 
accountability and the university.  
As regards the foundations of the modern university, Hoskin’s research 
supports and further develops Derrida’s reading of Kant’s university discourse 
offered in his already discussed essay ‘Vacant Chair’, where Derrida reads it as a 
‘response’ to cultural, intellectual and political shifts. Reading Kant’s university 
discourse in relation to Hoskin’s work would imply that the Faculty of Philosophy, 
theorized by Kant as a place which has no power, was not only a response to wider 
socio-political changes, the reinforcement of the State’s censorship after the death of 
Frederick William II’s in 1786. We could read Kant’s theorizing also in the context 
of the ‘pedagogic revolution’ Hoskin describes in his work. More specifically, 
Kant’s paradoxical university schema where the Faculty of Philosophy is withdrawn 
from forces which operate in the legal and public register, such as state censorship, 
but still exercises power, can be read also as a response to the forces which operate 
‘within’, that is, the new modes of answerability which, as Hoskin shows, had just 
began to emerge within universities at that time.  
Importantly, in relation to my discussion in this part of my thesis, Hoskin’s 
work also significantly unsettles accounts which dominate the debate over the 
current university and its relationship to its ‘marketization’ and ‘corporatization’. 
Not only in that it challenges the assumption that the ‘general logic of 
accountability’, as Readings believed, is alien to the university and its pedagogy, 
but, for example, it may help us understand why the universities, when they today 
face the expansion of this so called ‘accountable logic’ modified by its 
implementation in the world of private businesses, are so amenable it. 
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Part III – Narratives of Feminist Studies 
(From Accounts to Visions) 
Chapter V - Taking Tremendous Responsibilities  
Narratives of Western Feminist Theory and the Problem of Amenability 
In Why Stories Matter: The Political Grammar of Feminist Theory Clare Hemmings 
examines accounts produced by Western feminist theory about feminism’s past and 
present with the aim of intervening ‘in these stories, to realign their political 
grammar and to allow a different vision of a feminist past, present, and future’.1 
Similarly to the work of Robyn Wiegman discussed in part one, Hemmings’s 
explorations proceed through a close examination of the texts produced by feminist 
theorists. As the title of her book suggests, Hemmings addresses this problem by 
tackling the questions of language and linguistic practices. She examines narrative 
forms of feminist discourses and the textual and grammatical mechanisms which 
underwrite them, such as the formation of binary pairs, exclusions, embedded 
temporality and a hierarchy of meaning and, particularly importantly for Hemmings’ 
project, techniques of citation and textual affect.2  
In her analysis Hemmings focuses on a particular set of feminist theoretical 
productions. She examines texts which are published in English and in feminist 
journals such as Signs, Feminist Theory or Nora. Additionally, she does not examine 
                                                 
1 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 1. 
2 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 17. 
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only how feminist discourses account for feminism’s entanglement with the 
university, but also how feminists more broadly account for feminism’s past and 
present. She focuses particularly on how these narratives relate or, as Hemmings 
puts it, ‘intersect’ with broader ‘institutionalizations of gendered meaning’.3 
According to Hemmings, ‘despite the complexity of the last few decades of 
feminist theory – its dizzying array of authors, objects, disciplines, and practices – 
the story of its past is consistently told as a series of interlocking narratives [...] that 
oversimplifies this complex history’.4 The three feminist narrative forms Hemmings 
identifies through her analyses as those which simplify the complex history of 
Western feminist theory, and which currently dominate its storytelling, are the 
narratives of progress, loss and return. As Hemmings describes it, the first of these 
narrative forms, ‘narratives of progress’, is an approach which welcomes the 
challenging of categories such as ‘woman’, ‘feminism’ or ‘gender’. It understands 
itself as bringing ‘diversification’ into the unified, unifying and essentialist 
categories, attributed by this approach to feminism.5 Hemmings’ second form, 
‘narratives of loss’, describes the history of feminist theory in a way similar to 
‘narratives of progress’. However, instead of celebrating it as progressive 
development, it denounces it. Within this approach, what is called ‘postmodern’ or 
‘poststructuralist’ feminism is seen as a position which has led to the depoliticization 
of feminism and to the rise of ‘postfeminism’ as well as a larger shift from 
feminisms’ alliance with anti-capitalism towards its becoming an ally with 
capitalism.6 Hemmings calls the third position ‘narratives of return’. This is a kind 
of account which, on the one hand, claims that ‘“postmodern feminism” has proven 
                                                 
3 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 1. 
4 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 3. 
5 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 3-4; 31-58. 
6 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 4; 59-94. 
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ineffective because it leads to relativism and political incapacity’, yet, on the other, 
seeks to move beyond what is perceived as ‘the current theoretical and political 
impasse’ by combining ‘the lessons of postmodern feminism with the materiality of 
embodiment and structural inequalities’.7  
One of the key arguments of Hemmings’ book is that despite the proclaimed 
differences, conflicts and antagonisms among these various narrative forms, the 
accounts which dominate the space of Western feminist theory share common 
‘grammatical’ traits. The first common feature is that they all ‘divide the recent past 
into clear decades to provide a narrative of progress or loss, proliferation or 
homogenization’. As Hemmings develops on this, ‘whether positively or negatively 
inflected, the chronology remains the same, the decades overburdened yet curiously 
flattered despite each story’s unique truth claims’.8 The second grammatical feature 
these three feminist narratives share is that they ‘position their teller as a heroine of 
the past, present, and future of Western feminist theory’. These stories, thus, ‘are not 
neutral and do not ask us to remain neutral’. In this respect,  
 
what has happened in feminist theory are also claims about individual status. 
One’s own intellectual and political commitments are always at stake in these 
stories, as one sees oneself by turn marginalized by the passage of time, or at 
the cutting edge of contemporary thought and practices.9 
 
For Hemmings, these structural devices are highly problematic. They produce 
accounts of feminism’s past and present as a linear and teleological narrative and 
rely on the presence of a feminist subject as a means of telling ‘the difference 
                                                 
7 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 4-5; 95-127.  
8 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 5. 
9 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p 5-6. 
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between good and bad “gender agendas”’ with the effective impact described in the 
above quotation.10 Hemmings’ assessment of the effects produced by these narrative 
techniques correlates with Wiegman’s interpretation of Wendy Brown’s essay ‘The 
Impossibility of Women’s Studies’ and of those Brown seeks to oppose. More 
specifically, although the difference between the three accounting forms Hemmings 
distinguishes is ‘partly a question of the affective quality of its passing’, in each of 
these strands, ‘feminism is always surpassed’. These seemingly antagonistic stories 
which dominate Western feminist theory all end up positioning ‘feminism itself as 
over, or as anachronistic’. 11  
However, in Hemmings account, the positioning of feminism into the past 
within Western feminist theory does not necessarily imply detachment from feminist 
politics, theory or its institutional locations. It does not simply inaugurate ‘post-
feminism’ or ‘anti-feminism’. As Hemmings shows with her readings, the 
attachment to feminism’s demise appears, paradoxically, ‘to be a precondition for 
the take-up of feminist subject status in the present’.12 In other words, the demise 
functions as an enabling factor of feminism’s reoccurrence in present, as a vehicle 
through which subjects claim their feminist position within the current world and 
(feminist) theory which is perceived as ‘not enough’ or ‘non-’ or ‘post-’ feminist.  
As already suggested, Hemmings does not examine only the stories produced 
by Western feminist theory, but focuses on how these intersect with wider 
discourses on feminism, gender and sexuality. She points out that ‘it is not only 
feminists who tell us (feminist) politics has been lost’. Rather, this rhetorical trope 
resonates with the more general and broader storytelling of social and cultural 
                                                 
10 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 139. 
11 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 136. 
12 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 137. 
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theory. Social and cultural theory also mourns its ‘lost politics’ and is governed by 
similar narrative forms which ‘champion, lament, or advocate revisiting a unified 
past vision of social change’. Within these broader social and cultural narratives, 
feminism, as Hemmings further argues, also occupies an unstable position: it is ‘both 
located as part of what has been surpassed, but also as part of what contributed to the 
fragmentation of the Left in its downward narrative trajectory’. Yet, again, despite 
this variation, feminism is, in both cases, understood as ‘anachronistic, and the 
desire to hold onto it – and its objects and methods too –misguided’.13  
According to Hemmings, the idea that feminism is ‘over’ is, however, most 
directly and rigorously promoted by the Western media and popular culture. In these 
contexts, and unlike within Western feminist theory, invoking feminism’s demise 
does not function as a precondition of positioning oneself as a feminist subject in the 
present. Here, whether inflected as success or failure, invocation of feminism’s 
demise functions as precondition for rather different kinds of stories. Hemmings 
calls these accounts ‘postfeminist’ and argues that they consistently render feminism 
as ‘old-fashioned’ and stereotype it ‘as unnecessarily aggressive or misguided’ in 
order to promote anti-feminist and sexist agenda.14 Within these discourses, it is 
argued that feminism ‘has achieved its primary goals of equality in the West’. This 
success is then ‘enacted through assertions of young women’s and girl’s 
independence and freedom from feminism’ which, however, is not ‘“any old 
freedom” but the freedom to be feminine, to be sexually attractive-and available-to 
men’.15 
                                                 
13 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 7. 
14 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 7.  
15 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 137-138. 
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The narratives about feminism’s anachronistic character and the sexually 
saturated gender equality are also mobilized within the power struggles on the global 
scale. According to Hemmings, feminism is placed in the past and proclaimed to be 
irrelevant not only to contemporary Western societies but also non-Western ones. 
What is ‘exported’ from the West and ‘implemented’ in non-Western countries are 
therefore not ‘feminism’ but ‘gender equality’ and ‘sexual freedom’ discourses 
which have a ‘nonfeminsit subject and expert’. Hemmings describes its premises as 
following:  
 
Freed from the burdens of (historically understandable, but no longer 
necessary) bias, gender equality can finally be achieved impartially. Learning 
the lessons of Western democracies, we can skip that unpleasant bit in the 
middle and propel the culture-bound and unliberated directly to the 
emancipation part, directly to the freedom to participate in global markets 
part, which is to say without upsetting families, or challenging a democratic 
imaginary.16 
 
The ‘export’ of ‘gender equality’ and ‘sexual rights’ agendas separated from 
feminism bears geo-political implications which strengthen rather than challenge the 
current unjust distribution of powers and resources. According to Hemmings, ‘the 
fantasy of Western gender equality as already achieved is essential for the linked 
fantasy that a particular model of economic development will give rise to the 
universal good life, including women’s empowerment and opportunity’.17 As she 
describes it, 
 
                                                 
16 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 10. 
17 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 138.  
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the use of gender equality as a marker of an economic and regulatory 
modernity marks the subject of gender equality as Western, capitalist, and 
democratic, and the West, capitalism, and democracy themselves as sites that 
create the possibility of, and reproduce, rather than hinder, gender equality.18  
 
This ‘fantasy’, which is also supported by the ‘grammars’ shared by narratives 
which dominate Western feminist theory thus forwards the premise that ‘non-
Western cultures’ are ‘backwards’ (i.e. premodern) and ‘in need of help of Western 
philanthropists and experts (as postmodern)’. 19 
Another context which plays a key role in the formation and reproduction of 
the narratives which situate feminism into the past is Western higher education. This 
is not only because the universities are the ‘place’ where the feminist theory finds its 
institutional footing but because the story about feminism’s ‘over-ness’ also strongly 
resonates within the political and economic interest of this educational institution. In 
other words, also within higher education, feminism’s success (both as a social 
movement and a knowledge project) makes its current intellectual and political 
importance redundant. According to Hemmings, practically, gender equality (which 
is presented as being already achieved) or, conversely, feminism’s failure to attract 
young women, are alternatively or jointly cited as a justification for non-investment 
in feminist knowledge projects, and closures of feminist study programmes and 
women’s studies departments.  
However, as Hemmings’ continues, in cases where the institutional 
formation researching gender and sex reinforces the idea of feminism’s over-ness, it 
does receive institutional validation. Renaming departments of ‘women’s studies’ to 
                                                 
18 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 9. 
19 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 9. 
   
 
218 
 
‘gender studies’, when this shift is understood as supportive of the transition from 
what is perceived as biased and radical feminism to a more objective and neutral 
gender equality discourse, is an example of such an alternation. Furthermore, the 
narrative of feminism’s successful yet finished mission incarnated in gender equality 
discourses also plays a crucial role in the current academic global politics and 
international market of Western higher education. Particularly where research on 
sexuality and gender supports the split between the West and the rest of the world, 
where the seemingly neutralized gender expertize is utilized for pursuing economic 
and political interests of the ‘West’ in ‘non-Western’ contexts, research on gender 
and sexuality gains validation and support in the Western university.20 
Drawing on her analysis of the aforementioned narratives and the 
examination of how they become entangled with broader institutionalizations of 
gendered meaning, Hemmings calls for a transformation of how feminist theorists 
produce accounts about feminism’s past and present. As she argues, ‘instead of 
lamenting what is most often perceived as the co-optation of feminism’, feminist 
‘storytelling’ must take another route. Specifically, it has to focus on the exploration 
of ‘the links between postfeminism’s heterosexualizing imperatives, a free market’s 
violent passing as women’s liberator, and Western feminist narratives that 
underscore a similar linearity, even – or perhaps particularly – where these shifts are 
lamented’.21 Similarly, instead of making the presence of the feminist subject (which 
we identify with) the indicator of the right and true feminism, and thus condemning 
other positions as ‘not feminist enough’, we ‘need to pay attention to the amenability 
of our own stories, narrative constructs, and grammatical forms to discursive uses of 
                                                 
20 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 10; 152-154. 
21 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 12. 
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gender and feminism we might otherwise wish to disentangle ourselves from […]’.22 
By doing so, we will be able to introduce ‘a reflexive Western feminist 
accountability that shuttles back and forth between past and present in order to 
imagine a future that is not already known’.23  
With this proposition, Hemmings, however, does not call for telling 
‘different’ or necessarily inventing ‘new’ feminist stories. As she explains, her aim 
is not to ‘put together an alternative historiography that can tell a better story, one 
with fewer, or less harmful, exclusions’.24 Rather, she seeks to ‘intervene by 
experimenting with how we might tell stories differently rather than telling different 
stories’.25  
The interventions Hemmings proposes and develops particularly in the last 
two chapters of her book proceed by utilizing two techniques through which the 
narratives she examines operate and make themselves ‘believable’ - the ‘citation 
tactics’ and ‘textual affect’.26 As Hemmings describes it, her ‘recitation and affective 
mobilization’ start from what is absent both textually and politically in the stories we 
already participate in. By ‘folding’ these absences ‘back into narrative’ she seeks to 
reconfigure ‘the political grammars of Western feminism’.27 
It is, however, not these experimental practices Hemmings proposes which I 
find most compelling about her work. Even less so is it the typology of the dominant 
narratives of the current Western feminist theory Hemmings proposes.28 The aspect 
                                                 
22 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 2. 
23 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 3. 
24 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 12. 
25 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 16. 
26 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 3; 161-226. 
27 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 27. 
28 As Hemmings herself recalls, there is a danger in ‘focusing on repeated rather than anomalous 
stories’ which may bolster ‘the monotony of the progress, loss, and return narratives she identifies as 
so problematic’ (20). However, for my part, it is not her ‘interest in the rehearsed rather than the 
creative’ which I find problematic about her topology of narratives which dominate Western feminist 
theory, but the way in which her examination proceeds. In other words, I suggest that Hemmings’ 
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of Hemmings’ analysis which I find most moving, particularly in relation to my 
questions of the university and the trends which dominate it, as discussed 
particularly in part two, is how Hemmings conceptualizes the intersection of 
Western feminist accounts with the wider discourses on feminism, gender and 
sexuality.  
In this chapter, I will develop Hemmings’ work in relation to ethics. I 
support her proposition that Western feminist theories must account for feminism’s 
past and present differently so as to make those stories more ‘ethically accountable 
and potentially more politically transformative’.29 However, I argue that in order to 
do so, we must also pay attention to and re-conceptualize what we assume by 
‘ethical accountability’. Through a close reading of the opening passage of Derrida’s 
essay ‘Mochlos, or The Conflict of the Faculties’, I will trace ‘a university 
responsibility’ which does not lead to a subject conceived as self-identical. I will 
propose a conceptualization of responsibility which will make us, feminism and the 
university tremble. I argue that envisioning responsibility as tremendous will allow 
us to conceive of feminism as non-identical to itself and beyond the prerequisite of 
the sovereign (feminist) subject. ‘Tremendous responsibilities’ will thus, as 
Hemmings proposes, help us create feminist narratives which will be, as Kamuf 
would put it, more ethically accounterable, and thus also potentially more politically 
transformative.  
                                                 
argument that we need to ‘tell [feminist] stories differently’ must be extended also on how we ‘tell’ 
the stories about feminist stories, the meta-level of the analysis.   
29 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 2. 
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Tremendous Amenability  
As it is apparent from the brief outline of Why Stories Matter presented above, 
similarly to Wiegman, Hemmings understands feminist theory and its 
institutionalized forms as inherently paradoxical and as bringing ambivalent and 
sometimes even conflicted effects. She conceives of feminist theory as ‘non-
identical’ formation which has an ambiguous relationship not only with discourses 
which share its political agenda, but also with those which promote contradictory 
ones.  
For Hemmings, Western feminist theory is therefore ‘both caught and 
freeing’. It is, as she argues, ‘certainly bound up in global power relations’. This is 
shown particularly on how ‘a presumed opposition between Western gender equality 
and non-western patriarchal cultures is mobilized in temporal and spatial modes’. 
Yet, simultaneously, it ‘also occupies a position of reflexive non-innocence that can 
break open those relations’.30 In Hemmings’ account, the paradoxical character of 
Western feminist theory and the recognition that it produces ambivalent effects 
therefore is not perceived as paralysing. Similarly to Wiegman, Hemmings wishes to 
offer a future for feminist theorizing and identifies herself with what she calls the 
‘utopianism’ of feminist theory. Thus, although being critical of narrative forms and 
tropes which seem to dominate it, Hemmings wishes to make a ‘claim for the 
continued radical potential of feminist theory and for the importance of telling 
stories differently’.31  
As I interpret it, the tremendousness of Hemmings’ account does not, 
however, consist only in her self-critical and self-reflexive mode and her professed 
                                                 
30 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 2. 
31 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 2. 
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utopianism. It is tremendous also because of the task Hemmings sets for herself and 
strives to achieve in her book. More specifically, Hemmings declares that she does 
not believe that ‘an absolute distinction between feminist and nonfeminist 
mobilizations of gender discourses can or should be sustained’.32 Yet, despite the 
professed impossibility of such a demarcation or, rather, because of it, she strives to 
conceptualize a possibility of making it.    
According to Hemmings, in our attempt to mark the difference ‘between 
good and bad “gender agendas”’, we cannot rely on ‘the presence or absence of a 
feminist subject respectively’. This is because, as she argues, ‘the narrative 
connections between feminist and other stories about gender politics are too 
consistent and too embedded for a feminist subject alone to carry the burden of 
responsibility for political alignment’.33 Indeed, according to Hemmings, insisting 
that the difference between feminist and non-feminist narratives can be marked by 
the ‘presence of a feminist subject who remains critical is to miss the relationship 
between the structure and techniques of Western feminist stories and their broader 
institutional life’. Such an approach creates effects from which we would prefer to 
dissociate ourselves. More specifically, it not only protects ‘feminism and feminist 
subject from scrutiny’ but also encourages ‘blanket judgments’ about what is 
understood as ‘non-feminist’. Following this approach, projects such as gender 
mainstreaming would be readily described as either ‘devoid of feminism’ or ‘as 
wholly pragmatic and thus beyond critical judgment about epistemological impact’. 
Such an understanding would, by return, determine how feminist theory is perceived 
and positioned. Feminist theory would end up being portrayed as ‘a kind of luxury’, 
                                                 
32 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 139. 
33 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 137. 
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as ‘a prior engagement to be abandoned in the face of necessity, rather than an 
ongoing project of understanding the world with transformation in mind’.34 
In her account of the overlap between feminist and nonfeminist discourses 
Hemmings seeks to avoid such pitfalls. Simultaneously, however, she also wants to 
avoid relativizations which would portray ‘feminism’ and ‘sexism’ as two 
contradictory, but nonetheless otherwise equally valuable, perspectives. Hemmings 
seeks to achieve this tremendous task by conceptualizing the intersection between 
feminist and nonfeminist discourses via use of the term ‘amenability’. She describes 
the conceptual advantages of this notion by comparing it to another term widely 
used by feminist theorists, and, in Hemmings view, harmful to their narratives, the 
term ‘co-optation’.  
According to Hemmings, by grasping the intersection between the ‘stories’ 
feminist theory tells with other or even conflictual stories as ‘co-optation’, both ‘the 
innocence of “feminist theory”’ as well as the hegemony of those discourses with 
which it intersects, are preserved. In contrast, the notion of amenability allows to 
work ‘through their mutual implication in space and time’ and to think ‘carefully 
about what an accountable feminist theory might foreground in that relation and who 
its contradictory subjects might be’.35  
The term ‘amenability’ therefore does important methodological work for 
Hemmings. It introduces a certain ambivalence and complexity and disturbs the 
hardening of differences into binary oppositions endorsed by the term ‘co-optation’. 
Hemmings uses the notion of amenability in passages where she wants, in a concise 
way, to define the raison d'être of her project. Thus, in the opening of the book, she 
                                                 
34 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 140. 
35 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 12. 
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declares that ‘feminist theorists need to pay attention to the amenability of our own 
stories, narrative constructs, and grammatical forms to discursive uses of gender and 
feminism we might otherwise wish to disentangle from if history is not simply to 
repeat itself’. She further develops on this by suggesting that we should ‘interrupt 
the amenability of the narratives that make up dominant Western feminist stories and 
tell stories differently’.36 And, as she expresses elsewhere in the book, the different 
storytelling will help make ‘feminist theory […] less amenable to co-optation’.37 
But what is it Hemmings suggests we pay attention to within our own stories 
and narrative accounts? What does she suggest we interrupt and inhibit in narratives 
produced by Western feminist theory? And what are the complications which the 
term ‘amenability’ brings to the analysis of the narratives told by Western feminist 
theory?  
The adjective ‘amenable’ is of Latin origin and came to English through the 
Old French word amener which means to ‘lead up’. Amener comes from words 
mināre which means ‘to drive’, and minārī meaning ‘to threaten’. For example, the 
word ‘menace’ or, as the OED also lists, expressions such as ‘to drive cattle with 
minatory shouts’ come from this origin. To be ‘amenable’ thus indicates someone 
who is ready or willing to answer, someone who is open to accept suggestions and 
influences; someone who is responsive and thus likely to listen and cooperate. It 
describes something or someone who is tractable, receptive and compliant, someone 
or something which is liable to submit to authority, willing or disposed to comply. It 
designates someone who is willing to be led and susceptible to discipline, thus, also, 
perhaps to education. It indicates an openness or susceptibility to testing, criticism 
                                                 
36 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 2. 
37 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 26. 
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and someone else’s judgment, a willingness to account and answer for one’s 
behaviour.38  
Drawing on this brief excursion into dictionaries we can speculate that with 
her suggestion to interrupt or inhibit amenability of narrative forms in Western 
feminist theory, Hemmings proposes we cultivate feminist storytelling which would 
not cooperate and would not submit or surrender. She proposes we develop feminist 
narratives unwilling to ‘learn its lesson’, narrative forms which would not conform 
but would, instead, make Western feminist theory resistant, disobedient and 
unanswerable.  
Hemmings’ call to interrupt amenability of Western feminist storytelling is, 
however, not an isolationist gesture, an attempt to cut feminist theory off from any 
relations with what it is not. Neither does she suggest we abandon ethics. With her 
proposition to interrupt amenability, Hemmings does not promote irresponsibility. 
Rather the opposite. As it follows from her text, the attention to how narratives told 
by Western feminist theory intersect with other discourses is proposed in order to 
‘increase accountability for these resonances’.39 Or, as she declares elsewhere in the 
book, the proposition to interrupt amenability is led by the desire to ‘make the 
stories we tell both more ethically accountable and potentially more politically 
transformative’.40  
 As I interpret it, Hemmings therefore proposes we proceed in a way which is 
intrinsically paradoxical. She suggests we take responsibility for the amenability of 
our narratives and we interrupt that amenability in order to make feminist 
                                                 
38 ‘Amenability’, Oxford English Dictionary Online < http://0-
www.oed.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk/view/Entry/6292?redirectedFrom=amenability#eid> [accessed 22 
February 2017]. 
39 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 139.  
40 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 2. 
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storytelling more accountable which would, consequently, increase chances of 
Western feminist theory bringing about political transformation. As I read it, these 
propositions bring a useful complication of the relationship between the narratives 
produced by Western feminist theory and the trends which, as identified and 
discussed in the previous part, dominate current universities. As I understand it, 
what Hemmings tries to formulate and develop in her work is not dissimilar from 
Kamuf’s ‘accounterability’.41 Or, to recall Drucilla Cornell, Hemmings attempts to 
elaborate narrative forms which would not confine feminism’s ‘dream to what 
common sense takes to be realistic expectations for our future’. Her work can thus 
be interpreted as invoking an ‘ethical aspiration to live beyond accommodation’ 
which, as Cornell would argue, ‘begins with the refusal of that confinement’ and 
which seeks to ‘configure an ethics of social engagement that would significantly be 
more just than the one we have now’.42 
In the following sections of this chapter I will develop Hemmings’ work in 
this direction. In line with Hemmings’ argument, I propose that if we want to tell 
stories about feminism’s entanglement with the university in a more ethically 
accountable and potentially more politically transformative way, we need to oppose 
the reduction of feminism into linearly progressive narratives pivoting around an 
individual feminist subject. However, I also argue that we need to further examine 
what it means to be ‘ethically accountable’. In other words, feminist responses to the 
current situation in higher education cannot consist, as Hemmings also points out, 
merely in attempts to restore some ‘truthful’ and radical feminism or a (feminist) 
‘subject’ which has been lost in the so-called ‘postfeminist’ era in which we – 
                                                 
41 Kamuf, ‘Accounterability’, 251-266. 
42 Cornell, Beyond Accommodation, p. xii.  
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allegedly – live. Nor should we, as follows from the previous discussions of this 
thesis, attempt to reclaim or rely on some seemingly ‘proper’ or ‘original’ meanings 
of words such as ‘accountability’. I argue that, instead, we need to think through 
how we might reconceive ethical relationships which would be in contestation not 
only with the amenability of narrative forms which define the dominant ‘stories’ of 
Western feminist theory, but also with the so called ‘accountability movement’ 
which dominates current universities.  
Practising a University Responsibility  
As a way to conceive of such an ethical relationship, I suggest we take 
responsibilities which are tremendous. I employ this phrase –tremendous 
responsibilities – to argue that the way we think and practice relations to ourselves 
and to others, the way we respond and take responsibility, must be, as the etymology 
of the word ‘tremendous’ suggests, not only enormous, extraordinary, impressive, 
moving, exciting or even fantastic, but also dreadful and frightening. It must make 
us, feminism and the university, tremble.43  
However, despite the ‘playful’ impression the phrase ‘tremendous 
responsibility’ might make, developing the ethical aspect of the relationship to the 
university in this direction is a pragmatic choice. As already discussed in part two, 
the market-driven audit culture which dominates current universities does not 
proceed only through the implementation and the reinforcement of the language and 
logic of commerce. It is not only through ‘rebranding’ students to customers by 
                                                 
43 A modified version of my reading of Derrida’s text ‘Mochlos’ was published as Lenka Vráblíková, 
‘From Performativity to Aporia: Taking ‘tremendous responsibility’ towards feminism and the 
university’, Gender and Education, 28.3 (2016), 359-371. 
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which the so called ‘marketization’ of the universities and the ‘corporatization’ of 
knowledge proceed, but also through the utilization of words, concepts and 
arguments traditionally connected with modern emancipatory discourses.  
One of the words and concepts which seems to play a particularly significant 
role in this context is, as discussed previously, the word and the concept of 
‘accountability’. As Readings, Kamuf and others have argued, current universities 
are dominated by a ‘generalized logic of accounting’ which also redefines wider 
usage of terms essential to modern liberal and democratic discourses, such as the 
notion of the ‘accountable subject’.44 However, these shifts are not easy to resist, and 
not only because, as I showed with my reading of Derrida’s ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, the 
‘pharmakon-like’ effects produced by accountability, but also due to the historical 
affinity this particular mode of answerability shares with the modern university and 
its pedagogical practices.45 
In my examination of the questions of how we can re-conceptualize ethical 
relationships, I turn again to Derrida’s work. I will examine a text where Derrida 
addresses the question of responsibility specifically in relation to the university, the 
essay ‘Mochlos, or The Conflict of the Faculties’.46 As I will show with my close 
examination of the opening of this essay, although not conceiving responsibility as a 
fixed and stable ‘property’ of the subject, Derrida still manages to perform what he 
calls ‘a university responsibility’. Drawing on his other work The Gift of Death,47 I 
then interpret this ‘performance’ of responsibility not as an example of a 
‘performative speech act’ but rather as an ‘aporia’, that is, as an insolubly 
                                                 
44 Readings, The University in Ruins; Kamuf, ‘Accounterability’.   
45 Hoskin, ‘The Awful Idea’. 
46 Jacques Derrida, ‘Mochlos: or, the conflict of the faculties’, in Logomachia: The Conflict of the 
Faculties, ed. by Richard Rand (Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), pp. 1-34. 
47 Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995).  
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paradoxical event. As I interpret it, conceiving responsibility as aporetic does not 
only make the sovereign ‘I’ tremble, but also permits the articulation, in theoretical 
terms, of the possibility of political transformation. In turn, this may therefore 
potentially support interventions in how Western feminist theory produces its own 
accounts of itself as well as the current debates around feminism’s entanglement 
with the university.  
As the title of Derrida’s essay, ‘Mochlos, or, The Conflict of the Faculties’, 
suggests, the essay draws on Immanuel Kant’s book The Conflict of the Faculties. 
‘Mochlos’ was originally delivered by Derrida as a lecture at Columbia University 
on the occasion of the celebration of the centennial of Columbia’s Graduate School 
in 1980. Derrida takes Kant’s book as a point of departure, as a ‘lever’ or a ‘wedge’ 
(mochlos is the Greek word for ‘lever’) in order to conceptualise ‘a foundation of a 
new university law’. By envisioning ‘a university responsibility’ which negotiates 
what we cannot know, the ‘monstrous future’, Derrida wants to help the university 
to have a future.48  
What is the ‘university’ for Derrida? What does he mean by ‘responsibility’? 
And how does he conceptualise ‘future’? Those are precisely the key questions 
Derrida engages with, or, rather, ‘leverages’, in ‘Mochlos’. Categories such as the 
‘university’ or ‘responsibility’ are not taken for granted. They are not approached as 
given realities or unquestioned and unquestionable axioms. Nor does Derrida 
provide definitions which would clearly outline those terms. In fact, arriving at such 
definitions is not even the aim of his endeavour. Rather, he approaches these terms 
as questions which are yet to be answered or, even, as questions which are not to be 
answered and must remain suspended. For Derrida, conceiving of categories as 
                                                 
48 Derrida, ‘Mochlos’ p. 30-31.  
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uncertain spaces which can be taken into account only as ‘open-ended’, as not fully 
knowable or graspable, is not a deficiency, a lack of rigorousness or a sign of 
insufficient and poor scholarship. On the contrary, as the opening of the essay 
testifies, it is a deliberate decision: 
 
If we could say we (but have I not already said it?), we might perhaps ask 
ourselves: who are we? And who are we in the university where apparently 
we are? What do we represent? Whom do we represent? Are we responsible? 
For what and to whom? If there is a university responsibility, it at least begins 
with the moment when a need to hear these questions, to take them upon 
oneself and respond, is imposed.49 
 
As this quotation shows, Derrida clearly refrains from assigning a single and definite 
meaning to the terms he uses. He behaves as if he did not know what the university – 
or ‘we’ – means. There is not one stable footing in this passage to which Derrida, or 
I (or indeed ‘we’) could cling. Particularly, the uncertainty around the category ‘we’ 
introduces difficulties for a term that is essential for the discussion of the university 
in this essay, the notion of responsibility which is invoked in the second half of the 
quotation. Not knowing whether we could say ‘we’, or not knowing who ‘we’ are, 
radically undermines the classical notion of subjectivity traditionally understood as 
sovereign. In other words, according to traditional accounts, in order for there to be a 
sovereign subject, one must know – or at least claim or pretend to know – who one 
is. Only this fully conscious, sovereign ‘I’ is considered capable to take 
responsibility upon itself and can thus be held accountable for its actions and 
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decisions. Without a sovereign subject, in classical theoretical accounts at least, no 
responsibility is possible.  
Yet, the uncertainty and lack of stable foundations does not preclude inquiry 
within the realm of ethics and higher education. Derrida still manages to speak about 
‘a’ university and a collective ‘we’. Similarly, even though he explicitly challenges 
the notion of a sovereign subject, he does manage to invoke responsibility. When 
Derrida says ‘if we could say we’ and, building on this hypothetical ‘we’ asks ‘are 
we responsible?’, he does not promote relativism or nihilism against a ‘positive’ or 
affirmative discourses. Nor does he give up on ethics or politics in general. For 
Derrida, to show how unstable those concepts are does not necessarily mean to 
dismiss the possibility of a theoretical understanding, or the efforts of collective 
action. He does not promote irresponsibility.  
What Derrida performs here is what I call ‘tremendous practice’. Although 
his questioning makes the traditional notion of a responsible subject ‘tremble’, it 
does not cause disruptions which are paralysing or petrifying. Rather, it functions as 
a pressure point or a wedge, as something that introduces and causes division or 
disruption, something that forces an opening or a beginning. For as we read at the 
end of the quotation, the so called ‘not knowing’, the uncertainty performed by 
Derrida at the very beginning, is, simultaneously, the very prerequisite of his 
responsibility.  
The effect of this move is that it reverses the idea that the subject is the 
source of responsibility and suggests, instead, that the collective ‘we’ is produced, or 
as Derrida would put it, invented, through a practice of responsibility. In other 
words, subjectivity does not precede the invocation of responsibility, but is its very 
effect. The performative mode thus allows Derrida to engage in the complex scene 
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of responsibility he has staged. It allows him to declare openly and take, or to begin 
to take, upon himself, a university responsibility as soon as he begins writing. What 
Derrida offers in his essay is, therefore, not so much an ontological mode of 
questioning, or a theoretical contemplation on the topic or the meaning of the 
university, subjectivity or responsibility. Rather, it is a discourse on responsibility; 
Derrida’s writing is a discourse of responsibility.  
We should not, however, settle for this interpretation. On the contrary, we 
should become particularly unsettled or trembled at this point for at least two 
reasons. The first applies to any project that seeks to transform the current order and 
strive for a more just future (such as feminism or anti-racism). For, have we not 
already experienced that the more we attempt to ‘perform’ the changes we want to 
introduce in the university or elsewhere, the more the status quo appropriates and 
colonises our modes of performance and promotes its own agenda with even greater 
efficiency? Are not our attempts to transform existing power relations often 
assimilated and thus end up reinforcing that which we originally wanted to oppose? 
If ‘performativity’ is the way structures such as neoliberalism, phallocentrism, 
heteronormativity, or, precisely, ‘accountability movement’ sustain and reproduce 
themselves, then reading the introduction of ‘Mochlos’ as a ‘performance’ of a 
performative speech act can help us understand the mode of their functioning. Such 
an insight is a necessary prerequisite for choosing the best modes of resistance, the 
best lever - the best mochlos. This reading, however, as I will further argue below, 
does not, in itself, allow us to imagine a means of resistance against those dominant 
modes.  
The second reason for troubling the notion of ‘the performative’ relates 
specifically to feminist theory and politics. As Hemmings argues, feminist ‘political 
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grammar […] is highly mobile and does not belong only to feminists’.50 Its 
‘grammar’ travels across various geopolitical, institutional and linguistic contexts 
which can – or not – be feminist.51 The notion of ‘performativity’ is, undoubtedly, 
one of these highly ‘mobile’ elements of the so-called feminist political grammar. 
‘Performativity’ has gained this privilege particularly thanks to the work of Judith 
Butler who most famously described ‘gender’ as ‘performative’. Butler, however, is 
not the only feminist to have theorized gender as performative or as a performance.52 
Similarly, whether ‘performative gender’ or ‘gender as performance’ is or is not 
attached to feminist theory or to Butler’s name, it travels across various feminist and 
non-feminist narratives.53  
Troubling and further complicating the notion of the ‘performative’ therefore 
seems to me to be particularly important in relation to both feminist thinking and the 
current university. In the following section, I will develop on this problem by 
distinguishing Derrida’s university responsibility from a performance of a subject 
which produces that of which it speaks, that is, from a notion of a performative 
speech act introduced by Austin.54 I argue that this move will enable us to imagine a 
                                                 
50 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 2.  
51 As already argued, in order to account for this ‘travelling’ Hemmings uses word ‘amenability’. In 
The Fantasy of Feminist History, Scott attempts to address this issue by using a term ‘reverberations’ 
or with a help of the phrase ‘fantasy-echo’ (2011). In The Queer Turn in Feminism Berger addresses 
the issue of this ‘travelling’ or, as she calls it in the abstract to ‘Gender Springtime in Paris’, 
‘crossing(s)’ through the notion of ‘translation’. I will develop Hemming’s texts in the direction of 
Berger’s work in the following chapter.  
52 Anne Berger, ‘Queens and Queers: The Theater of Gender in “America”, in The Queer Turn in 
Feminism: Identities, Sexualities, and the Theater of Gender (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2014), pp. 11-82.  
53 For more on the question of the implications of ‘gender’ for feminist scholarship see Joan Scott, 
‘Gender: A useful Category of Historical Analysis’, The American Historical Review, 91.5 (1986), 
1053-1075; Teresa De Lauretis, ‘The Technology of Gender’, in Technologies of Gender: Essays on 
Theory, Film and Fiction (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987), pp. 1-30. 
Joan, Scott, ‘Gender: Still a Useful Category of Analysis?’, Diogenes, 225.7 (2010), 7-14; or Ranjana 
Khanna, ‘On the Name, Ideation, and Sexual Difference’, differences 27.2 (2016), 62-78. 
54 John, L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1962), pp. 6-7. 
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university responsibility other than as a product of a subjectivity which, although 
being ‘performative’, is still sovereign. 
Beyond Performativity towards an Aporia of Responsibility  
Although Derrida relies on Austin’s distinction between constative and performative 
utterances, and especially Austin’s ‘discovery’ of the performative, his notion of a 
university responsibility is not reducible to it. Rather, it fundamentally complicates 
the constative/ performative distinction and designates the instant of its failure and 
reaches, through a leap which institutes an irreducible rupture, beyond it. I will 
elucidate this complex movement and simultaneously will outline another way to 
conceive of responsibility – a responsibility as an ‘aporetic’ response.  
‘It is too often said that the performative produces the event of which it 
speaks’ Derrida notes in ‘The Future of the Profession or University without 
Condition’, an essay which develops issues outlined in ‘Mochlos’. In the same essay 
he warns against interpretations which believe that ‘performativity’, whatever the 
word is supposed to mean, subverts the status quo and leads towards its 
transformation.55 In contrast to such accounts, for Derrida, ‘performativity’ does not 
only stand for an ability to execute a power to do things but also the very 
interweaving of knowledge with structures of power:  
 
In speaking of performativity, I think as much of the performativity, or output, 
of a technical system, a place where knowledge and power are no longer 
distinguished, as of the Austinian notion of a language act not confined to 
stating, describing, or saying that which is, but capable of producing or 
                                                 
55 Jacques Derrida, ‘The Future of the Profession or University without Condition (Thanks to the 
‘Humanities,’ What Could Take Place Tomorrow)’, in Jacques Derrida and the Humanities, ed. by 
Tom Cohen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 24-57. (p. 54). 
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transforming, into itself alone, under certain conditions, the situation of which 
it speaks.56 
 
Thus, as Derrida argues elsewhere, ‘the performative is a power’; and, it ‘is not only 
a power, but also a legitimizing and legitimized power’.57 In other words, the power 
of performatives stems from their context, which is a context of power. In order to 
be able to have the right and the power to produce the performative, one must be 
situated within a context of authority and legitimacy. Simultaneously, however, 
although legitimacy and authority are conditions which make performative speech 
acts ‘powerful’, they also regulate and command them. By doing so, they limit the 
possibility to imagine futures which would be more than just an extension of the 
present; futures, which would be radically different from those which are already 
known. For this very reason, Derrida claims that performatives are ‘still found, like 
the power of language in general, on the side of the sovereignty […]’.58 They do not 
allow imagining other subjectivities than those which already ‘speak’ and are 
recognised as such. In this context, although ‘performative’, the subject is still 
sovereign, a fully conscious and autonomous ‘I’ mastering its own actions, decisions 
and responsibilities. The sovereignty of the subject is left unquestioned by 
performative speech acts.  
What does Derrida’s insight about performatives imply for feminist 
narratives and their relationship with the current university? What does it imply for 
those who attempt to imagine subjectivities and their relations to others which yet do 
not exist and who have only limited access to the sources of legitimacy and 
                                                 
56 Derrida, ‘Mochlos’, p. 20.  
57 Jacques Derrida, ‘Pefromative Powerlessness – A response to Simon Critchley’, Constellations, 7 
(2000), pp. 466-468 (p. 467).  
58 Derrida, ‘The University without Condition’, in Without Alibi, edited by Peggy Kamuf (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2002), pp. 202-237 (p. 301). 
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authority, such as history, common sense or current empirical reality? Can they even 
hope to make the so-called ‘other world’ they imagine become manifest?  
In accordance with Cornell,59 and following Derrida’s discussion of 
performative speech acts, it seems to me very difficult to imagine the arrival of a 
future which would be more than an extension of the present through the 
‘performative’ lens. By the same token, as the established order is systematically 
biased in privileging those within power, reversing the existing modes which govern 
our society and their latest innovations and mutations such as the accountability 
movement seems almost impossible.  
Is there a possibility to read ‘a university responsibility’ practiced by Derrida 
in a way which could provide those without power with more advantage? Could a 
reading ‘beyond the performative’ provide us with instruments which may help us 
imagine a future beyond what is currently imaginable?  
To be sure, we cannot just simply remove the accountability movement, let 
alone neoliberalism or phallocentrism. We are deeply entangled in them. A reading 
of this passage (and of deconstruction) thus can provide a lever, but this is not an 
adequate tool in the traditional sense. It does not simply transform weakness to 
strength. This device has no fixed hinge; its beam has nothing stable and rigid to rely 
on. More specifically, these tools do not pivot around a power that stems from a 
context of legitimacy and authority tied to a sovereign subject. They suggest we both 
develop and come to rely upon another type of power, a kind of ‘powerless power’, 
a power without stable and fixed grounding. The pull beyond the performative is, 
therefore, not to be read only as an attempt to enable the ‘weak’ so they can 
                                                 
59 While to some extent endorsing Judith Butler's position that gender is performance that can style 
new configurations, Cornell argues that the notion of performance fails to recognize adequately that 
gender is a social system with forceful tendencies to rather reproduce then undermine itself. Drucilla, 
Cornell, Beyond Accommodation, pp. 198. 
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‘leverage’ those in power. This leverage is not political in the traditional sense, but 
disrupts the very notion of politics.  
A responsibility beyond the realm of politics and sovereign subjectivity is 
also central to Derrida’s book The Gift of Death.60 In this text, Derrida performs a 
manoeuvre similar to the one described above. He moves responsibility beyond the 
constraints of legitimate and authoritative power and enhances the ‘new’ and 
‘powerless’ responsibility. In order to perform this leap, Derrida draws on one of the 
‘Heretical Essays’ by the Czech philosopher Jan Patočka where the latter introduces 
a genealogy of responsibility as related to the mystery of the sacred.61  
According to Patočka, the modern ‘European’ responsible subject is 
constituted by the mysterium tremendum, an encounter with the Christian God to 
whose call one responds. Envisioning a responsibility as a response implies that a 
responsibility does not simply originate in the one who says ‘I’ but comes to him or 
her from outside, as a gift from God. According to this account, not only is 
subjectivity described as an effect and an invocation of responsibility, and thus 
grounded in ‘personal’ experience and conditioned by a specific historical context, 
but also as exceeding the subject itself. In other words, ‘responsibility’ is conceived 
as a kind of ‘responding’.  
In addition, this ‘mystical’ communication is endowed by an extraordinary 
character. On one end, there is God who, as Derrida explains, ‘sees me without my 
seeing, holds me in his hands while remaining inaccessible’.62 God thus escapes the 
subject’s vision and understanding. He is absolutely transcendental and remains 
                                                 
60 Derrida, Jacques, The Gift of Death, trans. David Wills (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1995).  
61 Jan, Patočka, ‘Is Technological Civilization Decadent, and Why?’, in Heretical Essays in the 
History of Philosophy (Peru, IL: Open Court, 1996), pp. 95-118.  
62 Derrida, The Gift of Death, p. 40.  
   
 
238 
 
secret. On the other end of this extraordinary and asymmetrical exchange is the ‘not-
yet-I’ which, without seeing or knowing anything, responds and thus constitutes 
itself. In this instance, the subject’s singularity, as Derrida explains in The Gift of 
Death, is absolute. Its uniqueness is implied by the finitude of human beings, for in 
death no substitution is possible. In this sense, one cannot die for someone else (‘no 
one can die in the place of the other’).63 The mysterium tremendum thus not only 
constitutes a responsibility which exceeds the subject’s sovereignty, but also binds 
what is usually considered incompatible: the subject’s relationship to its absolute 
singularity and, simultaneously, the radical alterity represented by the inaccessible 
God.  
The reading of the mysterium tremendum initiates what Derrida calls an 
aporia of responsibility which he develops through another Biblical event, the 
sacrifice of Isaac. In this scenario, Abraham, who follows God’s command to offer 
his son as a sacrifice, also receives no explanation from the ‘fearful’ God. The 
fearfulness of Abraham’s situation, however, exceeds this particular point as 
Abraham not only follows God’s order without knowing or seeing anything, but also 
does not give any account to anyone else. Abraham experiences his responsibility in 
secret – in absolute solitude and silence. Simultaneously, this ‘secret’ responsibility 
makes him utterly irresponsible in front of his family and the human community. In 
his response to God, Abraham transgresses the human Law and thus betrays his 
community and ethics. The sacrifice of Isaac is, therefore, as Derrida argues, ‘a 
scandal and paradox’.64 On the one hand, the ethical law mandates Abraham to 
speak, to account for himself in front of others and thus dissolve his singularity and 
                                                 
63 Derrida, The Gift of Death, p. 42. 
64 Derrida, The Gift of Death, p. 60.  
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the secret. On the other hand, however, Abraham is bound to the ‘absolute’ 
responsibility to God which implies singularity, silence and secrecy.65 
The scene is thus defined by an insoluble contradiction, an aporia. Yet, 
Derrida pushes his reading further, altering and enhancing the trembling effects of 
this particular scene. Firstly, he argues that this unique and dreadful event is not 
specific only to Abraham but defines ‘the most common and everyday experience of 
responsibility’.66 In other words, every decision, every act of responsibility has a 
structure of an aporia. Secondly, Derrida replaces the figure of God with any other 
mortal being. This substitution binds the singular subject to another finite being 
which is also absolutely singular yet still radically transcendent. Derrida expresses 
this paradox, ‘the most irreducible heterology’, through an idiomatic formula, tout 
autre est tout autre which David Wills translates as ‘an every other [one] is every 
[bit] other’.67 I will briefly outline some of its key attributes.  
Firstly, according to this account of responsibility, responsibility always 
takes place before and beyond any theoretical determination and its deployment, 
beyond politics and ethics, and its ‘subject’, the sovereign ‘I’. We can indeed 
imagine it, as in ‘Mochlos’, as a leap; as a dreadful and frightening moment of 
losing one’s footing; a leap towards radical alterity which is originally non-present 
to one’s ego. Such a concept of responsibility thus not only lacks coherence and 
continuity but in fact does not possess any identity. Instead, it is defined as 
irreducible rupture, a ‘paralysis’ which causes disruption and thus forces an opening 
towards something radically other.  
                                                 
65 Derrida, The Gift of Death, p. 61.  
66 Derrida, The Gift of Death, p. 67.  
67 Derrida, The Gift of Death, p. 82-83. 
   
 
240 
 
A responsibility as an aporia is therefore a terrific event, an experience of 
absolute risk and danger. Yet, this risk of stepping beyond what is familiar and 
known to us, the common sense or officially and publicly stated and accepted 
doctrine, represents the only moment when a responsible decision can be made. To 
return to the opening passage of ‘Mochlos’, this is the reason why performative 
speech acts, which are still found on the side of sovereignty, prevent the ‘real’ 
responsibility to come. And this is also why Derrida urges for a leap beyond the 
performative. Responsibility, he claims, ‘must not only surprise the constative and 
propositional mode of the language of knowledge (S is P), but also no longer even 
let itself be commanded by the performative speech act of a subject’.68 
Secondly, an aporia implies that responsibility is never guaranteed. It is not 
only because ‘one always risks not managing to accede to responsibility in the 
process of forming it’.69 Its ‘monstrosity’ is even more fundamental than that. As 
soon as one enters into a relation with the other as other, that is, radically other and 
absolutely singular, in that very instance, irresponsibility insinuates itself. For as 
Derrida explains, one ‘cannot respond to the call, the request, the obligation, or even 
the love of another without sacrificing the other other, the other others’.70 This 
implies that one is always guilty of responding to the one and not the other. ‘Full’ 
responsibility, a sovereign responsible decision, is therefore impossible. 
Responsibility always entails sacrifice, guilt and irresponsibility.  
Envisioning responsibility as an aporia thus leads to unexpected territories. It 
leads us beyond the imagination of the so-called common sense, traditional 
philosophical discourses and modern politics. It goes against the widely shared 
                                                 
68 Derrida, ‘The Future of the Profession’, p. 53. 
69 Derrida, The Gift of Death, p. 61.  
70 Derrida, The Gift of Death, p. 68.  
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understanding of responsibility as tied only to one’s community, the public sphere, 
the possibility and necessity of accounting for oneself in front of others and the Law. 
It leads towards places which had been previously unforeseen in relation to 
responsibility or, alternatively, considered to represent a threat to responsible 
decision-making. It shows responsibility as containing mystery or a secret; it leads to 
the realms of dissidence, silence, solitude, absolute singularity, sacrifice, guilt and 
even to irresponsibility.  
If, as Derrida argues in The Gift of Death, responsibility and every decision 
has the structure of an aporia, such a ‘tremendous’ discourse apparently bears 
fundamental consequences for how we think about and practice ethics and politics in 
general. An aporia of responsibility seems particularly intriguing for the 
understanding and evaluation of the so-called ‘public institutions’, like the 
university, and especially for the trends which currently dominates it, such as the 
accountability movement. Reading the accountability movement through an aporia 
of responsibility would offer a peculiar insight into the display of a ‘good 
conscience’ of this seemingly pure and fully transparent and objective development. 
In contrast to what its proponents profess, it would disclose its ‘hidden’ agenda, that 
is, that the accountability movement promotes political and economic interests of 
particular groups. More importantly, however, it would also reveal that the 
accountability movement is grounded and thrives on denying the insoluble aporia, 
the tremendous character of responsibility. I, therefore, propose that in the context 
where responsibility and decision-making are being reduced to a technical 
deployment of accountability, taking tremendous responsibilities may function as an 
act of resistance against this otherwise irresistible trend.  
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Taking Tremendous Responsibilities 
By way of conclusion to this chapter, I will return to the opening passage of 
‘Mochlos’ in order to demonstrate how an aporia of responsibility might function 
here, and will outline the potential of taking tremendous responsibilities in relation 
to the interventions proposed by Hemmings within storytelling of Western feminists 
theory. For this purpose, let me quote the opening lines of ‘Mochlos’ again:  
 
If we could say we (but have I not already said it?), we might perhaps ask 
ourselves: who are we? And who are we in the university where apparently 
we are? What do we represent? Whom do we represent? Are we responsible? 
For what and to whom? If there is a university responsibility, it at least begins 
with the moment when a need to hear these questions, to take them upon 
oneself and respond, is imposed.71 
 
This opening scene is situated in the realm of ‘as if’. It is a hypothetical, fictional 
and fantastic scene, a fabulation. In a highly dramatic manner and with the help of 
‘ifs’, question marks and performative utterances, Derrida manages to set up a 
university scene which is, from the very beginning, distorted and dislocated. It is 
marked by uncertainty and openness. It is a fantastic but also frightening scene in 
which Derrida and his reader are immediately caught up as we begin to write and 
read. Unlike traditional performative speech acts, where it is the subject who 
produces that of which it speaks, in this passage, it is actually not easy to identify 
from where responsibility comes. It certainly does not come only from an act of a 
speaker. As the second half of the quotation testifies, the subject does not only speak 
but also hears: he or she hears the questions, takes them upon himself or herself and 
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responds. The speaker thus seems to have no choice; responsibility is, as if 
involuntarily, imposed upon herself or himself. Without giving reason or 
justifications, a responsibility comes as a command to the one who must take it upon 
herself or himself alone. The scene thus neither states nor describes anything but 
engages by responding to the other as the other. This is the moment where – if there 
is any – a university responsibility begins.  
As I interpret it, we cannot decide whether there is or is not responsibility in 
Derrida’s text. In this respect, the opening of Derrida’s essay is not what one would 
call a responsible scene. Yet, it does work as a lever or a wedge, as an opening for a 
new university responsibility to come. And, as Derrida explains at the end of his 
essay, choosing the best lever is in fact the key task necessary for making the ‘right’ 
decisions. As he argues,  
 
[t]he difficulty will consist, as always, in determining the best lever, what the 
Greeks would call the best mochlos […] When one asks how to be oriented in 
history, morality or politics, the most serious discords and decisions have to 
do less often with ends, it seems to me, than with levers.72  
 
The potential of deconstruction as a tool for thinking through issues of ethics is, 
therefore, different from that of an apt and sufficient tool in a traditional sense. An 
aporetic responsibility will not ‘protect’ feminist theorists and other academics from 
making bad decisions or from behaving irresponsibly. Although it appeals to fidelity 
to traditions, this responsibility does not adhere to any accepted and established 
doctrines and in fact counts on infidelity as a way of imagining worlds which are 
currently unimaginable. Taking aporetic responsibility will thus not provide any 
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guarantees but will, instead, make us, the stories Western feminist theory tells, and 
the university, tremble.  
This, however, as it seems to me, is not bad news for feminist theorists and 
academics. As I have shown, the alternative to the university dominated by the 
‘accountability movement’ is not an irresponsible university. Nor do feminists who 
refuse to ground their narratives on a feminist subject as a guarantee of 
differentiating between good and bad uses of concepts such as ‘gender’, ‘sex’ and 
‘feminism’ have to give up on ethicality. They cannot, however, claim as their own 
the classical notion of responsibility defined as a ‘property’ of a subject which – 
whether understood as fixed or performative – is still sovereign.  
Telling stories of Western feminist theory differently so as to envision 
feminist past, present and future, therefore does not entail only ‘realigning political 
grammars’ as Hemmings identifies, but also demands re-conceptualization of the 
notion of accountability. Tremendous responsibilities is a conceptualization of 
ethicality which would be adequate to the character and aims of feminist 
interventions which feminist theorists such as Hemmings seek to implement while, 
simultaneously, be in contestation to the accountability movement which currently 
dominates the context of Western academy.  
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Chapter VI – Re-inventing Feminist Resistance for a University-to-
come 
Dramatizing Stories that Matter 
In the previous chapter I proposed a conceptualization of ethicality which would be 
adequate to the character and aims of feminist interventions which feminist theorists 
such as Hemmings seek to implement – tremendous responsibilities. As I further 
proposed, the conceptualization of responsibilities as tremendous would also be in 
contestation to the accountability movement which currently dominates the context 
of Western academy. However, this proposition, as well as the grammatical 
realignments suggested by Hemmings do not, however, tackle an issue which, as I 
understand it, is no less important for the project of telling feminist stories differently 
– the articulation of the uses of political grammars which would be ‘idiolectic’ to the 
storytelling of feminist theory.73  
In other words, it is not only feminist theory but any field of study, any 
discipline or political group, may follow and implement grammatical realignments 
proposed by Hemmings. Her proposition to tell stories which would not form 
linearly progressive narratives pivoting around an individual subject is not limited 
only to storytelling of Western feminist theory, but can be generalized to any 
‘storytelling’ whether fictional or non-fictional. Similarly, the tremendous 
responsibilities I proposed in this chapter are to be taken by anyone inside or outside 
the universities, by any individual or collective which seek, or presents themselves 
as seeking, to resist against that which is perceived as the current status quo.  
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The two interventions thus do not tell us much about what is peculiar to the 
stories told by Western feminist theory. Yet, for me, the questions arising from 
reading Hemmings’ work are also those concerning the singularity of Western 
feminist theory: Are there any ‘grammatical’ features which would be unique to the 
stories told by Western feminist theorists? And should we even seek to articulate 
such specificity? Would not such an endeavour necessarily equate to the search for 
‘proper objects and subjects’? That is, is not the kind of endeavour which 
Hemmings, following her interpretation of Butler’s work, considers to be a 
misguided effort and thus one to be resolutely refused?74 Is ‘singularity’, as 
Hemmings seems to be arguing in an essay from 2016, to be understood to be an 
obstacle to pluralization and multiplication which seek to challenge conservative 
invocations of ‘fixed gender and sexuality as part of nationalist projects’?75 Or, 
rather, is ‘singularity’, no matter how paradoxical, contingent and unstable, a 
necessary condition if there is to be anything like ‘feminism’? Additionally, is not 
welcoming and promoting singularity an indispensable task for a feminist project 
whose very raison d’être, as Berger puts it, has been and continues to be not only 
‘promotion of plurality’ but also ‘the excavation of unrecognized or unwanted 
differences’?76 
In the following chapter, which is the final chapter of the thesis, I will contest 
the gesture of posing singularity against plurality and multiplicity present not only in 
Hemmings’ work but in much wider current within feminist theory.77 I will propose 
a way of theorizing in which the singularity of feminist political and theoretical 
                                                 
74 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 157. 
75 Hemmings, ‘Is Gender Studies Singular’, p. 81. 
76 Berger, abstract to ‘Gender Springtime in Paris’. 
77 For instance, this approach also defines the work of other feminist scholars examined in this thesis, 
namely Brown and Wiegman.  
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endeavours - that is, not only its irreducible specificity, but also its exceptional and 
extraordinary character beyond the usual and ordinary - can be articulated.78 
Following work of Anne Berger, I will identify an ‘idiomatic feature’ of the political 
grammars employed by Western feminist theory. This feature, as I will also 
demonstrate, has a particular connection to the regimes which dominate current 
universities. The following discussion will not, however, only shed further light on 
how the political grammar of narratives told by Western feminist theory entangle 
with the trends which dominate current universities. Following Berger’s work, my 
intention is also to theorize how, as Hemming’s may put it, we can tell feminist 
stories differently particularly in order to envision another university. 
In order to provide further insight into how Western feminist narratives 
entangle with the trends which dominates universities and in order to envision these 
educational institutions beyond their current predicament, I propose we further 
dramatize Hemming’s work. This dramatization consists of two moves: Firstly, I 
propose we amplify and further exploit the conceptual possibilities offered by the 
analytics of linguistics and textuality. The second move in the dramatization of 
Hemming’s approach entails adapting the problem of visibility, and visibilization of 
and in the current university, as a theatrical problem. This, as I will show, has a 
particular connection to the grammars of Western feminist theory.  
1. The amplification of the conceptual possibilities offered by the analytics of 
linguistics and textuality consists in utilizing the concept of ‘translation’.79 This 
                                                 
78 ‘Singular’, in Oxford English Dictionary Online, < http://0-
www.oed.com.wam.leeds.ac.uk/view/Entry/180174> [accessed 8 March 20177]. 
79 My discussion of translation follow from Derrida’s understandings of translation (see the 
‘Roundtable on on Translation’ which I discussed in the second chapter) and from Berger’s 
utilization and development it (see her already mentioned essay the introduction to the special issue 
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feminist theorizing see Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ‘The Politics of Translation’, in Outside in the 
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concept of translation is, however, a particular one. It not only tackles the crossings 
between two languages, but also operates within what seems to be a single language 
or lexicon, as well as between and within non-linguistic practices. Furthermore, it is 
not grounded in the belief that ‘meanings’ or ‘ideas’ can cross borders without any 
significant changes. Rather the opposite: the possibility of crossing from one 
language to another is grounded in the recognition that the gap of difference between 
various lexicons and their grammars is, to a certain extent, unbridgeable.  
It is in this sense that translation, as Derrida famously argued, is impossible 
yet necessary. As discussed in chapter two (entitled ‘Out of Place’), according to 
him, translation is an ‘agreement’ which implies ‘the difference of languages rather 
than transparent translatability’. This, however, does not imply that one should not 
translate. Although translation is a paradoxical operation, which within itself 
contains resistance to translatability, it also operates as a ‘promise’. It thus ‘never 
succeeds in the pure and absolute sense of the term’ but ‘succeeds in success, in 
promising reconciliation’.80 ‘Good translation’, Derrida argues, ‘is one that enacts 
that performative called a promise with the result that through the translation one 
sees the coming shape of a possible reconciliation among languages’.81 This 
‘promise’, as I take it, not only implies reconciliation among the already existing 
languages, but also embodies a chance of inaugurating that which is unimaginable in 
the languages with which we have told our stories thus far. 
In relation to the dramatization of Hemmings’ work, this concept of 
translation implies the following: It allows us to grasp the grammar of Western 
feminist theory as a conceptually heterogeneous and semantically unstable field. 
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81 Derrida, ‘Roundtable’, p. 123. 
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Simultaneously, however, it also allows us to grasp an articulation of what is 
peculiar to these stories. This is an aspect that Hemmings and other scholars who 
examine narratives of feminist theory, such as Robyn Wiegman, seem to be 
avoiding. 
More specifically, when Hemmings seeks to differentiate between feminist 
and nonfeminist narratives, or, when Wiegman theorizes the disciplinary possibility 
of academic feminism, they avoid differentiating feminist projects from other 
endeavours which are – intellectually, politically or institutionally - akin to it. Both 
scholars, following their readings of Butler, argue that an effort to articulate the 
specificities of feminist theory and politics is a stumbling block for feminist 
endeavours, and therefore condemn such efforts.82 Thus, in Why Stories Matter, 
Hemmings argues resolutely:  
 
‘[c]ertainly, ongoing argument over the proper subject and object of feminism 
as distinct from other modes of gender discourse seems misplaced at best, and 
unlikely to disrupt the narrative amenability I have been discussing. 
Assumptions about what singular genre of feminist theory, method, and 
practice can renew lost feminist capacities fall into two related traps, in my 
analysis. They consolidate understandings of feminism as anachronism, on the 
one hand, and propose one response as most significant, which is in fact to say 
one feminist subject, on the other.83  
 
Hemmings wrestles with the question of what would distinguish feminism from 
other modes of gender discourse - the problem of singularity and plurality - also in a 
2016 essay entitled ‘Is Gender Studies Singular? Stories of Queer/Feminist 
                                                 
82 In order to support this argument, Hemmings refers specifically to Butler’s Gender Trouble from 
1990 and the essay ‘Against proper objects’ (Judith Butler, ‘Against Proper Objects’, differences, 6.2-
3 (1994), 1-26. 
83 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 157. 
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Difference and Displacement’.84 There, it is discussed particularly in relation to 
feminist and queer intellectual and political endeavours and the conceptualization of 
gender.  
In this essay, Hemmings contests that there could be a single feminist theory 
of gender and seeks to ‘orient us toward multiplicity and away from singularity’.85 
She also welcomes ‘pluralizations’ created by ‘multiplying the terms themselves 
rather than the theory’, for such an effort also ‘makes plain the limits to singular 
thinking and orientations and the dangers of exclusion that attend the singularity of 
both object and politics’.86 Thus, according to Hemmings, pluralizations of terms 
and theories would imply positive effects not only in relation to scholarship, but also 
politics. As she argues, it will make 
 
feminism less easy to co-opt as a political and institutional project and [will] 
mark it as always already running counter to the adoption of gender equality 
by neoliberal and neoconservative states and actors. Where “gender” belongs 
to “feminism” then, it must be plural in order not to be “singular” […].87  
 
For Hemmings, therefore, pluralization and multiplication of feminist theories and 
concepts are also a strategy of resisting co-option by neoliberal, neoconservative and 
nationalist discourses (which, assumedly, promote singularity). However, further 
reading of her essay reveals that the relation between ‘singularity’ and 
‘pluralization’, and their political implications, are not as simple as it might seem 
from the passage quoted above. Hemmings further argues in her essay:  
                                                 
84 Clare Hemmings, ‘Is Gender Studies Singular? Stories of Queer/Feminist Difference and 
Displacement’, differences, 27 (2016), 79-102. 
85 Hemmings, ‘Is Gender Studies Singular?’, p. 81. 
86 Hemmings, ‘Is Gender Studies Singular?’, p. 82. 
87 Hemmings, ‘Is Gender Studies Singular?’, p. 82. 
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We also need to tune our ears to the alarm bells whose tones echo through the 
history of this politicized field. I want to suggests, in fact, that in moving too 
quickly to pluralization, we risk ceding the terrain of “gender,” preferring to 
participate in a fantasy of escape that cleanses us of the amenability of this 
concept to the violence of nationalist projects rather than to explore the 
complex terrain of gender that we inhabit. […] I propose rethinking gender as 
a scene of multiplicity, a more accountable institutional and political mode.88 
 
As this quotation indicates, Hemmings recognizes that the effects of ‘pluralization’ 
(understood as the opposite and the replacement of singularity) are not only positive. 
If we ‘move too quickly to pluralization’, we may buy into a false belief that 
separating concepts and theories from their complex histories and problematic 
affiliations is possible.  
That an erasure can be, indeed, a result of feminist projects motivated by a 
desire to promote plurality can be demonstrated by Wendy Brown’s essay ‘The 
Impossibility of Women’s Studies’. As the interpretation of this text in part one 
showed, pluralization, (when understood as the opposite of singularity, which is 
perceived as exclusionary and therefore as that which has to be exceeded), leads 
Brown away not only from particular concepts (e.g. ‘woman’ or ‘gender’), but also 
away from feminism and disciplinary locations where feminist work could take 
place.89  
Similarly, neither does the relationship between singularity/plurality and 
neoliberalism and global capitalism seem as unambiguous as Hemmings’ seems to 
suggest in her essay. Rather, it is not so much the ‘singularity’ as it is the so called 
                                                 
88 Hemmings, ‘Is Gender Studies Singular?’, p. 83. 
89 Brown, ‘The Impossibility’. For the close reading of her essay see chapter one.  
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‘moving too quickly to pluralization’ which seems to go hand in hand with the 
modes in which global capitalism operates. More specifically, ‘moving too quickly 
to pluralization’ seems to coincide with rather than resist one of the key premises 
and driving forces of capitalism, the search for the newest (and thus most 
irresistible) offers of the (feminist and postfeminist intellectual and political) global 
market. The drive towards pluralization at the expense of singularity may thus be 
seen, rather than a radical break, as that which perpetuates the ongoing crisis of the 
alliance between feminism and anti-capitalism.  
The proposition which I wish to argue for is that our feminist theorizations 
must stop avoiding the question of the singular and stop branding singularity as 
always and necessarily ‘exclusionary’. I do agree with Hemmings that ‘an absolute 
distinction between feminist and non-feminist mobilizations of gender discourses 
can or should be sustained’, and that we should not seek to identify ‘proper objects 
and subjects’ of feminist theory and politics.90 I also support how she embraces 
pluralization and multiplicity of concepts, theories as well as the politics of 
feminism or feminisms. Yet, I also argue that we still need to venture to articulate 
their specificity. For me, if there is to be anything like feminist thinking and politics, 
it is indispensable we continue the endless (and thus in its finality impossible) work 
of negotiating and distinguishing particular strands of feminist intellectual and 
political endeavours from that which they are not. 
As a starting point of such an endeavour I propose we cease perceiving 
singularity as being associated only with ‘the dangers of exclusion’ and rethink the 
relationship between singularity and plurality as other than oppositional.91 An 
                                                 
90 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 175. 
91 Hemmings, ‘Is Gender Studies Singular?’, p. 82. 
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articulation of the singularity of feminist political and theoretical endeavours, of that 
which is unique and extraordinary about them, does not have to be in contradiction 
with understanding feminism as a formation which is defined by ‘constitutive 
otherness’ and which is thus ‘non-identical to itself’, as proposed by Wiegman and 
other feminist thinkers invoked earlier. In other words, singularity does not have to 
be in contradiction with irreducible heterogeneity characteristic of variegated 
theories, concepts and epistemological approaches of feminist scholarship, as well as 
feminism’s political and institutional forms and modalities. Neither does embracing 
singularity have to contradict the desire for sharing and openness to otherness. 
Rather, insisting on singularity, on irreducible and irreplaceable uniqueness, is the 
condition of conceiving the heterogeneity and plurality which, however, would not 
inevitably imply displacement and/or an erasure of such efforts.  
The conceptualization of translation presented above, as it seems to me, 
represents a tool which allows for such an articulation in a particularly advantageous 
way. Firstly, and as already argued, this concept of translation binds what is usually 
considered incompatible or even standing in a direct opposition, singularity and 
plurality. Berger, drawing on Derrida and Scott, describes it as following:  
 
Translation, conceived […] above all as an active task of detection as well as 
reception of “particular meanings,” is thus paradoxically an act of resistance 
to translatability. And when particular meanings are teased out and stressed 
over the general use and the unity of meaning such use presumes, the work of 
(un)translation also becomes inseparable from one of pluralization.92 
 
                                                 
92 Berger, ‘Gender Springtime in Paris’, p. 10-11. 
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Secondly, it allows to conceive of the specificity of feminist endeavours as not 
deriving from the identities of its actors (feminist subjects) or as being intrinsic to its 
objects, conceptualizations rightly condemned by Hemmings. Here, specificity does 
not derive from the language in which stories are formed and conveyed so much as, 
as Berger puts it, from the ‘specific or “idiolectic” uses and contextual 
redeployments and displacements’.93 In other words, it derives from how language is 
used, that is, how it is spoken and written.  
Translation, as Berger puts it, is an ‘active task’.94 This concept of translation 
therefore also allows for theorization of agency and, consequently, that of 
transformation.95 As Berger further develops in her essay,  
 
something happens in and thanks to translation that may open paths and 
change hearts as well as landscapes, because, as a task taken on deliberately, it 
involves the act of reading and the active work of reception. Whether it is an 
individual endeavor or a collective one or both, translation is a responsive act 
in the most literal sense, an answer to the call of the other that mobilizes 
subjectivity as responsibility.96 
 
To put this in relation to Hemmings’ Why Stories Matter, this concept of translation 
allows for developing, in theoretical terms, the key proposition of Hemmings’ work 
that feminist theorists should ‘tell stories differently’.97 
                                                 
93 Berger, ‘Gender Springtime in Paris’, p. 10. 
94 Berger, ‘Gender Springtime in Paris’, p. 10. 
95 Spivak stresses a similar point in her deliberation on translation: ‘[…]I want to consider the role 
played by language for the agent, the person who acts, even though intention is not fully present to 
itself. The task of the feminist translator is to consider language as a clue to the workings of gender 
agency. The writer is written by her language, of course. But the writing of the writer writes agency 
in a way that might be different from that of the British woman/citizen within the history of British 
feminism, focused on the task of freeing herself from Britain’s imperial past, its often racist present, 
as well as its “made in Britain” history of male domination’. Spivak, ‘The Politics of Translation’, p.  
201. 
96 Berger, 19-20. 
97 Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 16. 
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Finally, investing in the theorization of the singular might help develop 
premises under which an effective resistance to the homogenizing pull of 
generalization as it has been escalated in global techno-capitalism, could be 
conveyed. As Berger explains in The Queer Turn in Feminism, 
 
territorial unity and internal coherence are undermined by the way a number 
of contemporary cultural phenomena and discourses travel across space and 
especially virtual space, bypassing borders, material and immaterial. The 
display and circulation of “information” on the Web has thus contributed to 
inflecting the meaning of the word “culture.” Notions of “culture” and 
“cultural space” or “areas” are traditionally tied to a notion of “location” as a 
bounded and “oriented” space. Virtual space does something more and 
something other than simply putting different geographical, linguistic and 
political spaces in permanent communication with one another: it dislocates 
and disorients location(s). It therefore modifies the task of translation.98 
 
On the Web, she continues elsewhere in the book, ‘the instantaneous circulation of 
“information” short-circuits the traditional process of diffusion and reception of a 
given cultural “trend” by ignoring frontiers and differences’. This means that ‘the 
work of translation – which implies that there is something in need of translation, 
thus some difference – can be supplanted by the play of citation, which stipulates 
that everything is imitable’.99 
In ‘Gender Springtime in Paris: A Twenty-First-Century Tale of Seasons’ 
from 2016, Berger embraces the problem of translation in order to enable a 
                                                 
98 Berger, The Queer Turn, p. 110-111. 
99 Berger, The Queer Turn, p. 82. As I interpret it, the changes implied by globalization and 
virtualization also account for the reason why Berger, rather than focusing on the notion of 
‘iterability’ or ‘performativity’ or citationality’, prefers the notion of translation which, rather than 
repetition, imitation, mimicry or copying, stresses irreplaceable singularity. For more on the relation 
between performativity and translation see Sandra Bermann, ’21: Perfoming Translation’, in A 
companion to Translation Studies, ed. by Sandra Bermann and Catherine Porter (Chichester: John 
Wiley & sons, Ltd., 2014), pp. 285-297.  
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discussion of internalization and institutionalization of feminist scholarship which 
will allow different ways of conceiving of ‘connections’ and ‘sharing’ as other than 
the ‘circulation of imitable information’ described above. In the section entitled ‘The 
Resistance of Translation’, she speculates whether this conceptualization of 
translation could help us theorize how  
 
decentering moves, allowing different ways of conceiving the connection(s) 
between the local and the global, the center and the periphery, or, even better, 
between various forms of “locatedness”’ may emerge in ways which would be 
different from that of ‘a hegemonic and/ or neo-colonial pattern of 
extension.100  
 
Berger thus invites us to consider the question whether ‘translation’, understood as 
‘a neohumanist practice of transnational exchange premised on the irreducibility of 
idioms and the hospitality to difference, can withstand the homogenizing pull of 
globalization’.101 Drawing from her reading of Scott’s deliberations in ‘Gender: Still 
a Useful Category of Analysis?’,102 Berger declares: 
 
It is not enough to be a native or neonative speaker of a given language […]; it 
is not enough, indeed, to be a reliable lexicographer. Only a “translator,” that 
is, somebody who asks her- or himself how meanings are established and 
what they signify in the particular context or text she or he is dealing with, 
might be able to trace and convey these meanings.103 
                                                 
100 Berger, ‘Gender Springtime in Paris’, p. 8. 
101 Berger, abstract to ‘Gender Springtime in Paris’.  
102 Scott, ‘Gender: Still a Useful Category of Analysis?’, p. 14. 
103 Berger, ‘Gender Springtime in Paris’, p. 10; As follows from Spivak’s text ‘The Politics of 
Translation’, the work of translation, is also work of love: ‘The task of the translator is to facilitate 
this love between the original and its shadow, a love that permits fraying, holds the agency of the 
translator and the demands of her imagined or actual audience at bay’. Spivak, ‘The Politics of 
Translation’, p. 181. 
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Following Berger, we can perhaps propose that the task twenty-first-century feminist 
scholars face is that of translation. 
2. As already indicated, the second move in the dramatization of Hemming’s 
approach entails adapting the problem of visibility and visibilization of and in the 
current university as a theatrical problem which has a particular connection to the 
grammars of Western feminist theory. In the sections that follow, I will develop 
Hemming’s efforts presented in Why Stories Matter in relation to trends which have 
dominated Western universities (i.e. the regimes of audit and accountability) by 
taking up the problems of ‘vision’ and ‘visibility’. I will introduce works by scholars 
who, in their attempt to envision the future of the university, seek to conceptualize 
the university’s relationship to visibility and visibilization as other than that of the 
panoptical all-seeing surveillance. I will then introduce an argument presented in 
Berger’s The Queer Turn in Feminism that certain feminist and queer identity 
politics today are driven by a ‘visibility demand’. This discussion will provide 
further insight into how the grammar of Western feminist theoretical narratives 
entangle with the trends which dominate universities. Importantly, however, it will 
also, as I will outline in the final section, help us theorize how feminist theorists can, 
as Hemmings would put it, tell their stories differently so as to envision another 
university.  
From Panoptical University to Academic Farce  
In economic, ethical and political lexicons, accountability is understood as 
overlaying or being intimately bound with notions such as ‘performance control’, 
‘publicity’, ‘visibility’ , ‘open access’, ‘transparency’, ‘right to information’ and 
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‘accessibility’. The techniques of assessing, auditing and evaluating (i.e. 
accountability regimes) both rely and are defended on the grounds of ‘transparency’ 
and other visibility and visibilization regimes. In other words, ‘seeing through’ and 
‘making what is invisible visible’ are understood as the conditions as well as the 
outcomes of ‘accounting’ and ‘audit’.  
Similarly to accountability, however, also notions such as ‘transparency’ 
have been shown to produce ambiguous effects in relation to politics, institutions 
and disciplinarity. ‘Transparency’ is therefore understood by scholars researching 
this phenomenon as both - a tool of ‘democratic pressure exerted by citizens on the 
states and governments’, as well as ‘a condition for counting’ in managerial and 
economic sense and thus techniques of conducting surveillance.104 
According to some of these scholars, nowadays, it is particularly in higher 
education that the desire for visibility often presents itself in terms of an economic, 
political and ethical imperative with unprecedented strength and significance.105 This 
could be, as for instance Marilyn Strathern speculates, because the university is an 
arena where ‘the notion of surveillance would seem to have made [itself] familiar, 
where visibility as a conduit of knowledge is elided with visibility as an instrument 
for control’.106  
                                                 
104 For further discussion of this complicated relationship see for instance Graham Allen, 
‘Transparency, incalculability, Mythologies today’, Nottingham French Studies, 47.2 (2008), 71-82; 
Marilyn, Strathern, ‘The Tyranny of Transparency’, British Educational Research Journal, 26.3 
(2000), 309-321; Maria Do Mar Pereira, ‘Struggling with and beyond the Performative University: 
Articulating activism and work in an “academia without walls”, Women’s Studies International 
Forum, 54 (2016), 100-110; 
105 Bruce G. Charleton: ‘Audit, Accountability, Quality and All That: The Growth of Managerial 
Technologies in UK Universities’, in Education! Education! Education! Managerial Ethics and the 
Law of Unintended Consequences, eds. Stephen Prickett and Patricia Erskine-Hill (Exeter: Imprint 
Academic, 2002), pp. 13-32. 
106 Marilyn, Strathern, ‘The Tyranny of Transparency’, British Educational Research Journal, 26.3 
(2000), 309-321 (p. 309). 
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The desire to ‘see through’ and ‘make things visible’ is, however, clearly not 
a recent phenomenon and is not tied only to the context of education. This is what 
Afshin Mehrpouya and Marie Laure Djelic show with their genealogy of the 
convoluted history of the notion of ‘transparency’. As the two authors argue, the 
conceptual origins of this term can be traced back at least to the political, intellectual 
and economic revolutions of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.107 Yet, it 
was particularly in the 1970s when transparency obtained semantic meanings we 
associate with this notion today. Additionally, the notion has been undergoing 
significant shifts in its semantic field and scope which are not dissimilar to those 
described by Readings, Kamuf and others in relation to the word and the concept of 
accountability. The notion of transparency has also proliferated through and 
attempted to rule every activity while its semantic field shifts from that of referring 
to a potent mechanism of liberation to a ‘norm that enables governing and 
domination’ of ‘market-based and calculative visibility regimes’.108  
Yet, significantly, and as argued previously, we do not have to read the 
university and the trends which dominate it only as ‘disciplining’ but also as more 
complex formations which imply ambiguous effects. More specifically, while 
recognizing the ‘disciplining’ character of these trends, we do not need to read the 
current university as a panoptical institution of all–seeing surveillance. Instead, 
drawing on the methodological shift from disciplinary power to textual reading 
proposed previously, I argue that we should not grasp the relationship between the 
current university and its ‘visions’ as merely a ‘disciplinary’ and ‘disciplining’ 
                                                 
107 Afshin, Mehrpouya and Djelic, Marie Laure, ‘Transparency: From Enlightenment to 
Neoliberalism or When a Norm of Liberation Becomes a Tool of Governing’, HEC Paris Research 
Paper No. ACC-2014- 1059, SSSRN < 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2499402> [accessed 14 February 2017]. 
108 Mehrpouya and Djelic, ‘Transparency’, p. 5, p. 44. 
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problem.109 More specifically, I suggest that instead of grasping the university as a 
‘panoptical’ institution, we conceive of it as a scene where visibility is not simply 
opposed to invisibility but the two are interwoven by range of more complex 
differences and diverse distributions of the visible, and its correlate, the invisible.110 
I suggest we conceptualize the university’s relationship to visibility, the relation 
between the visible and the invisible, and the process of ‘uncovering’ as a complex 
phenomenon which carries ambiguous effects and thus opens a possibility of reading 
the university beyond its phallogocentric and neoliberal predicament. 
One such reading is provided by the previously mentioned Marilyn Strathern, 
a feminist anthropologist who shows with her examination of audit practices, quality 
assurance and accountability in British higher education, how the demand for 
visibility in service of performance control undermines itself. In academia, Strathern 
argues, ‘everyone knows’ that what is being tested by various audit exercises is not 
the ‘real’ performance and productivity but ‘how amenable to auditing their 
activities are or how performance matches up to performance indicators’.111 
Academics, according to Strathern, play ‘both sides’:  
 
[they] both deploy, and are sceptical about deploying, visibility as a conduit 
for knowledge. Higher education professionals at once accede to the idea of 
accountability and regard performance indicators as highly constructed and 
artificial means of measuring real output. As the term accountability implies, 
people want to know how to trust one another, to make their trust visible, 
while (knowing that) the very desire to do so points to the absence of trust.112  
                                                 
109 For more on the proposed shift from ‘disciplinarity’ to ‘textuality’ see chapter III, ‘From 
Disciplinary Power to Textuality’, where I rely on work of John Mowitt. 
110 For more on the shift in methodological approach I propose here see Derrida’s critique of 
Foucault’s treatment of the problem of in/visibility in Discipline and Punish (Jacques Derrida and 
Roudinesco, Elisabeth, ‘Choosing One’s Heritage’, in For What Tomorrow: A Dialogue (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 1-19 (p. 12). 
111 Strathern, ‘The Tyranny’, p. 309-310. 
112 Strathern, ‘The Tyranny’, p. 310. 
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As Strathern argues, the demand for visibility therefore ‘no longer seems securely 
attached to knowledge and control’ and the question 'What does visibility conceal?’ 
arises. The proposal to see ‘audit as an obvious instrument of surveillance’ is thus 
‘thrown into doubt’.113 
For Strathern such an insight does not, however, imply that academics should 
give up on the demand for ‘transparency’. As she argues, it is the ‘job’ of a scholar 
and a pedagogue to try to bring things to the surface, to make - through investigative 
processes and pedagogy - as much as possible visible. Giving value to openness and 
transparency, and withdrawing and thus resisting the pressure for exposure for the 
purposes of audit, is, therefore, not in contradiction. By taking into account and 
exploiting the paradoxical character of the process of acquiring and transmitting 
knowledge, (that is, by postponing, showing transiently, going back and forth, or 
translating from one discourse, paradigm or language to another), we will be able to 
counterbalance the timeless proposition promoted by the audit cultures that things 
can be made transparently ‘clear’ and thus ‘understandable’ and ‘reproducible’.114 
Although focusing on the political rather than intellectual aspects, John 
Francis McKernan, who draws on Kamuf’s article ‘Accounterability’, proceeds in a 
similar direction. McKernan acknowledges ‘the “emancipatory” power and potential 
of an increased accountability achieved through an expansion of rights to 
information’. He argues that ‘the power to require that information be made public’ 
is ‘central to the process and conception of accountability’. Simultaneously, 
however, he stresses that ‘transparency can produce a kind of tyranny and have 
                                                 
113 Strathern, ‘The Tyranny’, p. 310. 
114 Strathern, ‘The Tyranny’, p. 320. 
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dysfunctional effects’. Following in steps not dissimilar to the arguments I presented 
in the previous chapter ‘Tremendous Responsibilities’, McKernan argues that ‘moral 
responsibility and decision-making relies, in its singularity, on a certain secrecy that 
can be incompatible with the answerability and visibility demanded by 
accountability’.115  
A similar suggestion can be found also in an interview with Samuel Weber 
entitled ‘Secrecy and Transparency’ from 2011. Apart from suggesting that the two, 
transparency and secrecy, are not in an opposition but in a supplementary structural 
relationship (Weber reminds us of Lacan’s observation that ‘the best way to hide 
something is to display it ostentatiously’), Weber highlights what is politically at 
stake.116 After arguing that we have to learn to be ‘more at home with the secret’, he 
makes clear that this suggestion is not a call for abandoning transparency: 
 
The demand for transparency is one that can be very important in defending 
and possibly expanding genuinely democratic government: how can people 
make reasonable decisions if it is totally misinformed about important events 
and processes? […] I wouldn’t want our conversation about the relative 
limitations of the notion of transparency and the need to live with the secret to 
become a justification of the exploitation of fear and insecurity as a way of 
ever more reducing the possibilities of democratic political processes – 
processes that are based on relatively extensive information that can serve as a 
basis for critical political decisions.117 
 
Although ‘we have to learn to live in a world where events can and will occur 
unpredictably, where surprise cannot and should not be eliminated or reduced to 
                                                 
115 John Francis McKernan, ‘Accountability as aporia, testimony, and gift’, Accounterability, special 
issue of Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 23.3 (2012), 258-278 (p. 261). 
116 Samuel Weber and John W. P. Phillips, ‘Secrecy and Transparency: An Interview with Samuel 
Weber’, Theory, Culture & Society, 28.7-8 (2011), 158-172 (p. 161). 
117 Weber and Phillips, ‘Secrecy and Transparency’, p. 168. 
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calculable “risks”’, it is important, Weber argues, not simply ‘to discredit or 
disqualify the demand for “transparency”’. Instead, we should focus on the aspect 
which Weber considers to be the biggest danger of this demand for transparency: 
‘those who make the demand are increasingly unable to put their own demands and 
responses into question’. In other words, the demand for transparency ‘hypostasizes 
the position from which and to which the demand is made’.118 
 Evidently, Weber is not the only scholar who relates putting oneself into 
question to academic work which strives to be politically transformative. Similar 
propositions have been made by many scholars, including those whose work I have 
discussed throughout the thesis. What I find interesting about Weber’s invocation of 
this recurrent and, as it seems to me, defining trait of both feminist and 
deconstructive scholarships, is that Weber relates the understanding of self-scrutiny 
as possibly politically transformative academic work to the notion of theatricality.  
Weber invokes theatricality in order to counter Readings claim in The 
University in Ruins that ‘academics must work without alibis’ which is meant to 
support Readings’ vision of the university as ‘non-referential’.119 In contrast to 
Readings, Weber argues that the university ‘perhaps today more than ever, has to be 
in more places than one’: As always, academic work ‘confirms the existing order by 
reproducing exploitable knowledge’, yet, at the same time it ‘must also strive to 
open to the unknowable as the enabling limit of what can be known’.120  
As already outlined in chapter four, taking into account this ‘double 
demand’, Weber then speculates on ‘whether the kind of infinite attention to the 
other that Readings imagines as the core of an alternative academic community […] 
                                                 
118 Weber and Phillips, ‘Secrecy and Transparency’, p. 168-9. 
119 Readings, The University in Ruins, p. 68. 
120 Samuel Weber ‘The Future Campus: Destiny in a virtual world’, Journal of Higher Education 
Policy and Management, 21 (1999), 151-164 (p. 163-4). 
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might not better be served by recalling a structure proposed by Kierkegaard in his 
text Repetition’. The ‘structure’ invoked by Kierkegaard is, as Weber continues, 
‘akin to a theatrical spectacle’ which is ‘neither tragic, nor even comic, but instead 
more akin to a farce’. In German and in Danish the word for ‘farce’, as Weber 
further adds, is posse and the word posse is, as Kierkegaard reminds us, ‘also the 
Latin word for possibility’.121  
The notion of posse (a ‘farce’ and a ‘possibility’), as Weber explains, is close 
to Derrida’s notion of ‘iterability’ or Deleuze’s work on difference and repetition. It 
is thus meant to stress that ‘nothing can be recognized as being identical with itself’. 
It ‘tends to inaugurate, or reassert, a movement of substitution, exchange and above 
all, of repetition and recurrence that renders all synthesis, all unification, all 
determination problematic, if ineluctable’. The posse, ‘the genre of popular, farcical 
theatre’, Weber argues, 
 
is not primarily representational or bound to a narrative story. It diverges 
radically from the mainstream of respectable Western theatre, which, ever 
since Aristotle, is defined in ‘mythological’ terms, which is to say, in terms of 
story and plot. For the Posse, on the contrary, theatrical ‘action’ is not 
primarily a subject of depiction or of contemplation, it is performative, taking 
place on the stage. It is, therefore, on the one hand far more immediate and 
actual than traditionally representational theatre, in which whatever happens 
on the stage is taken or viewed as designating something whose meaning is 
generally understood to derive from its non-theatrical narrative structure and 
properties. The posse, by contrast, is all performance.122 
 
                                                 
121 Weber, ‘The Future Campus’, p. 163. 
122 Samuel Weber, ‘The Future of the Humanities: Experimenting’.  
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As Weber proposes, it is thus the performative ‘farcical’ structure which will do the 
theoretical work necessary for us to imagine the public institution, the university, ‘in 
a world of virtualization and globalization’ and which, at the same time, will strive 
to be ‘centred on the attention to the other’. In other words, the posse, an alternative 
theatre which is ‘all performance’, will help us rethink the constitution of institutions 
and of knowledge production as ‘a separation which displaces its ultimate goal of 
“securing the Self”’ and thus ‘would reduce distance, difference and alterity to 
functions of an identical and constitutive subject’. For as Weber also suggests, this 
procedure ‘reveals the enabling limits of all system, synthesis and self-containment’ 
and is thus also a ‘movement of resistance’ which opens a possibility for 
institutional, theoretical and political transformation.123  
Weber’s deliberations on constitutive ‘separation’, which will not secure the 
Self but will open it to the other through the concept of theatre, seems to me to be a 
useful way of theorising the ‘public institution’, like universities, as other than 
‘panoptical’. Yet, his deliberations also show that not believing in the demand for 
transparency, and promoting procedures which would ‘reveal the enabling limits of 
all system’, does not guarantee that ‘the position from which and to which’ one 
speaks would not get hypostasized.  
As discussed previously, one of the problems with Weber’s theorizing of the 
university is that he defines the non-self-identical separation as ‘experimenting’ 
                                                 
123 An understanding of the university’s relationship to visibility through ‘theatrical structures’ does 
not, however, characterize only Weber’s work. Similar directions can be found in Kamuf’s chapter 
‘The University in Deconstruction’ where she complicates the notion of publicity (Peggy Kamuf, 
‘The University in Deconstruction’, in The Division/of Literature or the University in Deconstruction 
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1997), pp. 133-161; The theatrical aspect 
also appears in Mowitt’s conceptualization of ‘re:working’ which is a translation of Bertold Brecht’s 
concept of Umfunktionierung. Typically, this notion is translated to English as ‘re-purposing’. 
According to Mowitt, however, this translation does not evoke another meaning Brecht wished to 
convey. As Mowitt explains, Brecht ‘is just as often re-purposing purpose as he is, say, theatre’ (John 
Mowitt, ‘On the One Hand, and the Other’, College Literature, 42.2 (2015), 311-336 (p. 313).  
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which he opposes to ‘the experimental method […] according to which the future 
might be progressively mastered and its uncertainties gradually reduced, if not 
eliminated’, and which he identifies as being ‘scientific’. In other words, for Weber, 
the desire to ‘control the future’, to ‘assimilate the unknown to the known’, is a 
defining feature of experimentation conveyed by scientific disciplines. This makes 
‘science’, as he further develops, an ally of the dominant trends we witness in the 
university, such as marketization and corporatization, and which we seek to 
contest.124  
With this proposition Weber thus maintains the bias, the exclusion of 
‘numbers’ and ‘their’ discipline, ‘science’, constitutive of the Western metaphysical 
theoretical endeavours, as discussed in the part two. This approach does not only 
limit a possibility for self-scrutiny of one’s position, but also restricts academic work 
which would not only be ‘disciplinary’ but also ‘antidisciplinary’. In other words, it 
supports rather than resists the trends which such work originally set out to contest, 
namely the unequal and unjust distribution of ‘disciplinary forces’ which define the 
current status quo. 
In the following sections I will introduce another discourse which, like that 
of Weber, focuses on ‘theatricality’, but which does not repeat the bias characteristic 
of Weber’s accounts of the university and the humanities: Anne Berger’s The Queer 
Turn in Feminism: Identities, Sexualities, and the Theater of Gender. Additionally, 
as the title of her book suggests, this discussion will situate the problematic of 
theatre into the ‘subject area’ which is in the focus of feminist theory – questions of 
gender, sex, sexual difference and sexuality. 
                                                 
124 Weber, ‘The Future of the Humanities’.  
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A View (from) Elsewhere: Feminist and queer identity politics today  
As I read it, Berger’s work The Queer Turn in Feminism: Identities, Sexualities, and 
the Theater of Gender ‘enacts’ what Weber describes and argues for in his essay 
‘The Future Campus: destiny in a virtual world’. In other words, Berger exploits an 
ability to be ‘in more places than one’ in order to produce academic work centred on 
the attention to the other in the context of a globalized and virtualized world.  
This ability is perhaps most visibly invoked in the opening of the book where 
she stages a dialogue with herself. As Berger argues, she is a French scholar who 
travelled to the U.S. in the mid-1980s, that is, at a time when ‘French theory’, along 
with the institutionalization of feminism within American academia, was at its 
height. Conversely, now, that the U.S. feminist theoretical scene, which has become 
that of gender and queer theory, seems to be ‘for the most part, intro-retrospective’, 
and, simultaneously, ‘exported’ and ‘implemented’ in educational institutions, then 
mainstream media, popular cultures and political and cultural activisms all around 
the world, Berger finds herself in higher education in France.125  
The fact that Berger is active in both American and French academic 
contexts serves as a preamble for the examination of the ‘dislocated scene’ of gender 
and queer theory through analytical gestures that would provide novel insights into 
current feminist and, as Berger calls it, ‘(post)feminist’ and ‘postfeminist’ 
debates.126 It allows her, as she argues, ‘see double’. ‘Seeing double’, that is, being 
caught up not only between two languages and geopolitical places but also between 
                                                 
125 Berger, The Queer Turn, p. 1-4. 
126 As Berger explains, she distinguishes between two kinds of postfeminism: ‘First, a (post)feminism 
whose “immanent critique” aims less to discredit feminism that to refine its instruments of analysis’, 
which is ‘still faithful to the political and philosophical project of feminism’ and, second, a 
postfeminism which, ‘even as it assumes its genealogical link with feminism, resolutely regards the 
latter as inadequate and outdated’. Berger, The Queer Turn, p. 10.  
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‘there’ and ‘now’, between ‘retrospection and anticipation’, opens a possibility of 
critical examination of some of the most pressing issues of the current feminist 
thinking and politics. Berger thus manages to challenge one of the most reductive 
and pervasive narratives and assumptions that are unfortunately still reiterated in 
most discourses on ‘gender’, ‘queer’ and ‘feminism’ in the West.127  
As I interpret it, this endeavour is pursued in a way which Mowitt would 
describe as ‘non-affirmative critique’, as a work which has an ‘anti-disciplinary’ 
effects.128 In other words, Berger does not deny the existence of the ‘disciplinary’ 
and ‘disciplining’ trends which dominate current Western societies, their 
‘universities’ and ‘feminisms’. On the contrary, these trends, which have multiple 
origins in particular contexts and which are, however, increasingly obtaining a 
‘generalized’ and ‘globalized’ character, are, together with the processes of their 
generalization and globalization, at the very centre of her focus. Yet, because this 
focus is ‘dislocated’, Berger’s exploration does not simply affirm and therefore 
further fuel ‘imperial’ and ‘colonizing’ tendencies of those trends.  
As the dialogue staged at the opening of her book suggests, one of the key 
targets of Berger’s critical examination is the disruption of a tendency towards the 
deflection from feminism. With her work, Berger seeks to challenge the idea 
promoted for more than twenty years by the Western mainstream media and, to a 
certain extent, intellectual and academic cultures as well as certain ‘feminisms’ and 
‘postfeminisms’, that feminism is ‘over’. 
The strategy of ‘seeing double’, however, defines also the discussion of 
another issue, which is not, as I will argue, disconnected from the one outlined 
                                                 
127 Berger, The Queer Turn, p. 4. 
128 Mowitt, Text, p. 14.  
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above. According to Berger, current feminist and queer struggles and their analytical 
appropriations are driven by what she calls a ‘visibility demand’. As she argues,  
 
oppressed groups and diverse minorities seek above all to make themselves 
“visible,” as if their liberation – or their struggle to achieve it – required 
catching the light; as if, to advance a cause, one had to get spotlights to shine 
on it.129  
 
To be sure, Berger is not the first feminist scholar who points at the problem of 
visibility in relation to feminist and queer politics and theory. Her critique treads 
particularly in the steps of Scott’s article ‘The Evidence of Experience’, where the 
latter critiques the appeal to revealing hitherto hidden experiences as an alternative 
to patriarchal politics and their historical explorations.130 However, Berger’s 
exploration of the desire to become visible, seems particularly productive for 
examining and further complicating the discussion of how feminist theory and 
politics relate to the trends which dominate today’s universities. This is particularly 
so for two reasons: Firstly, Berger employs - as her methodology and as an object 
for her study - the notion of ‘theatre’. Secondly, she then develops ‘theatricality’ 
towards one of the key strands of feminist critique which, furthermore, has recently 
re-gained significance: the critique of capitalism.131 Berger expresses a suspicion 
that feminist and queer discourses driven by the demand to be visible attest to a 
certain ‘accommodation’ or ‘complacency’ between ‘(post)feminism’ and ‘the 
global capitalist social and economic order that “second-wave” feminism put on trial 
                                                 
129 Berger, The Queer Turn, p.27. 
130 Joan W. Scott, ‘The Evidence of Experience’, Critical Inquiry, 17.4 (1991), 773-797. 
131 See for instance Nina Power, One Dimensional Woman (Winchester and Washington: 0 Books, 
2009). 
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for a time’.132 As I interpret it, the observation that the ‘turn toward spotlights’ 
characteristic of certain feminist and queer politics relates to the ‘turn’ from ‘anti-
capitalist’ feminism to an alliance with capitalism, opens a particularly advantageous 
perspective for the exploration of how feminist theory and politics relate to the 
trends which currently dominate Western university.  
Clearly, the most obvious point which could be drawn from Berger’s work 
for our understanding of how feminism relates to the university is that gender and 
queer politics, driven by a desire to ‘become visible’, sustain and perpetuate the 
market-driven audit cultures. To position this argument in relation to Hemmings’ 
critique in Why Stories Matter, it could be argued that Berger has, in her book, 
identified yet another feature which defines ‘political grammar’ of the stories 
feminists tell about feminism’s past and present and which, rather than challenge, 
support discourses promoting ‘non-feminist’ or even ‘anti-feminist’ agendas.  
However, as already outlined in the introduction to this chapter, what is also 
in the ‘dislocated’ focus of Berger is the theorization of premises on which we could 
articulate the specificity of feminist endeavours, i.e. their ‘idioms’. Such a 
theorization, as I will argue, not only provides an opportunity for further examination 
of how the ‘grammars’ of feminist storytelling entangle with the trends dominating 
current universities, but also provides an opportunity for theorizing how these trends 
might be resisted.  
                                                 
132 Berger, The Queer turn, p.8, p. 130. 
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The Idioms of Western Feminist Theory  
What is so unique about the demand for visibility which, according to Berger, 
characterises certain activist currents within feminist and queer scenes? Clearly, and 
as Berger also points out, a demand to be visible could be applied ‘to any form of 
resistance to oppression and discrimination’.133 Any group that has been discriminated 
against or oppressed can - and often does - claim cultural or political visibility. The 
relationship of feminist and queer politics to this demand we witness today is, 
however, a particular one.  
One of the reasons for feminism’s strong connection to the rhetoric of 
visibility is rooted in Western socio-cultural and conceptual organization put 
forward particularly during the late 17th and the 18th century, namely the division 
between public and private spheres. This division, as Berger reminds us, has been 
‘organized and conceptualized as a partition between the field of the visible and that 
of the invisible’ and correlates with the division between ‘masculinity’ and 
‘femininity’.134 The reason that discourses on women’s liberation retreat to 
‘emancipation’ as ‘vizibilization’ is, thus, not only that women have been made 
invisible in history, philosophy and politics. It is also due to this peculiar 
organization which, on the one hand significantly contributes to the actual (that is 
unequal) position of women in current Western societies, and, on the other, appeals 
to the rhetoric of ‘visibilization’ by women’s emancipation movements. 
Yet, according to Berger, the topological division of the two spheres (the 
public, visible and masculine on the one hand, and the private, invisible and 
feminine on the other) cannot fully account for the visibility demand we witness in 
                                                 
133 Berger, The Queer Turn, p. 85.  
134 Berger, The Queer Turn, p. 83. 
   
 
272 
 
certain currents of feminist and queer politics today. For it is not only women who 
demand visibility; it emanates also ‘from social groups whose formation and history 
is not, like those of women, dependent on that partition, at least not entirely, and not 
in the same way’.135 More specifically, and as already argued, the problematics of 
visibility and visibilitization also occupy the foreground within ‘a certain 
contemporary gay and lesbian politics, or in the emergence of a transgender 
claim’.136 Whether the ‘hyperbolic exhibition’ which defines events and initiatives 
such as ‘Pride parades’ or ‘ACT UP’,  
 
is the hoped-for and anticipated effect of the exit from prolonged obscurity, 
thus of the end of the “repression” of homosexuality, or whether it stems from 
a new conception, or cancellation, of the distinction between private and 
public space, it belongs in any case to the discourse of “visibilization” […].137  
 
Thus, the demand to be visible, which is shared by certain feminist and sexual 
minority struggles, cannot be accounted for as only an implementation of the 
Western program of ‘Enlightenment’. Neither can it be, consequently, understood 
only as an effect of ‘the constitution of contemporary societies as societies defined 
by technically engineered and generalized exhibition, as well as panoptic modes of 
surveillance’, which we can, indeed, understand ‘as particular realizations of the 
Enlightenment project’.138 If we are to understand the emergence of the motif of 
visibility among these particular groups, we have to take into account other specific 
junctures than that of ‘Enlightenment’ or the ‘panoptical’ character of the current 
societies. Berger proposes that the demand to be visible characteristic of certain 
                                                 
135 Berger, The Queer Turn, p. 84.  
136 Berger, The Queer Turn, p. 85.  
137 Berger, The Queer Turn, p. 86. 
138 Berger, The Queer Turn, p. 96. 
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feminist and queer politics has, at least, two other sources which, rather than in 
‘European’ Enlightenment of the 18th century, are situated in the political, cultural 
and intellectual ‘America’ of the 1950s onwards.139 
In order to develop on one of these ‘American’ sources, Berger turns to 
Samuel Delany’s autobiographical text The Motion of Light in Water from 1988. 
More than twenty years prior to Berger, Scott draws on Delany in order to develop 
her critique of ‘the evidence of experience’ and the desire to ‘become visible’ among 
feminist and queer historians and activists.140 In contrast to Scott, however, Berger 
argues that ‘if the question of visibility as a political issue and the rhetoric of 
visibility are so central for him [Delany], it is not only because he is gay but also 
because he is black’. Relying on this reading of Delany’s autobiography, Berger 
speculates whether  
 
the political and cultural status of the black American community, marked at 
once by its symbolic invisibility and its “imaginary” hypervisibility, along 
with the political history of that community (a political history that involves 
treating the problematic visibility of that minority), served as models for the 
aspirations of others, for example, the gay minority, and, today, the 
transgender minority?141 
 
In other words, the ‘call for visibility’ that governs the discourse and the strategy of 
political struggles in queer and feminist politics, is thus also an effect of the 
problematization of race by the American civil rights movement. According to 
Berger, this problematization made a mark on the social movements that arose in its 
                                                 
139 For Berger, ‘America’, as she argues, ‘is not always or not merely a territorial entity with precise 
boundaries. It is also a cultural zone whose contours do not simply coincide with the geo-political 
entity “United States”; it is a phantasmatic territory […].’ Berger, The Queer Turn, p. 9.  
140 Scott, ‘The Evidence of Experience’, 773-797. 
141 Berger, The Queer Turn, p. 92. 
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wake - the women’s liberation movement and the movements in support of sexual 
minorities.142  
The second ‘juncture’ which supports the current demand for visibility 
deployed by certain feminist and queer politics is embedded in the particular way 
‘gender’ and ‘sex’ have been theorized, particularly in ‘America’. This source, 
however, does not, according to my interpretation, only explain why particularly 
feminist and queer politics are so attracted by the ‘spotlights’ but also spells out an 
‘idiomatic’, that is, a distinct characteristic of the current feminist and queer political 
and theoretical scenes.  
Berger argues that ‘gender’ and ‘visibility’ are intimately intertwined. What 
certain feminism and queer theory and politics share is that they ‘conceptualize 
gender (or gender identity) as a category that depends on a certain “test of the 
visible’”.143 The rhetoric and the politics of ‘visibility’ articulated and mobilized by 
feminists and queers is therefore a consequence of theorizations of gender as an ‘act’ 
or, to, use the more recent notion informed by it, ‘performance’.  
‘Gender as performance’ was, surely, most famously articulated by Judith 
Butler. According to Berger, however, the conception of gender as performance does 
not stem solely from Butler’s re-readings of Foucault’s analytics of power, as the 
story of the origin of ‘gender as performance’ is most often presented. One of the 
key arguments of Berger’s book is that such theorizations are characteristic of a 
much broader theoretical current. She shows with her readings that gender had 
                                                 
142 Berger, The Queer Turn, p. 92-93; This suggestion challenges yet another ‘story’ which begun to 
circulate widely within the discourses on gender and sexuality. Specifically, it challenges an opinion 
that, until the advent of the term ‘intersectionality’ used by Cranshow in 1989, but which has not been 
taken up until recently, the field has not reflected and did not take into account the questions of race. 
To me, ‘intersectionality’ seems to be (after ‘gender’ and ‘performativity’) yet another highly mobile 
element of feminist grammar where rigorous work of ‘translating’ is need to be done.   
143 Berger, The Queer Turn, p. 86. 
   
 
275 
 
already been theorized as performance in the 1950s by American sociologists and 
anthropologists such as John Money and later by Robert Stoller, Esther Newton, and 
Erving Goffman. Furthermore, theorizations which appeal to ‘gender’ and 
‘sexuality’ as categories that ‘depends on a certain test of the visible’ also appeared, 
around the same time, outside of America. More specifically, ‘linked to a 
problematic of social “visibility” emphasizing the “spectacular” character of the 
masculine/feminine duality’ is the tradition which also includes a certain French 
psychoanalytical discourse, namely the work of Jacques Lacan, who himself drew 
on Joan Rivière’s notion of feminine masquerade.144 Certainly, neither Rivière nor 
Lacan employ the English word ‘gender’ in their work. Yet, as Berger argues, ‘the 
Lacanian analytics of desire’, which ‘gives pride of place to masquerade, invites us 
to read “feminine” and “masculine” identity formations as so many “displays” 
destined to support the play of sexual seduction’.145  
With her close examination of how ‘gender’ and ‘erotic play’ have been 
theorized not only by feminist and queer scholars but also by American sociology 
and anthropology and French psychoanalysis, Berger thus identifies a particular 
feature which links the discourses produced by feminists and nonfeminists 
researching on gender, sex and sexuality. Specifically, she shows that ‘gender’ has 
been theorized as ‘performance’ from the earliest elaborations of ‘gender as role’ by 
Money, Lacan’s ‘comedy of the sexes’ in 1950s, theorization of ‘gender display’ by 
Goffman up to Butler’s concept of ‘gender as performance’. And, as Berger further 
                                                 
144 Berger, The Queer Turn, p. 64. 
145 Berger, The Queer Turn, p. 6. In the section entitled ‘Lacan and the “Comedy of the Sexes”’, 
Berger quoting Lacan’s formulations from ‘The Signification of the Phallus’ argues that, ‘if sex-
based identification as identification with an “ideal type” draws the thinking about sexual or gender 
identity that results from it toward a problematic of the lure (as narcissistic illusion and trap, for both 
the self and the other) right from the start, for Lacan the “unconscious castration complex” is what 
generates these at-once stereotyped and differentiated identifications and transforms them into role 
plays’. 
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suggests, it is the invocation of gender as ‘a quasi-theatrical social manifestation or 
production’ which is one of the key ‘sources’ of the current mobilization of visibility 
by feminist and queer politics.146  
One could, however, raise an objection to this ‘narrative’: Did not queer 
theory and politics undermine, in significant ways, the traditional understanding of 
‘gender’? Do not these theoretical, political and cultural developments which reach, 
as it is often claimed, ‘beyond (traditional) gender’ therefore, consequently, also 
introduce different configurations of how visibility is conceptualized and mobilized? 
Berger’s answer to these questions is not straightforward. Instead, it triggers yet 
another disruption to the narratives which dominate the feminist and queer 
theoretical and political scenes.  
In other words, in addition to challenging the ‘story’ that gender theory arose 
in the U.S. in the 1980s as a provocation by the so-called French thought of the 
1970s, Berger also contests the conventional and chronological distinction between 
gender and queer theory which suggests that the former precedes and determines the 
later.  
Berger presents two arguments to support this reading. Firstly, she argues 
that ‘American’ gender theory has always been ‘queer’. This is because, as she 
illustrates with her readings, gender theory evolved in close proximity to what 
normative discourses call ‘sexual deviance’. Furthermore, by referring to Butler 
who, elaborating on Lacan, theorized the link between ‘gender’ and ‘flirtation’ 
(which in contemporary French is expressed by the verb ‘draguer’), Berger suggests 
that ‘without gender the sexual scene [was] if not inconceivable then at least 
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unplayable’.147 Thus, ‘without “drag” (i.e., the theatricality of gender) there is no 
possibility of erotic relation and sexuality’; ‘[n]o drague without “drag”!’148 
Secondly, Berger contends that gay and lesbian studies cannot do without gender 
and its (feminist) theory, which she illustrates with an analysis of ‘Sexual Traffic’, 
the famous interview between Butler and Gayle Rubin. In this interview Rubin 
famously rejects gender as both a tool and an object of her analysis and leans instead 
toward a ‘postfeminist’ study of sex and sexuality.149 As Berger shows with her 
reading of this text, gender, however, continues to haunt Rubin’s wishful dreams of 
a gender-free discourse on sexuality.  
‘Gender’, according to Berger, thus has not only been, from the very 
beginning, theorized as ‘performance’ but it has, as well, ‘always already’ been 
‘queer’.150 This implies for the relationship between queer theory and politics and 
visibility that although ‘gender trouble induces vision trouble and vice versa’,151 it 
triggers a kind of ‘troubling’ which, nonetheless, still ‘depends on a certain test of 
the visible’: 
 
Queer questioning of the gender partitioning and of the normative distribution 
of roles does not necessarily imply a way out of this paradigm. Even a certain 
‘American’ thinking about sexuality that invokes Foucault and challenges the 
primacy of the category of gender as a tool for analysing the various forms of 
sexual oppression still subscribes, despite its denials, if not to a theatrical 
conception then at least to a theatrical practice of ‘sexuality’. Now, as soon as 
there is theatre, there are roles, and as soon as there are roles, gender tends to 
reconstitute itself visibly, even if in a queer fashion.152  
                                                 
147 Berger, The Queer Turn, p. 50. 
148 Berger, The Queer Turn, p. 56. 
149 Gail Rubin with Judith Butler, ‘Sexual Traffic: An Interview with Judith Butler’, differences, 6 
(1994): 62-99. 
150 Berger, The Queer Turn, p. 14.  
151 Berger, The Queer, p. 86. 
152 Berger, The Queer Turn, p. 87. 
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To summarize then, the demand to be visible which to a certain extent defines 
current feminist and queer politics cannot be accounted for only as an 
implementation of the Western program of the Enlightenment, nor as a result of the 
‘panoptical’ regimes which characterize contemporary societies. Berger suggests 
that there are two other sources to this demand. Both sources are tied to the political, 
intellectual and cultural specificity of ‘America’: First, it is the problematization of 
race by the American civil rights movements and, second, it is the articulation of 
‘gender’ as a category that depends on a certain test of the visible further perpetuated 
by its ‘queer’ questioning.  
For me, the second point also spells out an ‘idiomatic’ feature of current 
feminist and queer theories. As already suggested, showing that a ‘visibility 
demand’ is part and parcel of discourses on gender and sexuality could be 
considered to identify yet another ‘grammatical feature’ characteristic of the 
narratives which dominate discourses on feminism’s past and present, and their 
visions of its future put forward by Western feminist theory. More specifically, in 
addition to ‘grammatical features’ Hemmings identified, the ways certain feminist 
and queer discourses employ the rhetoric and conceptualize visibility might also 
contribute to the amenability of feminist narratives to institutionalizations and other 
interpretations which, rather than challenge, promote ‘non-feminist’ or ‘anti-
feminist’ agendas. Yet, unlike the ‘grammatical features’ Hemmings’s identified 
with her analysis, the feature Berger problematizes seems to be of a different kind – 
it is specific to how the language of gender and sex is used.153 This specificity, as 
                                                 
153 As Berger argues, the language invoking ‘theatre’ is used in ordinary language on gender and 
sexuality (‘it has us frequently talk about “roles” to evoke the positions and relations of sex’). ‘In 
contrast, relations of class or race are almost never conceptualized as rooted in dramaturgy; only in 
rarefied theoretical circles is the analysis of the performativity of social relationships occasionally 
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follows from Berger’s argument, is one of the reasons why certain strands within 
feminist and queer politics ‘turn toward the spotlights’. It could therefore serve as an 
evidence that the feminist and queer discourses embracing this view are, if not 
intrinsically, at least significantly tied to the regimes of visibility upholding 
accountability cultures which, as argued previously, impose themselves with 
particular intensity in the context of the university. This insight thus could be seen as 
implying that prevailing discourses within the field are not only making certain 
feminist theory amenable, but are perhaps fundamental to the accountability 
regimes.  
But this is not the end of the story that Berger offers with The Queer Turn in 
Feminism. Let us not forget that we are not dealing with a discourse where visibility 
is simply opposed to invisibility, but with a much more complex play between 
concealment and unveiling. In other words, because Berger does not treat ‘visibility 
demand’ simply as disciplinary but, rather, as a ‘theatrical problem’ which she 
approaches in a particular way, her account, as I interpret it, will help us propose a 
way of theorizing feminist resistance which makes use of this theatricality. 
Beyond the Spotlights: Reinventing feminist resistance for a university-to-come.  
While Berger is critical of a demand to become visible as characteristic of certain 
feminist and queer politics, and seeks to imagine strategies which would not depend 
on this demand, she, at the same time, acknowledges its importance. She argues:  
 
                                                 
pushed to such an extreme’. Clearly, at the same time, however, and also as both Berger and 
Hemmings show, ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ are not themes exclusive only to feminist discourses. Berger, 
The Queer Turn, p. 14. 
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identity politics […] passes or must pass through a demand for visibility. 
There is no ‘social identity’ that holds together without recognition, and what 
is called recognition – the intersubjective mechanism that allows one 
unquestionably to call out to – or to believe one is calling out to – a given 
subject as a member of a socially and culturally identifiable category – 
presupposes or induces visibility.154  
 
As I interpret it, it is not, therefore, ‘visibilization’ or the ‘visible’ as such, which are 
the target of Berger’s critique, but a certain configuration of how the visible is 
distributed, of how discourses and the politics of ‘vizibilization’ are invoked and 
employed. Berger reminds us of the importance of distinguishing ‘between the 
epistemology of the visible and the philosophy (or philosophies) of “vision”’. As she 
points out, ‘[p]hilosophical and historical reflections on “seeing” do not necessarily 
follow the same logic or belong to the same realms as reflection on “making oneself 
seen” or “showing oneself,” although for obvious reasons the two are often 
conflated’.155  
In relation to feminist theory specifically, in this field, we also find more 
than one approach to ‘vision’ and ‘visibilization’. As Berger points out, the 
‘visibility demand’, which dominates certain feminist and queer political scenes, is, 
at the same time, accompanied by an evident lack of ‘visibilization’. More 
specifically, discourses driven by the desire to ‘get to the spotlights’ at the same time 
ostensibly detach themselves from a certain kind of ‘vision’. Namely, they detach 
themselves from ‘a vision’ understood as a ‘utopian impetus’ which other feminist 
intellectual and political traditions (particularly those related to the context of the 
1970s, and further continued and developed by scholars such as Drucilla Cornell, 
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155 Berger, The Queer Turn, p. 88. 
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Elizabeth Grosz) have considered to be ‘a necessary heuristic condition for 
theoretical and political progress’.156 
As I interpret it, rather than a critique of desire to be visible and/or arguing 
for invisibility, the stakes of Berger’s argument lie elsewhere. She challenges 
statements which are ‘endlessly reiterated in most of the courses and discourses on 
“gender”’ – that is, that ‘gender’ or ‘femininity’ are ‘constructions’ and are all about 
‘performance’: 
 
The claim that femininity is a construction has been repeated endlessly since 
the difference between the sexes began to attract interest as a social 
phenomenon. From Freud through Joan Rivière, Simone de Beauvoir, and 
many others up to and including Judith Butler, who has not given his or her 
version of “femininity” as masquerade, pantomime, myth, travesty, comedy, 
performance? Who has not understood, given the advent of the so-called 
human sciences, that every social organization is a construction and that the 
relations between the sexes, being rule-governed, do not escape that rule? 
Who does not know, finally, in the wake of the convergent efforts of 
linguistics, psychoanalysis, and anthropology, that the universe of every 
speaking being is a fiction? “Construction” is the destiny of the social 
animal.157  
 
As regards her methodology, Berger’s argument proceeds in a direction parallel to 
that presented in the previous chapter, where I suggested that we conceptualize a 
university responsibility rather than as a ‘performance’ as an ‘aporia’. I argued that 
conceiving of ethical relationships as ‘aporetic’ will open a possibility to embrace 
the ‘utopian impetus’ of feminist thinking, which feminist scholars such as 
                                                 
156 Berger, The Queer Turn, p. 123. 
157 Berger, The Queer Turn, p. 11-12. 
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Hemmings and Wiegman, and many others before them (Drucilla Cornell in 
particular), have argued for.  
Berger’s book also offers an invitation to theorize a future radically different 
from our past and present. Her account, moreover, situates this attempt into the 
problematic central to feminist theorizing – the questions of gender, sex and 
sexuality. It opens a possibility for theorizing ‘a way out’ or an ‘“exit”158 from, or 
radical reconfiguration of, the normative staging of gender’.159 She challenges an 
assumption that what we got used to call ‘gender’ takes place only ‘on (social) stage’ 
and introduces a possibility for theorizing it also as being ‘off-stage’, that is, beneath 
or beyond the ‘performative closure’.160 She calls for, as Ranjana Khanna would 
perhaps put it, feminist theorizing which rather than conceptualizing gender, sex and 
sexuality as ‘spectacular’ categories, grasps them as ‘spectral’.161  
Yet, Berger’s proposition to consider sex and gender not only as being 
situated ‘on the stage’ but also being ‘off stage’, does not imply a ‘theoretical’ 
regression. It does not imply that ‘sex’ and ‘gender identity’ are a matter of 
‘essence’ or a ‘biological’ given. Neither does it suggest we abandon identity 
politics which, as argued previously, must pass through a demand for visibility. 
Rather, an attempt to articulate feminist and queer theories and politics which would 
                                                 
158 Berger reminds us that the French translation of the word ‘exit’, sortie, serves as a title for Cixous’ 
chapter in the book The Newly-Born Woman, ‘Sorties: Out and Out: Attacks/Ways Out’, Forays’. 
Berger, The Queer Turn, p. 180. 
159 Berger, The Queer Turn, p. 45.   
160 Berger, The Queer Turn, p. 44-45. Similarly, Berger’s proposition is not a new one. As she herself 
points out, ‘an entire current of thought which has undertaken to deconstruct the paradigm of 
visibility’ has been developing alongside the more prevalent spectacular theorizations. Among those 
who ‘find the very notion of visibility suspect, along with the role it plays, or may play, in a social 
problematics of gender identity, whether normative or not’ Berger names thinkers such as Sigmund 
Freud, Luce Irigaray and Derrida. Berger, The Queer Turn, p. 87. To this list I would also add other 
thinkers, such as Helen Cixous, Drucilla Cornell, Elizabeth Grosz, Barbara Johnson, Shoshana 
Felman, and also Bracha Ettinger and Jacqueline Rose.  
161 Ranjana Khanna: ‘On the Name, Ideation, and Sexual Difference’, differences, special issue 
Transatlantic Gender Crossings, 27.2 (2016), 62-78 (p. 63). 
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‘escape not only from the logic of binary opposition (whether involving the 
man/woman opposition or the homo/hetero opposition) but also the logic of 
recognition […]’ is done in order to theorize a possibility of political 
transformation.162 Theorizing ‘gender’ as that which ‘is yet to come, as the spectral 
demand from the future’ is an attempt to theorize, through the grammars’ of Western 
feminist theory, how a more just world than the one we have been inhabiting might 
become possible.163 In relation to the university specifically, it opens a possibility of 
articulating, by using grammars specific to Western feminist theory, the university 
beyond its current ‘neoliberal’ and ‘phallocentric’ predicaments, a university-to-
come.
                                                 
162 Berger, The Queer Turn, p. 103-4. 
163 Khanna, ‘On the Name’, p. 73. 
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Conclusion – Re-counting and Re-visions  
As with every journey, the one followed in this thesis will continue long after having 
reached its official end point. It will be underway and in motion after I complete my 
Cultural Studies PhD program at the School of Fine Arts, History of Art & Cultural 
Studies at the University of Leeds. In my future intellectual work I will continue 
engaging with feminist and deconstructive thinking. I will also continue questioning 
the limitations and dominant definitions which constrain the possibilities of the 
university and thus seek to open a space for its remaking. 
Challenges, some of which are yet to be seen, and some which have already 
begun unfolding, will undoubtedly divert the direction, rhythm and construction of 
this path. Indeed during the four and a half years through which I have worked on 
the project, the ground has continued to move. Reorientations and reconnections will 
be necessary. Furthermore, interactions and disparities with the multitude of feminist 
and other approaches to the problem of institutionalisation and the university not 
accounted for in this thesis, will continue to emerge. 
But before I attempt to anticipate and outline some of those diversions and 
reconnections, and propose potential responses to them, I will briefly recount how 
the problem of institutionalisation and the university has been taken up in this 
research study.  
In this thesis I pursued a line of questioning towards the limitations and 
dominant definitions of the university and thus sought to open a possibility for its 
remaking by bringing together particular threads within feminist and deconstructive 
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thought. These explorations were carried through a ‘pseudo-concept’ tremendous 
pedagogies.  
The kinds of trembling feminist thinking and deconstruction trigger were, 
however, not treated as interchangeable or reducible to one another. This is implied 
not only by the particularity of the enabling limits of the emergence of these two 
‘schools’. Importantly, it is also a question of how they are taken up, how they are 
put at work by those who are guided by them; who use them and from which place.  
How and from where is it, then, that I came to these questions? I did not 
consider the differences and disparities between and within feminist thinking and 
deconstruction and their particular employments to be a weakness or a defect, and 
thus as something which had to be overcome and smoothed over. Rather, I embraced 
this heterogeneity and disparity as a condition and an emerging sign of plurality 
understood both as an intellectual, a political and a personal aim which I sought to 
cultivate.   
I traced and developed the ‘tremendous’ abilities of feminist thinking and 
deconstruction and explored their folding particularly around the question of the 
university. This, however, was not in order to argue that the university is a self-
identical formation which, for instance, due to unprecedented pressures of 
marketization has recently been plunged into crisis. Or, conversely, that we need to 
put educational institution into crisis, that the university is in need of being 
‘trembled’ or ‘shaken up’. In my view, the university is not to be approached as a 
formation which once had or still has one unifying idea and function. Its history 
should also not be reduced to a single linear narrative. I argued for conceiving and 
have explored the university as a formation which has been, from the very 
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beginning, inherently paradoxical and a source of diverse or even conflicted 
political, theoretical and institutional effects.  
In order to theoretically grasp this peculiar character of educational 
formations and the diverse effects they set off, I employed the notion of 
‘pedagogies’. In my view, this word is no less complex and ambiguous than the 
word ‘tremendous’. The way pedagogies lead us is not by taking us through a secure 
and straightforward path. As we have seen on various occasions throughout the 
thesis, it is not unusual that pedagogies teach something else or more than they say 
they do, that they escape beyond themselves and undermine their own foundational 
principles and rules. This, on the one hand, opens them to unexpected and multiple 
flows of possibilities. On the other, however, it implies that teaching as well as 
learning is also a dangerous journey full of simulacra and deception, a path which 
may lead astray. I therefore conceived of pedagogy as a path which makes us both 
tremble and wonder. 
This irresolvable paradox, a certain kind of tremendousness perhaps, is 
inherent to pedagogies. Yet, despite of it, or, rather, because of it, I argued that we 
must strive to, as I have attempted to, follow and thus continue our transforming 
pedagogies. For my part, it is our only hope of instituting the university and its 
practices which are yet to emerge. Only in this way can we open a possibility for the 
unheard-of teachings and institutions which are fabulous and extraordinary not only 
in what and how they teach but also in how they are organized as institutions, a 
university of the world more just than the one we have inhabited. 
To articulate this in a more mundane terms, the ‘tremendous’ question I 
wrestled with in my thesis was how we could theorize and produce academic work 
which will not affirm the current configuration of disciplinary powers we seek to 
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contest. I identified and examined the unfolding of irresolvable paradoxes inherent 
to pedagogy to alert us to the intricacies of ‘teachings’. This was to suggest that we 
have to differentiate and choose carefully between various schools and to pay 
attention to how we follow them. More specifically, we must decide which rhetorical 
and conceptual means are to be used to counter trends such as the marketization of 
the university or discourses which try to persuade us that we live in ‘post-
patriarchal’ and therefore also in a ‘post-feminist’ world.  
How did I take up this ‘tremendous’ task in this thesis? Where did 
Tremendous Pedagogies (mis)lead me and where did I take them? Which intricacies 
of pedagogies did I engage with? And what kind of possibilities and flows did it 
open, if any? How do we proceed in this journey?  
As the ‘pseudo-concept’ tremendous pedagogies indicates, the aim was not 
to provide definite answers or to resolve aporias and reduce complexities and 
discrepancies. This thesis did not provide final solutions and resolutions to the 
problem of the university. Nor did it provide a metanarrative of feminism’s 
institutionalization within the establishment of Western higher education. It did not 
provide solutions which would, for once and all, ‘de-neoliberalize’ the ‘neoliberal 
university’. This, however, is not to say that this endeavour did not take us anywhere 
and that it was pointless journey which could have been avoided. I will briefly 
recount the places encountered on this journey before attempting to signpost those 
which may lie ahead.  
In part one, it was Brown’s famous essay ‘The Impossibility of Women’s 
Studies’ and Wiegman’s reading of it which triggered my journey. The latter’s 
critical analysis did not only provide a spring board for my own deliberations on 
how the possibility of feminist scholarship and its disciplinarity can be further re-
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thought. It also triggered and guided the examination and the critique of discourses 
through which the university is most commonly accounted for.  
In response to the lessons learnt in the first chapter, the second chapter 
approached Derrida’s essay ‘Vacant Chair: Censorship, Mastery and Magisteriality’. 
My reading of this text showed that whether academic disciplines are, in their 
impossibility, possible, and how the two can be negotiated, was always at stake. The 
modern university is, structurally, ‘out of place’. Yet, importantly, this reading also 
revealed that the forces which keep this paradoxical academic topology ‘in place’ 
are not, as Derrida seems to be suggesting in his essay, only ‘metaphysical’ but also 
‘phallocentric’. Paralleling and further developing Sarah Kofman’s analysis of 
Kant’s ethics, I showed that the university is founded by the exclusion of the 
sexually other. 1 In the case of the university however, as I proposed, this exclusion 
is mastered by the teaching philosopher playing a ‘double game’, by using ‘sexual 
powers’ which are both ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’. 
In the chapters of part two entitled ‘Accounting for the University’ I was 
then led to examine discourses which seek to theorize how the university can resist 
trends which we have witnessed in the academia for nearly three decades, the so 
called ‘neoliberalization’ of knowledge and the ‘corporatization’ of the university. 
Here the exploration proceeded through a term where this struggle both manifests 
and forms itself in a revealing way; the word and concept of ‘accountability’.  
Following Mowitt’s work, I did not treat accountability as a disciplinary 
technique but as a textual problem.2 This was done in order to avoid one of the key 
stumbling blocks which prevent us from theorizing the university and the humanities 
                                                 
1 Kofman, ‘The Economy of Respect’, pp. 355-372. 
2 Mowitt, Text.  
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respectively as other than ‘in ruin’. More specifically, a textual reading was 
implemented in order to critically address an assumption that the two (the 
humanities and the university) will survive the pandemics of financialization only by 
fortifying themselves against encroachment from what is understood to be their 
‘others’. In my journey, I therefore sought assistance from scholars working within 
the ‘textual’ tradition, notably Peggy Kamuf.3 Yet, in addition to Mowitt’s argument 
(that it is mostly those who follow the ‘critique of instrumental reason’ who rely on 
and further perpetuate this assumption), my exploration revealed that it has also been 
followed by scholars of the so called ‘textual reading’.4 My intervention in this 
tradition consisted of tracing how ‘counting’ and ‘accounting’ had been treated in 
the history of Western theoretical work (drawing on Derrida’s texts ‘Outwork’ and 
‘Plato’s Pharmacy’), and by showing how, drawing on the work of Keith Hoskin, 
‘accountability’ had been, since its very beginning, intimately intertwined with the 
modern university and its teachings.5 
The final third part of the thesis further followed interventions into accounts 
of the university and feminism’s entanglement with it. In chapter five I developed 
Clare Hemming’s suggestion to tell feminist stories differently proposed in her book 
Why Stories Matter: The Political Grammar of Feminist Theory in relation to ethics. 
I further amplified the inherent paradox which I identified in one of the terms crucial 
to her account, ‘amenability’. By drawing on my reading of Derrida’s work, I 
proposed tremendous responsibilities, a conceptualization of ethicality which would 
be adequate to the character and aims of her feminist intervention.6  
                                                 
3 Kamuf, ‘Accounterability’, 251-266. 
4 Mowitt, ‘On the One Hand’, 311-366. 
5 Hoskin, ‘The Awful Idea’, pp. 265-282. 
6 I followed specifically his essay on a problem of a ‘university responsibility (‘Mochlos’) and the 
book where Derrida follows Jan Patočka’s work, The Gift of Death. 
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This proposition, however, did not tackle one of the key issues, which, as I 
see it, represents yet another stumbling block in our theorizations of how feminist 
work can take place in the university, the problem of how we can articulate its 
irreducible and irreplaceable specificity, its singularity. In order to address this 
problem I led us to the work of Anne Berger.7 I focused particularly on her 
conceptualization of theatricality in and of feminist and queer politics and theories. I 
ended this chapter by reflecting on how Berger’s work sheds further light on how the 
narratives feminist theorists produce about feminism entangle with the trends which 
dominate current Western universities. More importantly, however, I suggested that 
it also provides a means to articulate how ‘stories’ produced by feminist theory may 
help us envision that other university, a university-to-come.  
There are particular issues which stand out and which I wish to highlight and 
thus conclude this thesis. I have followed feminist thinkers who propose new 
directions and shifts in how we account for feminism’s entanglement with the 
university and imagine its future.8 My proposition, however, was not meant to deter 
us from building on previous feminist work, let alone to break with it. It is not only 
that such a ‘turn’, ‘shift’ or a ‘break’ would be unnecessary but, more importantly, it 
would have been a repetitive replay of gestures which would be harmful in the 
attempt to imagine and theorise transformation. Instead, I therefore sought to 
excavate and re-cultivate traditions and currents within feminist thinking which 
developed alongside more prevalent strands. Indeed, as readers familiar with the 
scene of Western feminist theory have undoubtedly detected, the feminist traditions I 
am drawn towards are those which explore concepts and paradigms which, as it 
                                                 
7 I discussed particularly her book The Queer Turn in Feminism. 
8 In the thesis, I followed specifically the work of Robyn Wiegman, Clare Hemmings and Anne E. 
Berger but I also drew from work of feminist theorists such as Drucilla Cornell, Elizabeth Grosz and 
Joan W. Scott.  
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seems from my vantage point, have been rather peripheral, such as those which 
mobilize concepts of sexual differences.  
One of these thinkers, Elizabeth Grosz, conceives of ‘the force of sexual 
difference’ as ‘that untidy and ambiguous invocation of the pre-structuring of being 
by irreducible difference’.9 This force, Grosz argues,  
 
is that which both preconditions and destabilizes gender and bodies, that 
which problematizes all identity, that which discourse and representation 
cannot contain and politics cannot direct: sexual difference as force; and force 
itself as divided, differentiated, sexualized.10 
 
While I am drawn to feminist theorizations of sexual differences such as that 
proposed by Grosz, I also believe, however, that the way we reach this ‘shift’, or 
rather, as I perceive it, this ‘distortion’ in the focus of Western feminist theorizing, 
cannot proceed in a manner seemingly taken by Grosz, that is, by prioritising this 
current in opposition to the others.11 This is not simply to appeal to a feminist 
‘ethical imperative’ of accepting difference and endorsing plurality. Nor is it because 
one would, by doing so, claim for oneself the position of the right and true feminist, 
and thus would condemn other positions as being ‘not feminist enough’.12 It is rather 
that for feminist theories be effective, this plurality is necessary. 
                                                 
9 Grosz, ‘The Force’, p. 171. 
10 Grosz, ‘The Force’, p. 172. 
11 Grosz does not use this strategy only in order to propose a shifts in the paradigmatic focus of 
feminist theory. She employs similar gesture also in relation to philosophy and critical theory. See, 
for instance, and interview where she argues that ‘the whole linguistic turn’ is a paradigm where ‘all 
of nature was in fact language, all of the real was symbolic, nature was historicized, history was the 
overcoming of nature’. Elizabeth Grosz and Esther Wolfe, ‘Bodies of Philosophy: An Interview with 
Elizabeth Grosz, Stance, 7 (2014), 115-126 (p.125). 
12 For how this strategy has been used within storytelling of Western feminist theory see Hemmings’ 
Why Stories Matter. I discussed this work in chapter V, ‘Narratives of Western Feminist Theory and 
the Problem of Amenability’.  
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This is why I find Berger’s idea of thinking about the ‘feminist theoretical 
scene’ as a ‘theatre’, where one is not troubled only with what and who is on the 
stage but is interested and takes into account and problematizes that which is off-
stage, particularly useful.13 This conceptualization, furthermore, seems to me also a 
useful way of enabling the future and welcoming the plurality, the richness, the 
divergences and disparities which are yet to come or have already been unfolding 
but which my thesis has not accounted for.  
The most obvious shift, as it seems to me, is the one in how feminist thinking 
has been portrayed by the mainstream media and popular culture and how it has 
been taken up by political movements not only in the U.S. and the UK, but also in 
France or the Czech Republic. As argued previously, one of the key triggers for the 
explorations presented in this thesis was a certain diversion, within both the broader 
socio-cultural and political space as well as certain threads of feminist and cultural 
theory, stemming from the belief that different worlds are possible. More 
specifically, I followed feminist scholars who took into account the so called ‘turn 
away from feminism’14 and the rise of ‘postfeminism’ and sought to address them in 
a way which would not further confirm and perpetuate these trends.15  
The rise of women’s protests and the founding of multiple activist groups 
promoting feminist agendas particularly among younger generations within the past 
few years would indicate that this has changed. We also have witnessed a shift in 
                                                 
13 For my discussion of Berger’s proposition and its significance for our theorizations of the 
university and its future, see the final chapter, ‘Re-inventing Feminist Resistance for an University-
to-come’.  
14 Scott, ‘Introduction’, p. 3. 
15 On the problem of ‘post-feminism’ see, for instance, Hemmings, Why Stories Matter, p. 137-138. 
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how feminism is portrayed particularly in English speaking mainstream media and 
popular cultures.16 Where these distortions will lead is yet to be seen. 
Related to these shifts, and in relation to the university specifically, are a 
number of intertwined and complex epistemological, political, technological and 
economic changes provoked by the quick advancement of computational automation 
under techno-capitalism and anxieties induced by a global financial crisis.  
One manifestation of these shifts has been the collapse of employment and 
the destruction of the salaried condition.17 Clearly, those previously most threatened 
by automation were unskilled workers mostly located in the ‘Third World’, followed 
more recently by specialist manual trades and the liberal professions. However, the 
opportunities to work are shrinking also for intellectual and creative workers – that 
is, for those, whose job is to invent futures. As always, its negative impact is 
amplified for those who are systematically disadvantaged by the current 
configurations of disciplinary powers (based on the intersections of gender, class, 
sexual, ethnicity or language). This has been further modified and magnified by 
contestations regarding citizenship and migration alongside other global geo-
                                                 
16 See for instance the so called ‘Women’s March’, a worldwide protest which took place on 21 
January 2017 (Women’s March on Washington, https://www.womensmarch.com/ [accessed 27 March 
2017]. In the Czech Republic, a group of feminist artists and activists which calls themselves ‘Čtvrtá 
vlna’ [The Fourth Wave] started operate in 2016. See, for instance, a video reflecting on sexism in art 
schools produced by the group reflecting and published in 2017: Čtvrtá vlna, ‘Sexismus na českých 
uměleckých školách’ [‘Sexism in Czech Fine Art Schools’], 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IalaPTetZig [accessed 21 January 2017]. For activism in the UK 
see Rosie Collington, ‘Student Feminist Jamboree 2014: Taking student feminism forward’, The 
Independent, 25 February 2014, http://www.independent.co.uk/student/istudents/student-feminist-
jamboree-2014-taking-student-feminism-forward-9151762.html [accessed 27 March 2017]. See also 
a transnational, transdisciplinary and multilingual collective تائارقلاةيوسن ةكبش / Sdružení feministicých 
čtení/ Feminist Readings Network which provides space for the reflection and invention of feminist 
thinking, art, pedagogy and politics for emerging practitioners and which I co-founded with other 
feminist activists, artists and scholars in 2016 ) Sdružení feministicých čtení/ تائارقلاةيوسن ةكبش / 
Feminist Readings Network, <https://feministreadings.org/equipe/> [accessed 27 March 2017].   
17 Bernard Stiegler, ‘Introduction: Functional Stupidity, Entropy and Negentropy in the 
Anthropocene’, in Automatic Society: The Future of Work (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), pp. 1-18; 
Bernard Stiegler and Anaïs Nony, ‘Bernard Stiegler on Automatic Society: As told to Anaïs Nony’, 
The Third Rail Quarterly 5, (2015): 16-17. 
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political and ecological shifts. The future of tremendous pedagogies will have to 
take these issues which are already underway into account. 
These changes, however, do not undermine the proceedings pursued in my 
thesis. Rather, they demand that we take into even deeper consideration the 
propositions made in relation to how we account for the concept and the institutions 
of the university and any modifications or alternatives to it. In terms of neoliberalism 
and techno-capitalism, it is necessary to approach the university and the changes it is 
currently undergoing with paradigms other than those which currently dominate the 
debate. This, again, is not a call for a radical break with the traditions of critical 
thinking. Rather, the argument is that we have to put to work and re-cultivate 
theoretical traditions and habits of academic work which have, as it seems, 
disappeared from the toolkits of most of the critical thinkers who seek to address the 
problem of the future ‘under neoliberalism’.  
More specifically, critically addressing, let alone proposing alternatives to 
‘societies under neoliberalism’ is not merely a question of choosing between 
‘Marxism’ and ‘Foucault’, as is claimed by Wendy Brown who, in Undoing Demos, 
‘chooses’ Foucault.18 There are other strands of ‘poststructuralist’ thought than that 
of Foucault; strands which are not reducible to or may even be in conflict with his 
discourse.19 These strands include texts by Jacques Derrida and deconstruction. As I 
sought to show, Derrida’s work and deconstruction particularly have a lot to offer in 
our critique of ‘the neoliberalization’ of the university and our search for ways to 
                                                 
18 Wendy Brown, ‘Undoing Democracy: Neoliberalism’s Remaking of State and Subject’, in Undoing 
Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (New York: Zone Books, 205), pp. 17-46. 
19 On ‘the widespread misapprehension … that Derrida is essentially talking about discourse when he 
uses terms like “writing” or “text,” …’ see Bennington’s rather harsh critique of Butler’s introduction 
to the new edition and translation of Derrida’s Of Grammatology from 2016. Geoffrey Bennington, 
‘Embarrassing Ourselves’, Los Angeles Review of Books (2016), < 
https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/embarrassing-ourselves/> [accessed 27 March 2017]. 
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theoretically articulate how a university, beyond its current ‘neoliberal’ but also 
‘phallocentric’ predicament, could be possible.20  
However, this approach must be different from those prevailing among 
scholars who work under the name of ‘deconstruction’ today. More specifically, as I 
read it, the aim of deconstruction is not simply to ‘complicate things’ and therefore 
does not need to be abandoned or replaced when one wants to get ‘things straight’, 
i.e. give judgments or make decisions.21 As follows from my journey through 
Tremendous Pedagogies, the work of deconstruction is rather a step which it is 
necessary to take in order to make the ‘right decisions’.  
As such, deconstruction can open rather than close the possibility of 
intervening within the current context of disciplinary powers and thus needs to be 
put to work in our current and future efforts to rethink the issues of 
institutionalization, disciplinarity and the university. Yet, in order for me to do so 
effectively, the teachings of deconstruction need to be both distorted and augmented 
by feminist thinking. For my part, it is the places where deconstruction and feminist 
thinking fold into each other that cause the most interesting and profound trembling. 
It is in the instances of their interfolding, such as those explored in this thesis, where 
I envision the possibility of tremendous pedagogies.
                                                 
20 On deconstructive work on the university which takes into account ‘neoliberalism’ see Bernard 
Stiegler, States of Shock: Stupidity and Knowledge in the 21st Century (Cambridge and Malden: 
Polity, 2015). 
21 Elizabeth Grosz makes similar point. She argues against the prevailing representation of 
deconstruction, and Derrida’s work in particular: ‘while critical and perhaps in that sense politically 
useful, deconstruction … remain(s) ironic, parodic, skeptical, negative: calking a clear plan, given 
goals, a set of criteria to distinguish better from worse outcomes; that is, having no clear ethical or 
political stand, it tends toward nihilism’. It is a view which construes deconstruction as ‘destructive, 
perhaps – but never adequately constructive: able to criticize politics but never able to positively 
contribute to it’. Grosz, ‘The Time of Violence’, 57. 
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